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ABSTRACT
The recent financial crisis, not surprisingly, has often been attributed to ‘failure in 
corporate governance’. There is a belief that the resulting public scandal may have 
been minimized if not entirely prevented if the Boards had acted properly. Both in the 
developing and developed countries, there is a widespread belief that improved 
corporate governance mechanisms can lead to effective Board operations. However, 
Board effectiveness remains an elusive concept and what makes a Board an effective 
governance mechanism remains a fundamental question. Many studies have been 
carried out on Directors’ capabilities, their contributions to Board and Board 
effectiveness; however, none have examined these issues within the context of Public 
Sector Boards (PSBs) in Abu Dhabi- a fast growing developing economy. The present 
research, a first time study, explores the issues related to Board effectiveness, 
including Director’s capabilities and contribution within four major public sector 
Boards. Following the tradition of social constructionism, the research adopts an 
interpretive approach to understand the perceptions and views of the Board members 
concerning the factors which influence their effectiveness and the effectiveness of the 
PSBs Boards. Employing an inductive methodology, sixteen cases were selected to 
generate the relevant qualitative data required for analysis. The thematic analysis led 
to the emergence of seven major categories of themes, factors, and identification of 
some 157 ‘issues’, including Directors personal characteristics, Board dynamics, 
constraints, demands and opportunities, Directors core capabilities, and most 
important of all the implicit and explicit socio-cultural influences on the behaviour 
and interactions of the members on the PSBs Boards. Islamic values and beliefs 
seemed to positively influence the Boards operations through trust, honesty, and 
responsibility to others and community. The findings of the study, indicates the 
intricate and complex nature of influences on the Directors’ in particular and Boards’ 
effectiveness, as the whole. The findings make a series of contributions to our present 
knowledge of PSBs operations and the behaviour of the members on the Board by 
contextualising the principles of corporate governance, and Board effectiveness in 
Abu Dhabi, public sector. The practical implications are numerous; some could be 
applied to other Boards outside the public sector domain. They have far reaching 
implications for policy and practice to facilitate the increased effectiveness of the 
Directors and the Boards as the whole.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
RESEARCH BACKGROUND
Following O’Sullivan (2005) the study o f corporate governance can be understood as being 
concerned specifically with the distribution, exercise and implications of corporate control; 
and thus prioritises such questions as who controls corporate decision-making, the types of 
decision that are made and the implications of these decisions for different interest groups. 
Interest in corporate governance has recently been revitalised, and public consciousness 
following the financial crisis in 2008 has been heightened -  a crisis that some have attributed 
to failures in corporate governance (Aras and Crowther, 2010). Enron, Tyco, Parmalat and 
Marconi all provide well known recent examples of corporate governance failures, and it has 
been argued that if their boards had acted sooner the resulting public scandal may have been 
minimized if not entirely prevented (Kakabadse et al, 2011). Corporate governance failures 
are not confined to the western hemisphere -  great emphasis was placed on corporate 
governance reform, specifically targeting board structure following the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997/1998 (Abdullah, 2004). In the UK, various recommendations for reform have been 
offered over the years (see for example, the Greenbury Report, 1995; the Hempel Report, 
1998; Cadbury, 2002; Higgs, 2005).
The importance of corporate governance policies is clear; they act to determine and constrain 
the behaviours of boards - thus having implications for the way in which board director’s act 
and in which organisations are governed. This is important, the failures o f Enron, WorldCom 
and others in the US have been blamed on un-wanted director behaviours, as the CEO and 
other senior managers were able to dominate the board, they had control over organisational
strategy, and the divulgence of information to stakeholders, and so they were able to 
perpetrate their frauds without detection (Ezzamel and Watson, 2005). The implication is that 
there is widespread belief that corporate governance mechanisms can lead to effective board 
operation.
However, it is not clear that boards necessarily make use of codes of best practice, or even 
that a prescriptive approach will yield desirable results. A study of Irish technology firms, 
conducted by O’Regan et al (2005) provided quantitative evidence from 88 Irish Chief 
Financial Officers (CFO) on a range of topics concerning governance practice and the role of 
directors. The study found that overall CFOs were satisfied that their companies followed 
best practice, but did not believe that their respective boards had actually been briefed on 
what best practice amounts to. That board performance can be increased by the re-
examination of governance standards and protocols is only one thesis and it has been argued 
that further attention to corporate governance protocols and practice will only serve to 
increase administrative stipulation (Higgs, 2003; Wearing, 2005), and show little benefit as 
the cost of monitoring will overtake the benefits of improved performance especially as the 
capabilities of directors remain the same (Acemorglu, 2004). The researcher, based on his 
personal experience of PSBs concurs with is view and argues that in the case of Abu Dhabi, 
attention paid to corporate governance protocol and practices is may not sufficient thus more 
needs to be done to identify and improve the capability of the directors.
A second approach is to focus on improving the capabilities of directors, as they are crucially 
placed and have a significant impact on firm performance (Sonnefeld, 2002). It has been 
posited that in practice “directorial competence and board effectiveness are interrelated” 
(Coulson-Thomas, 1994: 34) and it is argued that competence requirements for directors stem
2
from what is necessary to improve the operation of the board and what is needed to 
complement the attributes o f colleagues, and that board effectiveness can be affected by the 
strengths and weaknesses of individual members perceptions o f each other and the board as a 
whole. Effective boards, it has been argued, cannot exist without effective directors (Leblanc 
and Gillies, 2003). As it will become clear below, the underlying assumptions of the present 
research are firmly embedded in this approach. Indeed, effectiveness o f the Abu Dhabi PSBs 
cannot be achieved unless attention is paid to effectiveness of the directors.
1.1.1 Rationale for the study
Board failures are not confined to the developed world; studies of board performance in fast 
growing developing economies also reveal a deficit between desired board contribution and 
the reality of director behaviour (Oseichuk et al., 2009). Yet, while board failure can be 
appreciated in hindsight without difficulty, board effectiveness remains an elusive concept 
(Garratt, 2003; McIntyre et al., 2007) and what makes a board an effective governance 
mechanism remains a fundamental question (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004).
There are two broad concerns for board performance: the call for re-examination of 
governance standards and protocols, and the enhancement of board director capabilities. The 
proponents of the former reform have suggested that while governance foundations of 
corporations go unexamined, efforts to enhance director capabilities will be of little benefit 
(Bogle, 2005). Yet, some argue that further attention to corporate governance protocols and 
practice will increase administrative stipulation (Higgs, 2003; Wearing, 2005), and show 
little benefit as the cost o f monitoring will overtake the benefits of improved performance 
especially as the capabilities of directors remain the same (Acemorglu, 2004).
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Alternatively, a call for a realistic approach asserts that it is the dynamic interaction of the
board which requires attention rather than the myth of sole effectiveness of the leadership
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2008). The contrasting view strongly suggests that the
inappropriate and unwelcome director behaviour ought to be the focus of attention (Heidrick
and Struggles, 2010). Thus, the latter asserts that in order to tackle the problem of poor board
performance, directors need to re-examine their role and contribution, and acquire the skills
and competencies needed to perform to exemplary standards (O’Higgins, 2009). Although
numerous scholars have examined and proposed desired qualities and competencies for board
directors (for example, Ingley and Van der Walt, 2003; Aguilera, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005)
and many have focussed on determining what necessary director contributions and
capabilities may be (for a review see Petrovic, 2008), none have examined the issue within
the context of Public Sector Boards (PSBs) in Abu Dhabi. Observations made by the
researcher revealed that the consideration of the concept of the role, role taking and
particularly role making is of the utmost importance for understanding the behaviour of the 
directors on the board.
The position held by most writers who are inclined towards structuralism and given role as 
opposed to the reality of role taking and role making cannot provide the basis for a 
meaningful understanding of the board members behaviour. The board dynamics are very 
much influenced by the nature of interactions between the members. Having said that the 
author also recognised that being concerned with the perception of the board members alone 
is not sufficient. The contextual factors especially the socio-economic factors do effect the 
perception and understanding, and finally the judgement of the members. Thus, the 
assumptions that all boards are the same and operate in the same way are erroneous and 
indeed, first hand observations of members of many boards confirmed the inherent
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differences amongst them. As contextual factors change so do the behaviours which are 
adopted by the members. However, much o f this scholarly debate is Western-centric and may 
not be appropriate given the dominant contextual socio-cultural values and practices o f the 
Islamic world (Sameh, 2011). To answer the question how boards operate, especially public 
sector boards in Abu Dhabi, has been the concern of the author As stated earlier, in order to 
achieve this aim the researcher intends to examine the perceptions of the board members in 
order to identify the factors that influence their effectiveness as the whole. Understanding the 
effectiveness of members and the PSBs will enable the acceleration o f the process of 
economic growth which is another reason for choosing the present study
1.2 BOARD EFFECTIVENESS AND RELATED LITERATURE
The literature review (see Chapter 2) contains a critical review of the literature relevant to the 
present work. The related literature is comprised o f five main areas that cover separate but 
interrelated topics, namely, (i) role and role theory, (ii) perspectives o f corporate governance 
(iii) the role theory o f the board, (iv) board effectiveness, and (v) board dynamics and 
director capabilities necessary for increasing board effectiveness.
1.2.1 Role and role theory
Understanding board effectiveness is inextricably linked to board members behaviour and 
actions and how they negotiate and manage the realities o f the board. Therefore, it would not 
be an exaggeration to claim that the review o f the relevant literature will remain incomplete if 
some of the ambiguities surrounding the use of the term ‘role are not dealt with. This is 
particularly crucial when the intention is to understand the behaviour o f the board members 
and their effectiveness. The ‘role theory’ as a theoretical perspective distinguishes between 
the different concepts of ‘role’ from a sociological and organisational point of view (Burrel
5
and Morgan, 1979; Rodhmam, 2000). Therefore, attempts have been made to demystify the 
concepts associated with ‘role’ (Mullin, 2002; Shivers-Blackwell, 2004), such as ‘role set’, 
‘role relationships’, ‘role expectations’, ‘role negotiation’, ‘role making and role taking’; and 
to assess their implications for the present research. The position arrived at, based on the 
following analysis, is that of ‘integrative theory’ which acknowledges the dynamics and 
interactions of both the local and external environments (structure). The role of the board 
members as proactive, capable and influencing role makers (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
1999) for negotiating the constraints and demands of their role (Stewarts, 1994) will be the 
concern of the this study. It is therefore, necessary to reiterate that the fundamental 
assumptions which underlie the present study are firmly grounded in the interactionism 
perspective. The role taken or made by the board members undoubtedly influences the 
capabilities and competences required for executing the task in hand. As it will be 
demonstrated, the findings of the research also point out to this issue. This forms the basis for 
understanding board members and their required capabilities for being effective.
1.2.2 Perspectives of Corporate Governance
Another indispensable aspect to the study of boards, board effectiveness and its members is 
that of 'corporate governance’. Like ‘role theory’ the chosen or favoured position of the 
writers in a paradigm(s) directs the attention to a particular perspective, hence the differences 
in points of view (Barrull and Moragan, 1997), corporate governance is no exception.
There are multiple perspectives of corporate governance, including agency theory, 
stewardship theory, managerial hegemony and stakeholder theory (Comforth, 2004), and an 
understanding of these perspectives is vital as what is to be considered effective corporate 
governance is likely to follow from the perspective that one takes (Ardalan, 2007).
Agency theory is the dominant perspective within the corporate governance literature 
(Comforth, 2004), and is concerned with the agent-principal relationship. The principal are 
the owners of the firm who divest powers to the agent, the firms’ managers, who control the 
firms’ business operations (Eisendhart, 1989). Jensen (1983) posits that while principal and 
agent are theoretically in partnership their interests can in practice often diverge with the 
agent pursuing self-interest to the detriment of the principal. The solution offered by agency 
theorists is that mechanisms should be prescribed that limit the ability o f the agent to act in a 
way that is detrimental to the interests of the principal (Jensen, 1983). This entails the board 
undertaking a role which involves monitoring and controlling the activities of the firm 
(Keasey et al, 1997). Yet, there will always be the possibility o f undesirable action on the part 
of the agent; as Hart (1995) highlights it is impossible to create contractual obligations that 
cover all eventualities. The agency theory particularly applies to the board members 
behaviour in Abu Dhabi PSBs. Here the performance of the Board as the whole and the 
behaviour of the members play an important part in the relationship between principle and the 
role taken/made by agent. This becomes clear as the perceptions of the members and their
views are explored in detailed.
By contrast, stewardship theory argues that the board of directors, shareholders and the 
managers within firms operate in partnership (Pound, 1995); this perspective is grounded in 
the human relations tradition (Hung, 1998) and posits that the interests of management are 
intertwined with those of the firm (Lam and Lee, 2008). Managers are viewed as good 
stewards of the company, being inherently trustworthy, and motivated by the need to achieve 
a sense of satisfaction from the work that they do (Donaldson, 1990). Following from this 
perspective is the belief that boards should take an active role in the running of the firm 
(Hung, 1998) and thus board members should be recruited on the basis of their expertise and
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experience (Comforth, 2004). The researcher also believes that the experience and expertise 
that board members bring with them to board is an important factor in their effectiveness. 
Thus the issues of expertise and experience have been taken into consideration in the present 
research.
The third perspective, managerial hegemony dates back to the work of Berle and Means 
(1932) who argue that as firms grow, shareholders become diverse, and the power of large 
shareholders thus becomes reduced. Such a situation is said to result in directors losing 
control of the firm, with the day to day and significant operations being carried out by 
corporate management with the board acting merely as a rubber-stamp on the actions of 
management (Comforth, 2004), resulting in a passive board where directors have little 
influence (Okpara, 2011). It follows from this perspective that the role of the board is 
minimal. In the case of the present research, as will be demonstrated in later chapters, the 
PSBs are proactive and they certainly do not act as a rubber-stamp on the actions of the 
management. Having said that, there is a need for close cooperation between management 
and the board, especially between chair and the CEO for the correct and efficient conduct of 
the board.
The final perspective, stakeholder theory, takes a wider view of the firm to consider not just 
managers, directors and shareholders but also other key stakeholders (Hung, 1998). 
Following Freeman (1984) stakeholders in a firm can be defined as any individual or group 
of individuals that can affect or are affected by the organisation and its operation. This 
perspective of corporate governance has been praised as being morally laudable as it requires 
that the board take into account the needs of more than just shareholders (Donaldson and 
Peterson, 1995). Further, this perspective provides the basis for a mode of corporate
8
governance often found in the public sector (Comforth, 2004) including PSBs in Abu Dhabi 
where different stake-holder groups exist and profit maximisation is not (if at all) the primary
objective of the firm (Rose and Lawton, 1998).
While each perspective has its merits and detractions (see Chapter 2) what is of fundamental
importance is what is made clear by this brief exploration o f the topic: that what is to be 
considered effective corporate governance will depend on the perspective of the corporate
governance adopted.
The present work adopts a broadly ‘ interpreted st’ stand and more specifically “Realist 
approach and following Ardalan (2007), views corporate governance principles as being 
largely pluralistic; that is there are no universal corporate governance principles that cover all 
societies, cultures or corporations. Rather, corporate governance principles are to be viewed 
as historically and contextually based, determined and continuously re-determined by the 
attitudes, values and behaviour o f relevant social actors (Silverman, 2005). Indeed, the 
present research aims to contextualise the corporate governance by paying attention to 
influences emanating from individual, organisational and external factors such as culture, 
education and religion. As will be demonstrated in debates in chapter on methodology the 
position of realism adopted for this study allows to combine both interpretation of the 
members as well as the organisational, social-economic and cultural factors which influences 
the board members and its operations.
1.2.3 Board Effectiveness
The major challenge in studying board effectiveness is determining precisely how board 
effectiveness is to be defined and measured (Herman et al, 1997). The issue has received
much attention in the corporate governance literature (Schmidt and Brauer, 2006) and is still 
divisive (Petrovic, 2008). It is clear prima facie that this also poses problems for practitioners 
-  if it is unclear what board effectiveness amounts to, then efforts to increase board 
effectiveness may miss the mark entirely or fall short.
The review of the literature reveals two broad approaches to conceptualising board 
performance, the first takes the firms’ financial performance as a proxy for board 
effectiveness (for examples see, Vafeas, 1999; Abdullah, 2004; Anderson et al, 2004; 
McIntyre, 2008). Under the widely held assumption that effective corporate governance is 
likely to increase financial performance, this approach may seem favourable when examining 
private sector firms. However, when considering public sector firms whose primary objective 
is not profit maximisation and whose goals are likely to be varied and vague (Rose and 
Lawton, 1998) the use of any performance measure is likely to be an untenable proxy for 
performance. This follows from the recognition that the objectives of the public sector are 
often set by politicians, and are vague, such as “raising educational standards” (Rose and 
Lawton, 1999. 81), resulting in a tendency to merely measure that which is measurable. Thus, 
the second approach, which is the approach adopted in the present work, is to evaluate the 
views of stakeholders in a firm and ask them to provide the evaluation of board effectiveness 
(see for example, Bradshaw et al, 1992; Herman et al, 1997). This approach is rooted in the 
social constructionist paradigm, which holds that there is no real board, board effectiveness, 
or board performance but rather a multitude of perceptions of the board, its effectiveness and 
performance that are held by stakeholders (Herman et al, 1997). Such an approach is 
especially suitable when examining the public sector as the board is expected to manage the 
firm to meet the needs of a variety of stakeholders (Rose and Lawton, 1998).
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Empirical research on the antecedents o f board effectiveness fall into two broad streams, one 
examines easy to observe and measure factors such as board structure, composition and
diversity, while the other focuses on factors which are harder to observe such as board
dynamics (Sherwin, 2003). With respect to the former stream, the empirical findings are
mixed.
Studies into CEO duality on boards (where the individual occupying the role of CEO also 
occupies the role o f Chairman) reveal mixed findings. Following from the agency perspective 
the separation o f these roles is theoretically beneficial, as it ensures that management do not 
have too much control over the selection o f board members and the monitoring of the 
company, and retains the scope to enable the boards to challenge the actions of management 
(Abdullah, 2004). By contrast those who favour the stewardship theory may argue in favour 
of duality -  as the trustworthiness of managers becomes a non-issue (Donaldson, 1990). 
However, Abdullah’s (2004) study of 1000 non-financial firms on the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange, of which 80% adopted a non-dual leadership structure found no impact on 
performance. Lam and Lee (2008) found that CEO duality impacted financial performance in 
family-owned firms but not in non-family owned firms in their study of 128 companies listed 
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2003. Perhaps, as Brickley et al (1997) suggests, it is 
likely that CEO duality and non-duality can have both positive and negative effects.
Research on board composition tends to focus on the ratio of executive directors (EDs) to 
non-executive directors (NEDs). While there is strong theoretical support for the view that 
boards with greater numbers of NEDs are likely to be more effective - a view that is evident 
in many reform recommendations (see for example, Cadbury Report, 1992; Higgs, 2003) 
where the empirical results are mixed. For example, a study conducted by Hossain et al
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(2002) in New Zealand finds that outside Directors are important in increasing firm 
performance, as does a study by Pearce II and Zahra (1991) which shows that boards with 
greater numbers of outside directors have better financial performance than those with fewer. 
However, other studies have found that a higher number of NEDs has no significant impact, 
for example Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) found that outside directors have no significant 
impact on firm performance and Abdullah’s (2004) study reveals that board independence 
has no effect on firm performance.
As with the other antecedents discussed the empirical evidence for the impact of board
diversity on board effectiveness is mixed. The issue of board diversity tends to surround the
degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity of the board, taking into account such factors as (age,
gender, tenure, educational background). This stream of corporate governance research can
be traced back to Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) seminal work that proposed the “upper
echelon theory” which posits that it is only a few managers at the top of organisations -  the
dominant coalition (see, Child, 1972; Cyet and March, 1983) that have the most influence
over decision making and organisational performance. Empirical evidence shows that
heterogeneity is not associated with higher performance in the long term but can lead to
increased performance in the short term (see for example, McIntyre et al, 2008; Boemer et al, 
2011) .
The review of this stream of the literature reveals a lack of consensus as to the relationship 
between board structure, composition, diversity and board effectiveness. Thus, for the 
purpose of the present research, it is contended that since board directors are in a crucial 
position to contribute to board effectiveness (Coulson-Thomas, 1994; Sonnefeld, 2002) the 
more fruitful direction for research into board effectiveness is to focus on director capability
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and contribution. As will be demonstrated one of the main findings o f the present research 
firmly points to the need for improving the capabilities o f the board members in order to
increase their effectiveness as members of the PSBs in Abu Dhabi.
1.2.4 Board Dynamics and Director Capabilities
The strand of literature that reviews board director capability takes the view, either implicitly 
or explicitly, that the board o f directors can be as understood as any other small social group
example
Petrovic, 2008) and are thus susceptible to, and influenced by those factors that affect such 
groups. Theorists that favour this position argue that what makes boards effective is how 
r W o r s  act as a oart o f this social grouping (Leblanc, 2001; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). The
central
directors (Leblanc and Gillies, 2003).
norms
Issues stemming from group dynamics that can affect director contribution and behaviour 
include dealing with board culture, which following Schein (1972) is understood as the basic 
beliefs, values and assumptions shared by a group that result in a pattern of behavioural 
. As Jensen (1993) notes when the emphasis within a boardroom is on politeness and 
courtesy at the expense of honesty, the result can be a failure in board operation. Related 
issues are group-think, whereby in the attempt to avoid conflict, proffered decisions are not 
criticized (Janis, 1972) and alternatively the conflict that may arise from diversity of views is 
o f critical importance when considering the board of directors. As numerous authors 
highlight it is important that directors are able to act independently (Jensen et al, 1993, 
Conger et al, 1998; Turnbull, 2000; Roberts et al, 2005) especially when undertaking a 
monitoring or control function. When acting independently individuals may subvert the
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norms of their social group, and in such instances conflict is the likely result (Tuckman, 
1965) and such individuals may be ostracized or face other social repercussions (Goffman, 
1959; Sherif, 1963). Yet perspectives on conflict vary (Mullins, 2007) and conflict can be 
seen as positive, especially when it leads to the examination of different perspectives and 
viewpoints (Renton, 1999; DTI, 2004, Petrovic, 2008) and it can also be managed (Thomas, 
1976; Hatch, 1997; Robbins, 1998). An issue closely related to conflict, is the need to 
manage trust relationships and impressions amongst board members (Westphal, 1991); trust 
has been found to play a large part in board room dynamics (Roberts et al, 2005); and helps 
to facilitate open communication between directors and a willingness to share concerns 
(Westphal and Bednar, 2005). In addition, Sherwin (2003) highlights the importance of 
directors being perceived as professional by their colleagues, an aspect of cognition-based 
trust (McAllister, 1995).
The review of the literature on board dynamics and necessary director capabilities revealed 
that the following capabilities are required for an effective director: having sufficient 
motivation to undertake the role (Conger et al, 1998; Sherwin, 2003; Roberts et al, 2005); 
have sufficient time to perform their duties (Conger et al, 1998; Keasey and Hudson, 2002); 
manage conflict (Petrovic, 2008); act independently (Jensen et al, 1993; Conger et al, 1998; 
Turnbull, 2000; Roberts et al, 2005); foster trust and a perception of professionalism 
(Westphal, 1991; Sherwin, 2003; Roberts et al, 2005; Westphal and Bednar, 2005); have the 
requisite skills and experience (Barrick et al, 1998; Conger et al, 1998; Comforth, 2001 
Leblanc and Gillies, 2003; Taylor, 2004; O’Higgins, 2009); have strategic awareness 
(Coulson-Thomas, 1991; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Nadler, 2004; Ezzamel and Watson, 
2005, Pye and Pettigrew, 2005) and have effective communication skills (Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2001; Sherwin, 2003; Nadler, 2004; House, 2005). Based on this review, an
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exploratory framework detailing the necessary director capabilities for increasing board 
effectiveness has been constructed (see Figure 2.1). The researcher also believes that PSBs in 
Abu Dhabi are no exception to the above findings. Thus, in the present research attempts 
have been made to ensure that the research can capture the required capabilities by the board
members.
The following sections detail the aims, objectives, research questions and the methodological 
approach taken in the completion of the present research.
RESEARCH AIM
Abu Dhabi like many other countries is facing new challenges especially in the face of 
today’s business climate. The public sector of Abu Dhabi is increasingly playing a critical 
role to meet these challenges, however; there is a need for sufficient effectiveness in order to 
be able to continue playing its part in maintaining and developing the expected standards. In 
today’s ever changing socio-economic environment in the region public sector organisations 
are taking the leading role to match and even surpass the private sector organisations. Public 
sector organisations armed with sophisticated boards and decision making processes to a 
large extent determine the wellbeing of the economy. Since the performance of directors 
significantly impacts the effectiveness of the board, there is need for an in-depth investigation
into what constitutes directors’ effectiveness.
In order to meet the challenges faced by PSBs in Abu Dhabi, the aim of the present research 
is to explore the various influences and contributions as perceived by board directors for the 
effectiveness of PSBs, in context of the organisational, socio-economical and cultural 
realities of Abu Dhabi, UAE. This provides both the direction as well as flexibility to explore 
the perception of the members without limiting the scope of the investigation. Hence, the
15
proposed methodology within the present research (Baser and Morgan’s, 2003; Kakakabadse 
and Kakabadse, 2011)
1.3.1 Research aim, questions and objectives
In order to better understand the methodological choices made for the present study, it is 
important to reiterate the main aims and research questions which this study intends to 
answer. Since the capability of directors is one of the main contributing factors which 
significantly impact the effectiveness of the board, there is a need for an in-depth 
investigation into what constitutes board effectiveness. This provides both the direction as 
well as flexibility to explore the perception of the members without limiting the scope of the 
investigation. The aim of the present research is to explore the factors and influences that 
contribute to the increase the effectiveness of PSBs. It encompassed the exploration of the 
various factors and contributions as perceived by board directors, including their own 
capability requirements for the board effectiveness, in context of the organisational, socio-
economic and cultural realities of Abu Dhabi, UAE.
1.3.1.1 Research Questions
Thus the main research question is;
What factors and influences contribute to the effectiveness o f the board?
The following sub questions could be of help to answer the above main question.
• What are the existing views and perspectives on board effectiveness and directors 
capabilities?
• Do the personal characteristics of the board members influence their performance?
• How do dynamics of the board members interaction influence the board
effectiveness?
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• What are the present demands, constraints and availability of choices that affect the 
performance of directors on PSBs?
• What are the board of director’s capabilities and their effect on board effectiveness?
.  Can these findings provide a basis (or not) for enhancing the capability of board 
members and effectiveness of the PSBs boards within the Abu Dhabi context?
1.3.1.2 Research Objectives
• To review the literature concerning board effectiveness and director capability
• To understand the role and responsibilities of the members and 
processes/activities of the board and their effects on the board effectiveness
• To identify the present demands, constraints and availability of choices that affect 
the performance of directors on PSBs
• To provide a research based conceptual model to formulate training and 
development policies and procedures which meet the Abu Dhabi board members
needs for increased effectiveness.
• To explore the personal, organisational, and contextual (socio-economic, 
traditional and cultural) factors which affect the effectiveness of the members and 
the board as the whole
1.4 METHODOLOGY
It is contended that the most common and useful purposes of the social science research are 
exploration, description and explanation (Johnson and Christensen, 2008). Whilst 
exploration satisfies the curiosity of the researcher (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002) the 
descriptive attributes aim to describe the characteristics of a phenomenon, situations and 
events which have been observed by the researcher during the course of study (Johnson and
Christensen, 2008). The qualitative studies, including the present research, by and large, aim 
primarily at description. The explanatory studies seek an answer to the question ‘why’ a 
phenomenon operates as it does (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002); and evaluation studies assess 
the effect of a certain action, program or policy (Kervin, 1992).
The nature of the present study (the research question) is primarily exploratory (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997), and to a certain extent it is at the same time descriptive because it is aiming to 
find out what factors, influences, and components are behind the effectiveness of the board 
members. However, the issues of board effectiveness have never been explored in the public 
sector in Abu Dhabi, UAE hence the use of explanatory research which is less structured and 
primarily relies on interviews and case studies (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Robson, 2002).
The choice of methodology is determined by the underlying assumptions concerning four 
main research concepts. These include axiology, the role of values in enquiry (biased vs. 
unbiased), ontology (the nature of reality), epistemology (the relationship of the knower to the 
known) and methodology (the best means to arrive at knowledge about the World). This, 
method can be seen as individual techniques for data collection and analysis (Blaikie, 1993). 
Epistemology concerns the nature of knowledge and how to come to know the “reality” 
(Healy and Perry, 2000) But it is the ontological perspectives which shapes the epistemology 
beliefs in terms of how knowledge of reality develops (Blaikie, 2000), both are influenced by 
axiological and methodological assumptions (concerning the overall research process) 
(Johnson and Duberley, 2000). The exponents of the ‘objectivistim’ assume that the essence 
of social phenomena exists independent of our perception. The subjectivists on the other hand 
assume that reality exists only in name or is a product of the mind, thus, forming the 
opposition to positivist stand (Bryman, 2000; Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Many researchers
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believe that social reality is the product of a process involving a continuous senes of 
subjective and objective moments (Giddens, 2004). They maintain that duality of structure in 
of how social structures are both constituted by ‘human agency’, and yet at the sameterms
time are the very medium of this constitution (Giddens, 1979; Blakie, 2001; Kasperson, 2000, 
Bryant and Bell, 2007). This is particularly important because research methods cannot be 
considered in isolation from influencing factors such as dominant cultural values and 
institutions such as religion. In the case of the present research, the culture of Abu Dhabi and 
the influence of Islamic values, undoubtedly affect the way board directors of PSBs describe 
the reality as they perceive it (Silverman, 1970; Kamoche, 2001).
The positivists therefore seek patterns and regularities of the social world thus treating the 
social reality as hard and concrete, similar to natural sciences (Remenyi et al., 1998: 32) 
hence the use of quantitative methods (observation) and statistical analysis (Saunders et al., 
2000; Denscombe, 2003). In contrast, the phenomenologist’s approach to social research 
emphasizes on subjectivity, description, interpretation and is concerned with people s 
perceptions or meanings, attitudes and beliefs, feeling and emotions’ (Denscombe, 2003. 96). 
Whilst the former is referred to as ‘deductive’ in nature and mainly concerned with 
quantitative analysis, the latter is associated with an ‘inductive’ approach characterised by the 
use of methods which yield qualitative data.
1.4.1 Realism the choice of present study
Ackroyd and Hughes (1982) aptly assert that there is a need for consideration of suitability, 
relevance to the nature of research, and availability and adequacy of data. The present 
research aims to understand board effectiveness assuming that the events are created by the
board members, and that it is essential to explore the meaning that participants on the board 
attach to their behaviours and action (Silverman, 1970; Analoui, 1999). Therefore, inductive 
research seems to meet the purpose of the current research because it conceives a social 
world as being constructed by the actor’s interpretations, motives, and intentions (Blaikie, 
1993; Easterby*-Smith et al., 2002). The challenging issue faced by the researcher is that the 
existence of an independent single reality is not necessarily inconsistent with the notion of an 
individual perception of this reality (Blaike, 2000). The board exists as a part of an 
organisation entity and its formation is subject to specific conditions which are laid down in 
detail in the organisational and legislative rule books. The board members, who contribute to 
board effectiveness by their participation, also have a perception of the reality of board 
effectiveness, which is the one reported to the researcher. Therefore the researcher felt that he 
ought to take into consideration both the reality of the board, as a part of the structure 
(contextual factors outside the individuals control), and as the values attributed to a particular 
social reality simultaneously hence the employment of “realism” (Bhaskar. 1978; Healy and 
Perry, 2000). The effectiveness of PSBs in Abu Dhabi cannot be considered in isolation from 
the global economic realities of modem life or in exclusion of the specific contexts in which 
the board’s interactions take place (Robson, 2002; Silverman, 2005).
The strategy adopted therefore is that of inductive research influenced by social constructs 
amongst the board members. The researcher in the position of realist, felt that there is a need 
to discover the structures and potential mechanisms which underlie the board phenomenon 
first, (Blaikie, 2000) before exploring the behaviour of the directors (Agency) on the board 
meetings and then explaining them by pointing to the social meanings which help their 
construction (Robson, 2002). It was felt that the conditions on which PSBs are based are of 
paramount importance and need to be understood.
1.4.2 Research design
Whilst there are a number of methods available to researchers, ultimately the choice of a 
method is firmly informed by the criteria of ‘fit for purpose’ referred to as ‘relevance’, and 
‘suitability’ (Achroyd and Hughes, 1993), and ‘feasibility’, ‘coverage’, ‘accuracy’, 
‘objectivity’ and ‘ethics’ (Denscombe, 2003). The researcher felt that case study, as the prime 
method for generating relevant and suitable data is the most suitable method for the present 
research project simply because it is a particularly useful strategy for studying processes in 
companies (organisational behaviour) and for explanatory purposes (Robson, 1993, 
Gummesson, 2000; Bryman and Bell, 2003). The main method of data generation is the use 
of semi-structured interviews. However, the use of secondary data and the involvement of the 
researcher have to be triangulated in the process. This is in line with the assumptions which 
underpin the “realism paradigm” that sees interaction between researcher and the research as 
necessary conditions for gaining a better understanding of the phenomenon under 
investigation (Manning, 1997; Guba and Lincioln, 1994; Healy and Perry, 2000, Bisman,
2002).
There is an ongoing debate in the literature concerning the use of multiple case studies. How 
many cases are required in order to build theory and generalise the results? It is suggested 
that the minimum number of case studies required is four (Eisenhardt, 1989: 546). It is 
argued that any number fewer than four may not meet the above criteria. The maximum 
number suggested ranges from twelve to fifteen (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Rahim and 
Baksh, 2003). However, Hedges (1985) sets an upper limit of twelve cases. In practice 
however, the decision made by the researcher ought to be based on the realities o f the context 
and related issues such as access, quality and relevance to the subject of the study (Patton, 
1990; Perry, 1998; De Weerd-Nedderhof, 2001). In the case of the present research four 
major public sector organisations were randomly selected and four directors (each treated as
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participant) including Chair, CEO, ED and Non-ED were targeted. In practice the researcher 
continued conducting interviews with participants (adding cases-organisation) until it was 
ensured that “theoretical saturation” was reached. After 12 interviews (from three cases) no 
more new ‘themes’ were identifiable (Eiesenhardt, 1989). Having said this, the researcher 
paid particular attention to the four major organisation samples from which directors have 
been selected (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987; Welch, et al., 2002). These cases included;
• Abu Dhabi Ports Company (ADPC)
• Khalifa Fund to Support and Develop Small and Medium Enterprises (Khalifa Fund)
• National Bank of Abu Dhabi (NBAD)
• National Drilling Company of Abu Dhabi (NDCA)
Prior to conducting the interviews the themes identified as being the main contributing
factors to board effectiveness; included personal nterpersonal
communication, constraining factors, individual capabilities and competencies, motivation, 
prior experiences and the academic attainment of the board members. The analysis process 
led to the drawing of conclusions, albeit in a very limited way (Ramsay, 1998).
Since the pilot study formed an integral part of the process of data collection, the first five 
interviews were used as a sample for testing the questions planned for the semi structured 
interviews. The researcher did not face any difficulties in accessing the board members. His 
credibility as a senior member of a public sector organisation and his access to boards as a 
member and chair person (Hertz and Imber, 1993; Silverman, 2005) eased the process of 
access, together with the firsthand internal knowledge of the researcher which facilitated the 
process of collecting qualitative data.
1.4.3 Methods for data analysis
In order to analyse the data in accordance with the research design, the interviews will first be 
transcribed and following this a thematic analysis of the data will be conducted (Miles and 
Hubmeran, 1994). This will improve the process of selective data reduction into categories 
that are meaningful and indicative of the research question (Vallaster and Koll, 2002; 
Rowley, 2002; Richards, 2009). As expected from the analysis of the individual cases a 
number of themes and sub-themes emerged that were integral to the research aim and
objectives.
Basically the analysis of the qualitative data comprised of: Data reduction (selecting); Data 
Display (organised compressed assembly of data); and, Verification and drawing conclusions 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994). These have been made possible by using 
‘coding’ and ‘memoing’. Whilst coding refers to labelling and identification, memoing is the 
writing about the codes and what they stand for. It is argued that these methods will enable 
the researcher to begin the task of drawing conclusions. Although the software Nvivo can 
achieve the above purpose (Bazeley, 2007; Vallaster and Koll, 2002), it was decided that 
because of explanatory nature of the research, the data was to be processed manually rather 
than using software and computation. This was based on the informed decision that the cases 
collected in conjunction with the data concerning the contextual background constituted the 
primary ‘raw’ data for analysis (Voss et al., 2002). This ensured that valuable observations 
made and the impressions formed by being involved in the board dynamics were included 
(Huberman, 1994; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Miles and Hubmeran, 1994; Trace, 2001).
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1.4.4 Ethics of research
The most important ethical principle to be considered when conducting research is that the 
researcher should not cause harm to participants or others (Saunders, 2007). Predominantly 
the risk stems from the possibility that the thoughts, perceptions, and details of incidents 
included within the report may be perceived negatively by others, hence reflecting poorly on 
both the participants and their organisations. Thus, following Miller and Brewer (2003) two 
key ethical considerations will be observed: informed consent and anonymity (Appendix 
Three). To ensure that participants are able to provide wtfwrcved consent, as advised by 
numerous scholars (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Hussey and Hussey, 1997% participants will be 
provided with an information sheet that outlines the projects aims, details of what their 
participation will entail, and the intended outcomes of the project. However, cultural norms 
and procedures must be respected and hence permission in written form wili not be requested. 
To ensure anonymity, the names of participants and their organisation wEM be obscured, as 
will any other information that may pertain to their identification! via a process of 
manipulation (Richards, 2009).
In addition, this study will be conducted in line with section 3.2 off nfee University trtf 
Northampton’s ethical code 21 (Appendix Three) as well as other sdicdkrty guidelines &
appropriate (Fritzsche, 1997; Ackroyd and Hughes, 1981; Miles andHUbmerm, 1994) .
1.5 ORGANISATION OF THESIS
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows
http://www2.northampton.ac.uk/knowledgeexchange/homepage/newprojectso6fifoe/jQifta3oiHfe
Chapter 2 presents a review of the relevant literature. First a review of the literature on role 
and role theory, then corporate governance and the role of board are presented and it is 
argued that while prescriptions of corporate governance mechanisms may have some value, 
any determination of what may be considered “good” corporate governance mechanisms are 
necessarily contextual, being a product of both socio-historical context and the needs of 
individual firms. Second, the contested notion of board effectiveness, and the factors that 
have been identified as affecting board effectiveness by empirical research, including CEO 
duality, the ratio of outside to inside directors and board diversity are critically reviewed. The 
final section considers the impact of board dynamics on board effectiveness, and is concluded 
with the presentation of an exploratory framework of board director capabilities necessary for
increasing board effectiveness.
Chapter 3 contains a discussion of the methodological issues consider by the researcher in the 
construction and development of the research project. The chapter begins by reiterating the 
aims and objectives of the study. Following this, issues of research philosophy are 
considered, the researchers’ philosophical position is outlined and the rationale behind the 
adoption of a realist philosophical approach is defended. The chapter continues with an in- 
depth discussion of the advantages of the chosen research design (multiple case study 
approach), method of data collection (unstructured interviews) and approach to data analysis 
(thematic analysis) for the purposes of the present work. The quality of the research is then 
considered, the steps undertaken to ensure the integrity and value of the work are outlined 
and it is argued that the present work exceeds the established criteria for both validity and 
reliability. This chapter closes with a review of ethical considerations for the present study 
and the steps taken by the researcher to ensure the safety of participants and participating
organisations.
Chapter 4 is concerned with contextualising the research. Thus, the chapter begins with a 
consideration of the geography of Abu Dhabi, and the country’s social and political history. 
Following this an in-depth discussion of the history of the public sector and recent changes in 
public sector ownership within the country is presented. The chapter concludes with a review 
of the corporate governance mechanisms that are dictated by law and prescribed as best 
practice in the country.
Chapter 5 presents a descriptive analysis of the cases. First, there are descriptions of the four 
organisations. Each description contains details of the history of the company, the structure 
the board and the demography of board directors. Following this a within-case thematic 
analysis of each case is presented and the key themes highlighted. The second section of the 
chapter presents a cross-case analysis, leading to the establishment of the key themes. The 
key themes that emerge include the importance of the CEO and the CEO’s skill-set for the 
increased effectiveness of PSBs and a variety of key capabilities necessary for board directors 
to increase the effectiveness of PSBs. The chapter concludes with a revision of the 
exploratory framework presented in Chapter 2 and thus presents a model of the key 
capabilities necessary for board directors on PSBs in Abu Dhabi.
Chapter 6 discusses the results of the study. First, the results of the study are contrasted with 
those of previous empirical researchers and the potential reasons for coherence and contrast 
with the findings of other researchers are highlighted. Second, the pivotal contributions made 
by the study to field of corporate governance are outlined. Following this the practical 
implications of the present work are examined, and it is argued that through a structured 
Human Resource Development programme the necessary capabilities required by board
directors can be transferred to board directors to improve the effectiveness of Abu Dhabi 
PSBs.
Chapter 7 provides a summary conclusion of the work. The overall aims of the project are 
reiterated, the key findings highlighted and the theoretical and practical implications of the 
work restated. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the research and 
outlines potentially fruitful directions of future research.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Recent history has borne witness to numerous corporate governance failures, largely due to 
the passivity of boards; Enron, Tyco, Parmalat and Marconi provide well known recent 
examples. It is tenable that had their boards acted sooner the resulting public scandal may 
have been minimized if not prevented (Kakabadse et al., 2011). The interest in corporate 
governance has been revitalised; public consciousness following the financial crisis in 2008 
has being heightened -  a crisis that some have attributed to failures in corporate governance 
(Aras and Crowther, 2010). Such failures are not confined to the western hemisphere - 
following the financial crisis that took place in Asia in 1997/1998 a good deal of emphasis in 
corporate governance reform was placed on board structure (Abdullah, 2004). The 
implication is that there is widespread belief that corporate governance mechanisms can lead 
to effective board operation. Yet, what amounts to effective corporate governance principles 
is a difficult question to answer, and the issue is arguably more complex when one considers 
public sector organisations: Comforth (2001) notes that in the western hemisphere there is a 
long running understanding that the governance of non-profit and voluntary organisations is 
problematic, with the effectiveness of governance mechanisms being questioned.
Despite these difficulties there are two broad theses for increasing board performance: the re-
examination of governance standards and protocols, and the enhancement of board director 
capabilities. The proponents of the former have suggested that while the governance 
foundations of corporations go unexamined, efforts to enhance director capabilities will be of 
little benefit (Bogle, 2005). Yet, some argue that further attention to corporate governance 
protocols and practice will increase administrative stipulation (Higgs, 2003; Wearing, 2005),
and show little benefit as the cost of monitoring will overtake the benefits of improved 
performance especially as the capabilities of directors remain the same (Acemorglu, 2004). 
As explained in the introduction chapter, the researcher believes that both the re-examination 
of governance standards and protocols, and the enhancement of board director capabilities are 
necessary, however researchers own personal experiences and first hand observation seem to 
place more importance to the latter rather than the former view.
Further complicating the attempt to increase board performance is the problem of 
determining precisely what board effectiveness amounts to - a complex question, and one 
which has received considerable attention in the corporate governance literature (Conger et 
al., 2001; Schmidt and Brauer, 2006). Precisely how to determine board effectiveness 
remains a divisive issue (Petrovic, 2008); and it has been stated that the major challenge in 
studying board effectiveness is determining how to define and measure board effectiveness 
(Herman et al., 1997). This is problematic -  if it is unclear what board effectiveness amounts 
to, then efforts to increase board effectiveness may fall short of the mark. Numerous studies, 
evaluate board effectiveness by taking a company’s financial performance as a proxy (see for 
example, Vafeas, 1999; Abdullah, 2004; Anderson et al., 2004; McIntyre, 2008). Such, an 
approach is widespread in the literature -  and is arguably well grounded; if, as suggested the 
board has a significant impact on firm operations then the success o f the firm should reflect 
the success of the board. Yet, it often appears that boards are effective -  precisely until they 
are not.
The research, adopts a realist philosophical position (see chapter 3) that contends that there is 
no real board and no real board effectiveness, there are merely perceptions of the board and 
of effectiveness that can be offered by different stakeholders (Herman et al., 1997).
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Following from this position, is the second common approach to determining board 
effectiveness by making use of various stakeholders in a firm and asking them to provide the 
evaluation of board effectiveness (see for example, Bradshaw et al., 1992; Herman et al., 
1997). Adopting such an approach is especially useful in the public sector context (for 
example Abu Dhabi PSBs) -  where various stakeholders exist; and whose interest the board 
is supposed to serve (Rose and Lawton, 1998). In the case of the present research, the very 
nature of the boards (public) stipulates the importance of the various stakeholders and their 
interest as influencing factors on the board and board member’s conduct. The PSBs in Abu 
Dhabi are expected to serve the interest of the public. The present research also aims to
explore the perception and awareness of the members of their roles and responsibilities 
concerning the above.
While numerous studies have considered how to increase board effectiveness by examining 
director capabilities and contributions (for a review, see Petrovic, 2008) none that the 
researcher is aware of have focussed on Public Sector Boards (PSBs) in Abu Dhabi. The 
proposed research aims to fill this gap within the relevant literature by determining the 
necessary capabilities of individual board directors for effective board performance on PSBs 
in Abu Dhabi. Thus, the primary focus of the present literature review is to critically consider 
the empirical literature on the capabilities of individual board directors that are necessary for 
effective board performance, or more generally: board effectiveness.
However, an examination of single factors such as capabilities, governance competences or 
protocol in Abu Dhabi, without considering Islamic work ethic (Yousef, 2001), may not 
provide a holistic picture of what influences the behaviour of the directors (Analoui, 2007). 
There is then a further need and necessity to explore needed competencies of the board
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members for increased effectiveness and improved performance, as they are (Analoui et al., 
2010), in context of social and civil service corporation realities in Abu Dhabi, dominated by 
Islamic values and beliefs (Abuznaid, 2006; Sameh, 2011).
The present chapter is structured in four parts. The first part considers the concept of role and
role theory form different perspectives namely structuralism and interpretivism in order to 
highlight the differences in underlying assumptions of the organisational writers when
dealing with organisational behaviours. It is believed that understanding perceived role of the 
member’s role (both role taken and made) plays a crucial part in understanding the behaviour 
of the individual directors in the Abu Dhabi PSBs. Attention will be paid to the importance 
of adopting an integrated approached and its implication for adopting ‘realism’ as the main 
philosophical stand when dealing with the issues of data, and data generation. Concepts such 
as ‘role set’, ‘role ambiguity’, ‘role expectations’, ‘role negotiation’, ‘role making and role 
taking’, and ‘role conflict’ will be elaborated in some details. The second part will explore 
the concept of corporate governance and the role of the board and argues that it is difficult to 
be prescriptive about such matters since what may be considered “good” corporate 
governance mechanisms are a product of both socio-historical context and the needs of the 
firm. The third part examines the somewhat contested notion of board effectiveness and the 
factors that are considered to affect board effectiveness, focussing on CEO duality, the ratio 
of outside to inside directors and board diversity. The fourth section considers board 
dynamics and draws from the literature, the capabilities o f board directors that are necessary 
for increasing effectiveness. It must be reiterated that selection and review of the above, as it 
will be demonstrated in chapters 4, 5, and 6 have been by design rather than default. It is 
believed that behaviour of board and its members cannot be achieved unless research is 
familiar with the above theories and concepts. The above forms the conceptual basis that
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equips the research with sufficient knowledge to conduct this first time research in PSBs in 
Abu Dhabi.
While the present work makes a contribution to the field of corporate governance the study of 
individual capabilities of those working within teams is one which may be studied from 
various theoretical perspectives including organisational behaviour, and sub-field of small 
group dynamics. Thus, where appropriate, evidence from these fields of scholarly inquiry is 
marshalled to provide further depth to the analysis.
2. 2 INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANISATIONAL ROLES
The review of the relevant literature will remain incomplete if some of the ambiguities 
surrounding the use of the term ‘role’ are not dealt with. This is particularly crucial when the 
intention is to understand the behaviour of the board members of the Abu Dhabi PSBs and 
their effectiveness. The ‘role theory’ as a theoretical perspective distinguishes between the 
different concepts o f ‘role’ from a sociological and organisational point of view (Burrel and 
Morgan, 1979; Rodhmam, 2000).
2.2.1 The diversity o f ‘role’ and its meanings
The concept of role with a sociological origin occupies an important place in understanding 
organisational behaviour (Welboume et al., 1998; Schmidt, 2000). Despite its crucial 
importance there is a great deal of disagreement amongst social scientists on its meanings and 
what it stands for (Buchanan and Hczynski, 1997). Whilst the concept of role is often used to 
mean the behaviour expected from the occupant of a position in a social system, in 
organisational terms it means more than just ‘job descriptions’ (Litterer, 1965). Role refers to
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more than duties and responsibilities it also includes the relationships formed by individuals, 
styles and manner of performance. In this sense of the word, the development of the concept 
of the role leads to interpretation of behaviour of the individuals and groups in different 
social and organisational settings. Role therefore can be seen as human output or the 
‘contribution to the achievement of organisational goals (Das, 2001: 590). At work the term 
role describes the part to be played by individuals in fulfilling their job requirement. ‘Roles 
therefore indicate the specific forms of behaviour required to carry out a particular task other 
than group tasks contained in a position or job’ (Chell, 1985; Armstrong, 2006). The concept 
of role suggests that people at work are always acting a part; they are not simply reciting the 
lines but interpreting them in terms of their own perception of how they should behave in 
relation to the context in which they work, especially with regard to their interactions with 
other people and their discretionary behaviour’ (Armstrong, 2006: 247). Researcher’s own 
observation and experiences firmly supports this view. The board directors in the Abu Dhabi 
PS Boards are actors who interpret their roles and negotiate the reality of the board 
accordingly. This view has also been discussed in the chapter on methodology (See Chapter 
Three). The participants in the four organisations (cases) have not been assumed to be 
passive, hence the importance given of their views and perceptions of their interactions with 
others and the operations of the board as the whole.
2.2.2 Multi perspective definitions
There is disagreement amongst the social scientists on the definition o f ‘role’. This is largely 
due to ‘how they are to be used’ (Lupton, 1971), and the perspective from which ‘role’ is 
viewed. Here ‘prescriptive’, ‘evaluative’, ‘descriptive’, and ‘action’ will be considered.
A Prescriptive definition is largely influenced by classical theories of organisation which 
points to the functional aspect of the ‘role’ and what needs to be done. It is concerned with 
the notion that the individual should play a specific role. A job description represents the 
content of the role.
An evaluative definition is more concerned with how a role is performed. It therefore requires 
established criteria and standards against which the assessment can be made. A role 
description can provide such a standard. Staff appraisal ‘could be considered to be part of the 
procedure intended to pattern, and make predictable the behaviour of the organisation 
members (Buchanan and Hucznski, 1997:377).
A descriptive definition of role is based on the actual duties performed by the person. This 
view is based on ‘what it is rather than what it ought to be’ and is influenced by the works of 
social scientists such as Mintzberg (1973) and Stewart (1976) who believed in adopting a 
realist view of the world. Analysis of the role content based on observation as carried out by 
an individual provides such information.
The Action definition of the role is not concern with the duties that should be undertaken; 
rather it is concerned with the action taken in pursuit of these duties. This definition of the 
role is influenced by social action theorist such as Silverman (1971) who view the action as 
being socially constructed. Any role therefore can be considered under these four broad 
interrelated and interdependent categories (Buchanan and Hucznski, 1997; Stewart, 1982).
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2.2.3 Role expectation and role set
Moreover, it leads to expected behaviour by others. To this end role is an important factor in 
personal behaviour but it is different from the personality of the role occupant (Lupton, 
1982). The role concept can also be used in the understanding of the intergroup behaviour. In 
particular all organisation participants have certain expectations from one another; these 
expectations can also be thought of as a set of roles that are overlapping role sets (Stewarts, 
1976; Mullins, 2002). According to Webber, the behaviour expected from a person 
occupying formal positions in the organisation, office or Bureau becomes recognised as his or 
her role (Argyris, 1957; Blau, 1966). In this vein, ‘A role is the expected pattern of 
behaviours associated with members occupying a particular position within the structure of 
the organisation’ (Mullins, 1993: 186). We manage to translate the set of external 
expectations about our behaviour in a role into a corresponding set of psychological 
properties such as belief values, attitudes and prescriptions (I ought to; I ought not to). This 
is referred to as internalisation of expectations and can result in a major change in an 
individual’s behaviour (Fincham and Rhodes, 1999). ‘Roles are internalised during role 
episodes, which refer to the whole of the process of perceiving others expectations of us’ 
(Fincham and Rhodes, 1999: 171).
Inevitably the role that individuals perform leads them to form relationships which can be 
seen as ‘role relationships’. In a group context, the roles that individuals play are influenced 
by a combination of ‘situational’ and ‘personal’ factors. Interestingly the roles that a person 
may play in one group may not be the same as those he or she performs in other task groups 
(Tuckman, 1963; Minor, 1971; Handy, 1985).
Role theory as formulated by Katz and Khan (1966) states that the role individuals occupy at 
work- and elsewhere- exists in relation to other people. An individual’s role therefore can be 
seen as being ‘associated with position in an organisation and are involved in interaction with 
others’ (Buchanan and Hczynski, 1997: 374). Since each individual interacts with different 
people in the organisation therefore he or she has his own ‘role set’.
The concept of role set refers to the set of roles with which a person interacts by virtue of 
occupying a particular position (Katz and Khan, 1978). The occupant of the position can be 
regarded as the ‘focal person’ whose role set necessitates him or her to play a number of roles 
in life both sequentially and simultaneously, and that only some of them are associated with 
their workplace (Stewarts, 1967; Lupton, 1971; Argyris, 1973). Khan is mostly associated 
with role-set theory of the organisation. In his view the organisation is made up of 
overlapping and interlocking role sets. These roles would normally transcend the boundaries 
of the classical concept of the organisation. Applied to directors and board members it reveals 
the involvement in more than one role which can result in ambiguity and conflict (Luthans, 
1998: 313). (See Figure 2.1)
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People’s roles in an organisation can be ranked by status (Van Maanen, 1991), but this is not
always clear cut. In hierarchical organisations status is very much related to the position and 
position defines the role and responsibilities of the individuals (Kakabadse, et al., 2004; 
Analoui, 2002). In a bureaucratic organisational structure people are expected to perform the 
duties of their role without consideration of people as individuals. Stewart (1986) views the 
characteristic of impersonality as a feature of bureaucracy which most distinguishes it from 
other types of organisation. However, Armstrong (2006) aptly contends ‘situational factors 
are important; the role individuals perform can ‘both shape and reflect their personalities. 
Stress and inadequate performance result when roles are ambiguous, incompatible, or in 
conflict with one another’ (247). These issues will be discussed in more detail later. In the
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case of the present research, it is evident that board members play an important role. For 
example, the Chair’s behaviour (as will be demonstrated) in resolving the conflict is crucial 
for the smooth running of the board’s operations.
2.2.4 Functionalism vs Social Interactionist approaches to ‘role’
According to the functional perspective, it is necessary to examine the structure of the 
society if we are to understand the actions of the individuals who make up the whole. The 
proponents of structural functionalism use the ‘biological analogy’ in the tradition of Comte 
(1853), Spenser (1873) and Durkheim (1938). It is believed that human activities are 
regarded as useful when they help to maintain the social structure. In a sense, human actions 
are largely structured by our environment (Nobbs, 1983), thus treating the external social 
world as a concrete reality governed by observable functional relationships amenable to 
scientific investigation. It is argued that by 1950’s its influence was so pervasive that in 
certain quarters functional analysis was equated with sociological analysis per se (Davis, 
1959). Radclifife-Brown went so far as arguing that ‘the ongoing life of a society could be 
convinced in terms of the functioning of its structure - hence the notion of structural 
functionalism (1952). The 1970’s and 80’s state of structural functionalism ranges from 
Grand theories1 to ‘abstracted empiricism’ with a general emphasis in the latter upon 
structure rather than function (Burrell and Morgan, 1979. 49-56).
The implication of the above for explaining what role is was extensive. The behaviour of the 
person was bound with the notion of structure and was prescribed by predetermined rules and 
regulations associated with a position in a particular social or organisational setting (Linton, 
1936). Organisational role was predetermined with emphasis on appropriate behaviour 
(Turner, 1962; Breese, 1997; Hogg and Doolan, 1999). In its extreme sense, the assumption
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was that individuals who share similar roles also share common identities and collective 
behaviour (Silverman, 1971; Schmidt, 2000). The major weakness o f the objectivist approach 
to the study of organisational role and behaviour was that it under-mined the individual 
characteristics and the nature of the interaction process (Stewart et al., 2005; Silverman, 
2005). The questions, can we assume that the director’s roles are predetermined? Do they all 
adopt the same pattern of behaviour? And indeed, would they attempt to interpret their ‘role’ 
as a member of the board? - firmly point to the position of the researcher that the functionalist 
view falls short of explaining the realities of the board, the processes involved and the 
interpretations made, which are by and large due to the capabilities o f each individual 
director-role holder. The underlying assumptions of the researcher concerning the nature 
“participants”, as explained in chapter three, and the findings of the research clearly show 
that board directors cannot be taken as “passive” individuals. They actively interpret their 
roles and act accordingly.
2.2.4.1 Interaction!sm and Social Action Theory
Historically, it was Max Webber who although was not a social interactionist in a modem 
sense of the word, emphasised the importance of the interpretation of the actions and 
interaction of the individuals in order to arrive at a causal explanation of its cause and effects 
(Webber, 1947; 1949). Interactionism changed the direction of sociology. According to 
Webber, because of the consensus and conflict perspectives society is a structured whole. It is 
believed that more can be learnt about the society by comparing it with a biological organism 
(consensus theory) or by considering a structure of competing groups -  conflict theory 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Of course, interactionism is fraught with difficulties, ‘because 
when we study interaction it will inevitably interact upon us and affect our judgment’ 
(Nobbs, 1983: 33).
The foundation of modern interactionism was laid by Goerge Simmel (1950; 1955) and 
Gorge Herbert Mead ( 1934; 1938; 1956) whose thoughts have come to be known as the neo-
idealist tradition which has immensely influenced the debate on objective-subjective 
dimensions of the social processes and reality (Silverman, 1971; Burrel and Morgan, 1979).
Simmel (1950) focused his attention upon human beings in their social context. He was
primarily interested in what he described as ‘interactions amongst the atoms of the society’. 
For Simmel conflict was inherent in social life (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). In Coser’s words, 
‘Any social relationship needs attractive and repulsive forces, harmony and disharmony, in 
order to attain specific form’ (1965: 12). Mead on the other hand has come to be associated 
with ‘symbolic interactionism’. According to Mead, symbolic interaction involves 
interpretation, or ascertaining the meaning of the actions or remarks of the other person, and 
defining, or conveying indications to another person as to how he is to act. Human 
association consists of processes of such interpretation and definition. Through this process 
the participants fit their own acts to the ongoing acts of one another and guide others in doing 
so (Blumer, 1966:537-8). Blumer goes on to present symbolic interactionism as being 
essentially concerned with the meanings which underlie the process of interaction and as an 
attempt to understand the society in those terms (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).
The social action theory is sometimes described as ‘the action frame of reference’ and derives 
largely from the work of Webber (1947; 1949). The notion of ‘verstehen’ or interpretive’ 
which suggests ‘understanding’ plays a crucial part in neo-idealist social thought (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979:83). Cohen (1968) suggested that theory of action can provide a mode of 
analysis for explaining the action and conduct of the typical individuals (actors or social 
actors) in a typical situation. For example, Cohen suggested that actors have goals and they 
pursue these goals. This involves the selection of the means for their attainments. More
importantly, the actor is influenced not only by the situation but by his or her own knowledge 
of the situation. The social actor has certain norms and values which govern his selection and 
his ordering of them into some scheme of priority (Cohen, 1968:69).
Social action theory, since 1960’s has received a great deal of attention. Empirical studies 
conducted by Goldthrope (1968) on orientation to work and Silverman’s (1970) advocacy to 
action frame of references have influenced the work of many researchers in the field of 
organisational behaviour. The essence of the social action theory is based on the notion that a 
person’s action is socially constructed and is socially maintained. To understand the action 
of a person the meanings attributed to social action should be explored (Silverman, 1970; 
Analoui and Kakabadse, 2000).
To sum up, social action theorists are concerned with subjectively defined ‘role’, 
understanding the interactions and processes involved, and micro reality as opposed to macro 
level of social reality (Turner 1978; Weik, 1979; Stewart et al., 2005). It is assumed that role 
consensus is an occasional thing because the patterns of behaviour change in line with 
contingencies and individual goals (Brees, 1979; Parker and Randall, 1997; Silverman, 
2005).
How do directors see their own and others’ action? How do they interpret these actions and 
more importantly, what norms and values do they use for such interpretations? The 
researcher’s view is firmly rooted in gaining an insight into the ‘meanings associated to 
actions by directors (social actors) in the board context, albeit, as will be illustrated the 
influence of the structure on people’s behaviour cannot be completely excluded from the 
influences of the structure.
Most models concerning ‘role’ have been influenced by the above main two perspectives. 
Here some of the most influential models will be examined in some detail.
2.2.4.2 Role conflict
The functionalist view of the role discusses the concept of the role independently of an 
individual’s personality. Role conflict arises from inadequate or inappropriate role definition 
and needs to be distinguished from personality clashes. Smith et al., (1982) aptly contends;
CL Role conflict exists when an individual in a particular work is tom by conflicting job
demands or doing things he [she] really does not want to do or does not think are part of the 
job description” (1882: 77).
Role conflict as a generic term includes (See Figure 2.2).
Role incompatibility
Role ambiguity
Role overload, and
Role under-load
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Role incompatibility arises from a situation when an individual faces simultaneous different 
or contradictory expectations. These create inconsistency. Compliance with one expectation 
makes it difficult to comply with the other (Dunkerley, 1975).
Role ambiguity however may result from a lack of requirements for the role which results in 
poor performance (Das, 2001; Mullins, 2002). Full information is required for the role 
incumbent to meet the expectations in his or her role (Schien, 1988). When a person faces too 
many roles or a variety of expectations, thus is classed as work overload (Handy, 1985). The 
opposite is also true, when a person’s role expectations fall short of their own perceptions of
role -  work under-load (Schien, 1988). It is contended that ‘unless role differentiations are 
defined clearly this can result in conflicting expectation [...] this can also lead to uncertainty 
about the exact requirement of the part a person is expected to play’ (Mullins, 1993; 190).
Not surprisingly, role conflict can result in role stress. Although a certain amount of stress is 
thought to be a good thing high levels of stress are potentially harmful and lead to poor 
performance (Filly and House, 1969; Kakabadse el al., 2004).
The concept of role is important to the functioning of the individuals, and group and their 
relationships. Inadequate or inappropriate role definition can result in role conflict including: 
role incompatibility, role ambiguity, role over and under load and finally role stress.
Inter-group conflict leads to role stress and poor performance on the part of the persons 
involved (Schopler, 1987). Indeed, managerial work is one of the areas closely associated 
with the effects of stress, and personality traits; and is often linked with high levels of 
coronary disease (Roenman et al, 1964). These are associated with people with high levels of 
personal investment in their work (Cooper, 1964; Thompson and McHuge, 1990: 325).
Various strategies can be adopted to manage conflict. These include avoidance, diffusion, 
containment, and confrontation, (Feldman and Huge, 1986; Robbins, 1990; Wall and
Callister, 1995). However the there are many strategies and each may fit a specific situation 
(Handy, 1985; Schopler, 1987).
2.2.4.3 Role Making and Role Taking
Role making simply refers to ‘taking the initiative to create a role by assuming 
responsibilities that are not a part of an assigned role’. The process of taking the initiative
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reveals that the individual is not a passive recipient of the role (Analoui, 1999; Kakabadse,
2000). Rather they will change the role in order to meet both the role requirement and 
expectation, and their own expectations (Stewart, 1994; Kakabadse, et al., 2004). The 
proponents of social interactionism acknowledge the fact that individuals do pursue their own 
goals and interests (Mead, 1934; Silverman, 1970) and it is not unusual from this perspective 
to see individuals at work adapt their role requirements to ‘fit’ their own interests too. 
Kakabadse, et al., (2004) has successfully explored the nature of the ‘politics’ at work and 
how the subtle processes involved suggest ‘volunteerism’ and ‘reactivity’ on the part of the 
role holders. It has been commented that’ differences do exist; and people think, feel and see 
the same situation differently. However, that does not have to be a serious constraint to 
harmonious working’ (2000, 173). This is not to say that the demands and constraints do not 
limit the focal person’s choice, indeed the focal person manages the expectations and the role 
to include opportunities to achieve his or her desired objectives too (Stewards, 1994; Analoui, 
1999).
Fondas and Stewart (1994) have argued that the individuals do not just react to others 
‘expectation’ but also are involved in the process of role making (enacting their own roles). 
Arguably all roles have the potential for ‘role making’ (Wilcocks, 1994; Troy et al., 2000). 
The directors on the board cannot be excluded from this process. They too are involved in the 
process of negotiating their interactions as a focal person to role senders (Fondas and Stewart, 
1994). It can be argued that the CEO, ED or even non-ED by the virtue of their membership 
of the board are influenced and influence others in their interactions with them (Kakabadse, 
et al., 2004). The autonomy and role discretion associated with a job provides the opportunity 
for role making (Kakabadse, 1993; Troyer et al, 2000). This issue becomes of interest to the 
present research when the notion o f ‘role taking’ is considered.
IV I   
I
Role taking is basically the process of performing one’s responsibilities associated with an 
assigned role. ‘Role taking is the common process of assuming a formal organisational role’ 
(Gorge and Jones, 2008, p: 337). Members of PSBs do assume certain responsibilities 
associated with their roles, for example CEO or ED. It would be interesting to explore the 
extent to which the role on the board provides discretion for role making and how this 
process of negotiating role receiving and role sending is being negotiated by the board 
member (focal person), and in what way it tends to influence the individual’ effectiveness? 
What is certainly supported by empirical research findings is that although executives, 
because of their position, do possess relatively higher levels of discretion this discretion is 
limited by the environmental factors such as legal and market related (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein, 1987; Bowman and Kakabadse, 1999). In agreement with the proponents of 
interactionism, it must be said that capability of the individuals, for example an executive, a 
CEO or a board member, should not be understated. The focal role holders are politically 
aware (Analoui, 2007) and as appropriately contended, the degree of discretion within the 
executive role is largely driven by the individual’s ability to influence the demands and 
constraints of their role (Stewarts, 1976; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 1999).
2.2.5 The reality of board member’s behaviour
It was briefly explained earlier when discussing the influences of the external factors on the 
individual and the way he or she is expected to execute his or her responsibilities, that 
realistically it is not possible to assume that a board member is only involved in the process 
o f ‘role taking’ (functionalist stand) nor is it feasible to assume that board members do not or 
cannot use their capabilities and other personal traits to negotiate any demands and 
constraints faced. Research has supported the notion that board members like any other
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executive (organisational member) are actively involved in the process of role making (Social 
Interaction!sm stand). Thus, in line with ‘integrative theory’, which characterises the brand of 
sociological theorising which occupies the middle ground (Burrel and Morgan, 1979, p: 87), 
the present research sees the position of the board members as both ‘ role takers’ and ‘role 
makers’ (Analoui, 1999; Kakabadse and Kakbadse, 1999). This is also congruent with the 
methodological assumptions adopted (see Chapter Three) where ‘realism’ is preferred to 
purely adhering to ‘perception’; rather focussing on how and why the behaviours occur 
(Rodhmam, 2000; Silverman, 2005; Analoui, 2007).
To sum up this section, role theory though contentious in times it provides a comprehensive 
perspective from which to view and understand organisational behaviour. In the case of 
present research, it allows us to view the board members roles, responsibilities, extent of their 
role taking and role making as well as the ways in which they deal with ‘role ambiguity’, 
‘role stress’ and how they strive towards effectiveness whilst negotiating and influencing the 
constraints and demands in their way. The foundation of this research is based on the ‘open 
system’ theory which acknowledges the presence and mutual influences of the external 
factors and board members, and their impact on the their own individual and board 
effectiveness as the whole.
2.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE ROLE OF THE BOARD
Within this section the literature reviewing corporate governance and the role of the board is 
discussed critically.
2.3.1 Corporate Governance
Recent history has borne witness to numerous corporate governance failures, largely due to 
the passivity of boards; Enron, Tyco, Parmalat and Marconi provide well known recent 
examples. It is tenable that had their boards acted sooner the resulting public scandal may 
have been minimized if not prevented (Kakabadse et al., 2011). Board failures are not 
confined to the developed world; studies of board performance in fast growing developing 
economies also reveal a deficit between desired board contribution and the reality of director 
behaviour (Oseichuk et al., 2009). Yet, while board failure can be appreciated in hindsight 
without difficulty, board effectiveness remains an elusive concept (Garratt, 2003; McIntyre et 
al., 2007) and what makes a board an effective governance mechanism remains a 
fundamental question (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004) (see Section 2.3).
Despite increasing public and scholarly interest in corporate governance definitions of the 
term and thus useful delineations of the field of study vary. For some it is understood broadly 
as being concerned “with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997: 737); for 
others it is viewed more specifically as being concerned with the distribution, exercise and 
implications of corporate control; prioritising questions such as who controls corporate 
decision-making, the types of decisions that are made and the implications of these decisions 
for different interest groups (O’Sullivan, 2005).
Indeed, interest in corporate governance has recently been revitalised, arguably due to 
heightened public consciousness following the financial crisis in 2008 which some have 
attributed to failures in corporate governance (Aras and Crowther, 2010). Outside of the 
Western hemisphere, Abdullah highlights that following the financial crisis that took place in
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Asia in 1997/1998 a good deal o f emphasis in corporate governance reform was placed on 
board structure (2004). This, interest in corporate governance and reforms, both by 
governments and scholars across the world seems to suggest that if effective corporate 
governance mechanisms can be determined -  firm performance can be increased and that 
firm failure can be avoided.
In the UK, various recommendations for reforms have been offered over the years (see for 
example, the Greenbury Report, 1995; the Hempel Report, 1998; Cadbury, 2002; Higgs, 
2005). The importance of corporate governance policies is clear; they act to determine and 
constrain the behaviours of boards - thus having implications for the way in which board 
director’s act and in which organisations are governed. This is important, the failures of 
Enron, WorldCom and others in the US have been blamed on un-wanted director behaviours, 
as the CEO and other senior managers were able to dominate the board, they had control over 
organisational strategy, and the divulgence o f information to stakeholders, and so they were 
able to perpetrate their frauds without detection (Ezzamel and Watson, 2005).
However, it is not clear that boards necessarily make use o f codes of best practice, or even 
that a prescriptive approach will yield desirable results. A study o f Irish technology firms, 
conducted by O ’Regan et al (2005) provided quantitative evidence from 88 Irish Chief 
Financial Officers on a range o f topics concerning governance practice and the role of 
directors. The study found that overall CFOs were satisfied that their companies followed 
best practice, but did not believe that their respective boards had actually been briefed on 
what best practice amounts to.
While what amounts to effective corporate governance principles is a difficult question to 
answer, the issue is arguably more complex when one considers public sector organisations: 
Comforth (2001) notes that in the western hemisphere there is a long running understanding 
that the governance of non-profit and voluntary organisations is problematic, with the 
effectiveness of governance mechanisms being questioned. As Rose and Lawton (1998) 
highlight the central differences between corporate governance issues for the private and 
public sector are that while private sector organisations are accountable to shareholders, those 
in the public sector are largely accountable to the general population, if not directly then 
through representatives of the populous: arguably providing a need for greater transparency. 
The objectives of companies located in the public and private sectors also differ -  leading to 
further difficulties in determining what board effectiveness amounts to (see Section 2.3).
As Ardalan (2007) notes the proponents of the perspective approach take on corporate 
governance as determining what are to be considered good corporate governance 
mechanisms. A variety of perspectives on corporate governance exist, including agency 
theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory and managerial hegemony. Drawing on 
different perspectives of corporate governance, Comforth (2004) offers an analysis that draws 
out implications for the role of board, for board members and for whose interests the board 
serves (see Table 2.1). These perspectives are considered in turn.
2.3.1.1 Agency Theory
Agency theory dominates corporate governance arrangements (Comforth, 2004) and is 
concerned with the agent-principal relationship: where the principal are the owners of the 
firm, who divest powers to control the firm to the agent -  the firms’ managers (Eisendhart,
1989). In theory these two parties are in co-operation, but in practice they can have divergent
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Table 2.1: Perspectives on Corporate Governance and the Role o f the Board
Perspective Interests
Agency Theory Owners/memb er s
and managers have
different interests
Stewardship Theory | Owners/members
and managers share
interests
Stakeholder Theory Stakeholders have
different interests
Managerial
Hegemony
Owners/members
and managers have 
different interests
Source: Adapted from Comforth (2004)
Board
Members
Owner/ members
representatives
Experts
Stakeholder
representatives
Owner/members
representatives
Board Role
Safeguard owners
interests
Oversee
management
Check compliance
Add value to top 
decisions/ strategy 
Partner/support
management
Balance
stakeholder needs
Create policy
Control the
executive
Ratify decisions 
Provide legitimacy 
for managerial
decisions
interests, thus as Jensen (1983) posits the agency theory is about prescribing mechanisms that 
mitigate the ability o f the agent to act in self-interest when doing so diverges from the
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interests of the principal. Agency theory views corporate governance mechanisms as the best 
way to ensure that managers act in the interests of the principal (typically shareholders) -  
through the board undertaking monitoring and controlling the activities (Keasey et al., 1997). 
Yet, many corporate governance issues arise from the separation of ownership and control 
and the inability to create contractual obligations between a firm’s management and 
ownership that cover all eventualities (Hart, 1995; Keasey et al., 2005). Boards and their 
directors are often held responsible, as the stewards of the enterprise, for enabling 
management to realise stakeholder value on behalf of shareholders (Monks and Minow, 
2001). In effect, boards act as the guardians of the principle/agent relationship, whereby the 
principal is the investor/shareholder and the agent is the management tasked with realising 
best value for that investment (Dalton et al., 1998). However, boards have been repeatedly 
criticized for not fulfilling their agency responsibilities (Drucker, 1974; Jensen, 1986; 
Kosnik, 1987). Despite these failings, many recent reforms in corporate governance in the 
UK and US aim at improving the control and monitoring abilities of boards (see below). As 
explained in previous chapter, the principle and agency approach is particularly relevant to 
the board members behaviour in Abu Dhabi PSBs. The performance of the Board as the 
whole and the behaviour of the members have to be considered in this context.
2.3.1.2 Stewardship Theory
Stewardship theory is grounded in the human relations tradition (Hung, 1998) and its 
principles and assumptions run contrary to those of agency theory. According to this 
perspective the board of directors, major shareholders and management operate in partnership 
(Pound, 1995); with the interests of management understood as being intertwined with those 
of the firm (Lam and Lee, 2008). As Donaldson (1990: 375) argues, managers are to be 
viewed as inherently trustworthy and as good stewards of the company; they act not only out
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of self-interest but are motivated by non-financial rewards; they have: “a need to achieve, to 
gain intrinsic satisfaction through successfully performing inherently challenging work, to 
exercise responsibility and authority, and thereby gain recognition from peers and bosses”. 
The role o f the board then, is to work with management to improve performance, playing a 
key role in strategic decision making (Hung; 1998; Comforth, 2004). Such boards take an 
active role in the running of a firm (Hung, 1998; Lam and Lee, 2008) and so board members 
are to be selected on the basis o f their experience and expertise (Comforth, 2004).
Yet, it can be argued that this perspective does little to enhance understanding o f board 
functioning, and “...fails to provide a causal explanation or to add much to our knowledge of 
organizational life. It does not reflect the interplay o f power, conflict and ideology” (Hung, 
1998: 107). The importance of power, conflict and ideology, or more broadly group dynamics 
for the functioning of the board is discussed below (see Section 2.3).
2.3.1.3 Stakeholder Theory
Comforth (2004) comments that stakeholder theory has been developed as a perspective o f 
corporate governance that provides an alternative to models that focus primarily on 
shareholders. Indeed, the stakeholder perspective of corporate governance differs from the 
theories of agency, stewardship and managerial hegemony as it focuses not just on the 
owners or managers of a company; but states that a firm must take into account its wider 
stakeholder group (Hung, 1998). Stakeholders in a firm can be defined as any individual or 
group thereof that can affect or are affected by the organisation and its operations (Freeman, 
1984). Thus, stakeholders in a firm are a diverse group, comprising o f customers, suppliers, 
employees, shareholders and creditors (Bhagat and Black, 1999).
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The stakeholder perspective has been praised for being morally laudable, serving the interests 
of more than just shareholders (or owners), and provides instrumental power, descriptive 
power and normative validity (Donaldson and Peterson, 1995). Furthermore, it is a model of 
governance often seen in the public sector (Comforth, 2004) and where different stakeholder 
groups exist and where the firm is less concerned with profit-maximisation and more 
concerned with client-satisfaction in the interests of the public good (Rose and Lawton, 
1998).
2.3.1.4 Hegemony
The managerial hegemony perspective argues that it is corporate management who control 
the operations of the company, with directors losing control as a result; the board acts as a 
mere rubber-stamp on the actions of management, the board is “essentially symbolic to give 
legitimacy to managerial actions” (Comforth, 2004: 17) leading to what may be termed a 
passive board, where directors have little influence (Okpara, 2011).
Managerial hegemony dates back to the work of Berle and Means (1932); this perspective 
follows from the view that while shareholders may own firms, and in theory control them -  in 
practice they have little to no control; as firms grow and share ownership becomes diverse, 
the power of large shareholders is reduced. In addition, Hendry and Kiel (2004) point to the 
issue of information asymmetry to explain the concentrated power of management in decision 
making. They highlight that since management have an intimate and on-going knowledge of 
the day to day operations of the firm, the board and specifically the non-executive directors 
are likely to be at a disadvantage.
There is empirical evidence for the veracity o f this perspective; as highlighted recent failures 
in corporate governance have been blamed on the passivity of boards (Kakabadse et al., 
2011). Further, studies by Mace (1971) and Lorsch and Maclver (1989) examine boards 
under normal circumstances and while in crises; they both report that the decision making 
power tends to rest with management under normal circumstances with directors becoming 
involved in strategic decision making under times of crisis.
Ultimately, the hegemony perspective revolves around power -  whether it lies in the hands of
top management, or the board of directors as a whole. Yet, it could be argued that these
perspectives are somewhat outdated; empirical support has been questioned in the literature
(see Stiles and Taylor, 2001) and it has been argued that the passivity of boards has been
reduced since the 1980s (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). However, it is clear that corporate
governance reforms suggested in the UK and the US (see below) aim at increasing board and
director independence, implying that not only is hegemony still a concern but also a matter of 
importance.
2.3.2 The Role of the Board
As clear from the preceding section perspectives on corporate governance mechanisms vary 
and thus so too does the role and focus of the board of directors. It is also clear that the 
prescribed role of the board varies by geography, arguably due to the dominant corporate 
governance specific undertaken in different countries. For example, an Anglo-American view 
prioritises the importance of representing the interests of shareholders (Sison and Kleiner, 
2005). Whereas Tuschke and Sanders (2003) highlight that in Germany the board of directors 
is responsible for protecting the interests of other stakeholders, including the community and 
employees of the company. Therefore, objectives of boards, in terms of whose interests they
protect and prioritise will differ. Given this, it may be unwise to attempt to outline specific 
functions of the board -  as these are likely to vary by geography and the dominant 
perspective of corporate governance under which they operate. However, a broad working 
definition of the role of the board can be achieved by adapting Denis and McConnel’s (2005: 
251) definition of corporate governance to include stakeholders beyond the suppliers of 
capital:
“[Corporate governance is]... the set of mechanisms -  both institutional and market-based -  
that induce the self-interested controllers of a company (those that make decisions regarding 
how the company will be operated) to make decisions that maximize the value of the 
company to its owners (suppliers of capital) and other stakeholder groups”
Thus, for the present research the board of directors are understood as being responsible for 
deciding company operations achieved through exercising influencing on management, 
through the hiring, firing and compensating managers (Denise and McConnel, 2005); 
succession planning (Conlon and Smith, 2010); monitoring performance (Kemp, 2006), 
participating in strategic decision making, providing outside experience and wisdom, and 
reviewing strategic plans and their implementation (Nadler, 2004). Furthermore, the OECD 
(2004: 24-25) prescribes a number of key functions for the board of directors:
• Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of action, risk policy, annual 
budgets and business plans; setting performance objectives, monitoring and 
implementation and corporate performance; and overseeing major capital expenditure, 
acquisitions and other divestitures
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Monitoring the effectiveness of the company’s governance practices and making 
changes as needed
Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, replacing key executives 
and overseeing succession planning
Aligning key executives and board remuneration with the longer term interests of the 
company and its shareholders
Ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination and election process 
Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of management, board 
members and shareholders, including misuse of corporate assets and abuse of related
party transactions
Ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and financial reporting systems, 
including the independent audit and appropriate systems of control in place, in 
particular systems for risk management, financial and operational control, and 
compliance with the law and relevant standards 
Overseeing the process of disclosure and communications
Yet, it is clear that not all boards pursue these various activities to the same degree (see 
above). Furthermore, as Brunninge and Nordqvist (2004) highlight, some boards are passive, 
that is, they only exist to fulfil a legal obligation or requirement, particularly in the case of 
owner-managed firms (Huse, 1995); others operate principally to control management -  and 
protect shareholder wealth where as others operate in a service role -  providing advice and 
guidance to management (Forbes and Milliken, 1999).
Overall, there are two broad concerns for increasing board performance: one of which is the 
call for the re-examination of governance standards and protocols, and the other the
enhancement of board director capabilities. The proponents of the former reform have 
suggested that while governance foundations of corporations go unexamined, efforts to 
enhance director capabilities will be of little benefit (Bogle, 2005). Yet, some argue that 
further attention to corporate governance protocols and practice will increase administrative 
stipulation (Higgs, 2003; Wearing, 2005), and show little benefit as the cost of monitoring 
will overtake the benefits of improved performance especially as the capabilities of directors 
remain the same (Acemorglu, 2004). Indeed, writing on the literature that prescribes 
corporate governance form to increase board, it has been argued that: “close inspection of this 
literature reveals it is almost entirely based on subjective individual experience and anecdotal 
evidence. It fails to provide any systematic, empirically tested basis for setting standards, 
measuring performance, or examining the extent to which board performance may affect the 
work of the organization” (Jackson and Holland, 1998:159-60).
Alternatively, a call for a realistic approach asserts that it is the dynamic interaction of the 
board which requires attention rather than the myth of sole effectiveness of the leadership 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2008). The contracting view strongly suggests that the 
inappropriate and unwelcome director behaviour ought to be the focus of attention (Heidrick 
and Struggles, 2010). Thus, the latter asserts that in order to tackle the problem of poor board 
performance, directors need to re-examine their role and contribution, and acquire the skills 
and competencies needed to perform to exemplary standards (O’Higgins, 2009). Although 
numerous scholars have examined and proposed desired qualities and competencies for board 
directors (for example, Ingley and Van der Walt, 2003; Aguilera, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005) 
none have examined the issue within the context of Public Sector Boards (PSBs) in Abu 
Dhabi. In addition, much of this scholarly debate is Western-centric and may not be
appropriate given the dominant contextual socio-cultural values and practices of the Islamic 
world (Sameh, 2011).
Ultimately, the latter concern is favoured by the present work, and it is contended the search 
for prescriptions as to what corporate governance mechanisms should be adopted, and what 
boards should do may be futile. As Ardalan (2007: 506) highlights “an analysis of corporate 
governance necessarily requires a fundamental understanding of the worldviews underlying 
the views expressed with respect to the nature and role of corporate governance ” Ardalan’s 
point is of importance, since an understanding of the basic values and assumptions held by a 
researcher will have significant impact on not just the way in which a research study is 
approached, but also, the way in which it is to be understood and evaluated by others (Hussey 
and Hussey, 1997). The research philosophy adopted in the present work is discussed in 
detail in chapter 4. However, it is necessary to highlight that the present research adopts a 
broadly ‘interpretivist’ stand and more specifically that of “Realism” approach and thus, 
following Ardalan, views corporate governance principles as being largely pluralistic, that is 
there are no universal corporate governance principles that cover all societies, cultures or 
corporations. Rather, corporate governance principles are to be viewed as historically and 
contextually based, determined and continuously re-determined by the attitudes, values and 
behaviour of relevant social actors (Silverman, 2005). This approach recognizes that what is 
required for “good” corporate governance and the roles and behaviours of those concerned 
with the operation of the board are likely to change over time. Aside from the philosophical 
merits of such a position, an investigation which may be left to other students, it is clear that 
this view has some empirical support; corporate governance systems do vary by country and 
culture (Keasey et al., 2005) and have developed over time (Aras and Crowther, 2010).
The present research aims at determining the key capabilities for increased effectiveness of 
Public Sector Board of Directors performance in the Abu Dhabi public sector. Thus, the focus 
of the review is not aimed at determining any overall “best” system or principles of 
governance but rather with how at a given point in time in the context of the study, directors 
capabilities may act to improve performance. Thus, in the following review the literature is 
drawn from a wide range of sources and ultimately the veracity and value of these scholarly 
insights are discussed for the present research in the discussion chapter (see chapter 6).
2.4 FACTORS AFFECTING  BO ARD EFFECTIVENESS
Precisely what is meant by the term board effectiveness; and the related questions of what 
behaviours are desirable in board members is a complex question, and one which has 
received considerable attention in the corporate governance literature (Conger et al., 2001;
Schmidt and Brauer, 2006).
But precisely how to determine board effectiveness remains a divisive issue (Petrovic, 2008); 
others have stated that the major challenge in studying board effectiveness is determining 
how to define and measure board effectiveness (Herman et al., 1997). This is problematic -  if 
it is unclear what board effectiveness amounts too, then efforts to increase board 
effectiveness may fall short of the mark. Numerous studies, evaluate board effectiveness by 
taking a company’s financial performance as a proxy (see for example, Vafeas, 1999; 
Abdullah, 2004; Anderson et al., 2004; McIntyre, 2008). Such, an approach is widespread in 
the literature -  and is arguably well grounded; if, as suggested the board has a significant 
impact on firm operations then the success of the firm should reflect the success of the board.
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Yet, as highlighted above, it often appears that boards are effective -  precisely until they are 
not.
Comforth (2001) states that, in the western hemisphere there is an understanding that the 
governance of non-profit and voluntary organisations is highly problematic; with the 
effectiveness of governance mechanisms still being questioned. Determining board 
effectiveness for public sector boards can be seen as even more problematic than for their 
private sector counterparts. While the boards of private sector firms are principally 
concerned with the organisational objectives of profit maximization those of public sector 
firms often have less clear objectives -  set by politicians which are difficult to measure, such 
as “raising educational standards” (Rose and Lawton, 1999: 81), resulting in a tendency to 
merely measure that which is measurable. Thus, if board effectiveness is understood as 
impacting on organisational performance (see above), and this is difficult to measure -  then it 
seems improbable that organisation performance is to be a useful proxy for board 
effectiveness in the public sector. Rather than being a stumbling block this strand of thought 
provides evidence for the position argued for below: that those best able to determine what 
board effectiveness amounts to, and more importantly for the present research -  what 
capabilities directors require — are the directors themselves. Indeed, this is another common 
approach — to make use of various stakeholders in a firm, and ask them to provide the 
evaluation of board effectiveness (see for example, Bradshaw et al., 1992; Herman et al., 
1997). This approach is rooted in the social constructionist paradigm -  there is no real board 
or board effectiveness, there are merely perceptions of the board and of effectiveness that can 
be offered by different stakeholders (Herman et al., 1997). Adopting such an approach is 
especially useful in the public sector context -  where various stakeholders exist; and whose 
interest the board is supposed to serve.
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Studies that examine board effectiveness (regardless of how it is conceptualised) fall into 
roughly two streams (Pearce II and Zahra, 1991; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Dahya et al., 
2002; Abdullah, 2004; Lam and Lee, 2008; Boemer et al., 2011). Some address issues which 
are easy to observe, measure and regulate from outside the organisation such as board 
structure and composition, while the other addresses issues that are harder to observe such as 
board dynamics and interpersonal relationships: and these are broadly the two sets of issues
that boards face (Sherwin, 2003).
In what follows the issues of board structure/composition and diversity and their espoused 
relationship to board effectiveness are considered in turn.
2.4.1 Board Structure/Composition
Studies that focus on board structure/composition focus on three main areas: CEO duality, the 
number of executive directors to non-executive directors (EDs and NEDs respectively) and 
the diversity of the board, considering such factors as age, tenure, cultural background and 
similar (Eisenberg, 1998; Mak and Yuanto, 2002; Judge and Zeithmal, 2002; McIntyre et al., 
2008). The result of the literature review reveals that studies of these factors show mixed 
results, suggesting, ultimately that board effectiveness is not solely influenced by
structure/composition.
2.4.1.1 CEO Duality
CEO duality refers to the situation where one individual on the board occupies the role of 
both CEO and Chairman, and thus, has responsibility for both the operations of the company 
and the monitoring of its actions — through control of the board. Those scholars that favour 
the agency perspective (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976) of the role of the board see this as
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detrimental, when the management have too much influence over both selection of board 
members, and the monitoring of the company there is little scope for challenging the actions 
of management (Abdullah, 2004), reducing independence and arguably creating a conflict of 
interest (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989). In such a situation there is no separation between 
control and management (Fama and Jensen, 1983); as Abdullah highlights the question then 
becomes “who watches the watchers?” (2004: 52). Indeed, much of the literature supports the 
view that the roles of CEO and chairman should be separated; and this is one of the principal 
recommendations of the significant Cadbury (1992) reforms in the UK. By contrast those 
who favour a stewardship perspective, argue that managers should be considered good 
stewards of the company and inherently trustworthy (Donaldson, 1990). In line with Lam and 
Lee (2008) this perspective views managers as being motivated by challenging work, and 
acting in self-interest which is tied up with the fortunes of the company However, empirical
evidence reveals little consensus.
Abdullah’s (2004) quantitative study of the board of directors of over 1000 non-fmancial 
companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange between 1994 and 1996 showed that 
around 80% of these companies adopted a non-dual leadership structure. The findings of the 
study reveal that CEO duality or non-duality is not related to firm performance.
Alternatively, Lam and Lee’s (2008) quantitative study of 128 companies listed on the Main 
Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2003 reveal mixed results. They found that CEO 
duality and accounting performance are both positively related in non-family owned firms, 
and negatively related in non-family owned firms. They suggest that ultimately there is no 
one best form of board leadership, but that contextual factors (such as ownership structure) 
need to be taken into account. Others such as Leblanc and Gillies (2003) argue that what is
most important is not the separation of the CEO and Chairman roles, but that the correct 
individual is selected to the Chairman position, whether they also act as the CEO or not.
Brickley et al (1997) suggest that a preference for CEO duality or non-duality both bring 
costs and benefits; the benefits being increased monitoring resulting from the separation of 
the roles, while the downsides include increased costs of supporting the two positions, 
possibility of incomplete information being shared between the two appointees. Ultimately 
the review of the literature reveals that is difficult to be prescriptive about leadership
structure.
2.4.2 Mix of Executive and Non-Executive Directors
A second stream of the literature that addresses board structure/composition focuses on the 
independence of the board, by examining the ratio of EDs to NEDs. NEDs are not a 
homogenous group, as Ezzamel and Watson (2005) note, some achieve their positions on 
board due to some pre-existing relationship with the firm, such as being a former executive, 
an important customer, or supplier and so on. However, others achieve their position through 
appointment and have no pre-existing ties to the firm -  and benefit only from the 
remuneration (if any) that they receive. Following Ezzamel and Watson (2005) the term 
NEDs is used to refer to this latter group of directors, unless otherwise stated
As with the question of CEO duality, author’s perspectives vary according to their 
perspective of corporate governance. Those who favour the agency perspective argue for a 
greater number of NEDs who act as detached outsiders, advising the board, monitoring 
activity and protecting shareholders. The need for such individuals is clear, as firms grow in 
size and business complexity, the direct monitoring o f the firm and its activities becomes
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advanced
experiences and knowledge (or more broadly capabilities) are required to understand and
unknowledgeable
outsiders would not be able to perform. By contrast, those in favour of the stewardship 
approach argue for a greater number of EDs who as knowledgeable insiders are well versed 
in the firm and its operations (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003); and are thus better placed to
alternatives and make decisions quickly without the need
approval from outsiders
The perceived importance of the role NEDs are expected to play in ensuring independence 
can be seen in corporate governance reform in both the US and the UK. The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act in 2002 suggested that Audit committees be composed of outside directors that have no 
other financial relationship or stake in the firm. In the UK the Cadbury Report (1992) 
recommends that boards have at least three NEDs (Dahya et al„ 2002) and the Higgs Report 
(2003) recommends that at least 50% of the board (not including the Chairman) is composed 
of NEDs. Yet, it is not clear that these NEDs can perform their roles effectively. As Ezzamel 
and Watson (2005: 98) highlight, NEDs in the UK and US are now expected to undertake a 
dual role, they are expected to participate fully in board activity being as responsible for the 
formulation and management of strategy as their full-time colleagues, whilst being “primarily 
responsible for ensuring the quality and reliability of corporate information disclosures, 
keeping executives focussed on the generation of shareholder value, via the design and 
implementation of appropriate employment and remuneration schemes, and the disciplining 
of their executive director colleagues who appear to be underperforming As Keasey and 
Hudson (2002) highlight, if NEDs are also responsible for corporate performance then it is 
unclear how they can maintain independence -  acting to increase corporate performance is a
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role that requires working closely with EDs. As Leblanc and Giles (2003) note, social 
relationships, friendships and other forms of conflict do affect independence.
The central issue is whether it is possible to retain independence while undertaking this role. 
Director roles, independent or non-executive, have recently been studied on the assumption 
that boards are unable to have an independent voice. Reform in the USA and the UK has 
constituted the creation of the roles of the lead independent director (LID) and the senior 
independent director (SID), respectively. In order to guarantee the expression of an 
independent opinion, the government have initiated inquiries and recommended a template 
for the independent director role, (Higgs, 2003). Recently, the value of such prescription has 
been challenged in a study of UK board directors which has shown that the SID is as 
vulnerable to dysfunctional board dynamics as any other member (Kakabadse et al., 2009). 
Moreover, few scarce studies suggest that the NED’s capability consists of acquisition of 
capabilities, and experiences such as functional skills, sector expertise, networking linkages, 
and mentoring and coaching competencies (Taylor, 2004), supported by an independence of 
mind However, how NEDs react to stretching challenges and how board dynamics can 
enhance or inhibit the contributions of the board director require further investigations (Daily 
et al., 2003). A further concern of NED independence is offered by Vancil (1987) who notes 
that the CEO often has significant power and influence over the selection of NEDs. If the 
intention is to appoint those that are sympathetic to the CEOs vision and generally 
acquiescent, then whether the NEDs are judged as observably independent is of little 
importance. Yet, this is another point of contention -  as Westphal (1999) highlights, CEOs 
who have close social ties to outside directors are more likely to seek advice from them; 
suggesting that close ties (which may reduce independence) may help NEDs to perform their
role effectively.
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The notion that NEDs increase independence and so firm performance is not a belief that is 
limited to those who prescribe corporate governance reforms. There is evidence that poor 
firm performance often leads to the appointment of NEDs to increase monitoring (Hermalin 
and Weisenbach, 1998) highlighting that those that sit on boards share the belief that NEDs 
have a worthwhile impact on monitoring and control. Further, following the Cadbury Report, 
firms in the UK appointed more NEDs, increasing board size (Ezzamel and Watson, 2005).
However, the degree to which the ratio NEDs to EDs is beneficial for performance is not 
clear from a review of empirical studies within the relevant literature. As with the issue of
CEO duality, the issue is contested, and the literature is contradictory.
Alternatively, Kaplan and Minton’s (1994) study of Japan finds that outside Director 
appointments increase after poor financial performance, and find that on average these 
appointments leads to a modest increase in firm performance -  suggesting both a recognition 
that outside Directors are of benefit to board performance, and such appointments actually are 
beneficial. In addition, evidence gathered by Hossain et al (2002) in New Zealand finds that 
outside Directors also increase firm performance. Similarly, Pearce II and Zahra (1991) find 
that boards with greater numbers of outside directors have better financial performance than
those with fewer.
McNulty and Pettigrew’s (1999) study of over one hundred executives in the UK found that 
NEDs were able to influence strategic choice and the methods and process by which ideas 
were evaluated and developed. Further, NEDs influence on strategic choice was found to be 
moderated by the process of board meeting and the informal communications between
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directors outside of the board room -  highlighting the importance of interpersonal 
relationships and the ability to make use of interpersonal skills.
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) found that outside directors have no significant impact on 
firm performance; further changes in board membership were associated with CEO turnover, 
changes in ownership structure and firm performance. The former, is arguably beneficial if 
CEO turnover occurs as a result of the perception on the behalf of the board of poor CEO 
performance. Further, Abdullah’s (2004) aforementioned study reveals that board
independence has no effect on firm performance.
Thus, it is unclear whether a board benefits from a greater ratio of NEDs to EDs, or, more 
specifically from observable independence. Since the independence of a director is generally 
used as a proxy, to highlight that these individuals are likely to act in the best interests of the 
firm, it can be argued that what is more important than meeting an observable test of 
independence is that they simply do act in the best interests of the firm. The importance of 
director ability and action is considered in section 2.5
Board composition also creates (and with the inclusion of new directors, changes) power 
relationships amongst directors (Ezzamel and Watson, 2005) -  highlighting the importance of 
taking an OB perspective in understanding board effectiveness. It is well recognized that 
power has a significant effect on group dynamics and interactions (Mullins, 2007)
2.4.3 Board Diversity
The literature on board diversity is vast, but as with the other issues of board composition 
considered, the literature yields little consensus as to the importance of, and the most
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preferable degree or type o f diversity for increasing firm performance The literature is 
mainly concerned with determining whether homogeneity of demographic characteristics 
(age, gender, tenure, educational background, and the like) is beneficial for board 
performance, again using firm performance as a proxy. This stream of c o l l a t e  governance 
research can be traced back to Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) seminal work that proposed the 
“upper echelon theory” which posits that it is only a few managers at the top of organisations 
-  the dominant coalition (see, Child, 1972; Cyet and March, 1983) that have the most 
influence over decision making and organisational performance. Yet as Liang and Picken 
(2011) point out, this suggestion is not what made their work seminal, rather it is the 
methodology they proposed -  that differences in observable and recordable characteristics in 
individuals will be reflective of social and cognitive differences This view is partially 
supported, Liang and Picken’s own study of 28 management teams, comprising 348 
executives in the US found some evidence for theory; and prior research in the area supports
the view (see for example, Miller, 1993).
There seems to widespread support for the notion that homogeneity is preferable; the Higgs 
report (2003) also highlights the need for diversity amongst NEDs, suggesting that a selection 
of NEDs with different skills and abilities is preferable to a more homogenous grouping. The 
UK Department of Trade and Industry’s (2004) publication “Building Better Boards also 
argued for the benefit of diversity on boards, arguing that diversity in factors such as age, 
experience, skills, knowledge and cultural background provide greater prospects for creativity 
and capability -  and that being able to draw on a wide range of perspectives will allow the 
greater anticipation of problems and better decision making.
However, empirical evidence is mixed. A recent study by Boemer et al (2011) considered 
TMT diversity (in line with other research) as the extent to which members are
heterogeneous, focussing on age, organisational tenure, dominant education background and
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dominant industry experience. This longitudinal study made use of a final sample of 59 
TMTs located in Germany from nine different industry sectors, the performance data, the 
diversity data from the year 2004 was compared with financial data for the years 2004-2007. 
Overall, it was found that diversity in TMTs is no guarantee of financial performance; but 
that diversity can be positive in the short-term while not being so in the long-term. They 
suggest that this may be because medium levels of longevity among a social group facilitates 
social integration and collective learning, whereas too much longevity leads to decreased 
outside communication and detrimental levels of team cohesion.
In a similar vein, McIntyre et al (2008) found limited evidence for their overall thesis that 
boards that are made up of directors with a diverse range of attributes (age, tenure, experience 
and board size) perform better. Their quantitative analysis of 1,678 board members on 173 
boards listed on the Canadian S&P/TSX Index in 2001 yielded mixed results. They found 
that diversity among directors with respect to tenure and age was beneficial for firm 
performance, but only to an extent, after which firm performance decreases. In addition, they 
found that smaller boards are associated with better firm performance.
This is somewhat consistent with the position espoused by Judge and Zeithmal (2002), that 
larger boards are less efficient — reducing participation and group cohesion, while also 
making consensus harder to reach. Indeed, this is a common theme of literature on board 
diversity that has been carried out in different contexts: Mak and Yuanto (2002) studied 
boards in Singapore and Malaysia and found that larger board sizes were associated
70
negatively with firm performance; similarly a study o f Finnish SMEs by Eisenberg et al 
(1998) reports the same relationship. In addition, Jensen (1993) argues that causes of poor 
governance include overly large board size and unskilled board members. Arguably, it is the 
latter that is most important, and it could be argued that it is not the size o f the board that is 
important -  but the abilities of the directors to deal with the dynamics o f a large group; there 
is evidence for this, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) found that increases in board size are 
negatively associated with decision making abilities and firm performance.
McIntyre et al (2008) also found that a high average o f directors with outside interests 
negatively affected firm performance and this finding supports the view that directors need to 
be committed to their role (Leblanc and Giles, 2003) and have the necessary time to fulfil 
their responsibilities (Keasey and Hudson, 2002; Leblanc and Giles, 2003).
Yet, research by Young (2004), argues that social capital defined for their purposes as 
external director memberships i.e. whereby a board director sits on a number of other boards 
is of strategic value to firms. The study of 256 companies listed on the TSE in 2002 produced 
evidence that there is a positive association between Tobins Q and social capital, suggesting 
that who executives know is as important as what they know. The notion that social capital is 
valuable is seen in previous research; it has been suggested that directors sitting on other 
boards reduces uncertainty with respect to resource availability (Burt, 1980) and provides 
access to wider strategic information (Haveman, 1993).
Generally, diverse TMTs face many obstacles; the integration of individuals with different 
characteristics is difficult (Carson et al., 2004) and makes cohesion, communication and 
socialisation difficult (Jackson et al., 1992). Diverse TMTs have been associated with higher
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turnover and absenteeism (Milliken and Martens, 1996). As a review by Hambrick et al 
(1996) points out -  there is theoretical support for the propositions that diversity amongst
TMTs can have both positive and negative effects.
Arguably, the issue is not one of whether diversity is positive or negative per se, but rather of 
whether board members, can deal with diversity and realise the potential benefits. There is 
some evidence that sensitivity training can help -  but again, the results are mixed (Flynn, 
1998). That diversity in groups brings challenges and conflicts is clear (Mullins, 2007); but 
so too do the everyday operations of the board; the following section considers board
dynamics.
2.4.4 Board Dynamics and Director Capabilities
Despite the elusive nature of board effectiveness (McIntyre et al., 2007); directors are in a 
crucial position to significantly impact firm performance (Sonnefeld, 2002). It has been 
posited that in practice "directorial competence and board effectiveness are interrelated” 
(Coulson-Thomas, 1994: 34) and it is argued that competence requirements for directors stem 
from what is necessary to improve the operation ot the board and what is needed to 
complement the attributes of colleagues, and that board effectiveness can be affected by the 
strengths and weaknesses of individual members perception. Furthermore, as Sherwin (2003) 
notes, although the board shares the responsibility for overseeing the achievement of its 
goals, directors must take responsibility for their role in the company s success (Clarke,
2005).
However, despite this crucial role, there is evidence to suggest that directors often lack the 
requisite competences to undertake the responsibilities and duties associated with their
72
position (Norbum and Schurz, 1998). Thus, they may act to limit board effectiveness through 
personality conflicts, incompatibility, lack o f skills and knowledge, and differences in 
attitudes motivations and commitment (Coulson-Thomas, 1994).
Numerous authors highlight -  or imply, that boards can be considered as any other small 
group within an organisation (see for example, Conger et al., 1998; Leblanc and Gillies, 
2003; Petrovic, 2008) and thus can be seen as being susceptible to, and influenced by those 
factors that affect such groups. The theorists that follow this line of inquiry argue that what 
makes boards effective is not board composition, or mechanisms o f corporate governance 
(although these clearly have some impact) but how directors act as a part of this social 
grouping -  being effective in their roles (Leblanc, 2001; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). The 
argument that is central is that it is impossible to have an effective board -  without an 
effective director (Leblanc and Gillies, 2003).
importance
Comforth (2001) in his quantitative postal survey of 737 charities registered in England and 
Wales suggested that the two main inputs presented by board members are skills and 
experience they are able to bring to their role and the amount of time they are able to devote. 
While other variables in the study included board structures, processes and outputs, the 
important conclusion for the present work is that when taken together, having the right mix of 
skills and experience provided a positive variance in board effectiveness, as did the 
importance of board members being able to resolve conflicts between themselves 
constructively. A different perspective on board effectiveness is presented by Conger et al 
(1998); their study argues that for dealing with complex matters such as CEO appraisal,
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board effectiveness is determined by five factors: knowledge, information, power, motivation
and time.
Table 2.2: Conger et al.’s Five Determinants of Board Effectiveness
Determinant _________________________ 1Description
Knowledge The experience and knowledge of the board 
must match strategic demand
The board should have a mix of 
complementary skills and backgrounds
An optimized mix of expertise from each 
individual director
Information The correct quantity and quality of 1 
information delivered in a timely fashion 
from both internal and external stakeholders
Power An effective board requires the correct 
degree of independence and power to hold 
the CEO accountable for performance and to 
make key decisions
Motivation Incentives should be in place that motivate [ 
directors to perform well -  with a preference 
for a long-term orientation for financial
reward
Time 1 Directors require sufficient time to consider, 
review and make decisions !
Source: Adapted from Conger et al (1998)
While their discussion is focussed on the task of CEO appraisal a more general reading of the 
work provides a usefiil prescription for board effectiveness in general (see Table 2.2):
Considered from the perspective of small groups it is clear that many factors will affect the 
social relationships between members; which in turn affect behaviour (Mullins, 2007). It is 
evident from the preceding sections that the corporate governance mechanisms that are 
undertaken by boards and board composition (CEO duality, ratio of EDs to NEDs and 
diversity of members) lead to issues at the social and group level. In this section these are
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considered in more detail -  and the capabilities required by directors to deal with, mitigate or
maximise these issues are considered.
In what follows, the term capabilities is used as an umbrella term to cover the qualities, 
competencies, skill and experiences required in members. Further, a distinction is made 
between what the researcher has termed enabling capabilities (EC), such as time and 
motivation that are necessary for the operation and the enactment o f primary capabilities 
(PC), such as interpersonal communication skills, creating trust, managing conflict
2.4.4.1 Enabling Capabilities: Motivation
Studies highlight that directors require sufficient motivation to perform well, and in the 
interests of the firm (Conger et al., 1998; Sherwin, 2003; Roberts et al., 2005). The degree to 
which directors are motivated, will o f course vary -  Conger et al (1998) highlight the 
importance of providing financial incentives; whereas those in the public sector may be 
simply motivated by the notion o f working in the interest o f the public good (Rose and 
Lawton, 2008). The general importance o f motivation for individuals engaged in work tasks 
has a long history; if defined generally as the impetus to act (Mullins, 2007) it is clear that 
even those directors that may have the capabilities described in this section are unlikely to be 
effective if they are unwilling to enact those capabilities in the pursuit of firm performance. 
Indeed, it is well established that no amount of ability, without motivation will engender 
performance (for example, see the review by Hucyznski and Buchanan, 2007). Thus, the
researcher proposes the following:
EC1: Directors must be motivated to perform well and in the interests of the firm
2.4.4.2 Enabling Capabilities: Time
The importance of directors having sufficient time to undertake their duties is highlighted by 
Conger et al (1998). Further, Keasey and Hudson (2002) suggest that this is even more 
important for NEDs, who have other commitments, and act as part-time members of the 
board (Ezzamel and Watson, 2005). Yet, it is difficult to be prescriptive about the amount of 
time required; for directors operating on primarily passive boards (Brunninge and Nordqvist, 
2004) little time may be needed; whereas those operating on boards which have a monitoring 
and control, or service roles (Forbes and Milliken, 1999) may need more time to perform 
their duties. Despite the inability to be prescriptive it is evident, prima facie that directors 
require sufficient time to perform their tasks, thus:
EC2: Directors must have sufficient time to perform their duties
The researcher contends that these two ECs are together necessary but not sufficient for 
director effectiveness (and so board effectiveness) as without the desire to act, and the time to 
do so directors will be unable or unwilling to put the PCs necessary for effectiveness to use.
2.4.4.3 Primary Capabilities: Managing Conflict
Conflict can be viewed from different perspectives (Mullins, 2007); and need not be negative; 
when conflict is seen as negative it is expected to cause frustration, friction and wasted 
energy (Drucker, 1989). This is one of the oft reported downsides to a diverse group; while 
conflict presents difficulties the establishment of group norms, and processes for effective 
working can help reduce conflict and promote effectiveness amongst teams (Tuckman, 1965).
Yet conflict, particularly task conflict can be viewed as positive; Taffinder (1998) argues that 
those firms that stimulate conflict about the best way to approach tasks are likely to perform 
better; although it is recognized that there is likely to be an optimal level. Task conflict is 
common amongst boards (Petrovic, 2008). Such conflict is most likely to arise when directors 
take on a monitoring and control role, or are offering advice; offering, evaluating and 
eventually selecting from different ideas requires that some viewpoints are necessarily found
to be lacking.
There is a greater chance for task conflict amongst heterogeneous boards, as members bring 
different skills, experiences, benefit from different industry and education backgrounds and 
so have different perspectives which may lead to dispute. Some see this, as beneficial -  
enhancing creativity (Renton, 1999; DTI, 2004) and improving monitoring and control
(Forbes and Milliken, 1993).
Whether one chooses to see conflict as positive or negative, it is likely to be unavoidable, 
since conflict can be managed (Thomas, 1976; Hatch, 1997; Robbins, 1998) the researcher
proposes:
PC I: Directors must be able to manage conflict 
2.4.4 4 Primary Capabilities: Acting independently
While independence (as highlighted in previous sections) may be of importance; what is 
likely to be of more importance is that directors actually act independently -  that is they act 
in accordance with their own beliefs and preferences and do not feel constrained by others 
such that they cannot act freely. This is often reported in the literature, for example, Conger
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et al (1998) highlight that directors must have sufficient power to question and challenge the 
CEO Jensen et al (1993) note that directors must be willing to speak; have an independence 
of mind and be active (Roberts et al., 2005) and act independently (Turnbull, 2000).
Numerous, factors may impede the ability of directors to act in such a fashion. One of these is 
group homogeneity: while heterogeneous groups may face issues of conflict, homogenous 
groups may face issues of “group-think”. There are benefits to homogenous groups; such 
groups are likely to develop interpersonal trust more easily and to interact more effectively 
with each other (Hambrick et al., 2001; Westphal and Bednar, 2005). Yet, when groups 
become overly homogenous, they are susceptible to group-think; a phenomena whereby 
members of a group feel the need to avoid conflict, and so acquiesce with preferred decision 
alternatives without proper scrutiny (Janis, 1982). Such an occurrence clearly impacts on the 
directors ability (and the board as a whole) to perform its control/monitoring and advisory
roles.
Similarly, board culture, understood broadly as the basic beliefs, values and assumptions 
shared by a group that result in a pattern of behavioural norms (Schein, 1972) can affect 
director and board effectiveness. As Jensen (1993: 863) highlights: “Board culture is an 
important component of board failure. The great emphasis on politeness and courtesy at the 
expense of truth and frankness in boardrooms is both a symptom and cause of failure in the 
control system”. Thus, directors must be able to challenge, or shirk board culture -  even at 
the expense of social reprisal; there is evidence that when group norms are rejected, 
individuals are likely to be ostracized (Goffman, 1959; Sherif, 1963) and the violation of 
group norms can lead to wider conflict (Ito and Botheridge, 2010) — again highlighting the 
importance of directors being able to manage conflict. Furthermore, Jensen (1993) highlights
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PC2: Directors must act independently
2.4.4.5 Fostering Trust and a Perception of Professionalism
The literature
highlights the importance o f trust; CEOs are more likely to trust those that they
have social ties to and seek and take on board their advice (Westphal, 1991); trust has been 
said to play a large part in board room dynamics (Roberts et aL, 2005); and helps to facilitate
open
communication between directors and a willingness to share concerns (Westphal and
Bednar
. 2005). In addition, Sherwin (2003) highlights the importance of directors being
perceived as professional by their colleagues The issues of trust and the perception of 
professionalism are intertwined under certain theoretical perspectives.
The seminal paper by McAllister’s (1995) posited a two factor theory of interpersonal trust 
He distinguishes between affect based trust which is akin to a warm personal relationship, 
almost a friendship between individuals and cognition-based trust, which is based on the 
perception that the other is competent and reliable Further, recent studies in the field of 
knowledge management (see, Holste and Fields, 2010) have provided empirical evidence that 
an individual’s desire to share ideas with another and make use o f those ideas received is 
moderated by levels of affect and cognition based trust. Trust need not develop organically it 
can be actively created (Webber, 2002, Huxham and Vangen, 2005). In addition, as Goffman 
(1959) notes, individuals in social settings make use o f the behaviours that are associated
with their profession; they play the role expected of them by their audience. In doing so, they 
have the opportunity to adopt behaviours, artefacts and so on that convinces their audience of 
their authenticity and their suitability for their role they are playing, in other words: their 
professionalism. Ultimately, the perception of professionalism as a by product of presentation 
is something that can be managed.
Since, interpersonal trust can be created and the perception of professionalism can be 
managed, the researcher proposes:
PC3: Directors must be capable of fostering a sense of trust and a perception of 
professionalism
2.4.4.6 Expertise, Skills and Strategic Awareness
Barrick et al (1998) highlight the importance of selecting directors who can contribute 
meaningfully to the collective effort of the board, and judge these to be those with the 
appropriate personality, knowledge, skills and abilities. Further, it is commonly highlighted 
in the literature that directors require the necessary skills and expertise to perform their roles 
(Conger et al., 1998; Comforth, 2001 Leblanc and Gillies, 2003; Taylor, 2004; O’Higgins, 
2009). It is difficult to be prescriptive about the functional skills and expertise that directors 
need -  as this will necessarily depend upon the particular roles and tasks they are required to 
perform.
Furthermore, directors play an important role in strategy (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; 
Nadler, 2004; Ezzamel and Watson, 2005) providing guidance, advice and monitoring the 
activities of the firm. To perform this role requires an understanding of the business of the
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firm, and of its external business environment (Johnson et al., 2008) and these are capabilities 
often highlighted as being of importance for directors (Coulson-Thomas, 1991; Pye and
Pettigrew, 2005).
Thus, the researcher proposes:
PC4: Directors require the requisite skills and expertise to perform their roles and 
tasks; and
PC5: Directors require strategic awareness 
2.4 4.7 Communication
The importance of communication skills is evident in much of the literature (Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2001; Nadler, 2004; Huse, 2005) as when directors are able to communicate 
openly, it is possible to discuss and entertain multiple perspectives and engage in a dialogue 
that is underpinned by constructive conflict. Further, communicating openly has been found 
to increase trust (Sherwin, 2003) and as highlighted it is likely to require trust for its 
occurrence (Holste and Fields, 2010) suggesting that the relationship between communication
and trust is not uni-directional.
Communicating openly, may also require the shirking o f board culture. What is deemed to be 
acceptable communication (tone, content etc) is based to a large extent on the social norms 
and values of a given group (Goffman, 1959). Therefore, it is not always easy for directors to 
communicate openly, especially if one fears reprisals (Jensen, 1993). Despite this when 
directors operate in a monitoring and control, or supervisory role — communicating openly is
clearly of importance: an independence of mind is of no benefit unless it is vocalized. Thus, 
the researcher proposes:
PC6: Directors require communication skills
2.5 EXPLORATORY FRAMEWORK
It is evident that correct identification of the relevant areas of the research is crucial for
conducting this research. The review of the literature in the field of role theory, in particular, 
has assisted the researcher to better understand the diversity views and concepts available to 
explain the behaviour of the participant directors. Thus, based on the above critical discussion 
it has been argued that the best predictor of board effectiveness is likely to be director 
effectiveness and a number of capabilities have been drawn from the literature, resulting in an 
exploratory framework (see Figure 2.3 below) that is to be used to guide data collection:
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It must be noted that the aforementioned capabilities form the bases for exploration into the 
director’s perception and views on the extent to which these and other factors may or may not 
influence their and the boards effectiveness. As pointed out earlier the cultural forces 
including Islamic values system have immense influence on the way members of the board 
think and value their role when engaged in board operations (Sameh, 2011). Thus, the 
proposed exploratory framework constitutes a solid basis from which to gain a better 
understanding of the board members and their need for required capabilities.
Figure 2.3: Exploratory Framework of Key Capabilities Necessary for Improving Board
Effectiveness
•  Manage conflict
•  Act independently
•  Fostering
Required for -> interpersonal trust
and a perception of 
professionalism
• Relevant expertise 
and skills
•  Strategic awareness
•  Communication skills
Source: Adapted from Holste and Fields, (2010); Ito and Botheridge, (2010);); Petrovic, (2008); 
Analoui (2007); Hucyznski and Buchanan, (2007); McIntyre et al., (2007); Clarke, (2005); Leblanc 
(2001); Pye and Pettigrew (2005); Keasey and Hudson (2002); Comforth (2001); Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse (2001); Conger et al (1998) Coulson-Thomas, (1994)
2.5.1 The Applicability of Determined Capabilities to Abu Dhabi PSBs
In the above section a variety o f literature has been consulted and reviewed to determine two 
sets of capabilities that board directors require to be effective. Yet, as Coulson-Thomas 
(1994: 33) highlights “what is required... [for a competent director]...can depend very much 
on the situation, circumstances, context and aspirations of the particular company’ 
and it may therefore be unwise to prescribe these for each board.
In addition, the majority of the prescribed qualities originate from studies with a 
predominantly Western perspective (Al-Meer, 1996), and it is unclear therefore whether these 
qualities will be of equal importance for directors on PSBs in Abu Dhabi.
Furthermore, while the literature reveals little consensus as to the importance and appropriate 
corporate governance mechanisms (that constrain director behaviour), and board
• Motivation
• Time
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composition; it has been argued throughout that these will impact upon the director 
behaviour, and thus effectiveness. Thus, the capabilities are proposed only tentatively; it is 
recognized that organisation, and regulatory context may influence the degree to which these 
capabilities are desirable and necessary in the context of PSBs.
Moreover, examination of single factors such as capabilities, governance competences or 
protocol in Abu Dhabi, without considering Islamic work ethic (Yousef, 2001), may not 
provide a holistic picture of what influences the behaviour of the directors (Analoui, 2007). 
There is then a further need and necessity to explore needed competencies of the board 
members for increased effectiveness and improved performance, as they are (Analoui et al., 
2010), in context of social and civil service corporation realities in Abu Dhabi, dominated by 
Islamic values and beliefs (Abuznaid, 2006; Sameh, 2011).
Moreover, the present research philosophical stand in so far as the methodological needs are 
concerned, does not rely purely on the perception, though extremely important, rather it 
adopts “realism” as a position which considers the contextual realities with which board 
members work. This is also in line with Analoui (2007) “Choice Model” which emphasises 
on the effectiveness of the senior management, and indeed the quality of the decisions made, 
as being influenced by both internal and external factors. The adoption of realism includes 
tangible organisational realities such as boards’ instructions, operational rules and regulations 
and legislative recommendations, as well as the cultural and traditional values (see above) do 
influence, to lesser or greater extent, the behaviour of the board members in PSBs and 
therefore will be considered when collecting relevant data from the field (see chapters three 
and four). The proposed research aims to fill this gap within the relevant literature.
SUMMARY
Within this chapter first the literature on the concept and theories o f ‘role’ have been 
explored in order to highlight the sociological origin and its, attributes and its relevance for 
understanding organisational behaviour in particular the board members. The two major 
perspectives namely structuralism and interpretivism have been critically look at and various
concepts si 
importantly
details. However, it was illustrated that neither of these perspectives can fully explain the
behaviour of the directors as they are therefore, it was suggested that an integrative approach 
would better explain the behaviour of the board members since it also includes the analysis of
structure
effectiveness.
The second part of the review, focused on different perspectives of corporate governance, 
board effectiveness and the capabilities required by directors to increase board effectiveness
have been critically considered.
The discussion on perspectives o f corporate governance examined agency theory, 
stewardship theory, stakeholder theory and managerial hegemony. Following from this 
discussion it was concluded that the precise role of the board -  that is, what board members 
should and will actually do will be to a large extent dependent on the way in which their role 
is conceived and presented to them; which will depend in part on the socio-historical context 
of the firm and the external governance regulations that prescribe both what behaviours are 
possible and desirable. Ultimately, it was argued that to be prescriptive about the role of the
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board and how corporate governance mechanisms should operate is difficult -  these matters
are determined largely by the philosophical position adopted by the researcher, and will be
influenced by the socio-hist oric context of the firm.
The review of the literature on board effectiveness concluded that board effectiveness is 
difficult to define. The key question for those scholars that wish to examine board 
effectiveness is how board effectiveness it is to be defined and measured. Two streams of 
literature were discerned: one makes use of firm financial performance as a proxy for board 
performance while the other, adopting a social-constructionist or similar philosophical 
positions holds that the notion of the “board” and of “effectiveness” are social constructs, and 
thus cannot be investigated independently of the beliefs, values and perceptions of those who 
create and continually re-create, and are affected by those constructs. It is the latter position 
that the researcher adopts, in part due to philosophical considerations but also because the 
empirical work that takes financial performance as a proxy yields little consensus among 
researchers -  providing little hope that further work undertaken in this vein will be of 
discemable value; arguably it would provide merely a little more evidence for a deeply 
contested position. The existing research on board effectiveness places great emphasis on 
matters of structure and composition and the empirical studies that examine such matters 
focus mostly on the issues of CEO duality, the ratio of EDs to NEDs and board diversity. The 
findings of these studies are mixed with no real consensus being found.
Previous researchers, who were similarly dissatisfied with the examination of composition 
and structure, to explain board effectiveness have argued that the most important factor is the 
directors and the contribution that they make. This strand of the literature highlights that 
directors may lack the requisite competencies to undertake their roles, and that many of the
86
problems faced by directors are due to issues of group-dynamics, such as a lack of 
interpersonal trust, an inability to manage conflict, group think, and difficulties in 
communication. Based on a review of this literature the researcher has created an exploratory 
framework consisting of eight key capabilities for effective board of director performance. 
This exploratory framework is to be used as a basis for data collection (see chapter 3).
The importance and relevance of the above review have been reflected in the discussions in 
chapter three, analysis of the findings, and their discussions in subsequent chapters. The 
acquired knowledge and understanding of the various positions of the researchers and theorist 
in the above fields of enquiry without the doubt have assisted the researcher to identify the 
relevant issues and providing explanation of the directors’ behaviour and effectiveness 
properly. It is therefore not surprising to see references being made to the above literature in 
future discussions and chapters. This is done to ensure that the findings of this research have 
also been substantiated and supported by the current literature.
The next chapter considers the methodological issues and presents the research design 
adopted in this study.
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH APPROACH
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter takes a constructive view of the methodology and research design which has 
been adopted for this research. Thus, it considers three issues; the philosophical background 
to scientific or methodological issues; research design, and finally the methods or techniques 
that have been used for generating and analyzing relevant data in order to achieve the aims 
and objectives of the present study. Robinson aptly argues that “In social science it is very 
important to collect data, if there is no data there will be no research project. Once a 
researcher has data, the next step will be data analysis and interpretation” (2002: 385). One of 
the central arguments of this thesis is that improving effectiveness of the board will 
undoubtedly have effect on the organizations’ performance and effectiveness which in turn, 
would enable the senior management to achieve the national economic goals. This is in line 
with one of the five features considered to characterize the antecedent of successful research - 
that is real world values. Hence a problem arising from the field ought to lead to tangible and 
useful ideas (Robson, 1993; 2002). However, it must be also acknowledged that the corporate 
board is comprised of senior management who are invariably influenced by the constraints, 
challenges and opportunities arising from the contextual and environmental factors as well as 
the influences of the actors, peers, colleagues, and stakeholders, such as shareholders, at play 
in order to understand the research setting (Analoui, 2007). The ultimate aim however is to 
enhance the effectiveness of the board members. This exploratory research attempts to gain a 
deeper understanding of how board members view their own, others and ultimately the 
effectiveness of the board on which they serve. In this respect, the development of the ideas 
and construct has emerged from data as oppose to data being used to test or confirm a
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specific theoretical model and hypothesis (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Therefore this research 
will take an inductive (as oppose to deductive) and qualitative grounded approach
This chapter has been organized into seven sections. Immediately following this introduction, 
the aims, objectives and the purpose of the research are discussed. The third section examines 
the concept ‘research design’ including research paradigms, positivism, phenomenology, 
quantitative-qualitative debate in the literature, and the values of adopting realism for the 
present research. The fourth section is concerned with the important issue of research design, 
the use of multiple case studies and theoretical saturation are discussed in some length. The 
fifth section introduces the data collection methods, the choice of interviews, use of 
secondary data, process of data analysis, and reflection on how the data was collected and 
analyzed. The next section describes the quality of research and discusses the issues of 
validity, reliability and the ethics of the research. Finally, section seven presents the
conclusions reached.
3.1.1 Research aim, questions and objectives
In order to better understand the methodological choices made for the present study, it is 
important to reiterate the main aims and research questions which this study intends to 
answer. Since the performance of directors significantly impacts the effectiveness of the 
board, there is a need for an in-depth investigation into what constitutes board effectiveness. 
This provides both the direction as well as flexibility to explore the perception of the 
members without limiting the scope of the investigation. The aim of the present research is to 
explore the factors and influences that contribute to the increase the effectiveness of PSBs. It 
encompassed the exploration of the various factors and contributions as perceived by board
directors, including their own capability requirements for the board effectiveness, in context 
of the organisational, socio-economic and cultural realities of Abu Dhabi, UAE.
Thus the main research question is;
What factors and influences contribute to the effectiveness o f the board!
The following sub questions could be of help to answer the above main question.
• What are the existing views and perspectives on board effectiveness and directors
capabilities?
• Do the personal characteristics of the board members influence their performance?
How dynamics of the board members interaction influence the board
effectiveness?
What are the present demands, constraints and availability of choices that affect the 
performance of directors on PSBs?
What are the board of director’s capabilities and their effect on board effectiveness^ 
Can these findings provide a basis (or not) for enhancing the capability of board 
members and effectiveness of the PSBs boards within the Abu Dhabi context?
3.2 PURPOSE OF RESEARCH
Social science research serves many purposes; the most common and useful are, exploration, 
description and explanation. Exploration is particularly important in the early phases of 
research to generate ideas about the phenomena under study before additional research can be 
made (Johnson and Christensen, 2008). According to Babbie and Benaquisto (2002)
exploratory studies are attempts to:
Satisfy the researcher’s curiosity and desire for better understanding,
• Test the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study, and
• Develop the methods to be employed in any subsequent study
The descriptive purpose is an attempt to describe the characteristics of a phenomenon, 
situations and events which have been observed by the researcher during the course of study 
(Johnson and Christensen, 2008). Description is believed to be one of the basic activities in 
research which might simply involve observing a phenomenon, recoding the events, or 
reporting the attitude and behaviors of those under study. The qualitative studies, by and large
aim primarily at description.
Whilst descriptive researches attempt to answer the questions of what, where, when and 
how, and explanatory studies usually attempt to answer the question of ‘why’ a phenomenon 
operates as it does (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002); Kervin suggests a fourth purpose of 
research- Evaluation studies which assess the effect of a certain action, program or policy
(1992).
The nature of the present study (the research question) is primarily exploratory and to a 
certain extent it is at the same time descriptive because it is aiming to find out what factors, 
influences, and components are behind the effectiveness of the board members. Of course, 
one of the main objectives of the present research is to explore the board members perception 
of what constitutes ‘board effectiveness’ and how this can help to further increase and 
improve the effectiveness of directors who are board members. According to Hussey and 
Hussey (1997), exploratory studies are conducted into situations where very few or no earlier 
studies have been conducted. The main purpose, it is argued, is to seek out new insights, ask
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questions and assess the phenomenon (Adams and Schavaneveldt, 1985). As indicated in 
chapters one and two, the issues of board effectiveness have never been explored in the 
public sector in Abu Dhabi, UAE. Of course, the explanatory research is much less structured 
than other forms of research. It primarily relies on interviews and case studies (Hussey and
Hussey, 1997; Robson, 2002).
3 J  RESEARCH PROCESS
Robson (1993) argued that the key research issues must be addressed before coming to the 
central point of considering whether the researcher should, for example, administer 
questionnaires or conduct interviews. Consequently, Saunders et al. (2000) proposed a 
research process comprising five aspects ranked in order of importance: research philosophy, 
research approaches, principles of research methodologies, time horizons and data collection
methods (See Figure 3.1).
3.3.1 Research Philosophy (Paradigms)
A research paradigm is the basic set of beliefs that guide human research actions (Easterby- 
Smith et al., 2002). It deals with underlying assumptions concerning four main research 
concepts. These include axiology, the role of values in enquiry (biased vs. unbiased), 
ontology (the nature of reality), epistemology (the relationship of the knower to the known) 
and methodology (the best means to arrive at knowledge about the World). Thus, method is 
viewed as individual techniques for data collection and analysis. In this regard, the 
researchers’ ontological assumptions affect the researcher’s views of the world and what he 
or she conceives as real (Blaikie, 1993). Epistemology concerns the nature of knowledge and 
how to come to know the “reality” (Healy and Perry, 2000). It is argued that whilst
ontological perspectives shape the epistemology beliefs in terms o f how knowledge o f  reality 
develops (Blaikie, 2000), both are influenced by axiological and methodological assumptions 
(concerning the overall research process) (Johnson and Duberley, 2000).
Methodological literature also suggests that there are two dimensions on which assumptions 
are to be made about the way the social world can be investigated. The first dimension relates 
to ‘the nature o f  society’ and the second to ‘the philosophy o f  science’. The philosophy o f  
science dimension deals with the analytical and methodological approaches o f  ‘the logic o f  
enquiry’ or ‘how new knowledge is generated’ as one researches into a social phenomena 
(Blaikie, 2001; 1993). According to Creswell (2003: 5), ‘philosophically, researchers make 
claims about what is knowledge (ontology), how we know it (epistemology), what values go 
into it (axiology), how we write about it (rhetoric), and the processes for studying it 
(methodology). This suggests that the nature o f  social reality has ontological, 
epistemological, methodological and methods dimensions or elements. The opposing ends o f  
these grounds o f the philosophy o f science are basically rooted in two major intellectual 
traditions: subjectivist and objectivist (Burrell and Morgan, 1979: Smith, 1998; Esterby- 
Smith et al, 2001: 28)
On the ontological level, the objectivist assumes that the essence o f  social phenomena exists 
independent o f our perception; thus indicating the ‘realist’ approach, that knowledge is real. 
On the other hand, the subjectivist assumes that reality exists only in name or is a product o f  
the mind; hence ‘nominalist’. With regards to epistemology, the objective strand assumes 
knowledge to be hard, concrete and tangible. The subjectivist takes an anti-positivist stand, 
that knowledge is not concrete; it is intangible and can only be experienced (Bryman, 2000).
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), on the models of human nature, the objective 
assumes that their environments and situations condition the actions and behaviour of people. 
The opposing view is that an individual has a free will and acts voluntarily in any social 
circumstance. Objectivist assumptions concerning methodology are therefore nomothetic (the 
use of scientific method) whereas the subjectivist assumes an ideographic methodology.
Based on the above expositions Burrell and Morgan have proposed that social theory can be 
conceived in terms of four key paradigms based upon different sets of ‘ meta-theoretical 
assumptions’ about the nature of social science and the nature of society. In their view, 
assumptions about the nature of science can be thought of in terms of the ‘subjective- 
objective’ dimension, and assumptions about the nature of society in terms of a ‘regulation- 
radical change’ dimension. These two dimensions define four paradigms: ‘functionalism, 
interpretive, radical humanism and radical structuralism ', (See Figure 3.2 below). Creswell 
(2003:5) prefers to call it four schools of thought about knowledge claims: post-positivism,
constructivism, advocacy or participatory, and pragmatism.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the four paradigms. The two quadrants above indicate the radical change 
theory of society, that society is radically changing and therefore always in conflict. The two 
quadrants below represent a society that is orderly with unity and coherence. The other 
vertical columns to the left and right respectively are the subjective-objective aspects of the 
philosophy of science in social studies. In the view of the authors, the paradigms define one s 
mode of theorizing and reflect one’s position with regards to the four basic sets of 
assumptions about the nature of the social world and the way it may be investigated.
Figure 3.2: Four paradigms for the Analysis of Social Theory
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It can be argued that while Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework has quite useful 
implications for the understanding o f  the nature o f organizations and different forms o f 
organizational reality, its utility is contingent upon the ‘conceptual scope’ and ‘substantive 
content’ as well as the particular social context within which such a ‘multi-theory’, could be 
applied (Kamoche, 2001: 68).
Burrell and Morgan’s sociological analysis o f organizations has been criticised by a number 
o f  people. Kamoche, (2001) has questioned the justification for dichotomizing the vast 
intellectual terrain into ‘four paradigmatic enclaves’. He contends further that by alluding to 
‘regulation’ and ‘radical change’ Burrell and Morgan seem to be implying the issue of 
‘dualism’ through the object-subject trap.
Many believe that social reality is the product o f process involving a continuous series of 
subjective and objective moments. To Giddens (2004), it is the moment o f making and re-
making o f  social practices using rules and resources. Giddens theory o f  structuration shows 
how the subjective and objective social realities are integrated in a ‘duality o f structure . He 
examined the duality o f  structure in terms o f  how social structures are both constituted by 
‘human agency’, and yet at the same time are the very medium o f this constitution (Giddens,
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1979; Blakie, 2001; Kasperson, 2000; Bryant and Bell, 2007). The relevant themes of 
structuration theory including, the social systems linkage of multiple actors or agents, rules 
and culture, resources and power would be explored where appropriate in the study. They 
appear to complement one’s attempt to understand and interpret how individuals and/or 
collective actors constitute, transform and reproduce the structural elements for the benefit or 
otherwise of society. This is an important point. Research paradigms cannot be considered in 
isolation from influencing factors such as dominant cultural values and institutions such as 
religion. This is particularly relevant to the present investigation. As argued earlier, the 
culture of Abu Dhabi and the influence of Islamic values, do affect the methodology and the 
nature of the way directors of the public sector boards describe the reality as they perceive. 
Kamoche (2001) when discussing research in an African context, has suggested broadening 
such intellectual thinking and networking to include “...the nature of social relations at the 
interpersonal and institutional levels and their implication for achieving change in society”
(Kamoche, 2001: 77).
3.3.1.1 Positivism and Phenomenology: The differences
Another similar and useful dichotomy is that two views concerning research philosophy can 
be seen as dominating the literature. These are positivism and phenomenology (Denscombe, 
2003). Positivism is “an approach to social research which seeks to apply the natural science 
model of research to investigations of the social world. It is based on the assumption that 
there are patterns and regularities, causes and consequences in the social world, just as there 
are in the natural world. These patterns and regularities in the social world are seen as having 
their own existence - they are real” (Denscombe, 2003: 299). The aim of positivism is 
therefore to discover the patterns and regularities of the social world by using the kind ot 
scientific methods used in the natural sciences (Denscombe, 2003). Hence, positivists are
44 working with an observable social reality and that the end product o f such research can be 
law-like generalisations similar to those produced by the physical and natural scientists 
(Remenyi et al., 1998: 32). A researcher in this tradition assumes the role o f  an objective 
analyst, making detached interpretations about those data that have been collected in an 
onnorpntK; \/nlnp.frp.p manner with an emnhasis on a hiehlv structured methodology to
facilitate replication (Denscombe, 2003) and quantifiable observations that lend themselves 
to statistical analysis (Saunders et al., 2000). The assumption is that ‘ the researcher is 
independent o f and neither affects nor is affected by the subject o f  the research” (Remenyi et 
al. , 1998: 33). As it is shown below this position was far removed from the assumptions o f  
the philosophical position based on which this research is designed
Alternatively, phenomenology argues that the social world o f  corporate or public sector 
management and governance is too complex to lend itself to theorising by defining ‘laws’ in 
the same way as the physical sciences, whereby insights into this complex world are lost if  
such complexity is reduced entirely to a series o f  law-like generalisations (Saunders et a l, 
2000). Thus, phenomenology is an approach to social research which has been useful as an 
umbrella term covering styles o f research that do not rely on measurement, statistics or other 
aspects generally associated with the scientific method.
In direct contrast to positivism it is seen as an approach that emphasizes subjectivity, 
description, interpretation and agency. Phenomenology deals with people s perceptions or 
meanings, attitudes and beliefs, feeling and emotions” (Denscombe, 2003: 96). According to 
Saunders el al. (2000), business situations are not only complex, but are also a function o f a 
particular set o f circumstances and individuals. This raises questions about the ability to 
generalise research that aims to capture the rich complexity o f  social situations. However,
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phenomenologist would argue that the ability to generalise is not crucial because of the ever- 
changing world of business organisations, whereby if the accepted circumstances of today 
may not apply in the future then some of value of generalisation is lost (Denscombe, 2003). 
Similarly, all organisations are unique, which makes generalisation less valuable. Indeed, 
Remenyi etal. (1998: 35) underlined “the details of the situation to understand the reality or
perhaps a reality working behind them”.
3.3.1.2 Deductive vs Inductive Research
Phenomenology forms the core interest of the present research and the “board effectiveness 
is taken as a phenomenon which requires understanding and exploration. This is in line with 
two other contracting research lines namely the deductive and inductive approaches 
respectively. The deductive epitomises the principles of the positivism and therefore it 
attempts to test theory, whereby hypotheses are developed and a research strategy is designed 
to examine the hypotheses, whilst the inductive approach focuses upon building a theory, 
whereby data is collected and the theory is developed as a result of the data analysis 
(Saunders et al., 2000). Deduction is the dominant research approach in the natural sciences 
where laws provide the basis of explanation, permit the anticipation of phenomena, predict 
their occurrence and therefore allow them to be controlled (Easterby-Smith et al., 2001).
In contrast, induction is particularly concerned with the context in which events are taking 
place. Therefore, the study of a small sample of subjects may be more appropriate than a 
large number as with the deductive approach (Robson, 1993). This has a particular 
significance for the present research whereby the context in which board members operate, 
both internal and external (socio-economic and cultural) situations act as the basis for the 
perception and behaviour of the boards as the whole. Understandably the behaviour of the
boards, decisions made and interactions between the members are o f qualitative nature and 
the methods or approaches employed ought to reflect this need for individual directors views 
and perception hence the use o f methods o f  data generation, as oppose to data collections, 
such as interviews and case studies in order to explore (study) the phenomena under 
investigation (Silverman, 2005). The major differences between the two major approaches 
have been illustrated below (See Table 3.1)
Table 3.1: The differences between ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ research approaches
Deduction focuses on Induction focuses on
Selection samples of sufficient size in order to 1 
generalise conclusions
Gaining an understanding of the meanings 
humans attach to events, actions and 
behaviours
Using Scientific principles Closer understanding of the research context
Rigid operationalisation of concepts to ensure clarity 1 
of definition
A more flexible structure to permit changes of 
research emphasis as the research progresses
Explaining causal relationships between variables Understanding the basis for and the nature 
o f  the phenomena
Collection of quantitative data 1 The generation of qualitative data
Moving from theory to data 1 Less concern with the need to generalise
Application of controls to ensure validity of data Application o f control to ensure reliability 
o f  data
Researcher independence of what is being 
researched
1 A realisation that the researcher is part of the 
research process
A highly structured approach 1 Semi structured approach
Source: Adapted from Saunders et al. (2000: 91)
Besides the stark differences that exist between the two major approaches; deductive and 
inductive, it is probably more important to pay attention to what Ackroyd and Hughes, (1982) 
refer to as the need for employing a suitable approach, consideration o f  the nature of the 
research topic and the availability o f  data and time. Given that the aim o f this research was to
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understand board effectiveness and that the events are created by the board members, it was 
deemed necessary to explore the meaning that participants in the board attach to their 
behaviours and action. Hence, it may be more appropriate to ‘generate relevant data’ and see
of the theme and topics which help to explain the phenomena. It is thereforethe emergence
felt that inductive research by and large is fit for the purposes of the current research.
3.3.2 Positivism, constructivism and realism
In view of the above discussion, the broad philosophy guiding this research can be described 
as phenomenology and more specifically inductive, mainly because of the complex nature of 
research subject, and also in light of the research objectives and research questions proposed 
However, it is felt that declaration of the research approach as phenomenological may be 
useful as a general approach but it does not clearly pin point the range of methodological 
issues and approaches employed by the researcher. In order to achieve this it is argued that 
whilst positivism in organisation and management studies attempts to discover the 
fundamental laws governing the organisational processes and operation (Johnson and 
Duberley, 2000) at one end of the continuum, the constructivism or interpretivism exist at the 
other end of the continuum from positivism. In its extreme sense o f the word it conceives the 
world as a social construct by means of people’s meanings and interpretations and their 
motives and intentions that directs their behaviour in their everyday lives (Blaikie, 1993;
Easterby
interactions that do not produce single realities but multiple ones constructed in multiple 
contexts. This is also referred to as ‘relativists ontology’. In short positivism believes in hard 
objective reality which exists outside the individual that can be observed measured and 
studied, whereas constructivism views the social reality as socially constructed and therefore
is value laden and subject to meanings and interpretation.
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As explained earlier, positivism has been rejected as an appropriate stand for exploring the 
phenomena of board effectiveness. Indeed social researchers frequently encounter 
phenomena that are not easily observed such as “value of culture” (Johnson and Dubeley, 
2000) which are rejected by positivists. Understanding the phenomena of board effectiveness, 
because of its very nature, requires a greater understanding of the unobservable socio 
economic, legal, and cultural values which cannot be entertained from a positivist stand. It is 
not therefore unusual for a social science researcher to be aware of, for example cultural 
values such as the Islamic view of interactions and financial transactions in order to interpret, 
consciously, the observations that he or she makes (Blaikie, 2000).
Having argued that positivism because of its very extreme biases towards social research 
could not be adopted for the present research it is also doubtful whether constructivism, the 
other extreme position, can fully explain the reality of public sector boards and their 
effectiveness. Putting it differently, the board member’s perception of the reality of the board 
is significant and it has to be taken into consideration because it is socially constructed, 
however, this perception is one of the many views of the reality (Bhaskar, 1978) of the 
corporate board of an organisation. The existence of an independent single reality is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the notion of an individual perception of this reality (Blaike, 
2000). The board exists as a part of an organisation entity and although it is formed of human 
beings, however its formation is subject to specific conditions which are laid down in detail 
in the organisational and legislative rule books. The board members, who contribute to board 
effectiveness by their participation, also perceive the reality of board effectiveness as a 
separate reality and report on that to the social science researcher. Therefore the researcher 
has to be conscious of the values attributed to a particular social reality and simultaneously
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recognise differences between reality (of the board) and the perceptions of the reality
can
“realism” (Bhaskar. 1978; Healy and Perry, 2000).
Table.3.2: The differences between 
Realism and Constructivism
Methodological
Issues_______
Purpose
Extreme
Positivis
Extreme
Constructivism
Realistic
Realism
Studying causal and fundamental 
laws to explain, predict causal and 
fundamental laws of human 
behaviour
Theory It is based on prior theory
Researcher Detached from the phenomenon 
under studv
Studying to explain and 
understand the human 
values, rituals, and social 
behaviours/ phenomenon 
which can not by 
explained using positivist
oach
Although cause and effect 
may not be direct, casual 
links behind social 
phenomenon can be 
found
emi
Context Attempt to generalise
Method
strategy
and Natural science m 
observation to ac 
ability of the results 
Deductive
such as 
general
based
theory________
Interact with subject to 
gain necessary
understanding of the
phenomenon__________
Attemot to contextualise
Is based on some prior 
theoi
Multiple methods to 
establish different
perspective of the same 
phenomenon 
Inductive
Searching for contextual 
reasons behind
behaviour/social 
phenomenon
Nature of Data 
Emphasis of 
Access
Quantitative 
Access to data
Qualitative 
Access to individual
separate structure and 
agency but considers both 
as important for 
understanding 
phenomenon 
Inductive reproductive
Both 
Access to both
Source: Adapted from Balkie (1993), Johnson and Duberley (2000) and Silverman (2005)
3.3.3 Realism the choice of the study
The forgone discussion reveals that the positivism and social constructivism are not 
appropriate for the present study. The researcher’s own ontological and epistemological 
assumptions which underpin a particular philosophy determine the methods to be employed 
which in turn determines the nature of the data to be generated. Therefore as Ackroyed and 
Hughes (1992) point out the methods should not be selected for their own elegance rather
they should serve a purpose; to direct us to the kind of the data which ultimately answers the 
research questions. Since the researcher’s own frames of references are forming the basis for 
choosing a specific research philosophy (Bisman, 2002) hence the nature of social reality 
(ontology) and gaining knowledge concerning the social reality (epistemology) and the 
phenomenon of “Board Effectiveness”, these issues have been discussed briefly below.
Understanding ‘Board Effectiveness’, as social phenomenon requires gaining in depth 
knowledge of the context, and the behaviour of the participants (directors) who make up the 
social phenomenon. These two components are very much related (Cupchik, 2001). The 
effectiveness of the board ought to be seen as perceived by each member, simply because the 
behaviour of the directors and their contribution cannot be separated from the phenomenon 
understudy. The researcher therefore is very much interested in exploring the extent of the 
contributions made by the members. However, adopting a purely social constructionist stand 
may not be helpful since the perceived notion of reality alone does lead the researcher to full 
understanding of the effective PSBs. On the other hand, it cannot be assumed that the 
effectiveness of the board constitutes an objective reality which can easily render itself to 
observation and quantitative analysis alone (Bhaskar, 1978). Indeed in order to make sense of 
the directors’ behaviour and contribution, there is also a need for including the “context” 
(Hunt, 1991; Analoui, 1999), in which the board is formed, established and operates. The 
contextual background emanating from organisational and wider socio-political, economical, 
and cultural realities provides a strong basis for adopting “Realism” for studying PSBs 
effectiveness in Abu Dhabi. The researcher does not consider the perception of the directors 
of the board as the reality rather it is believed that these perceptions should be considered as 
one or many views about the reality of the boards. Having said that, it must also be 
understood that the researcher is very much interested in these varied accounts (subjective
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perceptions) of the participants simply because they form the bases for and draw a picture of 
reality as perceived by the members, but this understanding must be accompanied by the 
relevant accounts of the ‘reality’ out there. To obviate the above statement, it must be further 
reiterate that the effectiveness of PSBs in Abu Dhabi will not be the same as boards in 
Western countries. There may be some common elements which are derived from the global
realities of modem life, never the less they are different and have to be explored ineconomic
their own specific contexts (Robson, 2002; Silverman, 2005).
3.3.4 Research strategy and research methodology for present research
There is often confusion between research methodology and the methods employed for 
studying an organisational/social phenomenon (Blaikie, 2000). It is important to bear in mind 
that research method is the techniques and procedures used for collecting/generating, and 
analysing of the data, whereas methodology refers to the critical process of analysing 
different research methods (Silverman, 2005). As illustrated above the research strategy for 
this study is that of “realism” bearing in mind that whilst positivism and social constructivism 
the extreme ends of the continuum, “realism does not necessarily assume the ‘middle’pose
Realism simply rejects the underlying assumptions held by the followers of each camp as 
being the only way to understand social/organisational reality. At the same time, it may use 
some aspects of the two opposing camps (paradigms) for explaining the behaviours, in this
case those of the directors of PSBs in Abu Dhabi.
The strategy chosen for this study is the inductive approach. However, it also allows for 
methods and/or data which can be collected and/or analysed deductively. It is envisaged that 
the present research will rely heavily on inductive strategy, simply because the perception of 
the participants (Directors) is considered as vital for understanding phenomenon, however,
the contextual data which sheds light on the formation of boards, the instructions and formal 
rules governing the behaviour have not been rejected (Blaikie, 2000; Silverman, 2005).
As explained earlier the choice of the strategy for realism could be a mix of reproductive 
(similar to deductive) and adductive which comes from constructivism. The researcher in 
the position of realist, felt that there is a need to discover the structures and potential 
mechanisms which underlie the board phenomenon first, (Blaikie, 2000) before exploring the 
behaviour of the directors (Agency) in the board meetings and explaining them by pointing to 
the social meanings which help their construction (Robson, 2002). It was felt that the 
conditions on which PSBs are based are of paramount importance and need to be understood. 
Of course, the choice of methodology for this research has undoubtedly been influenced and 
guided by the researcher’s own philosophical assumptions, the nature of the enquiry, the 
theoretical background which surrounds the phenomenon and the need for workability of the 
subsequent findings or the theory constructed (Blaikei, 1993; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002).
The adoption of realism is believed to be open to both qualitative and quantitative 
methodology (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). This is not to say that other influences such as the 
nature of study, the context and theoretical background do not play a part in determining the 
choice of the methodology, rather it frees the researcher from the hold of one specific 
paradigm and allows flexibility. In this study, the institutions (BS departments/banks etc), 
their board settings, and the individuals are all important. As will be explained in the next 
sections the accounts provided by the board members represent the complexities associated 
with board operations, the interaction amongst board members and its product-the decision 
made. These accounts, descriptive and subjective in nature, explain the phenomenon under 
study but not fully as the underlying factors such as institutional realities including the
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conditions for membership of a board, the background abilities and competencies of 
individual directors and their degree of influence (political), as well as the externalities such 
as legislation, economic and cultural backgrounds which govern the activities and operations 
of the boards, also need to be considered. The effectiveness of the directors (senior managers) 
is also contextualised (Analoui, et al., 1999). The realist attempts to understand and explain 
these realities. The researcher intends to explain and demonstrate how the actors (the board 
members) behave and how their behaviours form a contribution to the effectiveness of the 
board. The concept of realism is consistent with the empirical findings informed by empirical 
materials within the literature (Perry et aL, 1998). The task of building theory is informed by 
a comparison of emergent themes and the existing knowledge It results in shedding light on 
what is similar amongst the PSBs and what is different and why, taking into consideration 
realities at individual, institutional and societal levels. Thus providing ‘depth and detail’ of 
the complexities of the research phenomenon through understanding the inter-play of both 
structure and agency (Patton, 1990; Ziman, 1996; Blaikie, 2000; Esterby-Smith, et aL, 2001;
Voss et al., 2002).
3.4 RESEARCH DESIGN
Designing research is where the theory and practice of methodology meet It is about turning 
research questions into a feasible project (Robson, 1993; Hussey and Hussey (1997). It 
provides the link between aims, objectives, research questions, generated data and the 
conclusion reached. Research design methodologies can be classified into fixed, flexible and 
a combination of both (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). The fix design could be experimental 
whereby the researcher changes the position of the participants to produce changes in 
behaviour The flexible design is about ascertaining in depth knowledge about a situation
Studies for grounded theory and those of the case study and ethnographic nature which look 
into groups and communities are in this category.
In the real world, a combination of the fixed and flexible design strategies would be used to 
maximise its effectiveness and minimise the short coming of each. There is a variety of 
methodologies (i.e. action research, case study, ethnography) although there is no ‘one right’ 
direction to take, experienced researchers usually select research approaches based on two 
main criteria; ‘relevance’, and ‘suitability’ (Achroyd and Hughes, 1993) for specific aspects 
of an investigation and particular kinds of problems. In a sense, methods for collecting data 
are chosen as ‘fit for purpose’ (Bryman and Bell, 2003), whereby it is crucial for good 
research that the choices are reasonable and explicit on one hand and meet criteria such as 
‘relevance’, ‘feasibility’, ‘coverage’, ‘accuracy’, ‘objectivity’ and ‘ethics’ (Denscombe, 
2003). The researcher chose case study as the prime method for generating relevant and 
suitable data for this study (See Figure 3.3). Following is the comparison with other 
methodological approaches within the context of this research
3.4.1 Case Studies Methodology: Justification
Case studies are used extensively across a range of social science disciplines such as 
sociology, psychology, history, political science, economics, administration, public policy, 
education and management studies (Yin, 2003). In general, case studies are the preferred 
strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, with the investigator having little 
control over events and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon such as board 
meetings, interaction of board members and their effectiveness within public sector real-life 
rrmtpxt (G haun  and Gronhaue. 2002; Marschan-Piekkari and Welch, 2004). As Robson
(1993: 146) defined, the case study is “a strategy for doing research which involves an
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empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context 
using multiple sources of evidence”. In this context, the ‘contemporary phenomenon’ means 
the ‘case’ and can be applied to virtually anything. Similarly, Yin (2003 . 13) conceptualised 
it as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly
evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used .
Figure 3.3: Steps for Theory Building from Case Study
Source: Adapted from Miles and Huberman (1994), De WeerdNederhop (2001)
Voss et al., (2002).
In terms of the features of case studies, Gummesson (2000) characterised the features of the 
case studies as that which either attempt to derive general conclusions from a limited number 
of cases or to arrive at specific conclusions regarding a single case because this case history 
is of particular interest. Furthermore, researchers in business-related subjects traditionally 
limit case studies to the exploratory use, such as a pilot study that can be used as a basis for 
formulating more precise questions or testable hypotheses, whilst the descriptive is
considered as simple and based more often than not on observation and reporting. Hence, Sen 
(1980: 353) states that “the reason description is considered the simplest form of science 
rests, at least in part, in the idea that description is largely a matter of mere observation and 
reporting, or reading other people’s reports and summarizing - at best, systematizing. 
Whether a descriptive statement is acceptable could be thought to be dependent on its 
correctness and that could be resolved simply by observing”. Although case study approach 
can be used in all types of research: exploratory, descriptive or explanatory (Bonoma, 1985; 
Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002; Yin, 2003), it is a particularly useful strategy for studying 
processes in companies and for explanatory purposes (Robson, 1993; Gummesson, 2000; 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003).
Given that the aim of this research is to explore the relationship between actors and their 
contribution to effectiveness of the boards, especially PSBs, and to ascertain the perceived 
importance activities, operations and conditions which will lead to the formation of effective 
boards in Abu Dhabi, the researcher believed that the use of ‘case study’ is a suitable research 
methodology in this context. Since the personal experience of each member forms the basis 
for the emergence of the similarities and differences of the characteristics and contributions 
to, the researcher considered each account as one case for the purpose of analysis. The 
justification was the need for detail and in depth data, because, as Denscombe (2003), 
explains, the case study approach might be more beneficial where it allows the use of a 
variety of sources, types of data and research methods as part of the investigation. 
Specifically, it encourages the use of multiple methods, in order to capture the complex 
reality under scrutiny through fostering the use of multiple sources of data, in the case of this 
study, observation and use of secondary data, which in turn facilitates the validation of data 
through triangulation (Marschan-Piekkari and Welch, 2004).
3.4.2 Alternative Methodological Approaches
Although case study methodology has been selected for the purposes of this research, it 
should be noted that there are also other specific methodologies, which could have been 
selected (i.e. action research, ethnography, experiment, grounded theory, survey), whilst as 
explained earlier there were numerous reasons for not adopting these methodological
approaches. The main methods are;
.  Action research differs from other forms of applied research because of its explicit 
focus on action, in particular promoting change within the organisation (Robson, 
1993). This methodology emphasizes that the researcher is part of the organisation 
within which the research and change process are taking place (Saunders et al., 2000). 
Its associated methods are focus groups, discourse analysis, document analysis and 
content analysis. However, action research is not suitable for the aim and objectives 
of this research since firstly it entails long association with a specific corporate board, 
which is not practical, and secondly, the investigation should be concerned with a 
change of some sort rather than understanding the processes involved in the
realization of PS board room operations.
.  Ethnography emanates from the field of anthropology and takes place over an 
extended period. It is a time consuming process. Boards are not routine organisational 
operations which render themselves to a long term involvement so that the researcher 
can develop new patterns of thought about the phenomenon under study and the 
behaviours being observed Moreover, it entails unstructured interviewing, and active 
involvement often as a participant observer in the field (Saunders et al., 2000)
Corporate Boards generally meet periodically to consider matters of importance to the 
organisation. Their operations and their period of existence may vary from a few 
hours to a day long meeting. The formal processes involved do not allow for 
conducting unstructured interviews during their operations.
• Experimental approaches typically belong to the realm of scientific enquiry for 
example psychology, where the hypothesis are tested under controlled conditions 
and comparison is made between two groups to analyse the difference when one or 
more variables change. They are not commonly used in business and management 
studies (Bryman, 2004). It must noted that the purpose of the present investigation is 
not a comparative analysis of the PSBs operations, process and protocols, rather the 
intention is to explore the why and how effectiveness is or can be obtained. Moreover, 
in real life creating an experimental board is rather impossible let alone unrealistic or
feasible.
• The use of a survey is usually associated with the deductive approach. It has the 
potential for generating large amounts of data from a sizeable population in an 
inexpensive manner. It allows for quantitative analysis, and it does require the 
researcher to gain an in depth knowledge of each respondent since the data is 
standardised. This method cannot provide the kind of rich qualitative information and 
data necessary for understanding the role and responsibilities of the board members 
(Saunders et al., 2000).
• Grounded theory seeks the data, often qualitative, which leads to generation of 
theoretical statements using a set of fully integrated and practical steps. The drawback
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however, is the danger that the theory generated from the data might ignore the 
influence of social, economic, political factors (socio-economic, legal, globalization, 
cultural) and historical background to events. In the case of the present research these 
contextualised conditions and influences are vital for understanding the behaviour of 
the board members and the board as an organisation entity (Robson, 1993;
Denscombe, 2003; Silverman, 2005).
3.4.3 Multiple versus Single Case Studies: What is suitable for this study?
As indicated earlier there is a need and necessity on the part of the researcher to select 
methods which are relevant to the nature of the data and are suitable for answering the 
research questions (Ackroyd and Hughes, 1992). The case study has been selected because it 
“fits” the purpose for this study. However, the research can be based on either a single or 
multiple-case design (Tellis, 1997, Amaratunga and Baldry, 2001; Rahim and Baksh, 2003). 
Studies based on a single case study are often selected because of their “special nature” or 
that it provides a critical test to a well established theory which makes it almost unique 
(Tellis, 1997). However, they carry with them an inherent limitation which is primarily 
related to unsuitability for generalisation of the findings and/or developing models and 
theories for subsequent investigations (Voss et al„ 2002). The risk of misjudging a single 
event is generally deemed to be high. This is particularly relevant for the present study. 
Undertaking the study of effectiveness of one board, even though belonging to the same 
sector, namely public sector, although revealing its implications, lessons learnt and the 
potential for model construction would be very low.
It is often a misconception that organisations which belong to the same sector will be the 
same particularly when it comes to the nature of interaction and decision making and the way
in which they formulate their strategies. This is a fallacy. The public sector organisations in 
Abu Dhabi are comprised of a variety of organisations which includes banks, ministerial 
departments, and those related to ports, import and export. Undoubtedly, these organisations 
may share certain features and characteristics but they are not the same. With this in mind, it 
was decided to avoid the study of a single board and how it functions just for the ease of the 
process. Moreover, throughout it has been illustrated that the role of the directors or members 
of the boards is vital to the satisfactory outcome of the PSBs and indeed, the private sector for 
that matter. These are the key individuals who interact with one another and form the 
important part of the research phenomenon under study. Therefore, the researcher decided to 
cast the net further and choose a multiple-case study design which included a number of 
individual board members from several organisations in order to obtain an insight into the 
way boards operate, their similarities and differences, and to explore the role of the directors 
and their contribution to the effectiveness of the board.
A case study in this research is a unit of analysis (DeWeer-Nederhof, 2001; Rowley, 2002). 
The unit of analysis reflects the focus of the study and provides the basis for comparison on 
one hand and on the other acts as the piece of the jigsaw which completes the picture (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). It is also important to be aware of the issues of ‘boundary’ and the 
need for distinguishing the Unit of analysis from its context since without boundaries, 
Rowley (2002) suggests that there is the temptation and danger of ‘collecting everything’. 
Since the research question relates to PSBs effectiveness, the unit of analysis is individual 
board members of public Sector Boards in the context of Abu Dhabi.
In line with Gooddall and Warner’s (2002) assertion that future research on board directors 
should include access to corroborating accounts/comments provided by the directors, gaining
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an insight into the directors’ contribution to boards requires at least two case studies from the
ganisation/board. Thus, in order to gain a richer picture it was decided to selectsame or
randomly two directors from each board.
The main method of data generation, as will be explained, will be the use of semi-structured 
interviews. However, the use of secondary data and the involvement of the researcher have to 
be triangulated in the process. This is in line with the assumptions which underpin the 
“realism paradigm” that sees interaction between researcher and the research as necessary 
conditions for gaining a better understanding of the phenomenon under investigation (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1994; Manning, 1997; Healy and Perry, 2000; Bisman, 2002).
3.4.4 Sampling Strategy and Theoretical Saturation
There is an ongoing debate in the literature concerning the use of multiple case studies. How
studies would be sufficient for understanding the phenomenon and how manymany case
cases are required in order to build theory and generalise the results? The minimum number 
of case studies suggested is four (Eisenhardt, 1989: 546). It is argued that any number fewer 
that four may not meet the above criteria. The maximum number suggested ranges from 
twelve to fifteen (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Rahim and Baksh, 2003). However, Hedges 
(1985) sets an upper limit of twelve cases. In practice however, the decision made by the 
researcher ought to be based on the realities of the context and related issues such as access, 
quality and relevance to the subject of the study. The researcher will have a “feel” for the data 
and may conduct more or less than twelve cases. What are deemed important are three issues, 
a) the observation and analytical capability of the researcher (Patton, 1990), b) the 
meaningfulness of the qualitative data to be generated which is largely determined by the 
careful selection of the cases required (Ackroyed and Huges, 1992); and, c) coverage of the
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themes and issues involved (Perry, 1998; De Weerd-Nedderhof, 2001). In practice however, 
it is difficult to stipulate a number prior to being engaged in the field work and data 
generation process. Indeed, as Eiesenhardt (1989) appropriately suggests, the researcher 
should continue with conducting interviews (adding cases) until he or she ensures that 
“theoretical saturation” is reached and no more new ‘themes’ are identifiable. In this study 14 
cases have been planned for which represents the maximum numbers recommended in the
literature.
On the other hand, the representation and control of the contextual environment is equally 
important and has to be factored in when deciding the number of the cases needed for 
analysis. In the case of the present research, the organisation sample from which directors 
have been selected has been considered as important (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987; 
Welch, et al., 2002). Thus, seven public sector boards were selected to be involved in the
study (See Table 3.3).
Since the researcher himself has been and at presents hold membership of a few SBs he is 
sufficiently aware of the importance of access to individual directors and the context in order 
to complete the picture to be reported Ordinarily, it would be difficult if not impossible for a 
researcher per se to obtain access to PSBs and in the unlikely case that they were able to, he 
or she would find that most members were reluctant to provide ‘all the information’ because 
they do not want to take the risk of talking to researchers’ (Gummesson, 2000). The 
researcher did not face this constraint because of his credibility as a senior member of a 
public sector organisation and his access to boards as a member and chair person (Hertz and 
Imber, 1993; Silverman, 2005). This has eased the process of access and internal first hand 
knowledge of the researcher has facilitated the process of decision making since he was
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aware of what information was important to the study, what were the obstacles to be
importantly In short, the process of
answer the research 
ss. Prior planning, ta
informants
feasibility of the study.
DATA COLLECTION METHODS
The assumptions underpinning the paradigm, in this case inductive and realism are the mam 
deciding factors in what method should be used for the study (Yin, 1989; Robson, 2002). The 
qualitative as opposed to quantitative research methods, for the viewing of the reality, as 
perceived by participants, forms the description which is provided by informant This is the 
valuable raw data for the analysis (Vallaster and Koll, 2002) The intent is to generate
data which is the “information obtained firsthand by the researcher that has specific 
application to the current problem” (Malhotra et al„ 2002: 120). In addition as explained 
earlier, the use of triangulation is thought to provide the multi perspective source which is 
needed to ensure the richness of the data and the process of verification between perception 
and the contextual facts (Patton and Applebaum, 2003; Hair et al„ 2003).
primary
It must be noted that primary data is heavily dependent upon the ability and skills of the 
researcher (Kumar, 2005; Henn et al, 2006). To obtain data from boards and about the way 
boards operate has called upon the political skills and interactional competences of the 
researcher. Physical access does not guarantee ‘psychological access’ (Ackroyd and Hughes, 
1993). The researcher’s awareness and knowledge of public sector organisations within Abu
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Dhabi has enabled him to secure access to the necessary data to answer the research questions
of the present research.
As explained earlier, primary data is made up of the materials that the researcher gathers and/ 
or generates, such as results of the interviews, documentation, information from archives and
even case studies. Since the choice of the primary method for gathering data has already been
determined by the paradigm position of the researcher, interviews formed the main source of 
the data for the present research
3.5.1 Choice of Interviews
Interview is considered to be the most widely applied method for gathering information and a 
means for collecting large amounts of data very rapidly (Thomas. 2003; Miller and Brewer, 
2003; Punch, 2005) Interviews are associated with positivist as well as phenomenological 
methodologies (Blumerg et al., 2005). “They are a method of collecting data in which 
selected participants are asked questions in order to find out what they do, think or feel. 
Interviews make it easy to compare answers and may be face-to-face, voice-to-voice or 
screen-to screen; conducted with individuals or group of individuals (Collis and Hussey,
2003: 167).
Interviews, by their very nature, are generally classified into structured and unstructured
types
answers. In essence the structured interview is like a questionnaire which is administrated 
rigidly face to face with a respondent. The researcher has a predetermined list of questions to 
which the respondent offers limited responses (Miller and Salkind, 2002). In contrast, 
unstructured interviews are informal and are used to explore in depth areas of concern
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(Welman et al„ 2005). They are more evolving in nature as the questions depend upon 
interviewees’ responses. Initially the interviewer does have a number o f planned questions in 
mind but these concerns can be melded depending upon the responses. The strength o f the 
unstructured interview is the complete freedom they provide in terms o f content and structure 
(Kumar, 2005). This form o f interview has been considered as the most useful way to 
conduct a purposeful interaction with elites. Moreover, the structured interviews are usually 
frowned upon, culturally by senior members of the organisation since they give the 
impression that the participants is being “questioned” and “interrogated” which adversely
affects the nature, amount and accuracy o f the data provided.
For the present study, semi structured interviews were decided to  be the most useful method 
for collecting rich data based on the in depth knowledge o f the directors. The qualitative case 
as Fisher (2007) aptly suggests, combines the observation and interview. This is combined 
with the secondary data available on the contextual aspects o f each public sector organisation 
(Carson and Coviello, 1996; Trace, 2001) The multiple nature of the case studies involved 
meant preparation of a simple but effective protocol, or guidance which would give each
individual member consistency o f approach (Voss et al., 2002).
The researcher was aware that on some boards the Chair will also act as CEO and that he or 
she may have to play multi-roles in informing the board.
It was decided to target four individuals from the board (Chair, CEO, ED and None-ED) from 
each PSBs. As explained earlier, a minimum number o f four and a maximum number of 12- 
14 case studies has been suggested (Eisenhardt, 1989: 546) as necessary to reach the 
theoretical saturation (Miles and Huberman, 1994), whilst the most important criterion is the 
decision made by the researcher based on the realities o f the context and related issues such
, quality and relevance to the subject o f the study (Hedges, 1985). In the case of theas access
present research four PSBs were randomly selected. (See Table 3.3) and the four identified 
actors (participants) namely Chair, CEO, ED and None-ED were targeted in each
organisation. The organisations selected were:
• Abu Dhabi Ports Company (ADPC)
• Khalifa Fund to Support and Develop Small and Medium Enterprises (Khalifa Fund)
• National Bank of Abu Dhabi (NBAD)
• National Drilling Company of Abu Dhabi (NDCA)
Table 3.3: Name and brief description of the four organisations involved
No. Name of 
the
Organisati
on
Brief description of the organisation
1 Abu Abu Dhabi Ports Company (ADPC) was established in March
Dhabi 2006 by Emiri Decree No. 6 of 2006 in the Emirate of Abu
Ports Dhabi as part of the restructuring of the commercial ports sector
Company in the Emirate. It was given control and regulatory enforcement
(ADPC) power over all commercial ports assets previously owned by the 
Abu Dhabi Seaports Authority (ADSA).
ADPC is a leader in the development of world class ports and 
industrial zones.
Abu Dhabi Ports Company PJSC, is Public Joint Stock Company wholly 
owned by the Government of the Emirate o Abu Dhabi, established in 
March 2006 by the Emin Decree No. 6 of 2006 in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.
The Board of Directors is the highest governing authority within 
Abu Dhabi Ports Company (ADPC). The Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) reports to and acts as Advisor to the Board.
ADPC Senior Management comprising of Executive Vice 
President and Vice President level designations report to the
CEO.
ADPC organization structure comprises of Business Units, 
support/Functional Units and Divisions.
2 Khalifa Khalifa Fund to Support & Develop Small & Medium
Fund to Enterprises (Khalifa Fund) was established in 2007 based on
Support Law No. 14 of 2005 for the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. The Law by
& which Khalifa Fund was established has been amended by Law
Develop No. 13 of 2009 where the name of the fund was changed to
Small & Khalifa Fund for Enterprise Development, and the capital was
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Medium 
Enterprise 
s (Khalifa 
Fund)
National 
Bank of 
Abu 
Dhabi 
(NBAD)
raised to 1 billion dirham.
The Board of Directors is the highest governing authority within 
Khalifa Fund for Enterprise Development. The Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) reports to the Board. Khalifa Fund Senior 
Management comprising of Chief Operations Officer (COO) 
and Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) report to the CEO. 
Khalifa Fund organization structure comprises of core 
operations departments and support functions/departments in
iddition to corporate functions.
NBAD Listed on the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX), 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi (NBAD) is an integral systemic 
bank of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) providing a full range 
of products and services to the UAE market. NBAD is the 
largest bank in Abu Dhabi and the second largest bank in the
UAE in terms of assets.
NBAD is one of the primary banks to the Abu Dhabi 
government and public sector companies. The Abu Dhabi 
government owns 70.5% of NBAD's shares through its 
investment arm. the Abu Dhabi Investment Council (ADIC).
The CEO has responsibility for the day to day management < 
including:
Implementation of decisions of the Board and strategy determine 
board.
Managing the business of NBAD in accordance with strategy app 
the Board.
Managing systems of risk management and control.
M anaging delivery of targets set by the Board.
Chairing the Executive Committee and Management
Committee.
National
Drilling
Company
of Abu
Dhabi
(NDCA)
In 1972 National Drilling Company is established by a 
resolution of the Abu Dhabi Council of Ministers. In 1973-74 
NDC Acquired the first onshore rigs, ND-1 and ND-2. NDC 
Since 1976 NDC has expanded its off shore fleet of shore rigs 
continued to acquire offshore rig (1975-2010) and in land rigs
(2110-2011).
NDC has been involved in other activities such as Commenced 
Ground Water Research Project in Al-Ain in partnership with 
the U.S. Geological Survey (1988); Implementation of the Well 
Delivery Limit (WDL) initiative saves operating company 
significant cost and reduces well durations drastically (2000); 
and marked its 30 years anniversary by a corporate 
reorganization and new identity (2002).
In 2006 NDC completed 10 years without Lost Time Incident. 
Thus winning of ADNOC HSE award titled Simulating for 
Success” and special recognition award titled “Aviation Fires
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Down rated”, and won ADNOC HSE award titled “Improved 
Transport Safety through VMS”.
In 2007 Rig Junana completes Rig Integrity Assurance Program 
(RIAP) receiving ISO 14001 certification, and in 2011 NDC 
won DNOC HSE award titled ‘Traffic Lights: A snapshot of 
Asset Health”. Receiving ISO 27001 certification for 
Information Security.
Source: Data Analysis
In order to ensure the anonymity o f the board members involved and to facilitate the process 
of ‘coding’ the above organisations (cases) were given the ‘coding’ of A to D accordingly. 
This meant that the four targeted individual directors namely Chair, CEO, ED and Non-ED in 
each board were also allocated the coding of A1-A4, B1-B4, C1-C4, and D1-D4 respectively
(See Table, 3.4).
Abu Dhabi Ports Company (ADPC)
Khalifa Fund to Support and Develop Small and Medium Enterprises (K F)
• National Bank of Abu Dhabi (NBAD)
• National Drilling Company of Abu Dhabi (NDCA)
Table 3.4: Organisations and target individual ‘coding’ for interviews
No.
Total
Organisation 
(Board) 
Code 
ADPC 
KF
NBAD
NDCA
Total
Source: Data Analysis
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that somewhere between 12 and 16 interviews theoretical saturation 
reached. This provided the safety net for ensuring the generation o f adequate relevant
The assumption was
may be
data for the study (Achroyed and Hughes, 1993)
access
envisaged
organisation. A plan was devised (See Table 3.5) to provide as much time as necessary to 
meet and conduct the interviews (Stake, 1995; Hetland, 2002). It was also decided that should 
an interview, for one reason or other, not meet the planned schedule, the researcher should 
the individual another time and elsewhere (outside the organisation) if necessary tomeet
complete the planned number o f interviews
3.5.1.1 Interview questions and rationale
It is often mistakenly understood that ‘unstructured interviews’ do not necessarily need 
planning on the part o f the researcher (Voss et al, 2002). This o f course is not the case As 
Ackroyd and Hughes (1993) appropriately contend the questions to be asked need to be 
considered in terms of their rationale and their relationship with the data they intend to 
generate. Another related issue is that, questions to be asked have to be ample enough in 
order to ensure that the interview is in depth and generate detailed information. Since each 
interview is regarded in this study as one case, it was important to generate ample questions 
so that the criteria, quantity and quality were guaranteed (Miles and Hurberman, 1994) Thus, 
the questions generated, besides the demographic ones which enquire about individual 
characteristics of the interviewees, were a) related to the aims and objectives of the research,
Table 3.5.: Sample of questions considered for interviews, the rationale and their relationship
with objectives of the research.
Interview Question
Age. gender, education, position in the organisation/ sector /industry experience/ total years of 
experience at board level/ and experience on the present board?
What are the role(s) and characteristics of the PSBs? How often do they meet?
What are your role(s) and responsibilities on the board?
What demands and constraints affect your performance on the board?
7
8
10
11
14
16
18
Do you involve your senior management in the board meeting?
In what ways do the management team contribute to the board meeting, before, during and/or
after?
How well do you know the board members socially?
What do you believe constitutes board effectiveness?
Are rewards and motivation necessary for the board members' effectiveness? If so, how?
In your opinion, what ‘core capabilities’ do you, as a board member, require to be effective in your
roles?
How would you describe the atmosphere of the board? 
How well do the board members work together?
Is there any on-going training opportunity for acquisition of relevant skills and knowledge for 
board members? If not what kind of training would you envisage?
Do you conduct the board business in English or in Arabic?
How do Islamic values and beliefs affect your performance/effectiveness on the Board?
Do traditions and rituals affect the board performance/effectiveness? Please give an example
Has global economic decline affected the behaviour of the members on the board?
How important are the PSBs effectiveness for the overall social-economic development of Abu
Dhabi?
Source: Data Analysis
and b) could be justified by their relevance to literature (Gummesson, 2000; Bernard, 2002). 
The research adopted the strategy of being prepared with more rather than less questions in 
order to ensure that each interview yields sufficient data in order to be considered as a case
for analysis (See Table 3.5).
3.5.1.2 The pilot study
Although as explained in the previous chapter attempts were made to ensure that the
research-
research
considered carefully, never the less a pilot study was attempted involving the first five
interviews (participants).
The pilot aimed to see the relevance, time taken, theoretical suitability, methods used and 
more importantly whether or not the questions yield data concerning the ‘contexts’ in which 
the behaviours and actions have been exhibited. In the event, no real issues emerged except 
that at times the researcher had to resort to more than one ‘sitting’ to complete one case. Th.s 
issue was also incorporated when conducting other interviews. Thus, the first five intervtews 
were re-interpreted for the analysis and were added to other cases (interviews conducted 
The issue o f ‘access’ did not present itself as a serious challenge. All four organisations
selected and all targeted individuals selected were contacted prior to conducting the
(Ackroyd and Hughes, 1993). A schedule for interviews was prepared and adheredinterviews
to religiously.
3.5.1.3 Access and conduct of the interviews
The cultural etiquette in Abu Dhabi and the helpful attitude o f the members towards another 
colleague has allowed for more time being spent with members than was originally planned 
for. On average each interview took between 75-105 minutes. This was particularly 
encouraging, however the researcher had to exercise control to make sure that the 
interviewees did not digress beyond the expected amount In all cases the interviewer did not
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face any major obstacles in approaching the individuals and conducting interviews (See data 
collection process).
Almost all interviews were conducted outside working hours and were supplemented with 
telephone calls when necessary. Using the concept of theoretical sampling grounded data 
analysis, data saturation was achieved after conducting 12 interviews; that is no new extract 
or new issues appeared in the analysis. Further interviews supported the above concept.
3.5.2 Secondary Data
In this research, secondary data has been considered as those which have been obtained other 
than by interviews. The observations made by the researcher and even his knowledge of the 
organisation, if relevant to the research will undoubtedly form some of the secondary data. 
However, for this study, it refers to information relevant to the context in which the 
interactions take place (Hakim, 2000; Zikmund, 2003). This information is in a sense 
obligatory for any organisational research. It is essential that the bulk of the secondary data 
has been gathered first, as this information can provide useful background information that 
can assist in defining the research, developing goals and determining methodology (Polonsky 
and Walter, 2005). It has been suggested that data from secondary sources gives outstanding 
background information about the research area as well as providing excellent leads for 
conducting effective interviews (Blumberg et al., 2005). For example, background knowledge 
concerning the formation of the board and its previous operations, decisions made, and 
constraints experienced have been extremely helpful to the present researcher. Besides 
extensive documentary secondary data, such as joumais, books, business reports, national 
government reports, studies of organisations, publication of various organisations and 
institutions regarding the public sector, and historical development of these issues related to
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boards have been the main focus. The secondary data in the present research provided the 
researcher with the confidence and knowledge to approach the interviews, as in the case of 
unstructured interviews, almost any subject may “come up” (Hakim, 2000; Sekaran, 2003).
The rich qualitative data generated by conducting semi-structured interviews were 
triangulated by the information o f the contextual nature; the organisation and the wider 
environment factors It must be noted that the researchers’ own insight and knowledge, based 
on observation, and participation in the various PSBs has to an extent provided the insight 
necessary to define the scope, the whereabouts of the relevant data and the access to sources
normally in accessible to ordinary researchers (Ackroyd and Hughes, 1992).
Moreover, the researcher took on the task of attending boards and earnestly recording and 
collecting data. As explained by Kiel and Nicholson (2005), the information obtained from 
observing aboard meeting reveals a great deal about the dynamics of the relationship between 
individual directors which can be further corroborated by reviewing board papers and
governance charters (Tellis, 1997).
3.5.3 Data Analysis: Process
It has been suggested that the qualitative data obtained from semi structured interviews can 
be analysed using techniques commonly used such as ‘content analysis’ (Bernard, 2002, 
Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). This process will result in the emergence of themes and 
categorisation, and links to substantive and formal theories.
Other writers suggested that the analysis o f the qualitative data is bound by the approach 
comprised of the three components;
• Data reduction;
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• Data Display; and
• Verification and drawing conclusions
Data reduction refers to the process of selecting, focusing, abstracting and transforming the 
data. Data display refers to an organised, compressed assembly of information that allows the 
drawing of relevant conclusions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994). These have 
been made possible by using ‘coding’ and ‘memo-ing’. Whilst coding refers to labelling and 
identification, memo-ing is the writing about the codes and what they stand for. It is argued 
that these methods will enable the researcher to begin the task of drawing conclusions. The 
software Nvivo can achieve the above using computations (Vallaster and Koll, 2002;
Bazeley, 2007).
Since the nature of the present research is exploratory rather than explanatory, it was decided 
to process the data manually rather than using software and computation. This was based on 
the informed decision that the cases collected in conjunction with the data concerning the 
contextual background constituted the primary ‘raw’ data for analysis. Also, there is the fact 
that, as suggested in the literature, there is an overlap between the collection and analysis of 
the qualitative data (Voss et al., 2002). Whilst the bulk of the data was in English some of the 
secondary data collected such as organisational regulations and Charters were written in 
‘Arabic’ thus requiring translation. The process of data reduction and coding therefore 
included listening, reading, re examining interviews, the account provided by the directors, 
their perception of what in their opinion constitute an effective board; what capabilities are 
necessary for forming and contributing to the effectiveness of the boards; and under what 
organisational, socio-economic and cultural conditions the board effectiveness can be 
achieved in order to look for meaningful relationships amongst the themes which emerged
from the data. By entrusting this process, which requires giving meanings to descriptions, to 
computer software would have meant that the valuable observations made and the 
impressions formed by being involved in the board dynamics were not included (Huberman, 
1994; Trace, 2001). As Ackroyd and Hughes (1992) aptly assert, the methods and techniques 
used for generating and collecting data and/or analysis, ought not to be used for their own 
elegance, rather they should be employed to achieve the goal and objectives of the research.
In short, the process of data analysis took the following stages;
a) descriptive and content analysis o f the context related and case data for emergence of
the themes and sub themes
b) cross analysis o f the themes and sub themes across the cases to identify the
similarities and differences thus searching for common and unique themes;
c) understanding the nature of the themes concurrent between the twelve interviews
collected to allow the drawing o f conclusions and verification concerning the
contribution of the directors to ‘board effectiveness 
In order to test the parameters of the ‘realism’ methodology and its implications for the 
relevance of the data, a pilot study was attempted (See above) in which the contextual 
information about public sector organisations were also included prior to formal collection of 
the data. The themes identified as being the main contributing factors to the board 
effectiveness; included personal characteristics, interpersonal communication, constraining 
factors, individual capabilities and competencies, motivation and prior experiences and the 
academic attainment of the board members The analysis process led to the drawing of
conclusions, albeit in a very limited way (Ramsay, 1998).
3.5.4 Reflection on Methodology
An important aspect of research is that it also forms ‘a learning opportunity’, one which has 
implications for the research itself and the future endeavours in the same or similar field 
(Ackroyd and Hughes, 1992; Silverman, 2005). The present study, like many other empirical 
efforts has had its share of joy and concerns which formed the realities that had to be 
negotiated by the researcher. These basically fall into two groups, those concerned with data 
collection where situations expected or otherwise that were dealt with during the process of 
collecting and generating data, and those concerned with analysis of the data collected.
3.6 RESEARCH QUALITY
The question of how to judge the quality of a research project has preoccupied many social 
scientists (Christie et al., 2000; Riege, 2003). Often faced with criticism which has been 
directed at use of a specific method the researchers developed ways to ‘defend’ their position 
and the methods used for generating and collecting data (Yin, 1989; Bisman, 2002). The 
issues of the validly and reliability of both methods and data have formed the most notable 
issues questioned and debated in relation to qualitative studies, including interpretive and 
those which employ case studies. For example, Heron (1996) views the validity of enquiry in 
terms of whether or not it is well grounded. The procedure suggested for ensuring validity
includes five criteria (See Table 3.6);
Yin (1989) suggested four tests of the Internal Validity; the establishment of the correct 
relationship between patterns, External Validity; possibility of replication and generalisation, 
Construct Validity, appropriates of operational measures for the concepts being investigated, 
and Reliability, Proper documentation and execution of the procedure so that another
researcher would obtain the same results. Other writers bring in to play the methodological 
issues such as ontology and epistemology and aptly argue that the validity and reliability of a 
Table 3.6: Heron’s criteria of validity and reliability of the social inquiry
NO.
1.
CRITERIA
Cycle of the research
Reflection and action
Challenging uncritical 
subjectivity__________
Managing 
►rejections 
Convergence 
divergence
unaware
and
DESCRIPTION
The process of data analysis, models an 
adequately be refined, and sufficiently reflect 
experiences and the experience of actions taken
The action taken should be reflected upon to see if they worked 
or not and why it didn’t to form new theories, is a part and
narcel of validation process _____________________ _—
process of analysis 
outcome of the rese
distortion impacting on analysis 
experience or insight_________
Source
Using contradiction and multiple views to ensure ine process ui 
convergence (capabilities), and divergence (dissimilarities) in
___________ outcome.___________ _____________ _ _____
Adopted from Heron (1996); Torbert (1999); Rowan and Reason (1981)
research should be judged based on the expectations and allowable use o f the practices within 
its own paradigm (Healy and Perry, 2000; Bisman, 2002; Silverman, 2005) and that the issue 
of how reliability and validity should be assessed have not been finalised (Healy and Perry,
2000; Weber 2004).
The use of realism, as part of the interpretive paradigm has resulted in the generation of rich 
qualitative data which explores the perception and understanding of the participants but does 
not take these perceptions as ‘reality’, rather considers them based on objective contextual 
factors to obtain a realist version o f reality. Such procedure resulted in an abundance o f rich 
qualitative data which was subjected to coding, reduction, and cross analysis, and still were 
considered in context of the organisational and external socio-economic and legal realities 
which formed, contributed to and affected either implicitly and explicitly to the realities of 
PSB’ in Abu Dhabi. In some ways the quality of realism research uses a blend of the criteria
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that have been specifically developed for positivism and/or interpretivism (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985). The researcher, throughout the process of inquiry, methodically adhered to the criteria 
of validity and reliability as asserted by the relativist, thus has ensure that as Easterby-Smith 
et al., (2000) suggests, sufficient number of the perspective have been included to ensure the 
validity of the research, and in order to meet the criteria of the reliability, the processes 
employed have been adequately documented to ensure that similar observations can be
reached by another researcher.
Amongst the many issues which have entered the debate on quality of the research, three 
seem to stand out as important; the issue o f ‘trust worthiness’, ‘triangulation’, generalisation. 
These are discussed briefly here;
Trustworthiness of the data generated and/or collected relates to the richness, depth and 
details of the data collected (Kvale, 1996; Bisman, 2002). This in turn is influenced by the 
relationship which is established between the researcher and the individual participant for the 
duration of the interview. In the case of the present research, the credibility and integrity of 
the researcher played a part in ensuring that directors and members of the board felt that they 
could report their experience and discuss their views ‘confidentially’ and freely . Also to 
avoid the problem of ‘anticipation’ of saying the ‘right’ thing to avoid cultural 
embarrassment, the researcher not only enquired about ‘effectiveness’ but also questioned the 
participants about the ‘ineffectiveness’ of the boards and their underlying reasons. Although 
the researcher can disregard an interview on the account of not being reliable or suspicion of 
extreme bias and inaccuracy, all interviews carried out yielded detailed, rich, original data 
and met the stringent criteria imposed by the researcher.
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The triangulation of the data produced information and data which could be used for 
corroboration of the accounts provided by the participants. The observations made by the 
researcher and the data gathered from various sources, including literature and similar studies 
in to effectiveness of the boards, as well as the legislative and legal requirements for creating 
a board within the public sector formed invaluable data for verification of the interviews
(Healy and Perry, 2000; Shenton, 2004).
As for the generalisation of the findings or external validity, the intention was to gain a 
comprehensive, detailed, and accurate understanding of what contributes to PSB’s 
effectiveness in the context of Abu Dhabi. Arguably the intention is not to emulate the 
principles of the natural science to the extent that statistical evidence is used for testing 
hypotheses, on the contrary the ‘analytical’ approach has been adopted to record and explain 
the similarities and differences that make sense in attempting to improve the board 
effectiveness in Abu Dhabi. It was hoped that the findings lead to theory building (Kvale,
1996; Robson, 2002).
3.6.1 Ethics of research
The researcher was aware of the important ethical principle which has to be considered when 
conducting research - that the researcher should not cause harm to participants or others 
(Saunders, 2007). Predominantly the risk stems from the possibility that the thoughts, 
perceptions, and details of incidents included within the report may be perceived negatively 
by others, hence reflecting poorly on both the participants and their organisations. Thus, 
following Miller and Brewer (2003) two key ethical considerations have been observed: 
informed consent and anonymity. To ensure that participants are able to provide informed 
consent, as advised by numerous scholars (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Bryman and Bell,
2011), participants will be provided with an information sheet that outlines the projects aims, 
details of what their participation will entail, and the intended outcomes of the project; it will 
be ensured that participants give their full written consent prior to the collection of data. To 
ensure anonymity, the names of participants and their organisation will be obscured, as will 
any other information that may pertain to their identification via a process of manipulation
(Richards, 2006).
In addition, this study will be conducted in line with section 3.2 of the University of 
Northampton’s ethical code 2 as well as other scholarly guidelines as appropriate (Miles and
Huberman, 1994; Fritzsche, 1997)
SUMMARY
This chapter provides the rationale for the methodology employed by exploring the different 
perspectives in social sciences and assessing their suitability for the present research. The 
debates on ‘positivism’ and ‘constructionist’ approaches to study of the social and 
organisational phenomenon resulted in understanding that neither could adequately explain 
the reality of PSBs in Abu Dhabi. Therefore, by adopting ‘Realism as a realist alternative, 
attempts has been made to ensure that both subjective accounts (perceptions, understanding 
and views) of the participants were captured and simultaneously attention was paid to 
objective organisational and wider social realities which influence and contribute the 
effectiveness of the PSBs.
The adoption of the case study approach for this exploratory approach has ensured that those 
who are primary actors in contributing to the effectiveness of the board-members were
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involved in the study. In line with the concept of theoretical saturation, 16 participants were 
targeted for semi interviews and were undertaken, though as discussed earlier, data saturation
was achieved after 12 interviews.
The data collected was subject to systematic and analytical consideration. The accounts 
provided by the participants were coded, reduced and the emerged themes were cross 
examined with other cases, then the secondary data collected, and the evidence from 
literature also included in the analysis of the data.
The adherence to the criteria proposed by social scientists who have already attempted 
interpretive social inquiries and learning from researcher in similar fields led to a collection 
and generation of the rich qualitative data relevant to the subject of the social inquiry. This in 
turn satisfied the criteria of validity and reliability expected from a serious study. On the 
whole, the researcher is confident that the data collected, analysed and the conclusions 
reached during analysis are the true reflection of the realities of the PBS and experiences of 
the participants within the sample interviews conducted. Thus, some measure of ability to 
generalise in terms of identification of similarities and differences has been achieved.
CHPATER FOUR: ABU DHABI AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The late 1950s saw the first commercial oil discovery in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. This 
momentous event was followed by the UK’s withdrawal from the Gulf region and the 
subsequent formation of the federation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1971. Since 
then Abu Dhabi has witnessed a period of remarkable social and economic development 
(UAE, 2012; Visit, 2012a). In the span of one generation, a previously semi-nomadic people, 
whose lives centered on seafaring and pearling in the summer and date farming during the 
winter (Al-Fahim, 1995) have seen Abu Dhabi transform into a modem state which now 
enjoys one of the highest per capita GDP ratios in the world (Visit, 2012b).
In order to ensure the Emirate’s continued socio-economic progress, the leadership of Abu 
Dhabi is implementing strategies aimed at achieving increased economic growth and 
diversification. High on its agenda is a desire to reduce Abu Dhabi’s dependence on oil 
(ADCED, 2009). Abu Dhabi’s Vision 2030 has established the core pillars necessary for 
developing a sustainable knowledge-based economy. To this end, the Emirate is investing in 
a range of non-oil producing sectors including aviation, tourism, media and financial 
services. Integral to this development process is the cultivation of an economic and business 
environment that will support the integration of Abu Dhabi into the global economy (The 
World Factbook, 2012). Establishing a culture of good corporate governance is essential in
fl
underpinning this process if Abu Dhabi is to successfully attract Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) as well as local investment and grow export markets (Barakat, 1993; Cadbury, 2002;
ADCED, 2009).
This chapter first outlines the socio-economic development of Abu Dhabi, briefly exploring 
the geography, people and culture, religion and values, political structure and economic
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development. Second, within this context, the evolution of a corporate Governance culture in 
Abu Dhabi which creates competitive advantage (Charan, 1998) is considered. Third, the 
mechanisms for promoting corporate governance in Abu Dhabi are briefly examined. Finally, 
attempts to deal with the main challenges for developing a strong culture of corporate 
governance within the Emirate are discussed in some detail.
4.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF ABU DHABI
This section provides an overview of the socio-economic development of Abu Dhabi, and the 
contextual setting within which the leadership of Abu Dhabi is seeking to establish a culture 
of good corporate governance across both the private and public sectors.
4.2.1 Geography
The UAE is located in the Middle East region on the Arabian Gulf, and borders Oman, Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar, as shown in Figure 1 below (ADCED, 2009; Visit, a and b). The country is 
around 80,000 square kilometers in size, with an estimated population of 8.2 million in 2009, 
and a population growth rate of 1.6% from the previous year (NBS, 2006, 2010). Seven 
Emirati citizens represent approximately 20% of the total population, with the remaining 
comprising expatriates of which the majority originate from other than Arab nations, 
principally India, Bangladesh, Iran, and the Philippines. The urban population is estimated to 
represent approximately 84% of the total population (World Factbook, 2012).
Figure 4.1: Map of the Middle East Region and location of Abu Dhabi
Source: http://www.mideastweb.org/muae.htm
Abu Dhabi is the largest of the seven emirates with an estimated population of approximately 
2.1 million in 2011(ACAD, 2010, 2011). As with the UAE overall, Emirati citizens make up 
close to 20% of the Emirate s population. Abu Dhabi accounts for over 80% of the country’s 
total land mass, and has a coastline that stretches over 700 kilometers. The Emirate’s terrain 
primarily comprises of desert and arid land, with only 30 percent of land inhabited. The 
climate is sunny and dry, with summer daytime temperatures regularly climbing above 40 
degrees Celsius. Land cultivation and irrigation for agriculture and forestation have enabled 
growth in the Emirate’s agriculture sector, with just over 1 percent of total land area now 
used for agriculture. A lack of natural fresh water represents one of the most pressing 
environmental issues facing the Emirate, with desalination plants and efforts to promote the 
conservation of water aimed at redressing this problem. Other environmental issues include 
desertification and beach pollution from oil spills (Visit, 2012b and c).
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The city of Abu Dhabi is located in a low-lying island on the coast, one of approximately 200 
islands within the Emirate’s territories. Most islands are uninhabited, with many designated 
wildlife sanctuaries. Abu Dhabi is the capital of the UAE and the seat of its federal 
government, as well as the centre of the country’s oil industry. The Emirate’s second largest 
city is A1 Ain, located in the east and close to the Hajar Mountains. The Emirate is divided 
into three administrative regions: the City of Abu Dhabi, the Eastern Region and the Western 
Region (ADCC, 2010, 2011).
Abu Dhabi’s geographical location in the Gulf region provides it with the opportunity to act 
as a bridge between the economies of Asia, the European-Mediterranean region, and Africa. 
Nevertheless, in order to position itself on the global economic map, it is vital that the 
Emirate embrace a culture of good governance (Coglianese, et al, 2004). Moreover, this must 
be achieved within the context of the people and culture of the Emirate (INSTEAD, 2011).
4.2.2 People & Culture
Before the discovery of oil in Abu Dhabi, little was known to the outside world of the people, 
history or culture of the region. However, it is estimated that in the early 1800s the population 
of the Trucial States was in the vicinity of 72,000. The population primarily lived in small 
settlements dotted along the coast, and was made up of fishermen, pearl divers, seafarers, 
traders and other people involved in trades and services necessary to support seasonal pearl 
diving (Al-Fahim, 1995). Other people lived in the desert, which saw a low level of 
agricultural activity including date and camel farming Overall, very little in the way of 
industry existed in the region. Life was centered on family and the tribe, and people were 
socially, economically and politically interdependent, creating a common culture and social 
identity (UAE, 2012).
In the coastal areas people relied heavily on a diet of fish, whilst inland the Bedouin diet was 
largely based on dates, camel milk and meat. This diet was supplemented where possible by 
items imported from neighboring countries such as Bahrain and Iraq. Many families spent the 
winter months in the town of Abu Dhabi, fishing and pearl diving, and the summer inland in 
settlements such as A1 Ain where they tended farms (Visit, 2012a; UAE, 2012).
Life for people in the Emirate was simple and challenging before the export of oil brought 
income into the Emirate and dramatically increased the standard of living. Until the 1960s, 
much of the population lived in Barasti houses made from the branches of date palms, 
although prominent merchants and the ruling family owned houses made from earth. There 
was little access to fresh water or electricity, and wood brought by Bedouins was used to 
make fires for cooking. Access to schooling was limited, with religious schools providing the 
primary source of education and the Quran being the only book available to read. As a result, 
the majority of people were illiterate.
As the oil industry grew, Abu Dhabi began to develop into a hub for trade and commerce. 
The money generated by oil also facilitated a dramatic improvement in the standard of living 
for its citizens as reflected in improved diet, healthcare, education and housing. The socio-
economic transformation of Abu Dhabi also led to an influx of foreigners, resulting in an 
urgent need to expand local infrastructure and services to support the growing population. 
This in turn led to numerous business opportunities, with many Emirati families opening 
businesses across a broad spectrum of industries. At the same time, the demand for both 
skilled and unskilled expatriate labour grew sharply, as did the need to build schools to train 
and educate the local population. These changes compelled the people of Abu Dhabi, 
accustomed for centuries to a very traditional and quiet way of life centered on family, the 
tribe and religion, to adjust to life in a rapidly growing economy and multiethnic society, as
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Abu Dhabi transformed into a modem city and assumed its place in the global economy. At 
the same time, the citizens of Abu Dhabi were compelled to embrace a diverse range of 
cultures, religions and languages from the visitors and expatriate labour from around the
placed
traditions (Visit, 2012a).
As the Abu Dhabi economy has grown and there has been a concomitant need to introduce 
new systems, structures and technologies to enable the Emirate to modernize and grow. There 
has also been a pressing need to educate and train the citizens of Abu Dhabi to ensure they 
can take their rightful place in the development of the Emirate. Moreover, Emirati social 
structure has, historically, been based on family and tribal connections, with people’s family 
and tribe being highly influential in shaping their values and behaviour. Family and tribes 
traditionally support their members financially and emotionally. Not surprisingly, loyalties to 
family and tribe have remained very strong, and often carry over into business. Consequently, 
even as the economy has modernized and grown, it is not uncommon for companies to be run 
by and employ several members of one family or tribe (Al-Fahim, 1995).
In the face of the enormous socio-economic changes Abu Dhabi has witnessed since the 
discovery of oil in its territories, the Emirate’s leadership has sought to guide change in a 
fashion sensitive to the local culture and value systems, carefully balancing their dual roles as 
modernizers and guardians of the cultural heritage of their people (UAE, 2012). It is from 
within this contextual setting that the leadership is seeking to develop a culture of good 
corporate governance necessary to ensure the Emirate continues to integrate into the global 
economy.
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4.2.3 Religious Issues & Values
Islam is the official religion in Abu Dhabi, and most Emiratis belong to the Sunni sect of 
Islam (Helaibi, 2006). Islam emphasizes the importance of behaving with generosity, respect 
and modesty, and has a strong influence on most aspects of daily life, including law, 
marriage, inheritance, education, daily routines (e g. prayer times), and dress. This common 
religion has become the cement that has held Emirati society together, and its influence on 
life in Abu Dhabi extends to the way business is conducted in the Emirate (Hill, et al., 1998). 
This is reflected in the emergence of the Islamic banking system, as well as the importance of 
Islamic law which forms the basis of legislation in the UAE (Communicad, 2012).
4.2.4 Political Structure
Historically, the political system in the region has centered on tribal chiefs, or sheikhs, and a 
system of tribal government. The ruling sheikh held ultimate power over his people, and was 
responsible for overseeing everything associated with their well-being and prosperity. This 
included judging disputes between tribes and individuals, declaring war and negotiating 
peace, raising taxes and tariffs, maintaining the treasury, and representing their people to the 
outside world. Ideally sheikhs governed in consultation with the elders and prominent 
members of the tribe, village or town.
This system of tribal government largely remained in place until the formation of the UAE in 
1971, following the withdrawal from the region of the British and end of the British 
protectorate over what was then called the “Trucial States” (Al-Fatim, 1995). In 1971, His 
Highness Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the late President of the UAE and former ruler 
of Abu Dhabi and His Highness Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum, the late Vice-
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President and Prime Minister of the U AE and former ruler of Dubai, brought together six of 
the seven emirates (Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Shaijah and Umm A1 Qaiwain) to 
form the federation of the UAE, perhaps best described as a federation of constitutional 
monarchies. The seventh emirate, Ras A1 Khaimah, joined in 1972. The traditional tribal 
system of government in each emirate facilitated the establishment of the UAE, with the 
established system of hereditary dynastic family rulers operating as local governments under
the umbrella of the federal system (UAE, 2012).
%
In 1996, a permanent constitution was accepted by the emirates, and the city of Abu Dhabi 
was accepted as the capital of the UAE. The ruler of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi became the 
president of the UAE. Under the current political system, the Supreme Council is the highest 
federal authority in the UAE, and comprises the hereditary rulers of the seven emirates. The 
Supreme Council has both legislative and executive powers. Under the constitution the 
Supreme Council appoints the prime minister; this has traditionally been the ruler of the 
Emirate of Dubai. The Federal government also comprises the Cabinet, consisting of 
ministers largely drawn from the ruling families of emirates late H.H ShZayed Bin Sultan A1 
Nahyan, the Federal National Council, the country’s advisory council and legislative body, 
and an independent Federal Judiciary which includes the Federal Supreme Court and Courts
of First Instance.
The Federal government has initiated strategies to improve planning, execution and 
excellence in governance, while aiming to improve the living standards of UAE nationals by 
improving education and health care, furthering social development, enhancing government 
services, developing human capital and advancing the global standing of the UAE. The UAE 
Government Strategy 2011-2013 seeks to promote “an accountable, lean, innovative, and 
forward-looking government .’’(UAE, 2012)
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The tradition of the ‘Majlis’ continues to this day where citizens can access their leaders to 
discuss concerns and grievances. The Majlis has served as a form of political participation 
and governance appropriate to the cultural context of the UAE. However, while the majlis 
system is well suited to smaller societies, it has become increasingly difficult to maintain as 
the population grows. Together with the increasing sophistication of government 
administration, people are now may be required to deal directly with government institutions 
on most matters rather through personal meetings with the ruler (UAE Interact, 2012).
4.2.5 Abu Dhabi
H.H Shiekh Khalifa bin Zayed A1 Nahyan is the hereditary ruler of Abu Dhabi, and President 
of the UAE. His brother, H E Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed A1 Nahyan, is the Crown Prince 
of Abu Dhabi, Chairman of Abu Dhabi’s Executive Council, and Deputy Supreme 
Commander for the armed forces of the UAE.
Formed in 1971, the Abu Dhabi Executive Council is the executive authority in the Emirate 
and assists the ruler in carrying out his powers. The Executive Council meets with 
government departments and authorities on a regular basis to discuss issues relating to 
government-sponsored projects, the development of government services, and the 
improvement of government performance. This is not surprising, according to Mufi (2000; 
2008) there is a growing tendency to reject complacency and the status quo and to press for 
dramatic improvement.
The General Secretariat of the Executive Council is the administrative body that proposes 
public policies and strategies to be decided on by the Executive Council. It also provides 
support services to the Executive Council as required.
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4.2.6 Economic Development
The earliest human occupation of what is now the UAE is recorded as far back as 5500 BC. 
Settlements in the region grew as the result of trade with Syria, Iran, India, and 
Mediterranean countries. In the 1600s and 1700s, foreign powers including the Portuguese 
and Ottomans struggled against a group of sheikhs known as Qawasim to control trade in the 
region. In the second half of the 1700s, the British intervened to take control of trade routes 
leading to the signing of individual treaties with each of the emirates in the early 1800s, and 
the region became known as the Trucial States (UAE Interact, 2012).
On the back of a booming pearling industry, the economy grew in the 1800s and early 1900s, 
with the Gulf being one of the most prolific pearl producing areas in the world. However, the 
combined impact of World War I, the Great Depression, and the production of cultured pearls 
on a commercial scale by the Japanese in the 1920s, resulted in the collapse of the local 
pearling industry.
In 1939, the first oil concession was granted in Abu Dhabi to the Trucial Coast Oil 
Development Company. The company discovered its first commercial oilfield at Bab in 1960, 
with others to follow. In 1962 the company changed its name to the Abu Dhabi Petroleum 
Company (ADPC). In the meantime, the venture known as Abu Dhabi Marine Areas 
(ADMA) was also granted an oil concession, making its first commercial oil discovery in 
1958, and first commercial shipment of oil from Abu Dhabi in 1962. Then, in 1971, Abu 
Dhabi established a national oil company, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), to 
take over the Emirate’s interests in all oil and gas fields. Together with the other six emirates, 
the UAE is currently estimated to hold the world’s sixth largest oil reserves, with Abu Dhabi 
accounting for the majority of these reserves (UAE Interact, 2012),.
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Since the discovery of oil, and subsequent rapid growth of its upstream hydrocarbon sector,
Abu Dhabi has undergone a profound transformation into a modem economic centre both in
the region and globally. Its citizens have benefited from a vastly improved standard of living,
including better access to education, health-care, housing and government services. However,
it is important to note that fast growth of health organizations has meant that top management
in the health care system lack the necessary training and experience to direct the newly
emerged health care organization (Alkhazem, 2005). Since the Emirates benefits from one of
the highest per capita GDP rates in the world, it can afford to employ management firms and
recruit skilled workers and managers from the United Kingdom (UK) and the United State 
(US) (Mufi, 2008).
The Abu Dhabi government has been instrumental in fostering this economic development
through, amongst other things, expenditure on infrastructure, and through investments in
industry and job creation. At the same time, private sector investment has largely been driven
through the formation and growth of family businesses, reflecting not only the pooling of
family resources, but also the important family and tribal relationships that govern Emirati 
society (Tharawat Family Business Forum, 2012).
Despite the tremendous benefits that have come from the Emirate’s hydrocarbon sector, the 
leadership of Abu Dhabi has recognized the need to broaden and diversify the economy in 
order to ensure sustainable and long term growth. To this end, the Emirate has encouraged 
investment across a range of sectors including construction, commerce, transportation, 
tourism, and telecommunications. The launch of the Abu Dhabi Vision 2030 (Vision 2030) in 
2009, developed by the government in consultation with the private sector, provides a 22 year 
strategy to achieve long-term sustainable economic growth. The Vision 2030 sets out nine 
pillars that form the architecture of the Emirate’s social, political and economic future,
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including a large empowered private sector, and sustainable knowledge-based economy. 
Other pillars include a transparent regulatory environment, and maintaining the Emirate’s 
values, culture and heritage. The key priority areas for public policy are:
Economic development
Social and human resources development
Infrastructure development and environmental sustainability
Optimization of government operations
(Tharawat Family Business Forum, 2012)
The government is seeking economic development through economic diversification and the 
creation of higher-value employment opportunities. More specifically, Vision 2030 indicates 
that future growth in the Emirate is to focus on the following sectors:
Energy -  Oil & Gas
Petrochemicals
Metals
Aviation, Aerospace and Defence
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences
Tourism
Healthcare Equipment and Services
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Transportation, Trade & Logistics
• Education
• Media
• Financial Services, and
• Telecommunication Services
These sectors are considered to have good growth potential going forward, and are aligned 
with the Emirate’s broader development agenda.
In accordance with the Vision 2030, the government is putting measures in place to develop a 
dynamic and open economy that provides an attractive environment for local and foreign 
investment (TADEV, 2012),. A key objective is to make the private sector the main driver of 
economic growth in the future. Accordingly, the government is trying to increase the 
Emirate s international competitiveness and enhance the local business environment through 
a range of measures including, but not limited to: legislative reform; ensuring all economic 
policy is formulated with reference to rigorous data sources and statistical information; the 
establishment of a dedicated Investment Promotion Agency; and the opening of a world class 
Export Promotion Agency. At the same time initiatives are in place to restructure the 
government in order to create greater efficiencies and improve the overall operation of the 
economy; this includes the outsourcing of a range of government services to more efficient 
private sector service providers, including the formation of private-public partnerships (PPPs) 
for the delivery of a range of service and infrastructure projects (ABDE, 2012).
Within the context of what the leadership o f Abu Dhabi is trying to achieve, namely the long-
term sustainable development of a knowledge-based economy, the importance of developing 
a strong culture of good corporate governance is critically important (Bjerke and Al-MEER, 
1993). As Halib and Salleh (2006) contend, many developing countries have adopted 
Western management theories and practices. Although this claim is difficult to confirm, 
observations suggest that Western management has by and large influenced the managerial 
culture and practices in Abu Dhabi (Mutabaqani and Ajmi, 2001), though not all of these 
theories are applicable in the real world (Ochoa and Mujtaba, 2009). This is particularly 
important for the Emirate to successfully attract both local and foreign investors who demand 
rules, standards and procedures that demonstrate international standards of corporate 
discipline, as expected in West, in company management (Weier, 2001). This includes 
greater levels of transparency and accountability across the management and operations of 
companies than has historically been the case in the Emirate (ABDE, 2012).
4.3 COMPANY OWNERSHIP AND THE EVOLUTION OF A CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE CULTURE IN ABU DHABI
According to Hareb Al Darmaki Chairman, Abu Dhabi Securities Markets (News 
Details, 2006: 1)
“For Abu Dhabi, the benefits of privatization are dear and there are few, if  any 
disadvantages. The country is growing at a rate well ahead of its natural ability to provide 
the resources required by this rate o f growth. We simply do not have all the skills, 
technology, expertise, human resources and associated intellectual and non-financial 
capital to manage and implement the growth on the scale that is the vision for the 
country...Partnering with the private sector is the most efficient way o f achieving the 
capital's growth and development plan, [and] the private sector should mirror the 
diversification of the public sector by encouraging the listing and corporatization o f private
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family companies. There is a growing need for private family companies to adopt a model
driven by corporate governance to ensure continuity in (management) succession and
the maintenance of generated wealth. Faced with new competition in local markets, family
companies will see increased benefits through private placement or converting into public 
jo int stock companies.
They will share risk with other investors, gain access to capital to finance growth and retain
market share as WTO, FTA, and other international obligations reduce the domestic level
o f protection currently available to family businesses...\j Government ownership and family
ownership of the major enterprises o f this country during its early development phrases
have served well to nurture a fully functioning, globally integrated, developed economy in
the UAE. But the time is right for privatization to fuel the next stages o f our expansion. The
ADSM is continuing to support the government and encourage major shareholders in
companies with narrow shareholding base to increase the amount o f stock available for
public shareholding, as well as the percentage of company stock that may be held by 
anyone”
The rapid economic development that has occurred in Abu Dhabi since the discovery of oil in 
the last century has primarily been driven by the public sector, frequently through 
government-owned corporations (GOCs). In 1971, the formation of the Abu Dhabi National 
Oil Company (ADNOC) took over the government’s interests in all oil and gas fields in the 
Emirate (Cunningham and Sarayrah, 1994). To date, the private sector has typically taken a 
secondary but supporting role in driving economic growth, often through family owned 
businesses. More recently, increasing importance has also been placed on PPPs as vehicles 
for achieving long-term development objectives. This section briefly discusses the differing 
forms of company ownership in Abu Dhabi, as well as the role of PPPs. This is followed by a 
discussion of the government’s role in developing a culture of international best practice in
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corporate governance in GOCs, private sector organizations, as well as implications for the 
management of PPPs.
4.3.1 Government-Owned Corporations: An Overview
GOCs can be defined as state-owned enterprises, state-owned entities, state enterprises, 
publicly owned corporations, government business enterprises, or any para-statal legal entity 
created by a government to undertake commercial activities on behalf of an owner 
government organnsiation. The legal status of these organizations varies from being fully 
owned by the government, to partial government ownership, through to joint-stock 
companies with the state as a regular stockholder. The defining characteristics of GOCs are 
that they have a distinct legal form and are established to operate in commercial affairs. 
While a GOC may also have public policy objectives, GOCs should be differentiated from 
other forms of government agencies established to pursue purely non-financial objectives.
GOCs can be fully owned or partially owned by government. As a definitional issue, it is 
difficult to determine categorically what level of state ownership would qualify an entity to 
be considered "state-owned", since governments can also own regular stock in companies 
without this implying any special interference. GOCs are often the result of corporatization, a 
process in which government agencies and departments are re-organized as semi-autonomous 
corporate entities, sometimes with partial shares listed on stock exchanges.
The transfer of government assets or agencies into GOCs is often undertaken in order to 
introduce corporate management techniques to their administration. Corporatization is 
sometimes a precursor to partial or full privatization, which refers to a process by which 
formerly public assets or functions are sold or given to corporate entities by listing the shares
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of the GOC on publicly-traded stock exchanges. A common model is for public institutions to 
be corporatized and operated as autonomous joint-stock companies, while still being majority 
government-owned and run by government entities separate from a central government. Since 
2004, the Abu Dhabi government has tended towards the corporatization of certain public 
entities including the Tourism Development & Investment Company (TDIC), the Abu Dhabi 
Airports Company (ADAC), and the Abu Dhabi Ports Company (ADPC).
GOCs often operate in sectors where there is a natural monopoly, or where the government 
has a strategic or social interest. Examples include: electricity, water, health care, education, 
communications, public transport and airports. However, government ownership of industrial 
corporations is also common. In most OPEC countries, governments own the oil companies 
operating on their soil Notable examples include ADNOC in Abu Dhabi, and the Saudi 
national oil company, Saudi Aramco, which the Saudi government bought in 1988, changing 
its name from the ‘Arabian American Oil Company’ to the ‘Saudi Arabian Oil Company’. 
The Saudi government also owns and operates Saudi Arabian Airlines, and owns 70% of 
SABIC, as well as many other companies. However, they are being gradually privatized.
A variation of GOCs is government-linked companies (GLCs). GLCs are corporate entities, 
that may be private or public (i.e. listed on a stock exchange), but where an existing 
government owns a stake using a holding company. There are two main definitions of GLCs, 
each dependent on the proportion of the corporate entity a government owns. One definition 
purports that a company is classified as a GLC if a government owns an effective controlling 
interest (>50%), while the second definition suggests that any corporate entity that has a 
government as a shareholder is a GLC. The economy of Singapore is dominated by GLCs
that produce as much as 60% of the country's GDP. These GLCs are owned by a government
holding agency, Temasek Holdings. Singapore Airlines is an example of a GLC.
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The opposite of ‘privatization’ is ‘nationalization’ where the ownership of companies or
sector
nationalized large-scale companies or project considered to be of strategic importance. This 
was particularly true in Western Europe after World War U to ensure government control 
over natural monopolies and important industries, or to control projects of strategic 
importance. Examples include: the Suez Canal Company in Egypt in 1956; the Royal Bank of 
Scotland in the UK in 2008; and Citigroup in the USA in 2009 (OECD, 2004; Department of
Planning and Economy, 2008).
4.3.1.1 Abu Dhabi and Government-Owned Corporations
In the UAE, in accordance with Article 7 of Commercial Companies Law of 1984 (CCL), a 
company in which the State or any other public body hold any share capital, irrespective of 
its amount, shall be incorporated only as a ‘PJSC’. Therefore, all companies owned fully or 
partly by any of the governments in the UAE shall be incorporated as a PJSC. In the case of 
Abu Dhabi, the National Bank of Abu Dhabi (NBAD), for example, is partially owned by 
government and has adopted the form of a PJSC. NBAD is also listed on the Abu Dhabi 
Security Market.
Table 4.1. Companies fully or partially owned by the Abu Dhabi government by Legal Type
1 Type of company
A: Public Joint Stock Company (PJSC 
- Unlisted Companies in stock 
market
Ownership Link
Directly and fully owned by 
the govt.
- Companies listed on the stock 
Market
Partially owned by the govt.
Examples
Mubadala 
Emirates Palace 
ADPC 
ADAC 
Al-Itihad
AD National 
Insurance Co. 
Taqa (National
B: Limited Joint Stock 
Company (LJSC)
C: Limited Liability Company (LLC) Indirectly and partially
owned by the govt.
Energy Co.)
Indirectly owned by the govt. MASDAR (fully 
owned by by 
Mubadala 
Abu Dhabi Co. 
for Gas
Development (owned 
by ADNOC + foreign 
company)________
Source: Data Analysis
In another example, the Abu Dhabi Ports Company (ADPC), which is fully owned by Abu 
Dhabi government, has been formed as a PJSC. Nevertheless, many companies that are fully 
or partially owned by the Abu Dhabi government have also been formed as ‘limited liability
companies (LLC), reflecting the degree of the company’s relationship with the government. 
This is explained by way of examples (See Table 4.1).
For the purposes of this chapter, and in the context of corporate governance issues, GLCs will 
be referred to as GOCs rather than referring to them separately.
According to the ‘2012 Accountability Report’ published by the Abu Dhabi Accountability 
Authority, the Abu Dhabi government has an interest equal to or greater than 50% in 
approximately 160 GOCs. Further to this, information provided by the Abu Dhabi Stock 
Market indicates that 69 GOCs are currently listed on the exchange. Of these, 22 are partially 
owned by Abu Dhabi government, with ownership held either directly, such as in the case of 
the Abu Dhabi Ships Building company (ADSB), or indirectly through a holding company
(e g. Abu Dhabi Investment Council or Mubadala). Examples of government ownership held 
through holding companies include:
Abu Dhabi Investment Council (ADIC): 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank (ADCB) 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank (ADIB) 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi (NBAD)
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National Union Bank
- Mubadala:
• ALDAR
• First Gulf Bank
• Al-Waha Capital
- Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA):
• Al-Itihad
• Union Cement Company (UCC)
- General Holding Company (GHC):
• ARKAN Building Materials Co.
• Agathia
The Abu Dhabi government is seeking to limit the operation of GOCs to certain strategic 
projects and industries where the private sector cannot readily operate alone. Moreover, in 
order to ensure a level playing field, all the laws and regulations that apply to private 
companies are applicable to GOCs. Further to this, access to finance from state-owned banks 
and financial institutions is based on purely commercial grounds. Notwithstanding, 
obligations and responsibilities of GOCs in terms of public services must be clearly mandated 
by laws and regulations.
4.3.2 Private Sector Companies and the Importance of Family Owned Businesses
While the public sector in Abu Dhabi has been the principal vehicle driving economic growth 
in Abu Dhabi, primarily through its role in the oil and gas sector, the private sector has also 
played an important role. Although the oil sector is expected to continue to grow, increasing 
emphasis is being placed on economic diversification and increasing the role of the private 
sector. The key sectors identified in the Abu Dhabi Vision 2030 for driving growth over the 
coming years have been outlined in Section 4.1. The government is seeking to develop a 
large and empowered private sector that will play a major role in the growth of these sectors, 
and to this end is striving to create, “a suitable environment that will allow businesses and 
sectors to develop.” The Vision 2030 indicates that it is the government’s intention that, 
“those sectors where the Emirate has a competitive advantage at a global level will thrive” 
(The Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030, 2011). It is estimated that by 2030 the non-oil 
sector will represent 64% of total GDP, compared to an estimated 50% in 2010. Much of the 
growth in the non-oil sector is to come from the private sector Statistic Centre (2010).
One way in which the Abu Dhabi government is seeking to enhance the economic role of the 
private sector in the Emirate has been through gradually selling its shares in GOCs to the 
private sector, and through the privatization of public services or property by selling the 
operation of certain projects to private sector organizations, while the government maintains 
a supervisory and legislative role. An early example of this was the privatization programme 
introduced by the Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority (ADWEA) in 1998. Other 
privatization initiatives currently under consideration include the privatization of Etihad 
Airways, and the air cargo facilities of the Abu Dhabi Airports Company.
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The government recognises that for private sector companies to attract both international and 
local investors in order to raise the capital necessary to achieve sustainable growth, they must 
adhere to international best practices in corporate governance. This will include following 
best practice in relation to the disclosure and transparency of decision-making and financial 
records, and through the implementation of more effective oversight and internal controls.
4.3.2.1 Importance of Family Owned Businesses
Abu Dhabi has a rich history of private, family run businesses. As a result, the health and 
performance of these companies is of great importance to the overall growth of the economy. 
Nevertheless, they are often dominated by the original founder’s traditional methods and 
attitudes towards the management and operation of their companies. However, the overlap of 
responsibilities for executive and board decisions, an over-reliance on personal family
relationships, a lack of proper disclosure making
financial records, and the need for more effective oversight and internal controls, are often 
cited as serious issues confronting family businesses in the Emirate and wider Gulf region.
A lack of sound corporate governance frameworks limits the ability of many family owned 
businesses to attract foreign investors or access capital markets. Therefore, it is vital that 
family-owned businesses adopt a new culture of business governance if they are to thrive and 
grow in the future, and fulfill their potential as engines of growth in the Emirate. 
Nevertheless, in November 2010, during the second Governance Meeting held by INSEAD’s 
Abu Dhabi campus, participants noted that as “the old corporate patriarchs are being replaced 
by a younger generation of executives (Smith, et al., 2002), often educated at leading 
business universities. As a result the business culture is changing and as power is split in the
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family, younger members are setting up their own companies and running them in a less 
autocratic and closed manner (INSEAD, 2011).
Those involved in family businesses have indicated that their owners often find it difficult to 
trust “outsiders,” even if the “outsiders” are board members (Parkhe, 1993). Hence, the 
decision making powers of the boards of family business are sometimes compromised. This 
is particularly critical when “hard” decisions must be made, as was highlighted during the fall 
out of the global financial crisis. Since the crisis, banks and other investors have placed 
increased scrutiny on corporate governance practices, including the independence, strength 
and abilities of boards. There is now a need for independent non-executive board members, 
and those with international experience, are considered as extremely valuable. A further 
challenge is the difficulty of recruiting non-executive board members with sufficient skills 
and experience, and who have the time to commit to truly understanding the business 
activities of family owned companies.
In a workshop held in February 2012, by the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
Sameer Huda, Head of Corporate, Dubai, Hadef & Partners, pointed out that while there is 
evidence of a high failure rate of family businesses transitioning to the second and third 
generations, “those that do survive and thrive tend to have addressed family governance, 
succession planning, corporate structuring and corporate governance in some meaningful 
manner” (Dubai Chamber Workshop, 2012).
4.3.3 Importance of Private - Public Partnerships
PPPs are another mechanism being used by the Abu Dhabi government to increase private 
sector involvement in the economic development process in order to meet the growth
objectives set out in the Vision 2030. According to a study by the Department of Planning 
and Economy in 2008, the future of economic development in Abu Dhabi rests largely on 
strategic partnerships between the private and public sectors, including involvement in 
projects that were previously ‘government only’. The study contends that expanding the role 
of the private sector is necessary in order for Abu Dhabi to meet future economic challenges 
and for it to compete effectively in regional and global markets (Department of Planning and 
Economy, 2008).
PPPs provide the private sector with opportunities to contribute to public sector projects in 
the provision of both service and infrastructure. At the same time, private sector 
organizations can bring to the table a level of experience and expertise sometimes lacking 
within government organizations, thereby increasing efficiency while at the same time 
freeing up government resources to concentrate on core activities. Hence, PPPs provide a 
vehicle for pursuing growth objectives that government organizations would otherwise not 
have the requisite skills, expertise, technology, or financial resources necessary to undertake.
In Abu Dhabi, PPPs have been introduced across many sectors. Examples include:
• Health care -  e g. John Hopkins Medicine’s management agreement to operate Abu 
Dhabi’s largest hospital, Tawam Hospital.
• Education -  Since 2006, ADEC entered into agreements with private school operators 
to enhance the operation of public schools operations. It is estimated that over 150 
schools in the Emirate are operated under PPP agreements.
• Roads -  Abu Dhabi’s Department of Transport has entered a PPP offering a 25 year 
concession to upgrade, operate and maintain the 327 kilometre Maffaq-Ghweifat 
highway.
• Rail - Etihad Rail awarded the Italian companies, Saipem and Tecnimont, and the 
regional company Dodsal Engineering & Construction, contracts for the design and 
construction of the 266 kilometer first phase of the Etihad railroad linking Hashsan
with Ruwais and Shah by 2014.
4.3.4 Role of Government in Developing Corporate Governance Culture
Good corporate governance standards in public, private and semi-government sectors are 
fundamental in any economy to ensure financial market stability, attract investment, ensure 
competitiveness, and underpin economic growth. Governments worldwide play a pivotal role 
in their capacity as policy makers, legislators and regulators to ensure international best 
practice in corporate governance are implemented, monitored and enforced.
The repercussions of the global financial crisis brought into sharp focus the importance of 
good corporate governance standards. With corporate governance now clearly on the public 
agenda globally, governments need to determine how best to safeguard the interests of all 
shareholders and stakeholders across public, private and semi-government sectors 
(Charreauxm and Desbrieres, 2001) without stifling the dynamism that underlies a strong 
economy. Coglianese et. al., (2004) suggests that consideration must also be given to how 
best to regulate and monitor corporate governance practices. This includes consideration of 
how regulations and oversight is shared across different jurisdictions and levels of 
government, with both federal and state governments having jurisdiction over publicly traded 
companies. How responsibility for regulations and oversight are shared with various non-
government organizations must also be determined. Governments must also decide how best 
to enforce corporate governance standards (Conger and Lawler, 2002) including if 
enforcement should target individual perpetrators, or the corporations in which the
160
misconducts
organizations adhere responsibly to regulations, while others do not. Ultimately, the 
effectiveness with which corporate governance standards are enforced will affect the overall 
credibility of the regulatory system, deter bad practice, and provide a level playing field for 
all shareholders and stakeholders. However, care must be taken not to diminish the healthy 
risk-taking necessary for entrepreneurial spirit and economic growth. Government decision 
makers must therefore fully understand the likely impact of the corporate governance 
framework they are looking to introduce, as well as how it will be enforced, within the
context of the environments within which they operate (Coglianese et. al., 2004).
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD Principles) have become the 
international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders 
globally, providing guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives for both OECD and
non-OECD countries (De Andres et al., (2005). The OECD Principles also underpin the 
corporate governance component of the World Bank/IMF Reports on the Observance of
Standards and Codes (OECD, 2004). In the foreword to the OECD Principles, Donald J 
Johnston, OECD Secretary-General explains:
“Our efforts will also help develop a culture for professional and ethical behavior on which 
well-functioning markets depend. Trust and integrity play an essential role in economic life 
and for the sake o f business and future prosperity we have to make sure that they are
properly rewardsT (OECD, 200, P. 4).
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4.4 VEHICLES AND MECHANISMS FOR PROMOTING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN ABU DHABI
4.4.1 Overview of Developments in Corporate Governance in Abu Dhabi
The global financial crisis brought to everyone’s attention the importance of applying international 
corporate governance standards to the public, private and semi-government sectors. The Abu Dhabi 
government is committed to ensuring that all necessary rules and practices pertaining to corporate 
governance are in place and adhered to in order to ensure transparency and accountability in 
business, and to safeguard the interests of all shareholders and stakeholders. Through the promotion 
of a culture of good corporate governance, the leadership of Abu Dhabi hopes to improve business 
performance, attract investment, and ensure the future growth of the economy (Charreax and 
Desbrieres, (2001).
While the Abu Dhabi government, in conjunction with the Federal government, is developing 
systems to ensure the adoption of and adherence to international best practice, it is doing this with 
reference to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 2004). The corporate 
governance principles developed by the OECD were developed based on extensive experience and
rigorous research, and are seen as the international benchmark for policy makers (De Andres et. al, 
2005). The OECD Principles address:
• The rights of shareholders and key ownership functions
• The equitable treatment of shareholders
• The role of stakeholders in corporate governance
Disclosure and transparency
The responsibilities of the board (OEDC, 2004, P.7).
In order to compete effectively in a global market place, it is crucial that Abu Dhabi adhere to 
international best practice. While it might be necessary to tailor specific areas of corporate 
governance in order to adapt them to the culture, values and principles of the Emirate, it is also 
necessary that Abu Dhabi accepts the common ground that must prevail when adopting corporate 
governance standards if the Emirate is to position itself as part of the global economy and compete 
effectively (John and Senbet, 1998).
In December 2008, the Abu Dhabi Government Accounting Authority (ADAA) was established as 
an independent reporting body to His Highness the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi. The ADAA’s 
mandate includes playing an active role in monitoring governance standards across subject entities 
comprising local departments, councils, authorities, as well as institutions, companies and projects in 
which the Abu Dhabi government’s interest is equal to or greater than 50% (Abu Dhabi 
Accountability Authority, 20-12). ADAA indicates that its main objectives are to:
■ Ensure that public entities’ resources and funds are managed, collected and expended efficiently, 
effectively and economically
■ Ensure the accuracy of financial reports and the compliance of public entities with the relevant 
laws, rules and regulations and governance guidelines
■ Promote accountability and transparency principles at the public entities (Abu Dhabi Accounting 
Authority, 2012).
ADAA’s stated mission is to help improve performance and promote accountability and transparency 
across the Abu Dhabi Government and public entities by providing independent and objective 
assurance and advisory services. The ADAA also issues a Governance Report outlining its own
practices in order to earn the trust of its stakeholders, and to provide an example of the highest 
standards of accountability and transparency in its operations.
In early 2009, in a further initiative to promote the adoption of corporate governance standards in 
Abu Dhabi, the ADCCI launched the Abu Dhabi Centre for Corporate Governance (ADCCG). The 
ADCCG’s role is to support the companies and institutions in the Emirate in the adoption of 
international best practices through raising awareness and building local capacity in the field of 
corporate governance (Nadler, 2004). At the launch of the ADCCG, HE Khaflan Saeed A1 Kaabi, 
board chairman of the Centre, indicated that the ADCCG aims to assist the “public and private 
sectors to assess the application of regulations and rules of corporate governance in their 
institutions.” The role of the ADCCG is to:
• Provide specialist advisory consulting services
• Undertake internal audits and risk assessment
• Provide specialist training and professional development services
• Undertake and disseminate research and information on corporate governance issues
• Organize seminars and an annual conference dealing with issues relating to the development, 
application and adherence to corporate governance standards.
Companies incorporated in Abu Dhabi operate under Federal laws. In the UAE the legal structure of 
companies is set out in the Commercial Companies Law No. 8 (1984), and subsequent revisions. The 
law prescribes activities for the formation of companies, but it does not give precise instructions 
about the activities of boards, or the liabilities, duties and accountabilities of board members. At the 
time of writing, a new Federal law for commercial companies was being drafted that is expected to 
improve the business landscape in the UAE by making it easier to conduct business in the Emirates. 
It is also anticipated that this new law will strengthen the corporate governance standards of public
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joint-stock companies by improving and clarifying the rights of stakeholders, improving 
transparency through the disclosure in financial statements, and increasing the integrity of boards 
(Monks and Minow, 1995). This in turn should assist companies in attracting investment capital. The 
new law is also expected to enforce stricter corporate governance standards on private joint-stock 
companies, including issuing specific requirements for the boards of these companies to bring them 
in line with international standards (Renton, 1999). The new requirements will be enforceable by the 
SC A (El Ghul and Sadek, 2012).
In Abu Dhabi as in the wider UAE, the primary mechanism used by government to regulate 
corporate governance standards is the Ministerial Resolution No. 518 (R/518) of 2009 Concerning 
Governance Rules and Corporate Discipline Standards (See Appendix One). R/518 has drawn 
extensively on international standards of best practice. Prior to 2009, the Corporate Governance 
Code for Joint-Stock Companies (2007) (R/32) set out the governance framework to be followed by 
joint stock companies across the UAE, including prescribing the legal requirements for boards, 
members, the relationships of members to companies, and other aspects related to governance. 
However, in 2009, the Ministry of Economy introduced R/518 which superseded R/32. The changes 
indicated in R/518, the core tenets of which are the promotion of transparency and compliance, 
followed one of the most tumultuous years experienced by global financial markets and pointed to 
more robust corporate governance regime as a precaution against further financial shocks, and 
indicated that the Ministry of Economy is pursuing a course of increased accountability and 
economic efficiency (Bainbridge and Saliba, 2010).
Further to R/518, in 2010, the Board of Directors of the SC A issued a “Circular Concerning Matters 
Relating to Corporate Governance” (Circular) which is ancillary to R/518, and introduces mandatory 
requirements for companies listed on the UAE financial markets (Szadkowska, 2010).
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A discussion of the regulations and legislation that apply to the corporate governance framework of
companies in Abu Dhabi, including financial institutions, and GOCs is provided below.
4.4.2 Joint-Stock Companies
In the UAE, R/518 is applicable to all companies and institutions - including those that are partially 
government owned - whose securities are listed on the on-shore securities markets in the UAE, and 
their board members, but not all companies operating in the UAE. The provisions of R/518 have
been effective from 30th April, 2010.
R/518 of 2009 sets out corporate governance standards based on principles of transparency, fairness, 
accountability and responsibility. The provisions of R/518 prescribe requirements for board structure 
and operations, including the delegation of board authority, internal and external audit, and the duties 
of board members. This resolution superseded R/32 (2007). The SCA is charged with the 
supervision, control and verification of compliance with R/518, and can impose fines for non- 
compliance (Bainbridge and Saliba, 2010).
The broader initiatives contained within R/518 include that companies should adopt corporate 
governance rules aimed at creating an internal control system within their company (Norton Rose, 
2011) and to:
Evaluate risk management procedures
Implement the corporate governance code
Ensure compliance with local laws and regulations
Ensure compliance with internal procedures and policies
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• Review finance information used in drafting financial statements.
Companies must also establish an effective framework for the protection of shareholder rights, 
ensure the fair treatment of shareholders, increase transparency and openness, and clearly specify the 
duties of the board of directors (Hadef & Partners, 2010). R/518 also requires that the board of 
directors prepares a corporate governance report on an annual basis to ensure the efficiency of the 
internal control system of the company and its subsidiaries. R/518 also stipulates mandatory 
processes for the appointment of board members, including that the composition of the board must 
include independent (at least one-third) and non-executive directors (at least three, of which two 
must be independent). Companies must also develop a Corporate Social Responsibility policy. Other 
features of R/518 as outlined by A1 Tamimi & Company include:
• Requirements for the education of board members
• The maximization of individual participation in board processes
• The responsibility of the board in establishing clear rules and practices promoting good 
governance
• Emphasizing the importance of board committees, and most notably the requirement that two 
permanent committees be established, namely an audit committee, and a nomination and 
remuneration committee (Bainbridge and Saliba, 2010).
A1 Tamimi & Company provided the following observations in relation to the key elements 
contained within R/518:
• Board Accountability: R/518 makes it incumbent upon the board to develop a set of 
procedural rules for corporate governance and to supervise the application of such rules. As a
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result corporate governance has a more prominent role, combined with the implementation of 
an internal control procedure to be verified and monitored by a compliance officer.
• Board Education: The development of knowledge and skills of individual board members is 
also highlighted as a responsibility of the board. This complements the chairman's 
responsibility to encourage all board members to actively participate in board decisions, 
thereby maximizing the impact of the skill-set available to the board.
• Board Committee Independence and Empowerment: While board committees, by 
definition, are subject to board control, R/518 specifically notes the requirement for a 
majority of audit committee members to be independent members of the board and underlines 
the impact of audit committee recommendations -  even in the event the board disapproves of 
the same. For example, the board must include audit committee recommendations concerning 
external auditors in the annual corporate governance report, which is sent to the SCA and 
must be made available to shareholders, and explain any reasons for disapproval of the same.
The nomination and remuneration committee is also charged with a prominent role under R/518. The 
primary role of this standing committee is to formulate and review policies on salaries, benefits, 
bonuses, etc. for board members, executives and employees of the company (Stiegliz, 1969). In 
addition to this it is also charged with an on-going responsibility to monitor the independence of 
independent directors, and to follow-up on the procedures for the nomination of board members in 
line with applicable laws, regulations and R/518 itself.
Further to this, in May 2012, the SCA announced a further tightening of disclosure and transparency 
requirements for publicly listed companies, including the requirement that directors disclose not only 
their personal shareholdings, but also those of their spouse and dependent children. Regulations 
pertaining to the leaking of inside information by directors were also tightened.
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4.4.3 Government-Owned Corporations
The provisions of R/518, and the ancillary Circular (2010), apply to all companies and institutions 
and their board members whose securities are listed on the securities markets in the UAE. However, 
according to Article 2, clause (c) of R/518, they may not apply to the companies and institutions 
wholly owned by the Federal or local governments. The Commercial Companies Law No. 8 (1984), 
and new draft companies law when it is implemented, will also apply to all companies listed on 
securities markets in the UAE, but not those wholly owned by the government.
To this extent, GOCs that are not wholly owned by the government must adhere to the provisions of 
R/518, and the ancillary Circular (2010), as they apply to other joint-stock companies and as outlined 
in the proceeding section. Notwithstanding, under Article 2, clause (d) of R/518, “the Board of 
Directors of the Authority may exempt Companies to which the Federal Government or a local 
government subscribes from certain provisions of this Resolution; provided, however, that a 
Company's request reflects the provisions from which the Company is requesting exemption and the 
causes of exemption.” It is understood that the circumstances under which GOCs would be permitted 
exemptions from the provisions of R/518 are limited to ensure a level playing field for all listed 
companies.
Since 2008, the corporate governance practices of all GOCs in which the Abu Dhabi government 
owns an interest of 50% or greater have been monitored by the ADAA.
4.4.4 GOCs Wholly Owned by the Abu Dhabi Government and Public Sector Boards
Where a GOC is wholly government owned, the provisions of R/518, Circular (2010), and company 
law will not apply. To enhance the practice of corporate governance within GOCs wholly owned by 
the Abu Dhabi government it is recommended that their boards of directors, otherwise known as
Public Sector Boards (PSBs), adhere to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State 
Owned Enterprises (OECD, 2005). These guidelines, primarily based on an empirical study, take 
into consideration critical factors necessary when applying principles of good corporate governance 
in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), otherwise referred to hear as GOCs fully owned by the 
government. At the same time they also seek to enhance the efficiency of the operation of these 
corporations. In the foreword to these Guidelines, Donald Johnston, Secretary-General of the OECD, 
explains the importance and complexity of formulating corporate governance guidelines for SOEs: 
“A major challenge is to find  a balance between the state's responsibility for actively 
exercising its ownership functions, such as the nomination and election o f the board[ while at 
the same time refraining from imposing undue political interference in the management o f the 
company. Another important challenge is to ensure that there is a level-playing field  in markets 
where private sector companies can compete with state-owned enterprises and that 
governments do not distort competition in the way they use their regidatory or supervisory 
powers” (OECD, 2005, P.3).
In order to ensure that state ownership is exercised in a professional and accountable manner, and
that the state plays a positive role in improving corporate governance across the economy, the
guidelines proposes that states exercise ownership through a centralised ownership entity, or
effectively coordinated entities, which should act independently and in accordance with a publicly
disclosed ownership policy. Furthermore, ownership and regulatory functions should be separated. A
discussion of the suggested corporate governance framework presented in the OECD guidelines for 
SOEs is provided below (OECD, 2005). 
4.4.4.1 The Responsibilities of the Boards of SOEs (PSBs)
The boards of SOEs (PSBs) should have the necessary authority, competencies and objectivity to 
carry out their function of strategic guidance and monitoring of management. They should act with 
integrity and be held accountable for their actions. Responsibilities of the boards of SOEs should 
include.
The boards of SOEs should be assigned a clear mandate and ultimate responsibility for the 
company’s performance. The board should be fully accountable to the owners, act in the best 
interest of the company and treat all shareholders equitably.
SOE boards should carry out their functions of monitoring management and providing strategic 
guidance, subject to the objectives set by the government and the ownership entity. They should 
have the power to appoint and remove the CEO.
The boards of SOEs should be composed so that they can exercise objective and independent 
judgment. Good practice calls for the Chair to be separate from the CEO.
If employee representation on the board is mandated, mechanisms should be developed to 
guarantee that this representation is exercised effectively and contributes to the enhancement of 
the boards skills, information and independence.
When necessary, SOE boards should set up specialised committees to support the full board in 
performing its functions, particularly in respect to audit, risk management and remuneration.
SOE boards should carry out an annual evaluation to appraise their performance (OECD, 2005, P
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4 4.4.1.1 Ensuring an Effective Legal and Regulatory Framework for SOEs
The legal and regulatory framework for state-owned enterprises should ensure a level-playing field 
in markets where SOEs and private sector companies compete in order to avoid market distortions. 
The framework should build on, and be fully compatible with, the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance, and thus should include:
■ A clear separation between the state’s ownership function and other state functions that may 
influence the conditions for state-owned enterprises, particularly with regard to market 
regulation.
■ Governments should strive to simplify and streamline the operational practices and the legal form 
under which SOEs operate. Their legal form should allow creditors to press their claims and to 
initiate insolvency procedures.
■ Any obligations and responsibilities that an SOE is required to undertake in terms of public 
services beyond the generally accepted norm should be clearly mandated by laws or regulations. 
Such obligations and responsibilities should also be disclosed to the general public and related 
costs should be covered in a transparent manner.
■ SOEs should not be exempt from the application of general laws and regulations. Stakeholders, 
including competitors, should have access to efficient redress and an even-handed ruling when 
they consider that their rights have been violated.
■ The legal and regulatory framework should allow sufficient flexibility for adjustments in the 
capital structure of SOEs when this is necessary for achieving company objectives.
SOEs should face competitive conditions regarding access to finance. Their relations with state-
owned banks, state-owned financial institutions and other state-owned companies should be 
based on purely commercial grounds (OECD, 2005, P 12)
4.4.4.1.2 The State Acting as an Owner
The state should act as an informed and active owner and establish a clear and consistent ownership
policy, ensuring that the governance of SOEs is carried out in a transparent and accountable manner,
with the necessary degree of professionalism and effectiveness. This includes:
■ The government should develop and issue an ownership policy that defines the overall objectives 
of state ownership, the state’s role in the corporate governance of SOEs, and how it will 
implement its ownership policy.
■ The government should not be involved in the day-to-day management of SOEs and allow them 
full operational autonomy to achieve their defined objectives.
■ The state should let SOE boards exercise their responsibilities and respect their independence.
■ The exercise of ownership rights should be clearly identified within the state administration. This 
may be facilitated by setting up a co-ordinating entity or, more appropriately, by the 
centralisation of the ownership function.
■ The co-ordinating or ownership entity should be held accountable to representative bodies such 
as the Parliament and have clearly defined relationships with relevant public bodies, including 
the state supreme audit institutions.
■ The state as an active owner should exercise its ownership rights according to the legal structure 
of each company. Its prime responsibilities include:
1 Being represented at the general shareholders meetings and voting the state shares.
2. Establishing well-structured and transparent board nomination processes in fully or majority
owned SOEs, and actively participating in the nomination of all SOEs’ boards.
3. Setting up reporting systems that allowing regular monitoring and assessment of SOE 
performance.
4 When permitted by the legal system and the state’s level of ownership, maintaining continuous 
dialogue with external auditors and specific state control organs.
5. Ensuring that remuneration schemes for SOE board members foster the long term interest of the 
company and can attract and motivate qualified professionals (OECD, 23005, P. 13).
4.4.4.1.3 Equitable Treatment of Shareholders
The state and state-owned enterprises should recognise the rights of all shareholders and in 
accordance with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance ensure their equitable treatment and 
equal access to corporate information. This includes:
■ The co-ordinating or ownership entity and SOEs should ensure that all shareholders are treated 
equitably.
■ SOEs should observe a high degree of transparency towards all shareholders.
■ SOEs should develop an active policy of communication and consultation with all shareholders.
■ The participation of minority shareholders in shareholder meetings should be facilitated in order 
to allow them to take part in fundamental corporate decisions such as board election (OECD,
2005, P. 14).
4.4.3.1.4 Relations with Stakeholders
The state ownership policy should fully recognise the state-owned enterprises’ responsibilities 
towards stakeholders and request that they report on their relations with stakeholders. To this end.
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■ Governments, the co-ordinating or ownership entity and SOEs themselves should recognise and 
respect stakeholders’ rights established by law or through mutual agreements, and refer to the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in this regard.
■ Listed or large SOEs, as well as SOEs pursuing important public policy objectives, should report 
on stakeholder relations.
■ The board of SOEs should be required to develop, implement and communicate compliance 
programmes for internal codes of ethics. These codes of ethics should be based on country 
norms, in conformity with international commitments and apply to the company and its 
subsidiaries (OECD, 2005:15).
4.4.3.1.5 Transparency and Disclosure
State-owned enterprises should observe high standards of transparency in accordance with the
OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance (Renton, 1999). This should include:
■ The co-ordinating or ownership entity should develop consistent and aggregate reporting on 
state-owned enterprises and publish annually an aggregate report on SOEs.
■ SOEs should develop efficient internal audit procedures and establish an internal audit function 
that is monitored by and reports directly to the board and to the audit committee or the equivalent 
company organ.
■ SOEs, especially large ones, should be subject to an annual independent external audit based on 
international standards. The existence of specific state control procedures does not substitute for 
an independent external audit.
■ SOEs should be subject to the same high quality accounting and auditing standards as listed 
companies. Large or listed SOEs should disclose financial and non-financial information 
according to high quality internationally recognised standards.
■ SOEs should disclose material information on all matters described in the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance and in addition focus on areas of significant concern for the state as an 
owner and the general public. Examples of such information include:
1. A clear statement to the public of the company objectives and their fulfilment.
2. The ownership and voting structure of the company.
3. Any material risk factors and measures taken to manage such risks.
4. Any financial assistance, including guarantees, received from the state and
5. Commitments made on behalf of the SOE.
6. Any material transactions with related entities (OECD, 2005, P. 16).
In Abu Dhabi, the ADAA monitors compliance with laws, regulations and corporate of governance 
practices of all GOCs wholly owned by the government.
4.4. 5 Governance of the Public Sector
In addition to the work of the ADAA which is mandated to monitor governance standards across the 
public sector in Abu Dhabi including local departments, councils and authorities, and as discussed 
previously, the Governance Committee of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi was established through 
Resolution No. 17 of 2010 to supervise the implementation and development of concepts and 
frameworks of governance in government. The main objective of the Governance Committee is to 
create consistent and coherent public service practices and capabilities across the Abu Dhabi
Government; this is separate to the corporate governance framework that applies to joint-stock 
companies and GOCs, whether fully or partially owned by the Abu Dhabi government. The intention 
of the public sector corporate governance framework is to articulate public service core values, 
provide guiding principles, policies frameworks and standards, and guide organizational and 
individual development throughout the Abu Dhabi public sector (Norton Rose, 2011).
The Governance Committee has been tasked with:
•  Drafting the governance rules of government entities and public institutions
• Preparing financial policy guidelines, including those for public budgets and procurements, and 
including the categorization and classification of accounts, and specifying the deliverables of 
each government entity.
•  Transferring accounting systems from a cash basis to an accounting accrual basis.
• Developing job description and classification systems.
• Specifying the types and contents of reports on finance, performance, human resources, 
purchases and other reports, as well as respective auditing mechanisms.
• Developing and applying a common electronic infrastructure program.
The outcome of the Committee’s work is yet to be published (P. 16).
4.4.6 Private-Public Partnerships
Increasing emphasis is being placed on the importance of strategic partnerships, or PPPs, being 
formed between the Abu Dhabi government and private sector to promote the efficient and timely
delivery of services and infrastructure. PPPs are seen as providing the private sector with an 
opportunity to be actively involved in the future economic development of the Emirate, as well as 
allowing the government to access the extensive expertise and experience that exists within the
private sector.
To date no specific corporate governance framework exists for PPPs, although where the 
Government’s interest is equal to or greater than 50%, ADAA is responsible for monitoring 
corporate governance practices. It could be argued that the established principles of good corporate 
governance that already apply to all joint-stock companies, including GOCs -  whether partially of 
fully government owned- should be adhered to in the tendering processes, administration, operation 
and management of PPPs. Government departments directly involved in PPPs should also adhere to 
good governance practices, including the recommendations, once delivered, of the aforementioned 
Governance Committee of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. This will work towards ensuring fair and 
transparent practices in the establishment, operation and management of PPPs in the Emirate, as well 
as safeguarding potential abuses of government funding by private sector organizations.
4.4.7 Financial Institutions Regulated by the Central Bank
The SC A corporate governance code under R/518 discussed earlier in this section does not apply to 
financial institutions regulated by the UAE Central Bank. However, the Central Bank has issued 
Circular 23/00 that provides binding recommendations for corporate governance structures for UAE 
banks. Further, the Central Bank’s Corporate Governance Guidelines provide additional non-binding 
guidance for bank directors. The main provisions of the Central Bank Rules include:
A requirement for an independent Chairman who does not undertake executive functions.
•  A prohibition on the functions of the board of directors overlapping with the functions of the 
general management. The board may choose to appoint an executive committee with 
specified powers, but it is preferred that the Chairman is not involved in heading any such 
committee.
•  A requirement for an independent CEO appointed by the board and reporting to the board and 
the Chairman.
• A requirement to create a Corporate Standards Manual - setting out authorities, 
responsibilities and behavioural standards.
• A requirement that senior personnel be subject to the approval of the Central Bank and have 
at least five years relevant experience.
• A recommendation that the Internal Audit Department monitor overlapping work functions, 
conflicts of interest, significant losses, and wrongdoing (including cases of embezzlement), 
and that this department report to the Chairman, copying in the board, CEO and the Central
Bank.
• A recommendation that a Credit Committee be formed of not less than five members, with 
authority for loans in excess of the value of 1.5% of the capital and reserves of the bank, 
settlements, and the provisioning of bad debts (Norton Rose, 2011).
In addition to the above, the Central Bank provides directors with information packs outlining the 
basic principles of corporate governance including the expected role of the board, guidance on board 
selection, the qualifications of independent directors, performance monitoring, and corporate 
governance structures (Norton Rose, 2011).
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In April 2012, the Central Bank announced plans to overhaul the 1980 banking law, although at the 
time of writing details of the planned changes were limited, as were the implications of the changes 
on corporate governance practices in the banking sector. Ismail A1 Bloushi, Chief Manager at the 
Central Bank’s General Secretariat and Legal Affairs Division, indicated that the changes were made 
in response to lessons learnt during the global financial crisis, as well as a broader tightening of bank 
lending practices to avoid the risk of future banking crises. As part of the changes, the Federal 
government has split regulatory authority between two bodies; the Central Bank will retain 
responsibility of prudential regulation, while ‘conduct-of-business’ regulations dealing with such 
things as consumer protection and the daily business of running the financial system, including 
oversight of capital markets, is to be the responsibility of an expanded SCA, which will be renamed 
the Financial Services Authority. This new model reflects the Australian approach to banking 
regulation, as Australia’s banking sector weathered the global financial crisis better than banks in 
other countries (Arnold, 2012).
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4. 5: MAIN CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPING A CULTURE OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN ABU DHABI
Some of the main challenges facing the leadership within Abu Dhabi in developing a culture 
of best practice in corporate governance are summarized below:
The government of Abu Dhabi supports the initiative of ADCCG to develop a stronger 
culture o f corporate governance throughout the private and public sectors of the economy. 
These efforts should include raising the existing level of awareness of the importance of 
adhering to good corporate governance practices by effectively communicating the benefits 
of adopting good corporate governance practices. These benefits include achieving greater 
operational efficiency, increased international competitiveness, improved access to global 
capital markets, and promoting Abu Dhabi’s future economic growth as part of the global 
economy.
To work with family owned businesses in the Emirate to improve transparency, 
accountability and openness in their operations, and to otherwise promote the adoption of a 
culture of good corporate governance.
To ensure that regulations and legislation pertaining to corporate governance practices across 
all sectors of the economy are enforced. This includes ensuring that effective monitoring 
systems are in place to monitor compliance with existing corporate governance frameworks. 
This in turn should include the implementation of timely warning systems to ensure non- 
compliance is promptly detected and appropriate measured are taken.
4.6 SUMMARY
Since the first oil discovery in the 1950’s, withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the 
region, and the subsequent formation of the Federation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 
1971 Abu Dhabi has experienced a sustained process of socio-economic development which 
transferred the nomadic way life to the most sophisticated life style of today.
The UAE is located in the Middle East region on the Arabian Gulf, and borders Oman, Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar. It is about 80,000 square kilometers in size, with an estimated population 
of 8.2 million in 2009 with approximately 84% of the total population living in urban areas. 
Abu Dhabi is the capital of the UAE, divided into three administrative regions: the City of 
Abu Dhabi, the Eastern Region and the Western Region. Its geographical location in the Gulf 
region provides it with the opportunity to act as a bridge between the economies of Asia, the 
European-Mediterranean region, and Africa.
In 1971, Abu Dhabi established a national oil company, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company 
(ADNOC), to take over the Emirate’s interests in all oil and gas fields within Abu Dhabi 
accounting for the majority of these reserves. Today, Abu Dhabi is increasingly striving to 
change the originally oil based economic growth to a sustainable knowledge-based economy 
by investing in a range of non-oil producing sectors including aviation, tourism, media and 
financial services. Not surprisingly, the Emirate’s leadership has sought to guide change 
carefully by balancing dual roles as modernizers and guardians of the cultural heritage of their 
people. This necessitated development of a culture of good corporate governance necessary to 
ensure the Emirate continues to integrate into the global economy.
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The launch of the Abu Dhabi Vision 2030 in 2009, developed by the government, provided a 
22 year strategy to achieve long-term sustainable economic growth. It set nine pillars that 
form the architecture of the Emirate’s social, political and economic future, including a large 
empowered private sector, and sustainable knowledge-based economy. Other pillars include a 
transparent regulatory environment, and maintaining the Emirate’s values, culture and 
heritage. Thus the government attempted to increase the Emirate’s international 
competitiveness and enhance the local business environment through a range of measures 
including, economic policy, establishment of a dedicated Investment Promotion Agency, and 
the opening of a world class Export Promotion Agency. Also in parallel, there have been 
placed initiatives to restructure the government in order to create greater efficiencies and 
improve the overall operation of the economy; including outsourcing government services, 
formation of private-public partnerships (PPPs) for the delivery of a range of service and 
infrastructure projects. The government has recognized that private sector companies have to 
attract both international and local investors in order to raise the capital necessary to achieve 
sustainable growth. The government has recognized the need and the necessity for adopting 
best practices in corporate governance, because a lack of corporate governance frameworks 
limits the ability of many family owned businesses to attract foreign investors or access 
capital markets. As a result the business culture is continuing to change as power is split in 
the family, younger members are setting up their own companies and running them in a less
autocratic and closed manner.
Further to R/518, in 2010, the Board of Directors of the SC A issued a “Circular Concerning 
Matters Relating to Corporate Governance” (Circular) which introduced mandatory 
requirements for companies listed on the UAE financial markets. The leadership o f Abu 
Dhabi continue to face challenges in private and family own as well as public and parastatal 
companies. These challenges highlight the importance of the effective function of the boards 
in order to realise the ambitious dreams as well as ensuring sustainable socio-economic
growth.
Integral to this development process is the cultivation of an economic and business 
environment that will support the integration of Abu Dhabi into the global economy. 
However, establishing a culture of good corporate governance has been regarded as essential 
for underpinning the process of economic development to attract Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) as well as local investment and growing export markets.
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS FROM ANALYSIS
5.1 Introduction
As explained earlier, the performance of directors significantly impacts the effectiveness of 
the Board; therefore it was felt that there is a need for an in-depth investigation into what 
constitutes directors’ effectiveness and what factors influence the effectiveness of the Board 
members in the public sector in Abu Dhabi. This meant exploring the perception of the 
directors regarding the various capabilities required of Board directors to increase their 
effectiveness, as well as finding out how the directors develop the necessary capabilities for a 
sustainable performance.
In order to achieve the above aim four PSBs were selected and a number of in depth 
interviews were carried out. The rich qualitative data generated was subjected to a number of 
procedures which led to the emergence of 7 themes, 16 sub-themes and finally, 22 issues 
related to the sub-themes.
This chapter is structured based on the emergent themes. First, the process which led to the 
identification of the above will be explained in some detail. Then each of the emergent 
themes will be discussed and examples of the data collected will be given. These discussions 
have benefited from the literature reviewed earlier. These are: “Personal Characteristics of 
the Board Members” (Ramsay, 1998), “Membership of the Board” (Kakabadse et al., 2004), 
“Board and members’ functions” (Hung, 1998), “Board culture and dynamics” (Jensen, 1993; 
Sherwin, 2003), “Board effectiveness and contribution of members to Board effectiveness” 
(McIntyre et al., 2007), “Core capabilities” (Conger et al., 1998; Roberts et al., 2005), and 
“External influences on the Board” (Kamoche, 2001; Keasey et al., 2005). Interestingly, one of 
the main themes which emerged from the data was identified as a core capability required for
directors’ effectiveness. The emergence of this theme also validates the sound identification 
of the main aim of the study which formed the basis for the research question. The other 
themes relate to the factors which influence the effectiveness of the Directors on the Board in 
context of PSBs in Abu Dhabi. The emergent themes identified, the main categories of 
themes, and most importantly the sub-categories and emergent ‘issues’ will be discussed in 
the remaining part of the chapter. Finally, an overall picture the data and the findings will 
presented as a table for further discussion in the subsequent chapter of this thesis.
5.2 Presentation of the Findings
Using ground theory approach (Adams and Schavaneveldt, 1985), the data was coded using 
the four organizations involved. This resulted in 16 interviews which were analyzed 
accordingly. However, this classification of the data yielded little, except that it provided 
four major domains of the data related to the Chairs Al, Bl, Cl, Dl(4 interviews), CEOs, 
A2, B2, C2, D2. (4 interviews). BMs A3.A4.A5: B3 B4: C3 C4 and D3 fFD  and Nonp-FFB
(8 interviews). (See table 5.1).
Table 5.1: The coding of the organizations and participants involved in the interviews
185
1 I B4 | BM2 |
3 NBC (C) Cl CH_______________________
C2 CEO/ ED_________________
C3 BM1
C4 BM2
4 DCD (D) D1 CH
D2 CEO/ ED
D3 BM1
D4
Total 16 16
Source: Data Analysis
*Codes: CH: Chair CEO: Chief Executive Officer ED: Executive Officer 
BM1: Board Member One BM2: Board Member Two
5.2.1 Open and Axial coding
The data generated in the form of extracts from the interviews were subjected to two 
processes; First Open Coding and then to Axial Coding
Open coding, as used here, refers to the process of analysis of qualitative analysis to bring 
together the data and ideas. During this process the researcher identified tentative names of 
emergent conceptual categories (Stemler, 2001; Hussey and Hussey, 1997). The aim was to 
create multi-dimensional categories to form a preliminary framework for analysis of the data. 
However, instead of searching for ‘words’, the phrases and parts of the conversations with 
common themes were targeted. This resulted in seven open coding which was shared 
throughout the interview accounts by all interviewees. Thus open coding was used to reduce 
the data as well as identifying the conceptual main categories or themes. By sifting through 
each of the main categories, sub-themes or categories of the data were identified, for 
example, ‘Membership (composition) of the Board’ formed one of the main categories. The 
subsequent analysis yielded further sub-themes namely; Membership of present Boards and
membership of the other Boards. This process was applied to all 7 emergent categories. The 
open coding resulted in identification of a further 33 sub-themes which each formed a
conceptual sub-category.
Axial coding formed the next stage of the analysis of the interview’s transcripts. It involved 
the re-examination of the main and sub categories identified to determine how they are 
linked. These groupings of the data were referred to as ‘issues’ which formed the smaller 
branches of the tree of data. They contained a coherent collection of statements which helped 
better understanding of the nature and influence of the sub and main categories (themes) on 
effectiveness of the Boards, as perceived by different participants. It is worth noting that of 
the seven identified emergent themes, one specifically related to the ‘Core Capabilities’ 
required by members for further effectiveness. This theme was shared amongst all 
participants. The other 6 emergent main themes formed the cluster of influences for Board 
effectiveness.
As explained earlier, further analysis resulted in identification of 28 sub themes which were 
referred to as ‘‘issues” (See Table 5.2). These form the small branches of the seven main 
branches of the themes identified via data analysis. Each of these issues will be discussed in 
some detail in order to get a better picture of the perceived factors which influence the 
effectiveness of the Board. Therefore it could be claimed that the qualitative data generated 
has been subjected to a thematic analysis which resulted in a complete ‘tree of information’, 
where the position of each of the main themes, sub themes and issues represent the main 
branches, second branches and the final smaller branches. The outlook of the data is therefore 
determined by the relationship between the branches and most importantly it is formed by the 
presence of the issues or the final braches identified from the data. Understanding the 
effectiveness of the Boards as perceived by the participants has shaped the data tree and the
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final shape of the themes, sub-themes and issues involved. The researcher believes that the 
traditional approach which only endeavors to identify the main themes or includes sub-
themes may not present the fullness of the thematic analysis as it has been carried out here in
this study (See Table 5.2).
5.2.2 Profile of the participants
Fifteen Board Directors from four separate public sector Boards were involved in this study. 
The four organizations involved have been referred to as ‘Port’ (Code A), ‘Fund’ (Code B), 
‘Bank’ (Code C), and ‘Drilling Co’ (Code D) in order to disguise their true identify. This 
selection of the organizations and their Boards has adequately represented the public sector in 
Abu Dhabi.
The participants in organization ‘A’ were five in total. Although originally it was envisaged 
that only four Directors from each targeted organization should be involved in the study, 
because an adequate number of participants from organization ‘D’ could not be identified and 
interviewed, the availability of an additional participant (Executive Director) from 
organization ‘A’ provided a viable alternative and hence the fifth participant from Port 
organization ‘A’. The participants in organization ‘A’ have been referred to in the thesis as 
Al, A2, A3, A4, and A5 accordingly.
Eight directors from organizations ‘B’ and ‘C’ were interviewed from ‘Fund’ and ‘Bank’ 
organizations respectively. The participants in organization ‘B’ comprised of Bl, B2, B3, 
B4, and the participants in organization ‘C’ are coded as Cl, C2, C3, C4. However, as 
explained above only three interviews could be carried out in the fourth identified
organization (Drilling Co. ‘D’). Therefore the participants in organization ‘D’ have been 
referred to as D1, D2, D3.
It is important to note that the composition of each cluster of participants from organizations 
A, B, C, and D were the same (with the exception of A and D). Attempts were made to 
include in the targeted members from each organization at least one Chair Person, One Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), and two Directors one of whom occupied the non-executive 
position. As shown in Table 5.3 the last group of interviews have been referred to as 
Executive or just Board member. This reflects the labels used by the participants when 
describing the position of themselves and colleagues on their Board. It was also clear that 
participants felt that the position and role of the Chair is of particular importance and this has 
been reflected throughout the interviews.
The other attributes of the participants such as gender, age and their level of education and 
experience will be discussed when the identified themes and issues are discussed in some 
detail in section 5.4.
5 3  ORGANIATION PROFILE
As explained in section 5.1 four the interviews were carried out in four major Public Sector 
Organizations. These organizations are publicly owned and their Boards are subject to strict 
regulation in Abu Dhabi. They comprise of a Port Company Coded (A), a Fund (B), a Bank 
(C), and a Drilling Company (D).
Table 5.3: Profile of the participants/cases
Number of 
Interviews
Role on the 
Board
Nature of 
Organization
mm
Director
Director
Executive
ChairpersonCASE
Siird :!!
Member
m m
Methbei
mm
—
• • " • * • * • * • * « * • *  0 0 0  0  0  » ^  m tWMMMy.mm t o t ^ i
— -■ ------u i u --------------------------------------—
Source: Data Analysis
The methodology adopted has clearly set out the need for understanding the behavior of the 
participants, Board members context of their organization and in wider context of Abu
Dhabi. A brief background of the four participating organizations is provided in Table 5. 4: 
Appendix 1.).
To sum up, the information in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 provides the reader with the profile of the 
16 directors who participated in this study and well as the organization profile for each 
organization (A-D).
As explained five participants (A1-A5) were from Port Company, Four participants (B1-B4) 
were interviewed in Fund B organization, four participants are Board members at Bank C 
organization (C1-C4) and three participants were interviewed from Drilling Company D (Dl- 
D3).
Attempts were made to interview one Chair, one CEO and two Board members from each 
organization. In order to compensate for the unavailability of the Board member D4 an 
additional interview was arranged with a director from company A (A5).
On the whole, all participants were frilly engaged in the process of the interview however, 
some members provide more information hence the emergence of more issues.
What follows will comprise of seven sections in which the issues that emerged from detailed 
thematic analysis are analyzed and discussed in detail.
5.4: THEME ONE: PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
5.4.1 Emergent Issues
As explained earlier, the classification and tabulation of data revealed that during the 
interview participants provided information which led to the identification of their personal
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characteristics (See Table 5.5). This information emerged as themes with six related issues 
that were perceived as important by the participants. It is argued that the personal 
characteristics of the senior management could be an influencing factor on their effectiveness 
and performance at work (Forbe and Miliken, 1999).
Table 5.5: Emerged Categories and Sub -categories of the “Personal Characteristics”
No. MAIN CATEGORIES SUB-CATEGORIES
1 PERSONAL
CHARACTERISTICS
• Age
• Gender
• Education
• Total Years of industry experience
• Total Years of experience at Board level
• Experience on the present Board
Source: Data Analysis
5.4.1.1 ISSUE No. 1: Age
The participants’ age ranged from 39 to 65 years old (See Table 5.6). Most participants saw
the opportunity for a important opportunity for their career development. Some referred to
this opportunity for gaining recognition from their ‘work related circles’, acting as a Board 
member a director commented;
It is a kind of recognition, Yeah it is important to take up a position especially if
you work your way up to more exciting positions (meaning Chair). One has to be
known in the work related circles to be worthy of making representation on the Board.
Age does not come to this ot course with age comes experience and knowledge” 
(Interview No. 2).
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Observation has however shown that culturally there seems to be a relationship between the 
age and the suitability to take a position on the Board Those participants who were older 
implied that whilst formal qualification is seemingly an important factor the experience plays 
a critical role in determining the level of the performance. As one commented:
“Yes, we need younger and more qualified people on the Board but it often comes 
down to the experience and ability to get a feel for the issues raised and discussed. I 
may be older but I bring to the Board continuity of experience” (Interview No. 11).
When relatively older participants were asked about the cultural influences and whether or 
not it is the case that traditional values stipulate that elders benefit from more experience and 
therefore are more suitable for a placement on the Board The response was:
“Of course that is a part of the traditional values that have been around for years and 
can not be denied And, yes to some extent the elders’ views are respected, but the 
situation on the Board is changing and age is no longer plays an absolute factor, but 
can not be denied it is there.” (Interview No. 6)
Another participant commented that:
“Younger professionals are really keen on taking up positions on the Boards of the
companies, especially the private ones, they seem to be more keen on developing their
portfolio plus the fact that there is reward attached to these positions too” (Interview 
No. 16).
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It can be posed that the age of the participants did to some extent play an important part in 
their selection and their perceived contribution to the Board. As one director interestingly put
“Let me put it this way. Being an older member on the Board is not automatically 
seen as a negative aspect, far from it. The elders set the scene and contribute 
profoundly to the issues discussed. As you are fully aware, you may act as a member 
but you cannot be trusted with the position and responsibility of the Chair without 
relevant accumulated experience” (Interview No. 14).
The data also supports the comments made that there is a relationship between the age of the 
participants, their past experience including ‘how they have handled themselves’, and their 
appointment as Chair and CEO. With the exception of one participant who held the position 
of Chair aged below 40, other participants in positions of Chair were aged 50 and above. 
Literature also supports the belief that board members should be recruited on the basis of 
their expertise and experience (Comforth, 2004). In the light of above evidence, it is evident 
that cultural factors also have indirect influences on the selection of the older directors for 
‘sensitive positions’ such as ‘Chairmanship’ (Hambrik et al., 2001; Li and Hambrik, 2005; 
Analoui et al., 2011).
ISSUE 1: Findings
Participants who served on the selected Boards were aged between 39-65 
Appointment to membership o f the Board is mostly determined by experience
Traditionally age may mean experience hence membership o f the Board
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5.4.1.2 ISSUE No 2: Gender
All participants involved in the study were male. This is not to suggest that only male 
participants are appointed for positions on the Board in PS. Indeed, there instances of female 
directors especially in the private sector who are selected to operate on the Board.
Participants gave the impression that the issue of gender is, as one put it, “of no 
consequence”, and managed to steer the conversation skillfully away from the gender and the 
Board membership. As one commented:
“There are not many females in higher levels of seniority anyway. However, it does
not mean that they can not attain such positions but as it is, the likelihood that the
director appointed will be male is high. The issue is the performance, availability,
trust and a whole set of attributes and qualifications expected from the Board
members. Gender by itself should not be seen as an important factor.” (Interview No. 
14).
Another participant highlighted the fact that there is an awareness of this issue and the need 
for diversity on the Board but there seems to be a situation of ‘chicken and egg’ as far as the 
presence of the female directors on the Board is concerned
“We are all aware of the importance of this issue. May be it is the ‘Glass Ceiling’ that 
has contributed to presence of fewer female directors on the Board. We look for 
experienced and high caliber individuals and we often do not find them (Female 
Senior Manager) available for the post. It could be that female senior managers in PS 
are not interested in such positions, who knows, ... but the situation is certainly 
changing, already there are a number of female director who have worked on the 
Boards of Private and Public Sector Boards... We need to create this awareness, I
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myself have observed elsewhere how important is the diversity where the issue of the 
gender is concerned. The transformational nature of their (Female Directors) can be of 
huge value to the atmosphere of the Board and the decisions made” (Interview No. 1)
The presence of more male directors on the PSBs is certainly not accidental. Issues such as 
culture and history and the nature of the business can have significant effect on the 
composition of the Board as far as gender is concerned (Analoui et al., 2011; Kakabadse, et 
al., 2004; De la Rosa, 2006).
ISSUE 2: Findings
• All participants involved in the study were male
•  There seemed to be little motivation and/or opportunity for female senior managers to 
act as Board members in PSBs
• Traditional value may have an implicit influence on the choice o f the member's 
gender. However, officially the members characteristics such as experience and 
education act as merit fo r appointment
• It is reported that female directors do serve on the Boards elsewhere in the industry
5.4.1.3 ISSUE No 3: Education
The issue of education seemed to be treated with importance by participants. The comments 
made showed clearly that attainment of higher education qualification at least amongst the 
younger generation seem to be of importance. All participants possessed the first degree. 
Seven participants held first degree (BSc), and the remaining participants benefited from 
Masters (6) and Doctoral degrees (3).
The cross tabulation of the data shows that older participants seem to possess a first degree 
whereas those with Doctoral qualifications were younger in comparison. As one commented:
“It is becoming increasingly important to possess higher educational qualification,
especially these times ... having a doctorate can open the doors, I am not suggesting
that it is the only qualification, but it is important (moving the head twice). For those
who are established it is becoming increasingly difficult to contemplate studying for
their doctorate, they are busy and cannot leave the responsibilities.... As for the
position on the Board, qualification is not playing an important role at least not on the 
Board I am” (Interview No. 1).
There seemed to be an agreement amongst the participants that holding a position on the 
Board of PS is not directly related to holding higher qualifications. However the trend is 
towards possession of high degrees: A Chairperson commented:
When I got my qualification first degree was important. Not many people had the
qualification from abroad.....Acting as a Chair has little to do with your role on the
Board, but generally speaking these days its expected from top officials to hold higher 
degrees.... this is the trend everywhere..” (Interview No 14)
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The data clearly shows a direct relationship between age and educational attainment. The 
younger participants seem to hold higher education qualifications. However, as Kakabadse 
and Kakabadse, (1999) aptly note, there is little influence of the educational attainments on 
performance on the Board.
The participants with higher degree such as Masters and above felt more at ease talking about 
their educational backgrounds. As one suggested:
“We are all educated abroad and have connections there, most of us have been 
educated in the US but some have degrees from Europe. It does help to know the 
issues and be familiar with the international trends. Whether it is just enough to hold a 
higher degree as a pretext to Board effectiveness, I am not sure, it is a lot more 
complicated than that” (Interview No. 9).
The researcher observed that older participants who held only a first degree tended to avoid 
the issue and place more emphasis on the experience than educational achievement.
“At the end of the day, I (Chair) am expected to make a decision which has financial 
implication to say the least, the buck stops with me and I can only rely on my 
experience to guide me... and the experience of the other members. Holding a 
doctorate may be useful but the Board business is a different ball game (followed by a 
smile)” (Interview No. 6).
On the whole, there seem to be fewer participants with higher degrees. However the trend 
seems to be upwards for securing higher educational degrees.
ISSUE 3: Findings
• Most Board members possessed first degree(BSc)
• Few participants possessed Master degrees (MSc)
• Only three participants had doctorate (PhD)
• Older participants generally felt that experience is more important than solely 
educational achievement.
• Older participants felt that first degree is adequate fo r fulfilling their roles as Board 
members
• There is a trend towards attainment o f higher educational qualification amongst 
younger members of the Boards
5.4.1.4 ISSUE No. 4: Total years o f industry experience
The response o f the participants to enquiry about their years o f  experience in the industry was 
a mixed one. Some clearly showed willingness to consider this as a factor which may have 
influence on their own and the Board effectiveness. However, the majority did not see any 
relevance and did not wish to talk about the subject at length.
As one Board member said:
I have over eight years o f  experience in the industry... private sector works 
differently... but make no mistake—  our Boards (PSBs) are becoming as accountable 
as their counterparts... I feel the experience helps to see things differently. I have 
noticed that other members and sometimes Chair appreciate it and it is good to bring 
in different perspective—  but not essential” (Interview No. 10).
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Another Board member with industrial experience approved of “having experience from the 
other side”. He said;
“Some members have never had experience of the other side. That is all they know. 
OK, we are different with different responsibilities but I personally think having over 
fifteen years of experience in industry does not hurt. Quite contrary it can become 
very useful. As you are aware yourself, nowadays, the distinction is being lifted... We 
are all operating under financial pressure. Still having more experience would not 
hurt.” (Interview No. 13).
The researcher felt that most participants made an assumption that the researcher is already 
aware of their involvement or not as the case may be and therefore avoided discussing the 
previous experience in the industry. Some felt that working in the Bank, drilling company 
and being on their Boards is very similar experience to that of working on the industrial 
Boards. One participant tried to clarify the issue. He queried;
“You mean experience on the Boards of industry or working in the sector. It is 
essential to have experience of how private sector works. We are going in that 
direction and it is no secret” (Interview No. 15).
On the whole, there seems to be an implicit agreement that industrial experience, including 
membership of the industrial Boards, can be worthwhile. Yet the majority refused to make a 
connection between their effectiveness on the Board and their past industrial experience.
ISSUE 4: Findings
• A small number o f participants had industrial experience
• Those with experience in industrial setting felt that their past experience has impact
on their effectives on the Board
5.4.1.5 ISSUE No. 5: Total Years o f  Experience at Board Level
Only two participants specifically revealed their total years o f  experience at the Board level, 
participants B4 and C4. The former declared that he has up to five years and B4 up to 15 
years o f experience on the Boards. Why the other participants did not draw attention to this 
issue is partly due to their lack o f ample years o f  experience on the Boards and partly due to 
their preference. Subsequent question (See next issue) revealed that most participants did 
indeed not have extensive experience o f being on the Boards as researcher enquired. Whilst 
being a member o f the Board is seen as important is not something that participants found 
important enough to talk about extensively. As one commented:
“It is good to serve on the Board but often colleagues do not want to be associated 
with the Board of the organization which has not done very well. Besides it is not 
something that we (members) have full control on. Often it is an appointment o f some 
sort and it should be taken as something which is professionally rewarding and
financially (smiling) ... but the previous experience may or may not help” (Interview
No. 2).
A Board member with a few years o f experience on the Board said:
I have enjoyed being a member. I have contributed and I believe my past experience 
has been useful in understanding the issues involved, processes o f decision making
and helping me to make sound decisions......... It is not easy to juggle one’s time but I
believe it is rewarding” (Interview No. 9).
Some participants felt that it is their duty and that their participation on the PSBs was 
associated with a perceived sense of good citizenship. However they did not specifically 
comment on whether they have had previous experience on the Board. For example:
“You could say it is a duty of very senior officials to serve on the PSBs. We are 
responsible for what is happening to our brothers and sisters, we are Citizens of 
AD...” (Interview No. 16).
The conclusion reached is that, apart from a few participants, most did not have long and 
protracted experience on the PSBs.
ISSUE 5: Findings
• Most participants did not have long term experience o f membership o f the PSB 
Boards
•  Few participants with long term experience o f being a Board member found the 
experience rewarding
• Those with long term experience acknowledged the need for re adjustment and time 
management to fit  their Board duties in.
5.4.1.6 ISSUE No. 6: Experience on the present Board
Unlike the previous questions, most participants except two were candid in providing detailed 
information.
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Most participants (7) said that they had up to five year experience. Another five participants 
reported that they have served on the present Boards for between 6 and 10 years.
A CEO proudly said;
“Yes. I have served on the Board for over 12 years now. It is not easy though. It has 
its ups and down. You could say I am a Bank o f  experience (laughing)” (Interview 
No. 1).
Two participants reported that they had between 11-15 years o f experience.
It was discovered that two participants who were not forthcoming about declaring exactly 
how long they have served on the present Board, felt that their recent appointment to the 
Board may detract from the importance o f their role as Board members. For example:
44 I suppose in comparison with others I am a novice. Having said that I know one or
two that they practically resided there (on the Board) but did little to justify their 
presence. It all depends on your role and willingness to contribute”, (Interview No. 8).
Unmistakably long years o f service on the Board were seen as something to be proud of 
specially if one has attained Chairmanship or acting as CEO.
Most participants reported that they have served for up to five years on the present
Board
h ew participants had between 6-11 years experience o f being a Board member on the 
present Board
Minority o f the Board members had relatively less experience o f membership on the
Board (up to a year)
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In conclusion personal characteristics play an important part towards better performance of 
the individual members on the Board (Forbe and Miliken, 1999; Hambrik et al., 2001). Issues 
such as age, experience, and educational achievements do play a part towards appointment on 
the Board and securing a better position such as Chair and CEO on the Board (Li and 
Hambrik, 2005; Analoui et al., 2011). There also seems to be a relationship between 
membership, position and length of service on the Board and the experienced recognition for 
the member’s performance as officials. (Park and Ungson, 1997; Quick, 1997). It is important 
to bear in mind that contextual factors such as the nature of the work and the wider traditions 
and cultural value do play a part in the ways personal characteristics such as gender and age 
are seen as relevant to the position of the individual on the Board (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
1999; Same, 2009). On the whole, it can be claimed that the personal characteristics of the 
members are important and their understanding is essential for learning about Board 
effectiveness (John and Senbet, 1988).
5.5: Theme Two: Membership (Composition) of the Board
This emergent main category is an important theme. Membership of the Board has been the 
focus of many writers attention. It has been debated that the right composition of the Board 
membership would act as a determining factor for achieving Board’ objectives (Kakabadse,
et al., 2004; Bowman and Kakabadse, 1997). A great deal o f  debate surrounds the question o f  
what qualification should a member possess and the importance o f  non executive members in 
shaping the membership o f the Board (John and Senbet, 1988). The literature on Corporate 
Governance pays particular attention to composition o f the Board membership (Kakabadse et 
al., 1993; Hambrik et al., 2001).
The review o f  the organizational profiles, A-D, reveals that most Boards are compromise 
Chair, Deputy (CEO) and number members (5-7). What is implied however is that there 
seems to be a hierarchy o f the importance o f  roles within the Board. Data, as will be shown 
below, indicates that the role o f Chair seems to have the highest importance followed by CEO 
or Deputy, Executive and finally non executive members.
As shown in Table 5.7 the thematic analysis o f  the data resulted in identification o f sub-
themes: These are;
• Membership o f the present Board
• Membership o f other Boards
It was discovered that the role and functions o f  the members, which will be discussed in the
next section, is also influenced by the Directors membership o f other Boards. Holding
membership o f  several Boards is not confined to the PSBs in Abu Dhabi. Indeed it is a
universal phenomenon and it is a practice which can be found in different sectors. As 
participants pointed out;
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“It is not unusual at all. In fact there is little restriction on working on different 
Boards. The decision is yours to make. Of course, as you are well aware, not all 
Boards are the same (smiling). Membership of some is certainly more important than 
others. Besides (taking a serious stand), it helps to bring fresh experience from other 
organizations and even other sectors.... why not” (Interview No. 14).
Following the first classification, further issues emerged from both sub-categories. The 
emergent issues are:
• Involvement of the management team on the Board
• NED Membership of the Board
• Membership of the other PSBs
• Influence on the Board performance
It was noticed that involvement of the management team and NED membership came up in 
the conversation over and over again. The inclusion of non executive members was certainly 
seen as an important issue. Moreover, the influence of membership of other public sector 
Boards was also perceived as “important for the member and the Boards effective
functioning”.
In the remainder of this section each of these emergent issues will be discussed in some detail 
and examples will be provided from the data generated.
5.5.1 Emergent Issues
Table 5.7: Emerged Categories and Sub-category ‘Membership of the Board
No. MAIN
CATERGORIES
SUB-CATEGORIES
~2 MEMBERSHIP Membership of the present Board
(Composition)
OF THE BOARD • Involvement of the management team on the Board
• NED Membership of the Board
Membership of other Boards
* Membership of the other PSBs
• Influence on the Board performance
Source: Data Analysis
5.5.1.1 ISSUE ONE: Involvement of the Management
The responses from the participants suggested that there is an overwhelming feeling that 
management should be involved in the Board meetings.
And,
And,
t t It is part of the practice to have the senior management involved in Board meetings;
this provides useful feedback on issues related to their area and reflects positively on 
the relation between Board and management” (Interview No. 12).
tc Yes, they are always there, with at least two layers of management who are basically
the business owners of certain activities” (Interview No. 16)
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“Participate in the discussions that relate to their area. They are also invited to express 
their views on certain subjects as required during the meeting”. (Interview No. 11).
The Chairman o f organization A explained that:
“Management teams are always involved. The Board has the CEO and his senior team 
present” (Interview No. 1)
There is also a need for involvement o f management in the Board to listen and share their 
views on different subjects: For example.
“Yes, our senior management and all people who report to the Chief Executive are 
invited to the meeting so they can listen to the Board and gain a feeling o f the Board’s 
views and reactions to their recommendations and/or projects. Also, if there are any 
concerns, this provides an opportunity for both sides (i.e. management and the Board) 
to share views and discuss issues.” (Interview No. 5).
“Yes, they are invited to the meetings, sometimes for presenting their related case or 
justifying their recommendations and sometimes to provide information or to clarify 
certain issues (Interview No. 9)
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There seems to be a feeling that the involvement of the management on the Board is critical 
for the effective functioning of the Board (Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005).
“Yes it is critical to have them on the Board, in two ways; first, periodic meetings to 
update the management on the company from a Board members perspective; and 
second, as needed when the matter is a shareholder matter rather than a Board
matter”.(Interview No. 4)
Sometimes the members of management are invited to act as specialist and to contribute to 
the debate, and provide the Board with specific knowledge concerning a particular topic.
“All EVP’s and General Council. Others by invitation if specific topics are covered 
i.e. HR or IT. Sometimes the Board needs specialist views on, for example 
remuneration and reward policy of the organization. In this case the Board invites the 
HR Director to join us and provide the Board with relevant information. It is also true 
about IT or Finance. If the Board is expected to make decision regarding IT, the 
relevant person will be called to help us understand what our options are. It is very 
important....Besides we have to acknowledge that we don’t know everything and that 
we involve others. It is also politically correct to do that.” (Interview No. 2)
“Yes, as subject matter specialists. As Chief Executive, even before I was a Board 
member, I attended each Board meeting” (Interview No. 10)
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Exercising power and authority by the Board, in particular the Chairman to ensure that 
management understand their position and the nature o f their accountability to the Board
were also reported.
“Apart from the fact that management should be an integral part o f our operations, we 
(Chairs) sometimes call upon different specialists and key management members to 
appear in front o f the Board to make sure they understand that at the end o f the day, 
we the Board make decisions and we can call on them to justify their decision any 
time. The Board is the authority and has to be respected for it. It also sends a message 
to the rank and file. Also, it makes them feel good about their expertise... It is a good
practice.” (Interview No. 10).
“Involving management is a MUST, inviting some to the Board is politically 
important. You can’t hide somewhere and do what you like, we (The Board) want to 
see you and hear from you what is going on. It is the accountability to Board which 
has to be balanced with the need for information.. You understand what 1 mean 
(Interview No. 6).
The issue of risk management and the need to involve management on the Board was 
reported frequently (Pye and Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts, 2002).
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44 We don’t know everything, we know a lot but not everything, but we have to take
the risks. Some operations need to involve the shareholders, a strategic financial 
decision and the risk is high by involving the management in a way the risk is shared 
and reduced. Mind you the buck always stops here (Board), but the more informed we 
are the less risk we have to take ” (Interview No. 1)
“Deciding on the Funds is not so simple, it is a lot of responsibility for me (Chair), I
need to know the risk I am involved in simple.. ..rely on management to help me out
(Interview No. 6).
The more the consultation the lesser the risk. learnt this long time
ago....Yeah ...long time ago” (Interview No. 14).
Also it was discovered that involvement of the management is a far from simple practice. It 
has many implications for the relationship between the Board and Management. Moreover 
the Chairperson’s role for the operations of the Board is critical (Turner, 1978; Kakabadse 
and Kakabadse, 1999).
ISSUE i:  Findings
Involvement o f the management on Board is critical for the smooth and effective 
operation o f the Board
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Management involvement ensures the exchange o f views and learning on the part o f 
the Board and management
Management can provide specialist information to the Board which is essential fo r  
effective decision making
The role o f Chairman is critical in the degree o f the involvement o f the management 
on the Board
Involvement o f management often is politically motivated to ensure and validate the 
authority and power o f the Board.
Involvement o f the management is also a risk reduction practice on the part o f the 
Chairperson
5.5.1.2 ISSUE TWO: NED Membership o f the Board
The emergence o f this issue did not come as a surprise to the researcher. NEDs play an ever 
increasing role in the management o f the Board. Helmer (1996); Kakabadse et al., (2001) 
discuss the importance o f  the role o f the NEDs in relation to the group dynamics and its 
impact on the effectiveness o f the Board.
The data clearly showed that the presence o f NEDs was found by the participants to be not
NED
participation in all meeting o f the Board should be encouraged
44 Always, the Board members are all non-executive and have the key decision making
responsibilities” (Interview No. 1).
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Another participant, a CEO, indicated the importance their presence on the Board:
“We often change the planned meeting dates to resolve other commitments that 
NED’s have in order to achieve maximum attendance. NEDs provide independent 
views and challenge management” (Interview No. 2).
The presence of the NED has been associated with the need for ‘Independency’, and 
‘transparency’ and a challenge to the rest of the Board. As a Chair Person asserted;
“The NED membership becomes a good practice especially in banks. NEDs ensure 
independency and provide strong opinions and views. They also help the Board to 
keep the balance when interests of different stakeholders are discussed. Therefore for 
clarity and transparency the NED’s membership is encouraged” (Interview No. 10).
Another participant Chair commented;
“This is a good practice. The outside member can look at things in different ways and 
provide the Board with different experiences and an independent view point, which in 
turn will help the Board and management.” (Interview No. 6)
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Another Participant said:
“Yes, they are good for the system and provide comfort to the stakeholders due to 
their independency” (Interview No. 15)
A participant Chairman went further to say:
“Yes, non-executives represent the majority o f the Board. We find it important to 
segregate the duties o f  the executives vs. the prerogatives o f a supervisory body such 
as the Board” (Interview No. 13).
Whilst the majority o f  the participants acknowledged the importance o f the presence, role and 
importance o f the NEDs contribution to PSBs, some participants had reservations concerning 
the ‘commitment’, and ‘number’ o f the NEDs on the Board.
As one participant Chair explained;
“Yes, but they need to be committed and focused on the job. Reason for appointing 
NEDs: Independence they offer the Board. Don’t get me wrong they can potentially 
play an indispensable role but as we both know (included the researcher) some are 
there for the status and the extra earning. I know o f few whose main interest is 
furthering their career. You can tell their heart is not in their work ...mind you some 
can play the devil’s advocate and we need that sort o f NEDs.” (Interview No. 6)
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And another participant added:
“Yes, up to a point, and provided they do not distract or conflict. There should be a 
practical limit on the number of Non-Executive.” (Interview No. 13).
Clearly the NEDs were seen as an important player and at the same time challenging and 
sometimes a threat to the Directors (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). The accounts provided 
clearly showed that Chairpersons are particularly happy to make use of the NEDs as a new 
source of ideas, especially those with different sector interests. As one participant
commented:
“.......especially in the Banks. Clients and shareholders see them as independent pairs
of eyes monitoring the processes and ensure that nothing goes wrong. Ok they tread 
some toes from time to time and may be not familiar with some protocols but hey ... 
we need them for what they contribute to management and effectiveness of the Board 
and not for their conformity” (Interview No. 11)
The findings concerning the role and importance of the NEDs on the Boards here are in line 
with the literature. They provide challenge, independency, comfort, and make a crucial 
contribution to the Board outcome (Helmer, 1996; Kakabadse et al., 2001; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003; Long et al., 2005).
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ISSUE 2: Findings
• Presence o f NEDs is essential fo r  the effectiveness and management o f the Board
• NEDs provide the much needed ‘  independency ’  on the Board
• NEDs contribute to the ‘transparency ’ thus represent stake holders and are 
particularly welcomed in the Boards o f the Banks
• NEDs can provide a challenge to management.
• Chairperson needs to manage their involvement to get the best out o f their 
contribution
• NEDs contribution can be questioned at times
• There is a need fo r bringing up to date the NEDs with the protocol and procedures on 
the Board
5.5.1.3 ISSUE THREE: Membership of the other PBSs Boards
Participants were asked if they hold membership of other Boards especially PSBs. The 
responses provided were interesting and revealing.
The number of extra memberships held by the participants differed drastically. It is clear that 
there is no restriction for gaining membership of different Boards. The minimum number of 
reported was none to maximum 14. For example one CEO put it succinctly “No” (Interview 
No. 11), whereas another CEO said “No, only a private UK based company where I am a 
NED” (Interview No. 2). On the other hand a Chairperson reported that he has membership 
of six Boards. This showed a relationship between the number of the Board memberships 
and the perceived status.
“I happen to be a member of Boards... well it comes with territory... There is always 
a reason for everything ... I have no complaints (winking at the researcher to secure 
his approval.” (Interview No. 10)
Analysis of the data showed that Chairpersons of the organizations involved in the study 
except one (Al) who had two memberships, seemed to be members of several Boards (Bl: 
Four More; Cl: Fourteen More; Dl: six more). Further investigation revealed that 
membership of up to 5-6 Boards seems to be the norm amongst the ‘well known individuals’. 
As one asserted:
“It is unavoidable... and good to be involved especially when it gives variety of the 
positions (role) on the Board ... But more than six can be difficult and challenging” 
(Interview No. 7).
Some participants implied that ‘financial reward’ and ‘influence’ has to do with the increased
membership of the PBSs. However, this could not be confirmed by those with several Board 
memberships.
One of the perks of being a director or senior in some way to become involved in
extra curricular activities— the reward on some Board is more than others__
especially if the Board meets several times a year. But as you know very well__it is
status, recognition, and after all giving back something to the community. Money is 
not everything is it? Khalas (mean everything is said) (Interview No. 8)
Board membership has been studied and documented in the literature whilst the motive for 
such engagement seems to be varied (Sherwin, 2003; Kakabadse, et al., 2004; De la Rosa, 
2006), gaining and transferring ‘experience’ has been pointed out as a byproduct of this 
activity (Van der Walt, 2003).
ISSUE 3: Findings
•  There are no restrictions fo r  being a member o f more than one Board
• The tmmber o f extra memberships o f other PBS Boards varied between 1-15
•  Chairs o f the organization seem to be prone to more membership than others
•  5-6 extra memberships o f Boards seem to be an acceptable number amongst the 
participants
• Whilst the motive fo r  such engagements are varied and multi-faceted ‘gaining 
experience \ ‘financial gain  4 status \ and ‘extending one ’s influence ’  are reported to 
be the most common reasons
• Presence o f NEDs is essential fo r the effectiveness and management o f the Board
• NEDs provide the much needed * independency ’  on the Board
• NEDs contribute to the ‘transparency ’ thus represent stakeholders and are 
particularly welcomed in the Boards o f the Banks
• NEDs can provide the challenge to management.
• Chairperson needs to manage their involvement to get the best out o f their 
contribution
• NEDs contribution can be questioned at times
There is a need fo r bringing up to date the NEDs with the protocol and procedures on
the Board
5.5.1.4 ISSUE FOUR: Influence on Board members Performance
There seems to be an overwhelming sense of support for being associated with different 
Boards. It is believed that membership of other Boards will lead to more ‘Learning and 
experience.5 for example;
“Operating on a number of Boards gives the many benefits of cross learning and 
developing experience." (Interview No. 6), Also
“Having a manageable number of Board appointments allows diversity and a good 
continuity of learning.” (Interview No. 7)
It also can provide a different perspective1 for the participants involved
“Besides conflict and time management challenges, membership of other Boards can 
add perspectives.” (Interview No. 12)
It seems the membership of different Boards can be beneficial to get ‘a sense of what is best 
practice’ and ‘knowledge of what is happening in the sector’ as the whole.
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A Chairman of the Board also explained that;
“I can see positive effects such as: exchange experience, knowing other business 
sectors, and developing relationships with more people. Yes, it has positive impact on 
my performance ... no doubt.” (Interview No. 14)
However there seems to be some reservation in so far as time’ and ‘managing time’ were
concerned.
“I believe my membership on other Boards has a positive effect as it helps me 
knowledge transfer as each entity offers valuable learning experiences. Also, other 
Board memberships help me bring added value topics that I can share with other 
members of this Board. However, time, and managing my time, affects my 
performance on the Board the most. Availability can be an issue, although this can be 
avoided if we can achieve the right balance.” (Interview No. 5).
This concern was referred to in terms of ‘availability’ and the ‘need for having a balance’ to 
manage full participation on different Boards.
cc
If the time is manageable between the Boards, then the effect on my performance
will be positive for all Boards.”(Interview No. 15)
It was interesting to learn that participants seemed to think that the problem is not having 
little time for each Board rather they felt that it is related to how best they can ‘manage the 
time’. A one participant put it.
“We are, in a way, forced to think that we have to manage our time regardless of the 
workload ... in a way culturally some of us take the responsibility first and then try to 
manage their little time.... myself too...I am also guilty of this. But some of this 
practice is seemed to be expected from us...” (Interview No. 11)
On the whole, participants felt that their membership of other Boards has a positive impact on 
their performance and it benefits their organization. Clearly the learning, finding out the best 
practice in the sector and exchange of views were compelling evidence for further 
participation on different Board (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; Taylor, 2004; McIntyre et 
al, 2008). Managing time and ensuring availability were seen as the main challenge 
(Schilling, 200). Indeed, none of the participants mentioned the difficulty in professionally 
dealing with the different expectations to which they were exposed on each Board.
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Learning, developing experience, discovering best practice and expanding one’ 
network and relationships seem to be the motive fo r accepting the positions on more
5.6: Theme Three: Board and Members Roles and Functions
The third category of data which emerged from thematic analysis o f the data is concerned 
with Board and Members Roles and Functions (See Table 5.8). This led to the identification 
three sub-categories. These include;
• Role and responsibilities of the Board
• Board activities and processes
• Members’ role and contribution
These identified themes not only highlighted the fact that Boards take on different roles and 
have different responsibilities (Johnson et al., 1996) but they also shed light on the important 
functions of the PSBs such as decision making (Stiles and Taylor, 2001), the conduct of the 
Chair and more importantly the constraints, demand and choices that Board members 
experienced (Stewarts, 1980; Kakabadse, et al., 2004).
Table 5.8.: Emerged Categories and Sub-categories of the ‘Board members role and 
functions’
5.6.1: Emergent Issues
Further thematic analysis of the above sub-categories of the data resulted in identification of 
eight main Issues... These are;
• Role and responsibilities
• Frequency of meetings
•  Decision making
• Strategic nature of operations
•  Chair’s conduct and leadership
• Agenda, meetings and prior discussion with Chair
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Constraints and demands
• Availability of choices
In the remainder of this section each of these emergent issues will be discussed in some detail 
and examples will be provided from the data generated.
5.6.1.1 ISSUE ONE. Roles/Characteristies
Understanding a phenomenon necessitates taking into account what it means to the 
participants involved in that situation. How do they define the Board roles and 
characteristics? It is argued that understanding the nature of the role and role ambiguity 
(Rizzo, et al., 1970), is critical to understanding the operations of its members.
Participants seem to provide different descriptions of the role and characteristics of their 
Board. These descriptions often reflected the nature of the Board (PSBs) and its main role in 
realizing government’s strategy, goals, objectives and the like. For example;
I he primary role of the Board is to develop strategy and policy for the organization.
I he Board needs to make sure that there is alignment of the organization strategy with 
Government’s Vision 2030.” (Interview No. 2)
A Chairman asserted:
It is certainly getting to grips of the direction of organization ensuring the procedure and 
systems are there. Let s put this way, the main roles are:
- Set strategy objectives target as agreed with the Government.
Agree on plan / budget and 5 years business plan.
Discuss CO’s performance and direct work / efforts to meet the agreed plan.
Set system and control procedures and authorization level” (Interview No. 14).
As a director commented:
“To be an executor of government visions that will help to deliver government 
promises and insure the protection of stakeholders and the public’s interests” 
(Interview No. 5)
In the Bank the role was seen to be primarily to make returns on equity and investment.
“To make a good return on equity for the Bank, this will help the Bank to contribute 
to society. The Bank has already achieved a 20% p.a. return on equity.” (Interview 
No. 11).
There is no doubt that participants are aware of the public nature of the Board and its critical 
role in achieving government’s objectives. The importance of the role of the Chair in 
achieving these objectives is also highlighted.
“The PSB plays a critical role in achieving the government objectives. Individual 
Board members each bring experience from the industries they represent. The 
Chairman plays a directive role and has access to the government leadership. He and 
the Board members play complimentary roles.” (Interview No. 7)
Some participants referred to the sector and its growth as well as realization of governments’ 
interest.
“Very simple, (then began describing)...
- Provide the protection of public interest
- Facilitate the Government’s policies in specific strategic sectors.
- Enables the private sector to grow.
Improve business environment.” (Interview No. 9)
In addition to establishing governments vision other roles such ensuring management 
efficiency and even selection of the right team, systems and processes.
“In my view the main roles are;
- Delivering the government’s vision of leadership
- Implementation of the visions -  by means of a map and strategy
- Selection of the right team / system/ processes
- Management efficiency
- Board committees.” (Interview No. 6)
Governments’ goals and policies, aligning with government vision and ensuring the use of 
best practice were seen as the main characteristics of the Bank
“To me the main roles are;
- To achieve the government goals, enhance and protect the public interest.
Advise the Government with the trends and development of the business and the ways 
to improve the firm operations.
- Identify the best practice in the related industry.
Aligned with the Government vision.” (Interview No. 10)
Achieving the government goal and objectives was often understood by participants however, 
they saw the role in establishing policies and formulating strategies as well as management 
responsibilities for the activities of the organization.
“Looking after the government’s interest and envisioning its plans is given and apply to all 
PSBs. What it really comes down to is for the Board to pay attention to its three primary
roles:
1. To establish policies
2. To make significant and strategic decisions
3. To oversee the organization’s activities.” (Interview No. 3)
The above internal roles were often referred to as ‘governance’.
“To provide a structure of governance around the development of strategy, approving 
plans, monitoring performance and making key decisions.” (Interview No. 1)
As a CEO commented;
“The primary role is;
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- To establish proper corporate governance and to demonstrate full adherence 
to such practices
- To provide sustainability and leadership in business
- To realize a long term vision of the government” (Interview No. 15)
The need to understand the environment, the changes and their implications for the 
organization and the stakeholders are seen as the primary roles of the Boards.
“Understanding of the responsibilities, the growth and the limits of growth, and the 
principles that guide the organization. Therefore, the Board should understand the 
changes and factors that affect the environment in which they operate. It has to 
operate within the expectations of the stakeholders” (Interview No. 16).
It is clear that participants at all levels were aware of the varying roles of the Board (Johnson 
et al., 1996), both at macro level which was often implied that is achieving government’s 
goals and objectives to micro level which is related to formulation of strategy, ensuring good
governance and leadership and management of the Board processes and activities (Rizzo, et 
al., 1970; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005).
ISSUE 1: Findings
•  Board s main responsibility is to realize government vision, to watch over government 
investment and stakeholder interest.
• Its role is to ensure that proper governance is practiced, good practice is established 
and Board activities and processes are appropriately managed
•  Board responsibility is also extended to making the right decision and managing the 
Board members to ensure complimentarily o f the contributions o f the members
• A Iso, leaderships o f the organization to achieve the set objectives
5.6.1.2 ISSUE TWO: Frequency of meetings
The public sector Boards like their private counterparts have to meet regularly to ensure the 
smooth operation of the organizational activities (Buchanan and Huczynski, 1997; Adobor, 
2004). In most cases the number of the meetings is pre-planned however almost all Boards 
will meet to discuss urgent issues on an ad hoc basis.
The participants of the four targeted organizations reported that their Boards meet from two 
to six times a year.
It is difficult to suggest that there is a relationship between the Board effectiveness and the 
number of times that it meets, however, there seemed to be an agreement amongst the 
participants that large public sector organizations and those like Banks which have to deal 
with unforeseen circumstance and frequent changes in the market should meet more 
frequently.
“It is common sense, even the least active organizations need proper governance and 
leadership, they cannot be happy with a couple of Board meetings annually. Having 
said that I know of few firms that do without and they only have two meetings a year 
[as they rely more on the board sub committees]. You can imagine the time needed 
and the number of issues to be dealt with....God, it can be crazy” (Interview No. 5)
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The work load for the Boards and their frequency were often referred to:
“Ideally the Board should meet around four times a year. This would allow for proper 
consideration o f issues, problems, and decisions. The lengthy Boards are not always 
effective. Board members should not feel that they are being rushed. They need time 
to debate and discuss the relevant issues ... We meet 5 times a year and still we need 
more time to deal with everything which is brought to us” (Interview No. 11).
It was also reported that Boards can be called upon on an as ‘required basis’. Some 
participants felt that Boards need to respond to emerging situations and show support for the 
organization.
“Whenever a Board meeting is needed it should be held. This is the only way we can
manage our organizations in such a changing time......if  decision is needed meeting
becomes a necessity” (Interview No. 15).
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5.6.1.3 ISSUE THREE: Decision Making
The first issue related to the sub category theme ‘Board activities and processes’ is ‘Decision 
Making’. In other words, understanding Board effectiveness and how it works (Stiles and 
Taylor, 2001) necessitates learning about its processes/operations (Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). 
Decision making is an important process and activity of any Board. The comments made by 
interviewees clearly pointed to the awareness of the Board members of the role of the Board 
in going about making decisions and their contributions to the process of decision making 
(Cadbury, 2002; Roberts, 2002; Kakabadse, et al., 2004; De la Rosa, 2006).
The process of decision making involves preparation of proposal and recommendations, 
discussion followed by decisions made. As a Chair person explains
a Proposals and recommendations are presented by executive management
Background and material is pre-circulated and decisions are taken at the Board 
through consensus of opinion, but this not all...” (Interview No. 1).
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It is the management who prepares the background and agenda and presents it to the 
Chairperson. Another participant provides a more detailed view o f the process.
“Most o f the issues that have taken place on the Board’s agenda have come from 
management who have prepared the agenda and presented it to the Chairman for 
approval. Following this, the Chairman calls a meeting with specific, agreeable dates. 
The Board meeting takes place in the Bank’s premises, and is attended by the Board 
members according to quorum requirements and per the articles o f association. The 
Board meeting reviews each and every agenda item, and takes appropriate decisions 
against each after allowing for reasonable discussion among participants. 
Implementation o f  Board decisions is led by the secretary o f  the Board ” (Interview 
No. 11)
A participant from the Bank (organsiation C) explains the process and points to the 
importance o f the role o f  Chair in decision making processes on the Board
Decisions are made through meetings o f the Board when they take place. 
Management provides the basis on which to formulate decisions that relate to the 
Bank s strategy or business plan. There is a good level o f  transparency and sharing in 
decision making, and the Chairman plays an important role in allowing this kind o f
openness.” (Interview No. 13)
Most accounts provided indicate the importance of the role of the Chair in the process. As 
one suggested, “It is the Chair which is driving the issues.... The way he puts commitment 
and force behind it will undoubtedly have effect on the way others perceive the importance of 
the decisions to be made ...It is the tone of the debate and discussion which shows if the 
Chair is willing to take it all the way through or if the support for the issue under discussion
is luke warm.” (Interview No. 15).
The Chairperson’s influence begins from the early stages when an issue is to be tabled for
discussion.
ccThe Chairman plays an important role in the process from the preparation of the
has
members, and opportunities are provided for all members to express their views. In 
certain cases, the background materials are to be more comprehensive for Board 
members” (Interview No. 8).
The process may be slightly different but the main steps undertaken are the same. Decisions 
are mostly concerned with strategy, policy, business plan and macro level input down to 
functional decisions such as annual budget, enumeration, procurement, finance and the like. 
For example, in organization A the procedure begins with
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“A clear Delegation o f  Authority also allows management delegation. They are made 
through resolutions that are signed by all Board members after discussions are held at Board 
level. Other considerations include, strategy and business plan (prepared by Management). It 
has to be aligned with shareholders’ expectations; macro-operational issues that require the 
Board input; operational and corporate matters that are within the Board rights as per the 
Delegation o f  Authority (DoA) Matrix; Delivery model (hierarchy) o f  the organization; 
Annual budget and budget execution (subject to DoA); and Remuneration, procurement, 
finance, and the other main policies.” (Interview No. 4).
Whilst management is normally represented by CEO the proposed decision needs Chair 
approval before being taken further for debate and discussion.
“Of course there are guidelines o f responsibilities, and subjects are defined
accordingly but it boils down to the fact that major decisions are based on the CEO’s 
recommendations.” (Interview No. 6).
Another participant added;
“However, subjects consolidated, and then agenda proposed and agreed by Chairman 
before it is circulated to Board and decision taken. Chair can block the process if  he 
wishes. The politics between Chair and management is intriguing. Chair is political 
creature.... And has to be. There are times for compromise and I suppose times for 
sheer bloody mindedness (laughing to reduce the impact o f  the phrase used in relation
to Chair s role) ..........It is clear that there is a need for cooperation between the
management and the Board and in particular the Chair. Following the approval o f  the
proposal, the Board delegates the authority to management for implementation. 
Delegation of authority is given to management” (Interview No. 7)
The operation of the Board is very well rehearsed. Everyone is aware of their role, their 
contribution, and the outcome. As one participant commented;
“Based on the articles of association a mechanism has been established to manage the 
decision process between the Board and management, including voting and quorum. 
The Board expects feedback from management on Board decisions. The Board 
decides on a number of business issues which are established against KPIs. Decisions 
are made within the authority of the Board. However, internal processes ensure that 
any decisions made are based on delegated power (i.e. compliance process)” 
(Interview No. 16)
Chair person has been observed to ensure that ‘transparency’ is observed and each decision is 
given a fair amount of time, effort and attention.
“It is a balancing act, sometimes the Chair knows that certain proposals are not 
workable and do not get the approval but he cannot dismiss them outright, he has to
show that the issue in question is given a fair attention.....you got to take the Board
with you even if you know the end results...collaboration between management and 
the Board (meaning Chair) is crucial I say”( Interview No. 14).
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The feedback on the decision is expected as the decision is being implemented. In a way, the 
data suggests that the process o f decision making is interrupted, enriched and transformed 
before being implemented and monitored by the Board again (Stiles and Taylor, 2001,Pye 
and Pettigrew, 2005; Kakabadse, et al., 2004; O’Higgins, 2009).
ISSUE 3: Findings
The process o f decision making may he slightly different from one Board to another. 
The process generally involves: Back ground and supporting material usually 
prepared by the management, included in the agenda, discussed, approved or 
otherwise by the Board, delegations given to management fo r  implementation, and 
feedback provided by the management to the Board.
CZhairperson plays an important role in the process o f decision making
There is a need for close cooperation and collaboration between management (CEO) 
and the Board (Chairperson)
Board can be involved in decisions o f strategic and policy nature as well as functional 
and operational types
There are articles and guidelines fo r the conduct o f the Board, members and the
process however; the political nature o f the Chair's contribution seems to be the 
determining factors.
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5.6.1.4 ISSUE FOUR: Strategic nature of the Board operation
By the virtue of their position and role Boards are expected to act strategically. Boards to a 
large extent determine the strategy (Freeman, 1984; O’Neal and Thomas, 1995) and expect 
the management to achieve it (Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). The PSBs 
involved in the study are no exception they deal with recent past, present and are expected to 
act strategically at all times.
“Yes they (The Boards) are expected to act strategically and they often do act 
strategically to meet the targets of the five year plan” (Interview No. 5)
Another participant was clearly of the view that the PSBs do not act strategically.
“No, the Board is focused on the present and the recent past but fails to formulate a
consensus on the long term.” (Interview No. 12).
Analysis of the data available showed the presence of a polarity of the views. It led to the 
understanding that some Boards put more emphasis on strategic operation because of the 
nature of what they do, such as Banks and Oil companies; they seem to be more strategic in 
their operations. It is evident that such organizations follow the approach that strategies ought 
to be developed, followed through, and evaluated (a full cycle).
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“The performance is seriously reviewed and all latest strategic issues are discussed 
and looked at. There is an emphasis on the achievement o f  the firm’s objectives, and 
the Board asks for periodic evaluations o f the performance against the agreed plan 
which strategically covers a five year period.” (Interview No. 8)
As a Chairperson remarked;
“The management is required to highlight the strategic topics when we review the 
periodic performance report. Therefore as the Chairman o f the Board I facilitate the 
discussion in a manner which keeps the eyes on the strategic issues when the 
performance is reviewed.” (Interview No. 10)
There seemed to be a feeling that PSBs could be more strategic but they are not.
Yes, mostly, but sometimes we go off track. However, this depends on the nature o f  
the subject and the surrounding circumstances. Nevertheless, strategic topics always 
have the priority focus.” (Interview No. 13)
There was an overwhelming agreement amongst the participants on the issue o f  performance 
and the need for strategy.
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“When discussing the performance, the Board always focuses on strategic issues, 
especially in areas necessary for maintaining the company’s competitiveness, 
maintaining sustainable growth, and encouraging the employment of UAE Nationals ” 
(Interview No. 16)
There was also indication of the awareness of the participants, specially the Chairpersons, of 
the importance of adapting to the wider environment and the need for responding to the 
changes outside the organization strategically
“Generally, yes. They tend to think about the results and what will be done to support 
the bank strategically in order to position the Bank in a more advanced position in the 
competitive environment” (Interview No. 11).
And another participant had stronger views on this topic.
“The point is that PSBs are no different from any other Boards. They have capacity to 
act strategically but often they get drawn into detail and tactics. This is an area where 
improvement could occur.” (Interview No. 1).
Another participant from the same organization critically viewed the role of the Board and 
drew comparison between the public and private sector.
“Yes maybe in some organizations Boards are strategic, not because they are aware o f  
the need for it, no they think strategically because they have to like Banks, but in my 
experience, in most cases we have good intention but we get stuck in the past and 
details. We need to see things in the bigger picture otherwise we never can be 
strategic” (Interview No. 3).
“On the whole, there seems to be an agreement amongst the participants that ... 
operations o f the Boards are strategic but could be better... a Board which not 
strategic in its operation can not accurately measure the performance o f the 
organization let alone improve it ...W e need to become more aware o f the 
environment and get out o f the public sector mentality...” (Interview No. 5).
Boards are expected to operate strategically and focus on the required performance o f the
firm (Freeman, 1984; O’Neal and Thomas, 1995; Bowman and Kakabadse, 1997; McNulty
and Petigrew, 1999). It is also observed that those who put more emphasis on strategy
seemed to be more effective in achieving their targets. (Hendry and Kaiel, 2004; Kemp, 
2006).
ISSUE 4: Findings
•  The Boards of the organizations involved in the study to lesser or greater extent are 
strategic in their operations.
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5.6.1.5 ISSUE FIVE: Chair’s Conduct and Leadership style
There is no doubt that Chairperson plays a critical role in the smooth operation of the Board 
(Turner, 1978; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 1999). A wealth of literature focuses on this issue
(Dbury, 2002).
As indicated earlier, the accounts provided by the participants when discussing the 
composition of the Board clearly indicated the ‘importance’ of the Chair and the positive 
impact of their roles and their style of management on Board performance.
“I feel that the tone and understanding of the business that a Chairperson has is 
fundamental to efficient Boards” (Interview No. 1).
The participants were in no doubt that Chair’s influence on the conduct of the Board and
Board members.
“The Chairman’s style does, and in my experience o f other Boards, it always affects 
the conduct o f the Board. Our Chairman is close to the business, and has a good grasp 
of the key issues. His impact is positive but more time could be spent on team
dynamics.” (Interview No. 2)
Another participant (a CEO) asserted;
“No doubt the Chairperson has a great influence on both the way the meeting o f the 
Board is conducted and the outcome o f  the meeting therefore it is my responsibility to 
ensure that the Board comes out o f the meeting with meaningful results” (Interview 
No. 11).
The Chair does play an important role in PSBs. The role is perceived as;
The Chairman has a big role in managing the meeting and directing discussion and
his influence helps the Board reach a clear conclusion. As Chief Executive I find this 
very helpful.” (Interview No. 15)
Also, it was expressed that,
Yes, he provides guidance and wisdom, and manages the meeting o f  the Board 
toward achieving the purpose o f the meeting” (Interview No. 9)
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The Chair responsibility on Board goes beyond group dynamics and ensuring cohesion 
amongst the member;
tt Yes he does. The Chairman does this by: ensuring he has control; adhering to
corporate governance practices; being actively involved in the selection of Board 
members; making checks and balances; overseeing the legal responsibilities; and 
creating energy, and motivating and inspiring the Board members.” (Interview No: 6)
The support for the significance of the role of the Chair is often offered with some
reservation.
u Yes it does. The openness of the Chairman allows Board members to express their
views, build consensus, and engage in quorum decision-making (more of a team 
decision). The Chairman also provides management with a platform to express their 
views on proposals” (Interview No. 16)
>
The participants were aware of both the influence of the Chair on the conduct of the Board 
and the importance of his ‘management and leadership’ style.
“Yes, it does. I think it is dependent on whether the Chair has a micro or macro style 
of management”. In a sense, he or she should have the capacity for both. The micro
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management is needed for trivial issues but the macro management is important for 
seeing the big picture” (Interview No. 3).
Some participants saw the role o f  the Chair as ‘Big brother’ or ‘Godfather’ implying that 
Chairs are also responsible to government.
“Yes. From the starting date when the Chairman was given the mandate, he has been 
seen as the big brother to the Board and godfather to the organization. This sort of 
style has a positive impact in the Board and its performance.” (Interview No. 7)
The leadership styles o f the Chair differed from to another. Whilst participants did not refer
to the categories o f the leadership style employed by the chairpersons they resorted to
describing the desired conduct and behaviors which they expected from the Chair and his 
leadership style. For example,
“I have worked with three Chairmen and each has had their own style. Their
individual style depends on their background, experience and personal characteristics.
My current Chairman encourages debate and motivates every participant to
contribute. This has resulted in a healthier environment during Board meetings” 
(Interview No. 8).
The leadership style of the Chair is closely associated with the effective meetings for 
achieving the objectives of the Board
“The leadership style of the Chairman is instrumental in the effectiveness of the 
Board. Our Chairman is dedicated to ensuring that Board members are engaged 
during the Board meeting. He believes that Board members are accountable and 
responsible for the outcomes of the meeting, and therefore the meeting should always 
be productive and meaningful” (Interview No. 8).
Moreover, it seems that participants not only hold Chair position as very high they also have 
great expectations from the Chairperson. It is interesting to see that the Chair’s relationship 
with management is always under the scrutiny of the members. The independent nature of the
Chair was also emphasized.
“Yes. As I stated earlier, the Chairperson is a mediator. He/she should encourage all 
Board members to participate, starting with the meeting’s agenda The Chairperson 
should not give management the impression that his/her vote is the only vote they 
must gain; this is a common mistake made by Chairpersons. I have also seen some 
Chairpersons spend a lot of time with management studying and evaluating issues, 
and then forming a certain decision and rushing to the Board asking for approval. 
Board members, if they chose, should have all the insight to the business enjoyed by 
the Chairperson before making a decision. An effective Chairperson engages his/her 
Board, shares his/her insights, and encourages discussions between management and
the Board -  including access to information - before making a decision. However, 
such processes can be lengthy if not well managed” (Interview No. 4).
The appreciation that Chair role is a difficult one was shared amongst the participants. Chair 
seems to walk a tight rope. He or she has to balance the need for getting things done and the 
speed with which decisions have to be made. A participant explains,
“We have a lot of expectation from the Chair... it is difficult... keeping management 
and the Board happy and at the same time sticking to the mandate given ... not easy... 
no matter what you do (Chair does) someone will not be happy with your 
conduct..(Interview No. 5).
Understanding the role of the Chair, their responsibilities, leadership style and their 
management of the meetings provides a basis for measuring their impact on the effectiveness 
of the Boards (Rogers and Molnar, 1976; Turner, 1978; Turner, 1990; Rodham, 2000).
ISSUE 5: Findings
• Chairpersons play a crucial role in the conduct and performance o f the PSBs
•  Chairpersons are responsible fo r managing relationships with management and 
providing the Board with guidance and direction to achieve its goals
• Chairpersons are expected to maintain a balance between taking a classical 
leadership role to get things done quicker and adopting a more participative role to 
ensure involvement o f the members, members' engagement, a healthy debate and 
arriving at consensus.
• Culturally the Chair is expected to act as the big brother with wisdom and ability and 
sense o f direction
• Chairperson's capability and style o f leadership determines degree o f the 
effectiveness o f the Board
5.6.1.6 ISSUE SIX: Agenda, meetings and prior discussion with Chair
Arguably the members’ preparedness directly relates to their performance and the Board 
effectiveness (Renton, 1999; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). In this respect early preparation 
of the Agenda and the availability o f the supporting document is essential for effective 
decision making of the Board.
Observation has shown that in PSBs the Agenda and supporting materials are often prepared 
and provided a week before.
“Always! The agenda is pre-circulated to encourage input. All documents are issued 
one week before meeting.” (Interview No. 1)
The Board members expected that the Agenda for the meeting and its accompanying 
materials would reach them as soon as possible so that they are enabled to understand the
issues involved and prepare themselves for their role.
“Yes, as we receive the agenda in advance with the necessary accompanying 
materials. This allows us to review, prepare and analyze the subjects to be presented 
to the Board, and enables us to be ready for discussions." (Interview No. 13)
However, the process of preparation of the agenda begins much earlier behind the scene and 
predominantly involves the CEO, management team, and the Chair. From the management 
side it is important that issues are selected and presented properly and in order of importance.
“As Chief Executive, I together with my management team am involved in preparing 
the agenda and the necessary materials that are needed for discussions. We also make 
sure that all members are provided with, and assisted if necessary, all information 
required before meetings. This ensures that they are well informed on the issues to be 
discussed which definitely adds to the success of the Board meetings" (Interview No. 
2).
Since it is the management which has an interest in seeing that issues raised will go through 
the Board meeting and receive the approval of the Board, the CEO ensures that adequate
materials are provided and more importantly issues are discussed with Chair so that “there are 
no surprises” (Interview No. 5).
As one CEO explains;
“I see my role as making sure that most decisions reflect the reality of the 
organization’s capability and position. Board members may be very knowledgeable 
but no one knows the company and its state of operations like us (management). ... let 
me tell you Chair knows too ... so their relationship with the Chair is a collaboration 
and a sybaritic one if you get what I mean.... We need him and he needs us ... the 
first step is getting the items on the agenda and that needs the blessing of the 
Chair...he knows the Board and he knows what works and what doesn’t” (Interview 
No. 11).
The Chief Executive role is of particular importance when it comes “to getting approval from 
the Board”. Most CEOs have an interest in how the Board will deal with the issues raised and 
do whatever is needed to be in the Chair’s ‘good books’.
“If you have the Chair on your side you can relax. Chair is an important figure. He or she is 
trustworthy and powerful so he can swing the votes to one way or the other. Being in his or 
her good books is essential. Let’s put it this way, there is no point on tabling an item without 
discussing it with the Chair first .’’(Interview No. 14).
The discussion of issues to be discussed on the Board with other members varied depending 
on the issue and the management involved. As one Chair asserted;
“Some key/critical issues are discussed in advance with other members in order to 
ensure the smooth functioning of Board meetings. (Interview No. 1).
The significance of issues certainly makes all the difference in terms of deciding to share 
with others prior to the meeting or not.
“Only if there are additional requests or if there is a significant strategic review being 
carried out. i.e. industrial strategy review; long-term balance sheet structure; Annual
Business Plan " (Interview No. 2).
The Chair positron provides the prerogative for sharing information.
“Yes, if the issue is important we raise it with some members to ensure alignment.” 
(Interview No. 6)
And,
“I have to make that judgment call for members unless the subject has certain
sensitivity or priority, some members bring these issues to me as a Chairman before 
the meeting." (Interview No. 10)
However, the participants felt that it is not a usual practice ‘but it happens’. As a member 
explains;
a Some topics are discussed with the Chairman and other Board members in advance
of the meeting. However, this happens on an ad hoc basis, and will depend on my 
involvement in the subject area, as well as the sort of advice I am in a position to 
provide.” (Interview No. 13)
The main issue which all members were aware of was ‘conflict of interest’. However, this did 
not stop them from occasionally sharing information and discussing issues with others prior 
to the meeting.
LL ...They (members) must build knowledge and discuss topics on the Board otherwise
there will be a conflict of interest in one way or another” (Interview No. 16)
It is evident that preparation of the Agenda and discussion of issues amongst the participants 
is not uncommon. The political nature of the communication sometimes resulted in reaching 
a desired solution which otherwise would have been impeded (Renton, 1999; Carpenter and 
Westphal, 2001; Nicholson and Keil, 2004; Huse, 2005).
ISSUE 6: Findings
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r  ^rep a ra tio n ^^  ancCsupporting material for the Board meeting are important 
activities
.  CEO's often share the agenda and the issues o f strategic importance with the Chair 
prior to the meeting.
• Chairs also may discuss some issue before the meeting with other members “to get a
feel”for discussion on Board
• Members are aware o f the issue o f ‘conflict o f interest.
.  Agenda and the formation, quantity, and time allocations all have impact on the 
success o f the Board in meeting its objectives.
5.6.1.7 ISSUE SEVEN: Constraints and demands
Literature on the Board effectiveness recognizes the importance of considering demands and 
constraints faced by directors/ senior management (Stewarts, 1987). The directors’ position 
on the Board either as a management member or purely Board member is important and 
subject to a great deal of influences (Karasek, 1979; Analoui, 2007). These could range from 
the Board itself, such as the incorrect composition of the Board members to the external 
influences outside the member’s control (Roberts, 2002; Kakabadse, et al., 2004).
Interestingly, it was observed that the participants did not make any academic distinction 
between ‘demands’ and ‘constraints’. To them anything that “slows them down and does not 
allow [them] to get their job done” falls in this category (Interview No. 12).
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The data collected unexpectedly revealed fewer constraints and demands than are usually 
expected from such high caliber positions. As a CEO asserted, “a few.” (Interview No. 2).
Lack of time seems to constitute a major issue in this category. This ranged from time to get 
everybody involved;
aVery few. Time to get everybody to the same level of insight is often a challenge”
(Interview No. 1)
Time required for being fully prepared for the Board meeting;
u Receiving full information on time, and being prepared sufficiently on the topics to
be discussed and/or voted on.”(Interview No. 5).
Lack of time because of the commitments elsewhere;
Time -  when the director is involved in a large number of Boards. Time: Finding
time to read the Board material is challenging for management.”(Interview No. 7).
Participants were critical of the colleagues and members who hold membership of several 
Boards, and thus have little time to spend on the Board activities.
ccI feel a lack of time is one of the most significant constraints. This is particularly true
as some Board members who are members of several Boards.” (Interview No. 13)
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Little time seems to be allocated to various issues in the Board meeting.
“When time devoted to the Board is inadequate which may causes lack of focus and
weak contribution?’’(Interview No. 11).
A CEO commented that ‘time’ is not a major constraint;
“Since the Board meets only twice a year we have enough time for the preparation of 
issues. This enables us to devote sufficient resources to ensure that these meetings are 
successful, noting that the Board and these meetings are also supported by 
recommendations provided by the subcommittees. The real constraint is the 
unprepared ness of the Board to deal with issues in hand.” (Interview No. 10)
Other issues raised included the mismatch between members and the Board functions;
“The mismatching between the Board member’s qualification and background with
%
the firm business resulting in notable gaps in skills set of the Board.
When time devoted to the Board is inadequate which may cause lack of focus and 
weak contribution?”(Interview No. 10).
This was also reported by another participant;
“Clarity and consistency are the key to high performing Boards, as we continue to 
mature we will continue to be better at both dimensions.’’(Interview No. 7).
The inadequacy of the information, selective nature of the information provided by the 
management and limited discussion all pointed to constrains as a result of Board dynamics;
“Little or selective information is being presented at the Board. Emphasis is more on 
the good parts only. I.e. Matters are discussed mostly based on what went right. 
Limited discussion focuses on what went wrong and the reasons for this. We need to 
discuss the difficult issues and come up with solutions for these.” (Interview No. 9).
Constraints of an external nature were not brought up very often. However, the awareness of 
the Board members of the external factors and how they can act as demanding and 
constraining factors was present.
“Being a Board member, especially as a Chair or CEO means that you are subject to 
pull and push from outside. Not so much the CEO position but Chair certainly has to 
respond to external forces beyond their control. This is a political position and it 
comes with the role...” (Interview No. 5)
One of the interesting issues which emerged from the discussion of demands and constraints 
was the way different members perceived the severity of the issues depending on their role on 
the Board.
262
“Chairpersons and CEOs experience this more than others, they are responsible to the 
management, organization and the Board, so they feel the pressure more” (Interview
No. 14).
The researcher made the observation that most Board members especially Chairs and CEOs 
did not wish to make a big issue out of the presence of the demands and constraints. This is a 
characteristic of the traditionally oriented management style which finds it to be a weakness 
to admit that he or she experiences ‘demands’, and ‘constraints at work (Analoui, 2002).
5.6.1.8 ISSUE 8: Availability of choices
The availability of the choices to members of the Board has to be seen in the wider context of 
their activities (Stewart, 1987). Understanding the nature of the constraints and demands that 
people experience helps to understand the choices available to them. The literature on senior 
managers’ managerial effectiveness has been informed by the ‘choices’ available to managers 
and their influence on their effectiveness (Stewarts, 1980; Kakabadse, et al., 2004; Analoui, 
1999,2011).
The participants understood the choices available to management rather laterally. Stewart’s 
concept of the managerial choice refers to the availability o f the options or choices left when 
demands and constraints impose limitation on managers preference and alternatives sought 
(Stewart, 1980). In the case of the present research, most participants referred to choices as 
what members should do rather than what alternatives they are left with. For example since 
Tack of time’ posed a major constraint, the participants expressed that more time should be 
allocated to the Board.
“The most important choice to any Board member is the time they dedicate to really 
understanding the business. In my experience I have seen some variation” (Interview 
No. 1).
Or as another participant pointed out;
“Time availability” (Interview No. 4)
264
Some participants felt that they should allocate more of their time to their Board actmt.es;
“I make sure I allocate enough time to each Board of which I am a member, and try to 
utilize my network to help the Board and the Bank as needed .’’(Interview No. 13)
Other participants felt that increasing communication is a choice that members can make to 
improve effectiveness of the Board;
“To engage in more effective communication with the Board members to ensure an 
effective alignment between members and the Board’s vision” (Interview No. 3)
It was also interesting to see that some Board members were aware of the adverse effect of 
possessing multi membership on the effectiveness of the Board. As one explained,
“I look forward to keeping my Board memberships at a minimal level “not 
more than 3 Boards” as Chairman and Board member I understand that we 
have challenging duties which need our time.” (Interview No. 10)
A CEO explained; that the management team must meet Board expectation.
“We as a management team must meet the expectations of the Board and act in the 
best interests of the company. These are the choices available to us to ensure a fruitful 
relationship is achieved between management and the Board” (Interview No. 15)
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A Chair expressed his role and his contribution as a choice for improved performance of the 
Board.
“To follow up CEO’s business closely and meet government’s objectives through 
providing my time and guidance to the Board”. (Interview No. 14)
Induction training also is seen as an option;
cc Giving the Board the time and energy necessary to better understand the Bank’s
business. To this end, I am considering educating Board members by putting them 
through an induction program ” (Interview No. 11).
On the whole, the choices available to the participants were few if any “I have limited
enhance i i (Interview No. 12). However, the
majority showed awareness of what they can do in order to provide the choices for improving 
their own and their Board’s effectiveness. The examples of ‘better management of the time, 
practices, their own conduct and processes’ were choices which were left to them to exercise.
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.  Reducnot^TBoari meiUbership would lead to freeing up more time hence a choice 
fo r improving effectiveness o f the Board
• A llocation o f more time to the Board, better management o f effort, resources, and 
processes constituted the limited choices available to Board members
• Training was viewed as a choice if  it was available
• Board members proper execution o f their role is an important choice that can affect 
the Board effectiveness
To sum up, consideration of this category of the themes and resulting issues showed how 
important the processes and activities of the Board are in relation to its effectiveness. The 
conduct of the Board members, their choices, and constraints they experienced and other 
issues such as the procedures and protocols impacted the decision making process, the quality 
of decisions and the effectiveness of the Board in achieving its goals and objectives.
5.7 THEME FOUR: BOARD CULTURE AND DYNAMICS
The forth category of data which emerged from thematic analysis of the data is concerned 
with Board Culture and Dynamic (See Table 5.9). This led to the identification of two sub 
categories. These include;
• Interactions with others
• Culture/Climate of the Board
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These identified themes not only highlighted the nature, importance and influence of the 
interaction and communication of the members with others on the Board effectiveness, also 
interactions between Board members affect the Board effectiveness (Salk and Brannen, 2000; 
Sherwin, 2003; Kakabadse, et al., 2004; De la Rosa, 2006), but They also shed light on the 
nature of the group dynamics (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Hertz and Imber, 1993) as an 
essential factor for effectiveness of the Board.
As shown in the discussions of the previous themes, the Chairperson seems to play an 
important role in the dynamics and outcome of the PSBs (Kakabadse, et al., 2004). It has 
been observed that one of the established roles o f the Chairperson is to deal with any conflict 
arising during the Board meetings. Conflict management and resolution has been recognized 
as an important characteristic of the Chairperson of the Board (Floyd and Lane, 2000; Gong 
et al., 2001).
Table 5.9: Emerged Categories and Sub-categories of the ‘Board Culture and Dynamics’
No. M A IN  C A T E G O R IE S SU B -C A T E G O R IE S
4 BOARD CULTURE 
(Atmosphere) AND 
GROUP DYNAMICS
In teraction s w ith  others
• Group dynamics 
C u ltu re (C lim ate) o f  the Board
• Board atmosphere
• Working together
• Chair and conflict
Source: Data Analysis
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5.7.1: Emergent Issues
Further thematic analysis of the above two major sub categories of the data in this category 
resulted in identification of four main Issues... These are;
• Group dynamics
• Board atmosphere
• Working together
• Chair and conflict
In the remainder of this section each of these emergent issues will be discussed in some detail 
and examples will be provided from the data generated.
5.7.1.1 ISSUE ONE: Group dynamics
The issue of group dynamics has been the concern of many researchers in different work 
related settings. It is generally understood that a higher the degree of cohesion amongst the 
group and theme members (Analoui, 2007) often results in increased effectiveness, 
productivity and output of the group (Hertz and Imber, 1993; Hertz and Imber, 1993). In this 
context it was felt desirable if not necessary to understand the relationship between the 
members on and off the Board.
The majority of the participants described the nature of the interaction with others as;
%
“.. in varying degree... anything from well to very w eir (Interview No. 1)
269
A minority referred to their interaction with others as “not very well” (Interview No. 3). 
Certainly, the interaction amongst Board members did not seem to be homogeneous. As one 
explained;
“I know some reasonably well, while others very little... it also depends on the 
Boards. On one Board I know almost everyone but on some Boards where I am a 
member I only know a few“(Interview No. 11).
A CEO referred to internal interactions between the members as being based on trust and 
personal chemistry;
“In the main our interactions with each other can be described as good to very good. 
Most are extremely approachable and interesting individuals to be around. Trust and 
personal chemistry between CEO’s and Boards can often make the most significant 
impact on Board efficiency” (Interview No. 2).
Whilst most Board members assumed that the researcher is familiar with the nature of the 
relationships between the members on the Board, one succinctly described the relationships
Collegial and friendly, yet professional” (Intemew No. 12)
He felt that more explanation is needed, so he added,
“We are not enemies, we are friends... but we are also professionals and when 
operating in a Board meeting.... the professional role takes over. We debate and argue 
but in a friendly manner... it never gets out of hand... we do have respect for one 
another and that helps a lot” (Interview No. 12)
It was also discovered that most members belonging to one sector and sharing the 
membership of a small community means that almost everyone knows everyone else and the 
grading and social status has already been established. This, as one participant mentioned, has 
influence on the nature and extent of relationships between the members on the Board.
“In a small strong society like ours, we know each other either from school, or the 
community or family and friends.” (Interview No. 10)
It was also commented that sometimes professional relationships in other settings have 
created the opportunity for the members to know one another.
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“Yes, we know each other. However, we meet on an occasional basis at social events, 
or at formal meetings within the government community” (Interview No. 8).
Another participant also supported this view and commented;
“Occasionally! In real life we know each other socially and interact at common 
occasions. For example, farewell parties, weddings, and public government 
gatherings” (Interview No. 12)
The members of the Board also met outside the Board setting. Other participants explained 
how interactions outside the Board are usually determined by the nature of the business.
“Not much. Time is a factor here. However, gatherings are determined by business. 
Sometime a few of tend to meet in similar gatherings purely based on the business 
interests and department representation... but to put sometime aside to meet to discuss 
the Board issues generally does not happened as frequently as you would expect... ” 
(Interview No. 16)
A CEO further explained;
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“Sometimes we undertake effective offline discussion on things related to issues 
discussed at the Board. However, this is being done to a small extent only” (Interview
No. 15).
The researcher observed that there seems to be a pattern for the development of the 
relationships on the Board This was also confirmed by the participants;
As one Chairperson explained;
“Well of course... as a Chair you need to maintain a relationship with everyone 
involved....with as many members as you can to get a good atmosphere for 
collaboration... that is true.... but it is also true that the Chair and CEO have to 
closely work together- from setting the agenda to deciding the issues to be 
discussed... executive members are also known to me [Chairperson]., this leaves us 
with NED who play a very important part and have to be pulled in and got involved 
without showing major concern” (Interview No. 14).
It was evident that three major issues seem to influence the nature and extent of the 
relationships on the Board. These are;
• Previous introduction and interaction in other settings
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• Roles and responsibilities on the Board such as acting as Chair or CEO, and 
inevitably
• The personality and characteristics (‘chemistry’) of the members
On the whole, there seemed to be a ‘good’ degree of interactions between the Board members 
and the group dynamic can be described as being conducive to effective operations 
(Kakabadse, et al., 2004; De la Rosa, 2006).
ISSUE 1: Findings
• Group members interaction was influenced by professional meetings outside the 
Board
• The nature o f the role and position o f the members on the Board such Chair and CEO 
influenced the intensity and frequency o f the interaction inside and outside the Board
• Personal characteristics and  ‘Chemistry ’  between the members played an important 
part in their interactions
• The membership on PS and belonging to small community meant that almost 
everyone, to lesser and greater degree, knew about one another which facilitated 
interaction inside and outside the Board
• The assumed role o f the participants as professionals influenced the degree and extent 
o f their interaction inside and outside the Board
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5.7.1.2: ISSUE TWO: Board atmosphere
Related to the above is the ‘atmosphere of the Board’ To many writers the interactions and 
communications of the members invariably determined the atmosphere of the Boards 
(Shenvin, 2003; Kakabadse, et al„ 2004). Some writers go as far as suggesting the ability to 
communicate and interaction with one another should be regarded as ‘Core Competencies
for Board members (De la Rosa, 2006).
Participants were aware of the nature of interaction between members and the atmosphere. 
However, they described the atmosphere differently. Some used attributes such as ‘positive’ 
and ‘good’ in relation to the outcome of the interactions on the Board. For example;
A Chair explained;
“Generally speaking the Board has a very good atmosphere...” (Interview No. 14) 
Another Chair described it as;
“The Board’s atmosphere is healthy” (Interview No 6)
Whereas one participant felt that the atmosphere changes ‘from Board to Board’ and 
‘meeting to meeting*.
“For those of us who have the experience of other Boards it is clear that the 
atmosphere varies from Board to Board, and even from one meeting to another” 
(Interview No. 4).
A CEO however qualified the nature of the atmosphere as;
“Generally positive. The Board is constructive and supports management proposals. 
At times small inter-personal agendas become a distraction and drive the conversation 
into detail.” (Interview No. 2)
Another CEO commented on the professional nature and team composition of the Board;
“No doubt the atmosphere is friendly and professional. It is team work. ...you expect 
that from a Board with responsibility for managerial issues....” (Interview No. 15)
A Board member explained the professional nature of the interaction and atmosphere of the
Board
“They work together as a team They have due respect for each other. Differences in 
points of view in Board meetings do not directly impact on personal relationships ”
(Interview No. 12).
Another Board member also supported the above view;
“Since I joined the Board I feel that we are enjoying a positive and healthy 
environment. We have worked as a team and 1 have no concerns in this regard.
(Interview No. 8)
Interestingly, it was discovered that the role of the Chairperson not only is important in so far 
as creating connection and facilitating interactions, but also his role is seen as essential for 
creating and maintaining a positive atmosphere on the Board.
“The tone is set by the Chairman. In our case congenial and relaxed" (Interview No. 
11).
Another CEO remarked;
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“Our Board enjoys a positive atmosphere.....And let’s not forget the Board is aligned
with the Chairman... He sets the temperature and tempo so to speak.” (Interview No.
7)
On the whole, the Board members felt that there is a relationship between being professional 
and friendly, the nature of the meetings and the positive atmosphere when they interacted 
with one another
ISSUE 2: Findings
• Generally the Board atmosphere was described as ‘positive and friendly '
• The CEO generally suffixed good atmosphere with productivity o f the Board and the 
resolution o f the issues on the agenda
• The Chair person role has been acknowledged as ‘essential 'for creating a good and 
positive atmosphere
5.7.1.3: ISSUE THREE: Working together
The question, how well the Board members work together generated positive responses all 
around. These views validated the positive atmosphere and the group dynamic on the Boards 
and their importance for the Board effectiveness (Hertz and Imber, 1993).
The emphasis seemed to be placed on the ‘collaboration’ and ‘coordination’. As a CEO 
explained;
278
“In the main. Well again the thinking styles and personalities are complementary. 
However, it only takes one member with a different personal agenda to dilute the
Board’s effectiveness.” (Interview No. 2).
6
A Chair person also reported that there is a ‘close coordination’ amongst the members. 
However, he placed emphasis on the ‘Key issues raised on the Board'.
“..very well, there is a close coordination and collaboration on key issues. We know 
we are here to get a job done and it has to be done by us. the key issues are those 
which relate to the survival and development of the organization. When we discuss 
issues of that nature attention is focused and there is a high degree of coordination
between the members.” (Interview No. 1)
Interestingly, the participants when describing the way they worked together they used the 
terms ‘team’ and ‘team spirit’ frequently. A CEO referred to the Board members and said;
“They are working together as a team and the amount of interaction among 
themselves during the meetings is very encouraging.” (Interview No. 11).
This was also mentioned by another member;
“They work as colleagues and a team. There are no adverse attitudes.” (Interview No. 
16)
There was also a feeling that in that context there is an expectation from members to work 
and collaborate together and that was ‘acceptable’
“They are fine and there is a team spirit that can be felt. There is an acceptable degree 
of cooperation between members. It is expected from everyone to pull together the 
resources and deal with sometimes difficult decisions.” (Interview No. 7)
It was intriguing to see that when reporting on the activities of the members each member 
could easily detach himself from the others and adopt a ‘parental view’ of the situation and 
refer to others as ‘ They \ This was particularly evident in the views of the Chairs and CEOs 
who felt that they were stakeholders and had special roles to play on the Board. None the 
less, the participants described their interaction and working together as “generally very 
w eir (Interview No. 14).
As one member described;
“We are all aware of the importance of working and cooperating together. We work 
on a Board and it is only natural to expect from us team work. Out there [in daily 
positions] we are expecting the others [employees] to cooperate with one another. ..
280
aren’t we? It only makes sense to practice it ourselves and for a good reason too. 
(Interview No. 5)
A few participants use the term ‘synergy’ to place more emphasis on team work and the need 
for close co operation on the part of the members,
“There is a good synergy between the members.” (Interview No. 6)
One participant (CEO) also referred to the ‘strategic partnership’.
“They work as strategic partners and there is synergy.” (Interview No. 7).
The participants generally avoided talking about conflict and disagreement. It was evident 
that the overall managerial culture was influenced by deep rooted ‘classical’ thinking where 
conflict is bad, destructive and has to be replaced with ‘harmony’.
“Yes, all members work together well. There are no notable conflicts or 
disagreements that negatively might influence these good relationships, therefore we 
see them working in harmony.” (Interview No. 15).
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Another indication came from a Chairperson who seemed to exploit this desire for reaching 
agreement and avoiding disagreement and conflict;
“We all know what conflict does... nothing is done, relationships are damaged 
sometimes beyond repair and nothing good comes out of i t . . .  Board [members] 
knows it too and they are open to sensible suggestions from the Chair... it saves us 
time and effort all around.” (Interview No. 14)
As one member succinctly put it;
“They usually work together very well, but the key is the CEO and the Chairperson ” 
(Interview No. 4)
The cooperation between secretary and the Chair seemed to act as a determinant for working 
together well. The role of the Chair in achieving ‘good working’ amongst members was 
noted frequently.
%
“Chair is the key... like a conductor... sets the tone... I have seen it before. When 
Chair works well with say Chief Executive, the Board [members] takes notice and 
operations go smoothly. Conflict is inevitable but the Chair should be able to deal
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know what I am saying [seeking approval fromwith it should it arises... you 
researcher] ” (Interview No. 12)
To sum up, the members valued the positive side of the good coordination, collaboration and 
avoidance of the conflict and disagreement. There was a unanimous agreement that ‘They 
worked together well' and that was essential for the effectiveness of the Board (Hermalin and
Weisbach, 1988; Hertz and Imber, 1993).
ISSUE 3: Findings
• Generally the Board members worked very well together
• The terms ‘team work \ ‘synergy ’ were use to signify the ‘cooperation ’ and ‘good 
coordination ’ amongst the members.
• They associated harmony and good relationships with working well together. There 
was a distinct feeling o f the undesirability o f conflict and the need to avoid 
disagreement on the Board
• Chairperson played an important part in achieving the state o f 'working together ’ 
and ‘achieving results and
#
• Adherence o f the members to the classical values which emphasized on harmony and 
cooperation on one hand and negative aspects o f conflict on the other was seen as 
necessary for getting jobs done especially by Chairpersons
5.7.1.4: ISSUE FOUR: Chairs and Conflict
The researcher’s own observations and the data generated through interviews shows the
indisputable importance of the Chair, his role and his influence on all aspects of the Board.
%
Studies concerned with behavior of the members on the Board especially Chairpersons 
(Aguilera, 2005; Petrovic, 2008; O’Higgins, 2009) have stressed on the Board members 
contribution for the overall effectiveness of the Board. The role of the Chairs on PSBs is 
particularly perceived as important. The Chair role especially in ‘managing conflict’ is 
viewed as crucial for the smooth operation of the Boards.
Participants confirmed that dealing with conflict is an integral part of the Chair’s role. The 
participants in charge are also aware of their role and the importance of managing conflict on 
the Board. However each adopt a different approached influenced by his own managerial 
values and perspectives. For example, a Chair person who places importance on the problem 
solving and using rational and logical approaches explains;
“By attempting to always anchor the issues back to a logical well-formed understanding of 
the problem and respecting everybody.” (Interview No. 1).
The CEO in the same organization revealed that;
“The Chairman deals with the conflicts well, although at times he can show frustration if 
people don’t ‘get it’, or promote personal agendas.” (Interview No. 2).
This is another indication of the adherence to the classical management values and beliefs 
where the manager is almost entirely preoccupied with organization interests rather than 
recognizing the individual interests too. In another assertion ‘reaching consensus’ has been
emphasized.
“The Chairman will try for consensus first. He takes a fair stand. (Interview No. 3).
In this case it is clear that attributes such as ‘firm when conflict goes beyond protocols’ are 
used to describe the Chair style of conflict management.
“He asks for further studies. He also uses his skills to simplify a deadlock, is firm when 
conflicts go beyond meeting protocols, and anticipates conflicts before they happen.”
(Interview No. 4)
Another example of adherence to the classical approach amongst Chairpersons is where the 
presence of conflict is denied and stress is placed on ‘working in harmony’.
“Yes, all members work together well. There are no notable conflicts or disagreements that 
negatively might influence these good relationships, therefore we see them working in 
harmony.” (Interview No. 14).
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In cases where adopting a classical approach by the Chair is evident, observation has been 
made that instead of involving as many members as possible, the Chair stresses on the 
presence o f ‘more physical evidence’ and ‘documentations’.
“He [Chair] often makes an assumption that the solution is hidden in the documentations 
rather than reaching out for members views... it is not surprising... he wants to swift through 
the evidence and solve the problem himself... and this is partly our own fault., we holding in 
the position of boss rather than a facilitator.” (Interview No. 16)
Another interesting approach adopted by a Chair is ‘avoiding the creation o f a public scene’. 
For example, A Chairperson explains;
‘As Chairman I try not to discuss conflicts in the Board room, .. creating a public scene...but 
take them outside to avoid embarrassment.” (Interview No. 6).
The CEO also confirms this and comments further;
He has had a hands-on style since the Board’s establishment. He responds to challenges as 
they occur, and will call for a closed session to resolve a dispute if necessary.” (Interview No.
The use of closed session is often used to “keep the thorny issues inside the family
T9
(Interview No. 5).
By dealing with conflict outside the formal meeting the Chair attempts to defuse the situation
before the next Board meeting. A Board member said;
CLHe usually deals with any kinds of conflict outside of the Board on a case by case basis, and
on a one-to-one basis, to ensure the next Board is not subject to any kind of conflicts or
constraints.” (Interview No. 8).
The issue o f‘respect’ becomes an important ingredient for performing the Chair’s role. This
has been mentioned by both the Chairs themselves and the Board members. A member
explains:
CLHe has the ability to manage any conflicts as he knows every member in person and enjoys
their respect.” (Interview No. 9).
Another Chairperson admits that there are conflicts but he uses ‘respect’ as a basis for
resolving conflict.
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“I deal with conflicts on the basis of respect to every party views, however, we try to bring 
amicable solutions to these conflicts.” (Interview No. 10).
It is clear that the human relation style of management is used by some to deal with conflict 
in an ‘amicable’ way. This view is supported by the CEO of the organization.
“By listening carefully to all points of view and ultimately making a decision 
the Chairman asks every member for their personal opinion.” (Interview No. 11).
The participative approach adopted by the Chair allows for greater involvement hence 
‘satisfaction all around’.
“Good, understand, discuss, take time and convince members. It is satisfaction all around. It 
is not easy and at times it seems there is no solution but he gives the impression that the 
solution whatever it may be is here on the Board. Someone has it... if not the complete 
solution... it becomes enjoyable work.” (Interview No. 12).
On the whole, the Chairs of the Boards seem to use whatever style they are familiar with to 
resolve a ‘problematic’ situation. In all cases they are aware that conflict will weaken the 
effectiveness of the Board. Moreover, conflict resolution is an important characteristic of the 
effective Chairperson (Floyd and Lane, 2000; Gong et al., 2001).
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ISSUE 4: Findings
Board members are aware of the presence and inevitability o f conflict during their
meetings
It is an all around expectation, all-be-it implicitly, that Chairs should be charged with 
the task o f ‘conflict resolution'
Chairpersons adopt different styles o f conflict resolution. It varies from ‘Classical' 
(deals with conflict) to ‘Human Relations' (adopting participative and democratic
approaches
5.8 THEME FIVE: MEMBERS PERCEPTION OF CONTRIBUTION TO BOARD
EFFECTIVENESS
The fifth category of data which emerged from thematic analysis of the data is concerned 
with contributions of the Board members to Board effectiveness (See Table 5.10). This led to
the identification of three sub categories. These are;
Attributes of an effective Board
Individual (self ) perception of effectiveness
• Reward and motivation
These identified themes highlighted the perception of the participants about Board 
effectiveness, and their perception of their own effectiveness or contribution made towards 
the overall effectiveness of the Board. It is believed that the perceptions of the members 
regarding the Board’s effectiveness are crucial for understanding their behavior (Conger et
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al i998; Conger and Lawler, 2002; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). Finally, the issue of reward 
and motivation for membership of the PSBs is discussed in some length. Reward and 
motivation are thought to be crucial for senior management motivation (Park and Ungson, 
1997; Tyson and Boumois, 2005; Analoui, et al., 2011).
Table 5.10: Emerged Category and Sub-categories of the ‘Board effectiveness and members 
contribution’
No. I MAIN CATEGORIES SUB-CATEGORIES
Members Perception of Board effectiveness and members contribution 
Contribution to Board
Effectiveness •  Attributes of effective Board
• Individual (self) perception of effectiveness
• Reward and motivation
Source: Data Analysis
5.8.1: EMERGENT ISSUES
Further thematic analysis within each category did not result in the emergence o f strong 
issues as sub-divisions to the identified sub-categories. It was felt that the identified themes 
should be treated as main issues for the purpose of the analysis. These are;
•  Attributes of an effective Board
• Individual (self) perception of effectiveness
• Reward and motivation
The above emerged themes have direct relevance for the achievement of the objectives of the 
present study. As such they provide the core theme for better understanding of the
effectiveness of the PSBs.
5.8.1.1 ISSUE ONE: Attributes of an effective Board 
7he variety of comments and views concerning Board effectiveness support the findings in
the literature that Board members perceive effectiveness differently (Pye and Pettigrew, 
2005). The position of the individuals on the Board, their role and even their accumulated 
experience to date influences their views of what should be the main attributes for effective 
Boards (Quick, 1997; Katzell and Thompson, 1990; Kakabadse et al., 2000).
4
It was intriguing to see that when participants were asked to provide their own ‘assessment’ 
of their Board almost all participants express their view both in numerical terms as well as 
listing a variety of characteristics that could be attributed to an effective Board per se. For 
example, A Chairperson placed emphasis on ‘clarity’ and ‘business capability of the
members’.
“I believe it is down to clarity of the objectives, decision making, and a balance of well- 
developed business capabilities. In my view a supportive culture is, on a 1-10 scale 
where 10 is excellent, ours is about 7. We are an improving (Interview No. 7).
• Clarity
• Consistency
• Capability (individual and collective)
• Trust
• Proper order and structure ” (Interview No. 1)
Another Chair felt that the issue of the ‘delivery’ for ‘achievement’ must be emphasized.
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“I assess the degree of the effectiveness of the Board by providing a score of 7/10. This is 
on the basis of the delivery that has been achieved, which is a major element in the 
success the company has achieved.
•  Experience
• Commitment .
Time
Engagement / contribution” (Interview No. 6)
resorted to outlining a number of characteristics
Chairperson perceived an effective Board as follows;
I think effectiveness o f the Board is about;
► The ability to contribute (knowledge, information).
► The experience that brings solutions to issues raised in the Board
The commitment of the members
The strategic thinking of the Board members.
The ability to work with others as a team member.
The motivation to achieve results.” (Interview No. 10)
He also referred to effectiveness o f his Board as;
“Pretty good... around 80 percent... it could be better... but I am happy with it
(Interview No. 10)
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Another Chair whose views tended to represent a classical mode of managing operations 
asserted that;
“Reasonably effective... 80 percent... we need more efficiency but it is difficult to get 
consensus all the time. To me effectiveness is about,
Authorization
Organization
Procedures
Co’s management.” (Interview No. 14)
The views of the Chief Executives seem to be more critical and provide a view of the 
Chairperson in their comments;
“The difference would be a function of maturity of the Board.... For our Board I give 5 
out of 10...we need to learn more about the issues we deal with and the environment we 
are operating is.... 50%... it could be better. I believe Board effectiveness is about.....
• Good Board Charter
• Good Chairmanship
• Independent Board, and
• Having very effective Board Committees like the Executive Committee, Project 
Committee and the Audit Committee.” (Interview No. 2)
It was clear that CEOs felt that the Board should support them and that was seen as criteria 
for an effective Board.
•The effectiveness of the Board... well 8 out of 10....the important elements are;
• Clarity of decision-making
•  Understanding of the supervisory role
• Agreement as to strategy
• Supporting the executive in implementation of that strategy
• Holding the executive to account
Support and strategy are very important. In my view once the strategy is agreed on ... we 
need to stick to it and remembering the Board is there to support the management and the 
organization.” (Interview No. 11).
This view was also shared by other CEOs.
“Effective Board in my opinion is about understanding the company, her needs, and 
taking action...It is about;
• Alignment between Board members and management
• Understanding company needs and issues
• Providing specific actions and decisions
• Having time for each topic
• Providing necessary support
• Access and proper communication.” (Interview No. 15)
It was also evident that the committees associated to the Board play an important role in 
‘getting things done’. As a member explained,
“Generally, the Board is effective and has got better over time. Most of its detailed 
work is done through Board committees. Four committees have been established 
namely Audit, Risk, Remuneration and Governance. Each of the committees has its 
own charter. Generally each of the committees is effective in supporting the work of 
the Board as a whole.” (Interview No. 12)
Another member commented on the effectiveness of the same Board and stressed on the 
importance of the role of the Chair, effective communication and ‘handling conflict’;
“The Board is highly effective but can be enhanced by including more technically 
oriented members.
• Clarity about the roles and responsibilities of Board members
• Clarity about targets and the strategy of the firm
• Proper composition and multi-discipline representation of members on the Board
• Reasonable frequency of Board meetings i.e. four plus meetings per annum
• Clear agenda and sufficient time allowed for discussion and deliberations
• The effectiveness of the Chairman of the Board in handling conflicts, 
disagreements and ensuring effective communication between the Board and 
management, and between the Board members themselves.” (Interview No. 13)
Board presentation was also flagged as being important. As a member explained:
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“Effective in the subjects presented, but not involved in other matters which 
potentially need Board involvement. So in general the Board is selectively effective. 
However, the Board needs to be generally effective in all matters ” (Interview No. 8)
In summary, the Board effectiveness was perceived as a combination of a variety of factors. 
These included capability, Chairperson, delivery, involvement, decision making, and the 
indispensable role of the committees which serve the Board (Conger et al., 1998; Conger and 
Lawler, 2002; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005).
ISSUE 1: Findings
• Board effectiveness is a function o f a multitude of personal, organizational attd 
managerial factors
• The expectation o f the members in defining Board effectiveness varies according to 
their roles on the Board.
•  Chair is expected to exhibit leadership and management qualities
• CEOs are interested in what the Board can do for the company
• Independent members show interest in independence, involvement, decision making 
and relationship between the members
• The committees play an important role in facilitating the decision making on the 
Board
5 8.1.2 ISSUE TWO: Individual (self) perception of effectiveness 
It has been reported that the perceptions of the members of the Board effectiveness is crucial 
for understanding their behavior (Conger et al„ 1998; Conger and Lawler, 2002; Pye and 
Pettigrew, 2005). The data generated indicated the nature of the role each member plays on 
the Board and how effectiveness is perceived based on the functions expected from 
individuals on the Board. For example, a Chairperson would view his effectiveness in terms 
of what he does and what he should be doing. Thus in describing their perception of 
effectiveness they generally described the ingredients (Conger and Lawler, 2002) of their role 
(role holder). For example a Chair described his perception of effectiveness as;
“As Chairman of the Board others can say how effective I am. However, as for the 
CEO I can see that he is very effective and instrumental in our operations.
Both plays an important role, therefore the combination of both is required as a good 
practice in any organization.
I provide adequate support and guidance and ensure we are working as a responsible 
team to achieve the best results for our stakeholders. All members have to feel that 
they are on the Board to add value, therefore, I encourage the contribution of all of 
them and ensure that the time given in the meeting is utilized to bring up the expected 
outcome.” (Interview No. 10).
Another Chair person directly described what he does;
“In my role I ensure:
• The correct subjects are raised at Board meetings.
• The Board discusses items on the agenda.
• The Board delivers decisions
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The engagement of all Board members.” (Interview No. 6)
A Chairman provided what he thought to be the main responsibilities of a Chair;
“I believe that a significant part of the Chairman role is to develop the Board’s 
capability and support management.” (Interview No. 1)
A similar pattern was also observed amongst other groupings (members). For example, a 
chief executive explained;
“I believe that the CEO role should take a big responsibility for Board effectiveness. 
Particularly in making the Board prepared, well informed, and structuring thoughtful 
and professional meetings.” (Interview No. 2)
The CEO from the Bank also offered similar duties and activities;
“My role as CEO is to leverage the Board in execution and to provide support 
to the Board through information and careful preparation of the agenda. These 
activities are essential for an effective Board meeting ” (Interview No. 7)
Sometimes the account provided is more detailed. For example, a CEO commented;
“My role is suggesting new ideas and practices for improvement of the overall 
conduct of the Bank; Presenting the performance report of the company in a very 
transparent manner; Listening carefully to the Board’s views and direction;
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Contributing to the discussions whenever it is appropriate, and translating their 
decision into actions." (Interview No. 15).
Like Chairpersons and CEOs other Board members including NEDs described what they 
normally do and in a way explained what their contribution is towards the Board
effectiveness. For example a Board member asserted;
“I try to point the Board towards seeing details and thereby push management to be 
more effective in running the firm” (Interview No. 3)
Usually the Board members referred to their expertise and or experience that would be a 
measure of their effectiveness. For example,
“I make sure that I attend the meetings and provide enough time to the Board. I also 
utilize my financial expertise to review all financial proposals and issues, and provide 
my ideas, recommendations, and sometimes scenarios that might help the 
management and Board.” (Interview No. 5).
Another member explains the importance of the expertise which he brings to the discussion 
and debates on the Board.
“I feel my strongest contributions are in the fields of financial budgeting and accounting.
I enjoy helping the firm in these areas.
• Compliance and internal controls
• Human Resources and Emiratisation
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Challenging short and long term strategies of the firm 
Ensuring the corporate governance rules are respected at all times
Monitoring the performance of the bank and identifying areas of improvement. >9
(Interview No. 13)
As explained earlier the members’ experience counts for a great deal and it is something that 
others are aware of and respect because it adds another perspective, maybe from another 
organization or other Boards, or even from the private sector.
“In my role I ensure:
I provide the Board with wealth of knowledge and experience o f more than 15 years.
I offer my network within UAE or abroad.
I give my time to the executive committee that handles more difficult subjects on 
behalf of the Board.” (Interview No. 9)
It was discovered that when it comes to describing their effectiveness, Chairs and CEOs seem 
to see their effectiveness as being interrelated. In other words, as one Chair explained, “The
effectiveness of one is largely influenced and even determined by the other ... oh yes. 
(Interview No. 14)
T 9
A Board member made the following observation about the ‘partnership’ between the Chair 
and CEO on the Board.
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“Both are effective The CEO has always been capable and a strong leader, and both 
the CEO and Chairman have a good degree o f  harmony. (Interview No. 5)
Whilst it was evident that the roles o f the Chair and CEO are complementary in nature and 
indeed necessary for effectiveness o f both on the Board, the roles o f  other members 
especially the NEDs seem to be a monitoring and evaluating ones. Thus their effectiveness 
was described in terms how well they carried out their roles on the Board. For example, as
one mentioned;
“I see my effectiveness in what I do best;
• Focusing on issues to be discussed
• Drawing attention to issues at hand -  to hone in on these
• Bringing up issues o f priority
• Providing opinions and solutions ” (Interview No. 16)
Another ED explained;
“Yes, EDs and NEDs both complement each other. However, NEDs usually have 
more experience and time available to assist management. They also provide wider 
networks and bring professionalism to the table.” (Interview No. 5).
It was interesting to see that CEOs felt that NEDs play an important part and that their 
effectiveness makes a significant contribution to their effectiveness and the effectiveness of 
the Board as the whole. A CEO explains;
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« We rely on the EDs and NEDs to keep an eye on the ball ... make sure everything 
goes according to plan. They bring in expertise and they can act as the eyes and ears 
of the Board... They help the CEO to see things better...” (Interview No. 11).
Overall, whilst it was difficult to ascertain what was exactly meant by ‘effectiveness’ on the 
part of the different members, it was generally understood that Board members contribution 
is crucial for the overall effectiveness of the Board (Aguilera, 2005; Petrovic, 2008;
O’Higgins, 2009).
ISSUE 2: Findings
•  Board members described their responsibilities and dues in their roles as a 
requirement for effectiveness
• No member described himself or others as ineffective. In contrast, most members 
described others as effective
•  It was generally understood that others should view their effectiveness rather than 
making statements about themselves
• Chair and CEO’s roles formed a 'partnership' and were ‘complementary ’ when it 
came to their effectiveness
• EDs and NEDs saw their role and effectiveness as being able to monitor the progress 
of the Board and contribute in their area of specialization
• The role atid effectiveness o f the EDs and NEDs were appreciated by other members
| especially the CEOs
5.8.1.3 ISSUE THREE: Reward and Motivation
There is no doubt that rewards are crucial for the senior management motivation (Park and 
Ungson, 1997; Quick, 1997; Katzell and Thompson, 1990; Kakabadse et al., 2000). Literature 
points to the commitment o f the members and how important it is to have motivated members
on the Board.
The participants generally agreed that motivation and rewards for the members has an effect 
on the overall effectiveness o f the members and the Board as the whole. Members need
incentives to ‘provide their best’.
“The Board members need such kind o f incentives to encourage them to provide their 
best to the Board” (Interview No. 10)
However, there were different views concerning what kind o f reward motivates the members 
and who should receive what kind o f incentive for their performance on the Board especially 
where the Board manages high profile projects
“Yes, the rewards and motivation o f Board members are very important. This is 
especially true for this Board as it is managing a project o f not less than $1 billion, 
and this requires considerable time and concentration from Board members. Hence it 
is important to keep levels o f motivation and morale high in the interests o f the 
company as it expects their full dedication and their quality contribution to its 
business.” (Interview No. 5)
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It is clear that participants feel that maintaining high morale and dedication on the part of the 
members is important and adequate reward and motivation should be provided for the 
members. Interestingly, the recognition is often associated with monitory reward.
“Yes, human nature needs recognition of all kinds, whether financial or 
moral/psychological. Therefore, it is important to reward Board members financially 
and morally, since they have many other responsibilities, and therefore need to be 
rewarded in order to devote their time and provide assistance so they feel their 
contributions are appreciated and that they add value to the business ” (Interview No. 
13).
An interesting view which emerged from a number of interviews was that participants felt 
that financial reward should be provide based on the role that the members play on the Board. 
Basically, it was ascertain that those who are executive directors should be reward more and 
maybe with a salary, and the NEDs should be given a fee. Indeed, it is not unusual to see 
NEDs being rewarded by ‘fee per session’ rather than a financial arrangement on a permanent 
basis (Kakabadse et al., 2000). As a CEO asserted,
“No doubt, the reward and motivation is the engine for any success. In the Board case, 
members need recognition for their time, contribution and dedication. Non-Executive 
Board members should receive a Board fee relative to the market and size of the 
business. Executive Directors (if any) should receive a salary and bonus. Executive 
Director’s compensation should be aligned with the economic performance of the 
business which would include a substantial amount of variable pay to make them 
effective. Non-Executive Directors, given their supervisory and part-time role, should
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receive a fee only, and should not be incentives with a variable bonus (Interview 
No. 11).
There were also examples o f participants who agreed with the provision o f reward, 
specifically salaries or fees o f some sort, but tended to qualify their response.
“Yes as long as they are responsible and they put their time and effort into the firm. 
(Interview No. 3).
The participant further explained;
“Not everyone pulls his weight and shows commitment. I have nothing against 
holding membership o f several Boards but one need to dedicate time, effort and show 
responsibility... not all do.” (Interview No. 3).
A Chair approved the provision o f rewards and implied the responsibility o f  the members for 
continual self development hence improving contribution to Board.
“Yes, for the responsibilities they take and contribution they make plus they go on a 
self-leaming/development process to continue improving their contribution to the 
Board.” (Interview No. 14)
Other participants felt that financial reward should come secondary to the ‘cause’. As one 
explained;
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“As a non-profit organization, monetary reward should be secondary. The social 
perspective is most important.” (Interview No. 7)
Besides ‘recognition’ the feeling of ‘achievement’ and being associated with ‘a high 
performing Board* were also suggested as rewards in their own right;
LL I think success and achievement being ‘felt’ in a shared outcome is the greatest gift
for Board members. Most NEDs want to be on high performing business Boards. 
(Interview No. 2)
11
A Chairperson also commented that ‘achievement’ is more important than anything else.
“This varies from case to case, although achievement is more important than anything 
else”. (Interview No. 6)
However, the general agreement was that although rewards and motivation are essential for 
effective operation of the members and the Board the nature of the rewards provided should 
be different according to different cases. These include the nature of the organization work 
(for example NGOs), position on the Board, and importance of the issues managed by the 
Board (Tyson and Boumois, 2005; Analoui, et al., 2011).
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ISSUE 3: Findings
Rewards and motivation are essential for ensuring the effectiveness o f the Board
The size o f the monetary reward and incentive should he decided by the nature o f the 
operations involved The higher the risk the higher the monetary reward 
Achievement ‘being associated with high performing Boards , and discharging 
social responsibilities ’ were amongst the non-monetary motivation for the Board
The monetary reward should be provided to permanent members (executives) in the 
form o f a ‘salary'> however, NEDs should be rewarded by fee  ’
Membership o f the Board provides social status which acts as a motivator for 
effective performance
To sum up, the accounts provided by the participants validated the issues discussed in the 
literature. Understanding members’ effectiveness requires learning about their behavior on 
the Board. Moreover, the effectiveness o f  the members was largely determined by their roles. 
Members in roles such as CEO felt that they contributed more to the Board through their 
effectiveness, and acknowledged the role o f executives and NEDs and their expert 
contribution to the Board (Conger et al., 1998; Conger and Lawler, 2002; Pye and Pettigrew, 
2005). It was evident that rewards and motivation is seen differently by different participants. 
However, there seemed to be an agreement that rewards (monetary) and motivation 
(achievements, being associated with high performing Boards, social status and 
responsibilities) are crucial for senior management effectiveness (Park and Ungson, 1997; 
Tyson and Bournois, 2005; Analoui, et al., 2011).
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5.9: THEME SIX: MEMBERS PERCEPTION OF CONTRIBUTION TO BOARD 
EFFECTIVENESS
The sixth category of themes which emerged from thematic analysis of the data is concerned 
with contributions of the Board members to Board effectiveness (See Table 5.11). This led to 
the identification of two main sub-categories. These are;
• Required/ Acquired Capabilities
• Acquired core capabilities
Is there any on-going training opportunity for acquisition of relevant skills and knowledge for 
Board members? If not what kind of training would you envisage?
Relates to the need for training and development of the Board members for improved 
effectiveness
Training and development (Kakabadse and Myers, 1996; Kakabadse et al, 2000; Analoui, 
2007) are crucial for senior managers.
These identified themes related to the answers provided by the participants to two main 
questions; first concerning the availability of any on-going training opportunity for 
acquisition of relevant skills and knowledge for Board members? And their views on the kind 
of training required? Thus, the identified themes in the first sub category highlighted the 
perception of the participants in relation to their required and acquired core capabilities 
necessary for personal and Board effectiveness. Capabilities including training and 
development are crucial for senior managers (Kakabadse and Myers, 1996; Kakabadse et al, 
2000; Analoui, 2007). It has been recognized that Board members’ core capabilities have an
important influence on their overall effectiveness on the Board (Conger and Lawler, 2002; 
Pye and Pettigrew, 2005).
The second sub category of the theme ‘Core capabilities’ was identified based on the question 
asked; In your opinion, what ‘core capabilities’ do you, as a Board member, require to be 
effective in your roles? The response to this question led to the generation of ample data on 
what core capabilities Board members thought to be important for their effective operation on 
the Board. It is reported that Core Capabilities are essential for Board effectiveness abilities 
required for Board effectiveness (Coulson and Thomas, 1991; Forbe and Milliken, 1999 
Boulkden et al., 2003). Another aspect related to core capabilities was to establish whether or 
not the Board members had already acquired core capabilities suitable to the needs of their 
Board effectiveness. The second identified sub-theme also related to this category of data 
(Cascio, 2004; Nadler, 2004).
Table 5.11: Emerged Categories and Sub-categories o f ‘Core Capabilities’
N o . M A IN  C A T E G O R IE S S U B -C A T E G O R I E S
6 CORE CAPABILITES R e q u ir e d  C a p a b ilit ie s
• Required core capabilities to function 
effectively on Board
• Available opportunities for ‘Induction’ 
Training.
• Available opportunities for ‘on -going’ T 
&D
A c q u ir e d  C o r e  C a p a b il it ie s
Source: Data Analysis
309
5.9.1: Emergent Issues
Further thematic analysis of the data within the first sub-category namely; ‘Required 
Capabilities’ did result in the emergence of strong issues. These are;
• Required core capabilities to function effectively on Board
• Available opportunities for ‘Induction’ Training.
• Available opportunities for ‘on -going’ T &D
The second sub category did not lead to the emergence of well-defined issues therefore the 
whole sub-category namely ‘Acquire Core Capabilities’ has been treated an issue in its own
right.
The above emergent themes have direct relevance for the achievement of the objectives of the 
present study. Indeed, the core capability theme is identified as one the main aspects of 
effectiveness in modern BSBs (Kakabadse et al, 2000; Analoui, 2007).
5.9.1.1 ISSUE ONE: Required core capabilities to function effectively on Board
The analysis of the views and perceptions of the Board members indicated a wide range of 
opinions. These ranged from general to more specific including a recommended set of 
knowledge, experience and expertise to specific set of skills that they felt would contribute to 
the effectiveness of the members on the Board.
Some of the general views related to the attitude, approach, energy and experience. For 
example, a Chairperson suggested;
“Clear thought, objectivity, commercial appreciation, integrity, positive energy and
experience.” (Interview No. 1).
Or, as another Chair asserted;
“Suitable qualifications and relevant experience.” (Interview No. 5).
Some views seem to relate to the personality and outlook of the Board members and suffered 
from an air of generality. A CEO commented,
“In my view, the required capabilities are as follows; suitably knowledgeable in the 
business field; strong commercial awareness; ability to handle ambiguity and high 
levels of complexity; the ability to have clear thought, the ability to be able to
‘provide meaning’.” (Interview No. 3)
When he was asked to expand on the comment ‘provide meaning’, he went on to say;
“I mean being able to explain. Sometime colleagues make an assumption that we 
know what they mean... but we don’t... the problem is that some members think 
being ambiguous is good and even see it as being sophisticated... we need coherence 
and complexity.” (Interview No. 3).
It was clear that some members were aware of the contemporary issues in leadership and 
Board dynamics and management. This also suggested that different role requires different 
sets of skills. For example,
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“What we need is ‘Empowerment’, especially from the Chair. He needs to prepare the 
ground for effective engagement with relevant stakeholders both internal and 
external.” (Interview No. 7)
Another example of a general description of required capabilities was;
“I must understand (counting the issues with is his figures):
• the industry, competitiveness and environment
• the company’s capabilities and weaknesses
• stakeholder objectives
• economics -  regional and international. It is clear isn’t it? (seeking approval) ” 
(Interview No. 16)
The specific category tends to name the skills and competencies participants felt necessary 
for increased effectiveness of the Board. For example;
“Experience; interest in the future of the firm; responsible for their actions (i.e. 
accountable); knowledge of the total spectrum (i.e. finance, projects, legal, HR. 
(Interview No. 3).
More specifically, it was mentioned that;
“Communication and strategic awareness are very important capabilities to effectively 
perform in the role. This is in addition to the practical experience of the Board
member ” (Interview No. 8).
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Technical knowledge and skills, and knowledge of the industry were also emphasized.
“Board members must be very competent and have the required experience. In 
addition, they must have the technical skills and knowledge necessary for this 
specialized industry to be able to perform as responsible Board members in relation to
any decision-making.” (Interview No. 5)
A Board member outlined the range of skills and competencies required,
“Board members need to have a good understanding of the business. They need to have 
leadership skills, good communication skills, and a proper knowledge of finance, the 
economy, business environment and Board dynamics. Let me tell you... (counting the 
issues with his fingers, a cultural habit used for emphasis)... we need;
Managerial.
- Tearn work 
Financial 
Business
- PR, and social skills... yeah.” (Interview No. 14)
It was evident that the range of skills and competencies recommended evolved around 
enabling managerial and leadership competencies.
“The following capabilities are particularly important:
The knowledge and experience of the business and the related risks.
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- The communication with others and an ability to build the relationship at different 
levels.
- Managing conflicts
- The ability of seeing the big picture.
Dealing with the stakeholders and managing their expectations ” (Interview No. 10)
Interestingly, the participants were aware that in addition to a specific set of knowledge and 
skills necessary for performing on PSBs, it was also necessary to;
“....acquiring the skills and knowledge of the business; providing sufficient time and 
energy for the Board meetings; enjoying political and emotional intelligence, and 
more importantly... understanding the role of the Board and the management 
carefully.” (Interview No. 9)
Another example is;
“A clear understanding of the role of a Director and a good understanding of the 
business.” (Interview No. 11).
On the whole, Board members showed awareness of the kind of experience, knowledge, 
skills and competencies required for improved performance and effectiveness on the Board 
(Kakabadse et al, 2000; Cascio, 2004; Nadler, 2004).
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ISSUE I: Findings
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induction program for the Board members were particularly interesting.
The participants reported that essentially there is no comprehensive induction training 
available to the Board members.
the Bo
5.9.1.2 Available opportunities for induction training
The accounts provided by the participants to the question regarding availability of the
I believe there is an opportunity to improve by providing a comprehensive induction
program.” (Interview No. 1).
Another member explained;
Nothing except an overall introduction to the firm’s activities.” (Interview No. 4).
This comment suggested that there is some form of induction ‘materials’ available to the 
participants. A Chair commented;
u We provide newcomers with the organizational background.” (Interview No. 5)
Another Board member explained that new members especially NEDs are provided with 
some information about the organization.
i t There is no such induction training provided. However, if new Board members are
from outside of the industry, then induction training would be necessary to enable 
them to acquire knowledge of the industry.” (Interview No. 15).
Another member commented;
t t There was a general orientation. However, in my opinion, there should be a more
structured induction program for new members before joining as this would be 
beneficial to both the individual Board member and the Board.” (Interview No. 13)
Further analysis transpired that the information provided about the organization and is 
provided only to the new members. However, it was evident that all members felt that the ‘it 
is a good idea’ and ‘it should be provided’. A Chairperson commented that induction training 
is required for the members to become fully aware of their role and responsibilities on the 
Board;
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“No, we need training to help members to be more effective in their role Such 
training will develop their knowledge about their role in a short time. (Interview No.
14).
A Chair person placed emphasis on the need for having ‘more effective Board meeting
“There is no induction training before joining the Board’ However, there is a need for 
one, such a program would provide a good start to the members who will have an 
opportunity to learn about the organization and it s business and how it operates, so 
they can be ready to participate in more effective way to the Board meeting." 
(Interview No. 10)
“There should be. It is important so that they will better know what is expected of 
them as Board members. Also, through training they will better understand their role, 
the extent of their accountability, and better understand the business " (Interview No. 
16).
The need for familiarity with the ‘operating model’ and to help ‘the Board and members’ was 
also strongly aired.
“There is no such program. They should introduce one in order to highlight the 
operating model." (Interview No. 6); and
“There is no training available. However, I strongly encourage induction training to 
help both the Board and the members." (Interview No. 7).
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It was evident that the members were aware of the need for induction training especially 
focusing on the committee roles as well as the knowledge and skills required for participation
and ‘full engagement’.
“Yes, there should be training, especially training focused on the role of the Board 
Committees. But as you know there is no induction training provided to Board 
members. However, I would highly recommend induction training because it would 
help to ensure that new members are adequately equipped with the knowledge and 
background of the company necessary to facilitate their effective participation, and to 
ensure their full engagement in discussions and meetings at a later stage.” (Interview
No. 5).
All participants overwhelmingly agreed that induction training should be provided some went 
on to suggest specific knowledge and skills which the induction program should include. A 
member explained;
C4Let me explain; the induction training should include; understanding the role of the
Board and the management carefully; acquiring the skills and knowledge of the 
business; providing sufficient time and energy for the Board meetings; and enjoying 
political and emotional intelligence ” (Interview No. 9)
Another member suggested the inclusion of the following topics in an induction training 
program for the Board members.
“No. However, such programs are needed, and the topics that should be covered in 
workshops are as follows:
•  Private sector: engagement and partnerships
• Corporate governance: principles and practices
.  Responsibilities of Board members.” (Interview No. 8)
On the whole, there seems to be an overall agreement for having ‘induction programs.” This 
view has also been emphasized by Kakabadse et al, 2000; Das, 2001 and Analoui, 2007.
ISSUE 2: Findings
• There is no formal induction training fo r the Board members in PSBs
• Some organizations provide the new members fo r example, NEDs with some basic 
information about the organization
• There is an overwhelming agreement that there ought to be an induction training 
program for the Board members
• There is a belief that induction training would help both members and the Board to 
work/operate more effectively
5.9.1.3 ISSUE THREE: Available opportunities for ‘on-going’ T & D
Despite the importance of the training and development and its relationship with the members 
and Board effectiveness (Kakabadse and Myers, 1996), participants reported that there is very 
little opportunity for ongoing training and development available for them.
A Board member shrugged his shoulders and said “Nothing I am aware of.” (Interview No.3). 
Another participant commented;
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“There is nothing on the ground. We lack such a program, but it should be looked at 
(Interview No. 5).
11
Participants’ views and comments also revealed that participants are aware of the need for on 
going training. For example, a Chairperson commented;
“Not currently but again there is an opportunity to improve here by considering sector 
specific knowledge development.” (Interview No. 1).
Another Chairperson commented there is capacity for provision of some training
“There is no existing on-going training. However, we can provide training in certain 
areas, such as corporate governance and Board effectiveness.” (Interview No. 6)
Another member indirectly referred to the induction training and said;
“The Funds [organization] doesn’t have any such training and I support we have one 
because it helps in providing the member with smooth transition period.” (Interview 
No. 8).
The Chairperson explained that there is a need for on going training and not the ad hoc type
offered from ‘time to time’.
From time to time, on an ad hoc basis, there is an offer given to Board members to
join a training program. However, there is no system in place to provide such an
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opportunity. Therefore it would be appropriate to provide an ongoing training 
program that covers areas of: corporate governance; compliance and internal controls; 
finance for non-financial people; banking for non-bankers; and overall training about
business and Board related issues.” (Interview No. 14)
Some participants when acknowledging the lack of on going training provided a list of topics 
that they felt would be desirable for this purpose. For example;
“Yes, there should be ongoing training opportunities that can help in meeting the special 
needs of the Board members, especially in the following topics:
• Corporate governance
• Managing conflicts
• Project management
• Audit and control
• Strategy development.” (Interview No. 16)
It was interesting to see that there were similarities in the list of topics that participants 
recommended.
“I believe we need to have...
Strategic planning/scenario planning.
- Risk management.
- Corporate governance.
Board members responsibilities and role 
Legal and audit.” (Interview No. 12)
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Issues such as ‘corporate governance’, ‘strategic planning’, and ‘business management’ 
seemed to have been identified as the most essential topics for on going training.
“We need a systematic approach to our on going training. I feel we all could benefit 
from a decent program of training that helps us with real issues we deal with on the 
Board, like...
Strategic Management
Economics
Business Management
Finance
Organizational performance and leadership.” (Interview No. 4)
As was reported earlier, the Chairpersons and CEOs seemed to be more concerned with the 
ability of the members to function effectively on the Board. As a Chair mentioned.
“No. however, such programs are needed, and the topics that should be covered in 
workshops are as follows:
1. Private sector: engagement and partnerships
2. Corporate governance: principles and practices
3. Responsibilities of Board members.
At the end of the day, it is of no use to us, if our colleagues are knowledgeable but 
can’t function on the Board. This is essential for the organization and the sector as the 
whole.” (Interview No. 10)
However, there was some skepticism about availability o f  the members for on going training.
“No we don’t and yes we need it, but it must also be recognized that Board members 
should make themselves available to spend time in the business on a regular basis to 
understand the issues confronting it. Topics will vary depending on the industry.”
(Interview No. 13)
On the whole, the participants seem to be supportive of the idea of have on going training and 
development and there seems to be a consensus on this issue. Also, there seemed to be
dissimilarities between the topics they recommended. This was clearly due to the differences
• Little or no ongoing training and development seemed to be available to the Board 
members
• Participants fe lt that ad hoc training provided is not useful fo r  increasing their
effectiveness on PSBs
• Amongst the topics recommended ‘Strategic Planning \ ‘Corporate Governance \
in the nature organization.
ISSUE 3: Findings
• Most participants seem to have concrete ideas o f what ought to be included in a typical
on going training program
Business Management \ and Board members roles and responsibility ’ received more
attention.
5.9.1.4 ISSUE FOUR: Acquired Core Capabilities
As expected very few participants reported having had major training experiences. Those 
who claimed to have had training of some sort often referred to training in general rather than 
training with the aim to prepare them for their role on the Board. For example, a CEO 
commented;
“No, I have not received any other specific training. However, it is useful to provide
this type of training. As far as I am concerned, I received training as part of my career
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program to be an executive.” (Interview No. 15).
A director added;
“Yes, in management, leadership and business development.” (Interview No. 4)
And, another example was a member who commented,
“Yes, I have been involved in several training programs elsewhere that cover several 
subjects. On other Boards most training has cover their businesses and financial 
matters.” (Interview No. 13).
There was also mention of the Institute of Directors that provides some sort of training for the 
members.
“Yes, as a fellow of the Institute of Directors in the UK, and as a Director of several 
companies for many years.” (Interview No. 11)
Another participant also commented; “I am a Fellow of the loD.” (Interview No. 2).
Interestingly, some participants referred to se lf training and previous exposure to other 
Boards as the only relevant training for performing their roles on the PSBs.
“I received training after I joined the Board. However, I did not find this role a 
surprise as I was interested in reading and learning about the function of Boards, and 
best practices associated with Boards in general. We also learn as we go.” (Interview
No. 5).
A Chairperson commented;
“No, we learned our role by practice and experience, some training at a later stage 
was received on an ad hoc basis.” (Interview No. 10)
Another Chairperson referred to his experience of the training as ‘self-training’.
“Self-training only, through reading and experience from different parts of the world 
I have built my knowledge.” (Interview No. 6)
The above views were interesting and somewhat surprising for the researcher since it was 
refreshing to see that the senior participants are happy to admit that they have not received 
any training relevant to their roles on the Board As a member said;
“No, other than through exposure to other Boards.....only through experience.”
(Interview No. 16)
However, the consensus seemed to be that there is a need for on going training which is 
relevant to the roles and responsibilities of the Boards.
“Actually, no prior training was prepared. I would strongly recommend this kind of 
training be provided as it would be very beneficial for the Board.” (Interview No. 8).
On the whole, participants candidly reported that they have not acquired any on going 
training prior to undertaking their roles on the Boards of the PSBs organizations. However, 
they wished they had.
ISSUE 4: Findings
• No or little training which is directly relevant to their roles and responsibilities had 
been acquired prior to their appointment on the PSBs Boards
•  Most participants have received some form o f general management training before 
their appointments
• Most participants reported their experience from and prior exposure to other Boards as 
the main source o f relevant knowledge, skills and competencies relevant to their present 
roles and responsibilities
•  There was an overwhelming consensus that training should be provided for the 
members
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To sum up, accounts provided by the participants confirmed the views in the literature that 
training and development are essential for the effective functioning of the senior managers 
(Kakabadse and Myers, 1996). Unfortunately, there seems to be little opportunity available 
for the Board members to acquire relevant training and development. The lack of opportunity 
available and the absence of proper training which prepares the members for their roles on 
the Board suggest that there is a need and necessity for provision of relevant knowledge, 
skills and capabilities as the whole (Kakabadse et al, 2000, Analoui, 2007).
5.10: THEME SEVEN: EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON THE BOARD
The seventh main category of themes which emerged from thematic analysis of the data is 
concerned with the influences of the external factors on the Boards (See Table 5.12). Further 
analysis led to identification two or three sub-categories. These are;
• Socio-cultural factors (attributes) of the Board
• Awareness of the Global Economics
• Sector role and function
Whilst previous themes explored the factors and influences from the individuals and their 
perception and capabilities, as well as the functions and processes of the Board, the final 
main categories of theme seven which emerged from the data are concerned with the impact 
of the external influences such as language used, religious values and beliefs, rituals, 
awareness of the global economic and the PS itself Board effectiveness can not only be 
attributed to the internal factors, indeed cultural influences play an important part in 
determining the degree of effectiveness of the Boards (Hofstead, 1980; Chattopadhyay et al., 
1999; Yousef, 2001; Same, 2009).
These identified themes emerged from the answers provided to questions; Do you conduct 
the Board business in English or in Arabic? How do Islamic values and beliefs affect your 
performance/effectiveness on the Board? Do traditions and rituals affect the Board
performance/effectiveness? Has the global economic decline affected the behavior of the 
members on the Board? How important are the PSBs effectiveness for the overall social- 
economic development of Abu Dhabi?
Table 5 .12: Emerged Categories and Sub-categories of External Influences (Factors)
No. MAIN CATEGORIES SUB-CATEGORIES
7 EXTERNAL 
INFLUENCES ON THE 
BOARD
Socio-cultural factors (attributes) of the Board
• Language of the Board
• Islamic values
• Ritual and tradition
Awareness of Global Economics
• Global Economics
Source: Data Analysis
5.10.1: EMERGENT ISSUES
Further thematic analysis of the data within first sub category namely; ‘ Socio-cultural factors 
(attributes) of the Board’ did result in the emergence of three important issues. These are;
Language of the Board
Islamic values
Ritual and tradition
The second sub theme identified the emergence of one major issue;
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Global economy
The above emergent themes, sub themes and issues have direct relevance for the achievement 
of the objectives of the present study. Indeed, one the objectives of the present study is to 
contextualize the Board effectiveness in the public sector within Abu Dhabi. Recently, the 
influence of the cultural and external factors influences on the functions and its effectiveness 
has been taken seriously by researchers and writers in the field. (Sameh, 2009, Johnson et al., 
2008, Analoui, 2007; Yousef, 2001; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 1999).
5.10.1.1 ISSUE ONE: Language of the Board
Language is an important ingredient of the culture (Silverman, 2005; Hofstead, 1980). It has 
the potential for symbolic interaction and conveys the social meaning used for making sense 
of the social and organizational reality experienced (Analoui, 2002).
The researcher observed that the language used in PSBs is primarily English. However, the 
Arabic language is also used for discussions and debates.
As a Chairperson explained;
“All documents are produced in English and the meeting is quite often in both English 
and Arabic to good effect.” (Interview No. 1).
This was also confirmed by another Board member who commented;
“Most Directors and Board members are familiar with the English language. Abu 
Dhabi is located in internationally financially operated regions. It is expected from the 
members to be familiar with the English language. ...Besides, we all mostly educated
abroad and English language has been become our second language. Most of our 
business is conducted in English, with Arabic available. However, most discussions 
are done in English.” (Interview No. 5).
The materials are prepared in both languages;
“In both languages, although mostly in Arabic for discussions. Material is provided in 
both English and Arabic.” (Interview No. 6).
It was reported that most business transactions are formally carried out in English. 
Participants saw the Board phenomenon as a business forum hence the use of English 
language was treated as a ‘tool’ for the purpose o f ‘communication’.
“Internationally all Boards used English for their transactions. We deal with foreign 
companies and their use English language. It is the language of business. We treat it 
as a tool for our communication ” (Interview No. 11)
The transition from English to Arabic or the other way round is often carried out where 
emphasis, understanding and coherence are required.
A member explained;
"... It is mostly in English, and sometimes in Arabic... Having said that as you are 
aware it is sometimes necessary to switch from one language to another to explain a
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term or provided better understanding of an issue, the Arabic language is our mother 
tongue... it makes better sense.. (Interview No. 16)
A distinction is often made between ‘side conversation’ and the main discussion
“We do have side conversations and yes, we use Arabic. But during the meeting 
English is the spoken language.” (Interview No. 13)
The members were aware of the cultural issues and connotations of using a different language 
on the Board. As One member explained;
“Yeah we are internationalized... the Western emphasis of our business side of the life 
is undeniable. Still we conduct our meeting the way we think is most beneficial to the 
Board and its objectives. .. Switching from English to Arabic is not so unusual. We 
sometimes do this without knowing it.” (Interview No. 8).
On the whole, the language formed neither a constraint nor a barrier. Board members used 
English and Arabic as ‘tools’ or a ‘means of communication’ .” (Interview No. 11).’
ISSUE 1: Findings
•  Materials and documentations are prepared in both English and A rabic
• Both languages were spoken on the Board
• Arabic language is sometime used as an additional tool fo r assertion, clarification, 
creating coherence and emphasis
•  English language is recognized as the ‘business ’ language o f the Boards
331
5.10.1.2 ISSUE 2: Islamic values
Undoubtedly Islamic values and beliefs have formed the very foundation of the members 
conduct, relationships and the working practices. In Abu Dhabi Islamic values provide the 
comer stone for the social and business interactions (Abuznaid, 2006; Sameh, 2011).
Participants felt that Islamic values and codes of conduct are ‘very important’. For example,
“Very important [with great emphasis]. It is the basis of our daily behavior, so 
hopefully it is reflected in the Board.” (Interview No. 3).
The participants reported that Islamic values and ethics formed the standard for the ‘running 
of their firm’.” (Interview No. 11).
“ ...directly not relevant for me, but I am committed to running the firm with high 
ethical standards consistent with my understanding of Islamic tradition.” (Interview 
N o l l ) .
It was revealed that Islamic values have permeated into the participants’ life and business 
alike.
“Very much as they are great values and fit in with my life conduct, whether it is 
business or social. These values cover such principles as honestly, ethics, 
transparency, devotion, etc. Islamic values encourage transparency, believing in the
task you perform, and dedication towards achieving the best outcome from any 
assignment. In addition to this, it fosters trust and confidence amongst each other.
(Interview No. 15)
Islamic values of transparency, devotion and honesty were particularly emphasized. As a 
member explained;
44 Honesty, integrity and high moral conduct helps me be an effective Board member.
Such values are easy to implement as they are shared between all religions and 
cultures.1' (Interview No. 4).
It was generally felt that they can help to create ‘understanding and patience1 especially 
when dealing with conflict.
44 Yes, they are important when dealing with each other (respect), and when providin:
opinions (honesty). They are also important when dealing with conflicts 
(understanding and patience). At prayer time we walk together and come back with a 
better spirit to complete the meeting.’1 (Interview No. 16)
It is evident that Islamic values determine both the interaction with others on the Board and
the outcome expected.
44 These values improve the relationships between the Board members and
management, and encourage simplicity and openness.11 (Interview No. 5).
A participant commented that Islamic values and principles should be taken into 
consideration when;
“Dealing with each other with respect; be dedicated to our jobs and firm; ensure full 
adherence to the Company laws and regulations; keeping the interest of the 
shareholder on the top of our agenda ” (Interview No. 9).
Another participant explained how “they respect our Islamic values when dealing with;
- Conflict of interest situations
- Taking our roles with highest degree of honesty and integrity
- Acting on behalf of the stakeholders with utmost care and honesty .” (Interview No.
10)
A CEO explained that values such as transparency and managing time effectively reflect the 
Islamic values and they are used in ‘our organizations’.
“Of course, they are; in our organization we ensure that we:
• have a code of conduct and ethics
• transparency
• an open door policy, and
• manage time effectively during working hours.
These principles have been introduced as part of international best practice, as well as 
to reflect the values that our Islamic religion calls for.” (Interview No. 7).
It was also specifically mentioned that Islamic values are believed to enhance the 
effectiveness of the Board. A Chairperson said;
“I believe they only enhance effectiveness as it promotes self-discipline and respect 
for different opinions.” (Interview No. 1).
One participant clearly made a distinction between his Board and an all European 
Board’.
“They make for a richer experience. If this was an all-European Board it would have 
far less interest for me.” (Interview No. 2).
When he was pressed to explain what he means by ‘all European Board’. He said;
you know what I mean... we are Moslem and we are expected to deal with issues 
and people with honesty and fairness... we are here to protect people’s right and not 
just be interested in our interest ... we are in position of trust and that means a lot in 
Islam We ought to be diligent and work with integrity on the basis of trust .” 
(Interview No. 2)
The researcher discovered that undoubtedly Islamic values have effects on the behavior and 
performance of the Board members.
The accounts provided by the participant showed how important that Islamic values and way 
of life are for the participants, and how they affect their relationship with others as well as 
their performance and effectiveness at work.
5.10.1.3 ISSUE THREE: Ritual and tradition
Rituals and tradition cannot be separated from the dominant cultural values (Chattopadhyay 
et al., 1999). As shown earlier religious values in particular the Islamic values and principles 
have formed the very fabric of the social and cultural activities and traditions (Yousef 2001;
Sameh, 2009).
When participants were asked; do traditions and rituals affect the Board performance/ 
effectiveness? One Board member asserted:
“Not to my knowledge. We are professionals and we deal with any given situation 
according to our roles and responsibilities...” (Interview No. 1)
A CEO from the same company also aired the same opinion;
“Not at all! The control and personal discipline are very valuable. Status dynamics are
the only factor that can reduce effectiveness...............I mean it should be avoided.”
(Interview No. 2).
It was evident that both participants associated involvement of the personal issues as 
counterproductive to the Board’s effectiveness. Other comments made by the Board 
members supported this view that from time to time personal views can ‘get in the way’.
For example;
“No it does not. However, individual members do bring their personalities to 
debates... it can get in the way.” (Interview No. 13)
The majority of the Board members felt that rituals and tradition can impact on the Board 
effectiveness ‘but not necessarily in a negative way’.
“Yes, our tradition/ritual way is to deal with people with truthfulness, sincerity; 
respect and transparency... yes it does [placing stress] but not necessarily in a 
negative way.” (Interview No. 14).
A Chairperson placed emphasis on the values o f ‘understanding and sharing’.
“Yes, through displaying understanding and sharing ...these are important values. 
Some go back to hundreds of years ago... we feel sharing is important... it can create 
the understanding that sometimes badly needed. ” (Interview No. 6).
Another member echoed similar views;
“Board members work as a family. We therefore feel that we are responsible for any 
decisions and this encourages unity amongst us. This reflects tribal values and roots.” 
(Interview No. 3).
It was evident that traditional influences for example, the tribal values and beliefs still play an 
important part in unifying the Board members. For example;
“As the social traditions are influenced by Islamic values, I can say yes because they
are, in a way, they are inspirable.....Islam is our way of life and cannot be separated
from our daily rituals and tradition... these values and rituals unify us... bring us 
together ” (Interview No. 9)
Some of the important issues raised by the participants were the presence and influence of the 
traditional values such as ‘respect for elders’ and ‘allowing time for praying and fasting’. For 
example;
“I can see that respect of the views of others is important, and especially respect of 
elder members of the Board.” (Interview No. 8).
Another director supported the above view and indirectly revealed what was discussed in 
earlier sections of this chapter that Chairpersons are often listened to partly because they are
often elder and senior to others.
“Yes, they include respect for elder members, and giving special attention to the
Chairman of the Board being master. Allowing time for fasting, praying, and making 
sure these are respected during meetings, is also important ” (Interview No. 13)
Another participant clearly showed how traditional and Islamic values contribute to the 
cohesiveness of the group.
“ As I said before the respect and honesty is the hall mark of the Islamic values in our 
society. For us praying in the mosque in Jamaa [collectively] is more than a ritual. It 
is our way of life. We share it with others and this brings us closer and closer 
together. Yes, feel disagreement but we feel that our shared religious and spiritual 
values provide the foundation to resolve difficult issues.” (Interview No: 16).
The theme respect came up again, when a Chairperson asserted;
“Yes, we listen to the elder member or the senior member in position to demonstrate 
our respect to his experience and wisdom. We share each other feelings (happiness or 
sadness) which in turn improves the spirit of team work.” (Interview No. 10).
Perhaps the most striking issue raised which was largely taken for granted by others was the 
importance of communicating as a social and cultural value. The researcher has experienced 
this issue first hand that often the descriptive nature of the way participants interact with one 
another prolongs the duration of the meetings.
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“Yes, in particular the amount of time taken up in conversations which are not 
relevant to the work of the Board. This is a social tradition which is difficult for 
anyone to change although over time it should (change) given time pressures. In 
addition, sometimes a light hearted attitude to conflicts of interest causes difficulty 
and often confidentiality is not respected.” (Interview No. 11)
As Chairperson commented;
“Sometimes we talk too much, ... it is what we do best [laughing] and sometimes it is 
necessary especially when the Board has to deal with exceptional cases and agree on 
projects based on their social importance or background... .but we could do less... 
that’s where the Chair comes in and spoils the party [smiling].” (Interview No. 6)
On the whole, the views expressed by the participants supported the contemporary literature 
that the Board is open to influences from its wider environment (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
1999; Sameh, 2009)
A member’s view clearly showed this relationship between the tradition and religion.
“As the social traditions are influenced by Islamic values, I can say yes... because
they are. In a way they are inseparable.....Islam is our way of life and cannot be
separated from our daily rituals and tradition ” (Interview No. 14)
The views of the majority of the participants confirmed the above. It is difficult if not 
impossible to separate the Islamic values from the very tradition and rituals.
ISSUE 3: Findings
o f tr a d i t io n , Islamic values and rituals on
their behavior, interaction with others and the effectiveness o f the Board.
Tradition and rituals have influence on the ways members interact on the Boards of
PSBs.
Islamic values and principles and tribal rituals influence the relationship between 
members and the way Boards operate
Amongst the traditions and social values which affected the Board effectiveness, 
•Respect \ ‘Respect for elders ’  ‘Honesty ’  and \Sharing ’  seemed to be the most
influential
Prolonged debates are symptomatic o f the traditional needs for communication, 
creating understanding and resolving conflicts
traditional
operations
understanding
external influences in particular social, religious and traditional in operation 
Islamic values are adopted in daily life as well as Board interactions and activities 
Islamic values fosters trust, honesty, integrity and hard work
Islamic life values and code o f ethics determines the foundation o f members ’  behavior 
in particular and the Board performance and effectiveness as the whole.
5.10.1.4 ISSUE FOUR: Global Economics
Undoubtedly globalization has had impact on Board effectiveness, Board members and the 
Board as the whole (Johnson et al., 2008; Coulson-Thomas, 1991; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005).
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Understanding the extent of the external influences (Johnson et al., 1996; Lutter, 2001; 
Davies, 2002; Hopt and Leyens, 2004) such as global economics on the Directors’ perception 
is crucial for understanding their effectiveness at work (Aguilera, 2005; Tyson and Boumois, 
2005). In order to gain a better understanding of the mentioned influences, participants were 
asked; how aware are the Board members of the global economic conditions?
There was an overwhelming view that the directors are aware of the global economy and its 
influences on the economy of Abu Dahbi in general and the public sector in particular.
“We are part of the world economy, and awareness of global economic conditions is 
necessary to conduct business. All members who represent different industries are 
linked in one way or another to global economic conditions. No, other than it has 
raised Board members’ awareness of good practices and bad practices. As a result, 
they are more careful in pursuing their business, and take appropriate decisions based 
on careful analysis and best practice.” (Interview No. 8)
A CEO also stressed the directors’ awareness of the global economy;
“They are quite aware from their roles in their own organizations.
Current developments provide an opportunity to maintain a close watch on what is 
going on, and to learn new methods and practices. Yes, by enhancing the corporate 
governance awareness among the Board members, as well as introducing more 
processes of internal control.” (Interview No. 7)
Some participants indicated that not only are directors aware but more so this has increased 
the need for being ‘cautious’ especially in relation to ‘investment decisions’.
As a Chairperson commented;
“In the main, our Board is very aware of global economic conditions. I believe all 
Boards are more cautious given global events and require greater confidence when
making investment decisions. (Interview No. 1)
And, another director emphasized the above issue;
“Well aware. Yes, it did. by making them more cautious.” (Interview No. 4).
It was clear that recent developments in the global economy have had impact on the Board 
members. For example,
“Collectively, all members are very well aware since we are operating in an open 
market with special connections to all global economic centers. Yes, as and when 
needed. There is now more focus on the issues that relate to banking relationships 
with others. And certain attention is given to any new deal or transaction to ensure 
protection is given.” (Interview No. 13).
The CEO said;
“Extremely aware and well briefed. The UAE in general is very well educated and 
mindful of global economic conditions, and I would say, Board members [Port 
organization] have particularly good insight. They have always been wise in this 
regard. Making sure we do not ‘rush what needs not be rushed’.” (Interview No. 3)
Interestingly, the Directors saw that as an opportunity for greater awareness on the part of the 
Boards and Board members;
“All members are aware of the global conditions as the company is working in the 
international market, it has international ties and relationships, and it deals with an 
international commodity (i.e. oil). We found this situation has provided an 
opportunity, and that in a sense it has affected Board members’ behavior encouraging 
them to learn more about how to avoid mistakes and by their learning lessons from 
what has happened. As a result, members are more careful in their decision-making, 
and go more in depth in their analyses.” (Interview No. 15)
Another member echoed this concern and asked for awareness and involvement in global 
events. A CE commented;
“Yes, they need to be fully briefed as we are an international business and they should 
be fully involved and influenced by global events. I think the Arab Spring has had an 
effect on certain members of the Board.” (Interview No. 11).
It seemed that recent global changes have had more implication for some organizations (for 
example, banks) than others; A Chairperson commented,
“Being in the bank, Board members are exposed to the international market, they are
close to what is going on in globally. Definitely, in general the Board behavior
become more careful about the risk, therefore adequate risk assessment is provided to
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the cases presented to the Board and proper enhancement to the governance rules is
exercised ” (Interview No. 10)
The issue of risk ‘assessment’ and ‘management’ were the concern of the Board members;
“No doubt, the members become more educated with this new experience particularly 
in risk management.” (Interview No. 9)
The participants conveyed the view that the public nature of the organization does not protect 
the organization and the Board from external global influences; a director of a drilling
organization commented;
“The [D] organization, being 100% government owned, was not substantially 
impacted by the decline. However, due diligence is taken into consideration, for 
example, when building offshore rigs.
They also exercise caution when dealing with contractors and sub-contractors.
Security is also an issue. Within the context of organization and directing growth, 
they are effective in terms of the overall growth and contributing to the development 
of Abu Dhabi.
They are effective in terms of meeting the strategic objectives of the company and 
country at large ” (Interview No. 16).
Overall there was a feeling that global economic declined has provided an 'opportunity’ for 
learning and becoming more aware of the global economic condition and its impact on the 
Board.
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“Most of our members are well connected with global affairs in one way or another, 
and of course they are exposed to information on the latest economic issues. 
Therefore there is no gap in knowledge about economic conditions in this respect. We 
tend to be more conscious of issues and try to capitalize on opportunities. Hence, I see 
this as having had a positive influence on the behavior of Board members.” (Interview
No. 5)
It is also important to remember that PSBs are, as a CEO asserted “ considered as economic 
pillars for Abu Dhabi as they provide the energy necessary for the Economic Vision of Abu
Dhabi.” (Interview No. 2).
On the whole, based on the views expressed the changes in the global economy have 
influenced the public sector Boards (Johnson et al., 1996; Lutter, 2001; Davies, 2002; Hopt 
and Leyens, 2004; Aguilera, 2005; Tyson and Boumois, 2005). It has influenced the 
individual and Boards’ effectiveness ‘positively’ by making the members ‘more aware’, 
‘cautious’, and ‘risk aware’.” (Interview No. 9)
ISSUE 3: Findings
•  On the whole, Board members displayed a high level of awareness of the global 
economic condition
• The changing global economy has had impact on the members and Board behavior
• The global economic decline has made the Board members more ‘cautious’ in terms of 
investment decision making
• The awareness of the global economic changes has been perceived as an opportunity for 
becoming more vigilant in monitoring, risk assessment and risk management
On the whole, the external faetors, socio economic factors such as religion, tradition and 
global economy have had influence on the Board members’ behavior and their effectiveness 
It is evident that PSBs are sensitive to external factors within their national and international 
environment These forces cumulatively affect the overall effectiveness of the individual
members as well as the PSBs as the whole.
5.11 ISSUES IDENTIFIED
The issues identified in each category highlighted the aspects of the Board, organization and 
social, economic and political realities that Board members dealt with in their daily life as 
well as whilst operating on the Board. As explained earlier, identification of the main themes 
although necessary and important do not by themselves constitute the findings of the 
qualitative study (Silverman, 1970, 2005). The analysis should involve understanding the 
meanings that participants attribute to actions and interactions in order to understand the 
values and standards with which they interpret their personal experiences. Thus in the same 
way that issues emerge from main categories of the data, findings are formed and emerge 
from the issues identified. These findings should be considered in personal, organizational 
and external contexts and indeed they reflect the realties as experienced by the participants. 
The findings of the study thus far have varied according to the issues that have emerged. 
Whiles some resulted in identification of 2-3 findings others yielded 8-10 findings. These 
finding have been assimilated and presented in Table 5.13
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Table 5.13: Summary them es, issues and findings of th e  analysis
MAIN 
CATERGORIES 
THEME
1 PERSONAL
CHARACTERISTICS
EMERGED 
ISSUES
FINDINGS
Age (1)
Gender (2)
1.
2.
4.
4.
Education (3) T
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Total years of j T
experience (4) 2.
Total years ° f  r " T
experience at
Board level (5) 2.
3.
Total years of I™ T.
experience on the
present Board (6) 1 2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Participants who served on the selected Boards were aged 
between 39-65
Appointment to membership o f the board is mostly determined 
by experience
Being a board members is seen as a form o f recognition fo r  
excellence in one's career
Traditionally age may mean experience hence membership of 
the board
A ll participants involve in the study were male 
There seem to be little motivation and or opportunity fo r  
female senior managers to act as board members in PSBs 
Traditional value may have an implicit influence on die choice 
o f the members' gender. However, officially die members 
characteristics such as experience education act as merit fo r  
appointment
It is reported that female directors do serve on the boards 
elsewhere in the industry
Most board members possessed first degree(BSc)
Few participants possessed Master degrees (MSc)
Only three participants had doctorate (PhD)
Older participants generally fe lt that experience is more 
important than sole educational achievement.
Older participants fe lt that first degree is adequate fo r  
fulfilling their roles as Board members
There is a trend towards attainment o f higher educational 
qualification amongst younger members o f the Boards
A small number o f participants had industrial experience 
Those with experience in industrial setting fe lt that their past 
experience has impact on the effectives on the board
Most participant did not have long term experience oj 
membership o f the PBS Boards
Few Participants with long term experience o f being a b^ard 
member found the experience rewarding
Those with long term experience acknowledged the need fo r  re 
adjustment and  time management to f i t  their board duties in.
Most participants reported that they have served up to five 
years on the present Board
Few participants had between 6-11 years experience o f being 
a board member on the present board
Minority o f  the Board members had relatively less experience 
o f membership on the Bead (up to a year)
Experience o f being a member on the board is valued as an 
achievement
Those participants with long years o f experience fe lt they are 
effective at managing their affairs
Participants who hold the Chair or CEO positions associate 
their roles with added status.
MEMBERSHIP 
(COMPOSITON 
THE BOARD
OF
Involvement of 
the management 
team on the Board
1.
2.
Involvement o f the management on Board is critical fo r  the
smooth and effective operation o f the Board
Management involvement ensures the exchange o f the views
NED Membership 
of the Board (2)
Membership of 
the other PSBs (3)
Influence on the 
Board
performance (4)
the part o f  the Board and management
3. Management can provide specialist information to the Board 
which is essential fo r  effective decision making
4. The role o f  Chairman is critica l in the degree o f  the 
involvement o f  the management on the Board 
Involvement o f  management often is politica lly motivated to 
ensure and validating the authority and power o f  the Board.
Involvement o f  the management is also a risk reduction 
practice on the part o f  th____________
Presence o f  NEDs is essential fo r  the effectiveness and 
management o f  the board
NEDs provide the much needed” independency" on the Board 
NEDs contribute to the "transparency" thus represent stake 
holders and are particularly welcomed in the Boards o f  the
Banks
NEDs can provide the challenge to management.
Chairperson need to manage their involvement to get the best 
out o f  their contribution 
NEDs contribution can be questioned at times 
There is a need fo r  bringing up to date the NEDs with the 
protocol and procedures on the Board
Involvement o f  the management on Board is critical fo r  the 
smooth and effective operation o f  the Board 
Management involvement ensures the exchange o f  views and 
learning on the part o f  the Board and management 
Management can provide specialist information to the Board 
which is essential f o r  effective decision making 
The role o f  Chairman is critica l in the degree o f  the 
involvement o f  the management on the Board 
Involvement o f  management often is politica lly motivated to 
ensure and validate the authority and power o f  the Board. 
Involvement o f  the management is also a risk reduction
the part o f  th
board membership as having
positive effect on their performance 
Learning, developing experience, discovering best prc 
and expanding one ' network and relationship seem to b 
motive fo r  accepting the position on more than one board. 
Managing time and availability were reported as
they had
BOARD & 
MEMBERS 
ROLES AND  
FUNCTIONS
Role and 
responsibilities
( 1)
Frequency of 
meetings (2)
Decision making
(3)
3.
4.
1.
3.
4.
sponsibility is to realize government vision, to 
watch over government investment and stakeholder interest.
Its role is to ensure that proper governance is practiced, good 
practice is established and board activities and processes are 
appropriately managed
Board responsibility is also extended to making the right 
decision and managing the board members to ensure 
complimentarily o f  the contributions o f  the members 
Also, leaderships o f  the organisation to achieve the set 
objectives
PSBs meetings vary according to the nature o j the 
organisation. They meet between 2-6 times a year.
Ad hoc board meetings to discuss an important emergent issu
is not uncommon
There little relationship between frequency o f  the board 
meetings and their effectiveness
The length o f  the time allowed fo r  preparation and discussion 
may have effect on the effectiveness o f  the Board
The process o f  decision making may be slightly different from  
one board to another.
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Strategic nature of 1.
operations (4) 1
2.
3.
4.
Chair’s conduct P 1.
and leadership 1
( 5 )
2.
3.
4.
5.
Agenda, meetings | 
and prior 1
T.
discussion with 2.
Chair (6)
3.
4.
5.
Constraints and I 7.
demands (7) 1
2.
3.
4.
Availability of 
choices (8)
The process generally involves: Back ground and supporting 
material is usually prepared by the management, included in 
the agenda, discussed, approved or otherwise by the board, 
delegations given to management fo r  implementation, and 
feedback provided by the management to the board.
Chairperson plays an important role in the process o f decision 
making
4. There is a need fo r  close cooperation and collaboration 
between management (CEO) and the Board (Chair person)
5. Board can be involved in decisions o f strategic and policy 
nature as well as functional and operational types
6. There are articles and guidelines fo r  the conduct o f the board, 
members and the process however, the politica l nature o f  the 
cha ir’s contribution seems to be the determining factors.
The boards o f  the organisations involved in the study to lesser 
o r greater extend are strategic in their operations.
The extent to which PSBs are strategic in their operations is 
mainly due to the nature o f  their operation. Banks are reported 
to be more strategic in their work
The chairpersons o f the boards seemed to be more aware o f the 
need fo r  strategic approach towards dealing with management 
and firm s performance 
There is a case forfurther improvement
Chairpersons plan a crucial role in conduct A „ 
o f  the PSBs
Chair person are responsible fo r  managing relationship with 
management and providing the board with guidance and 
direction to achieve its goals
Chairpersons are expected to maintain a balance between 
taking a classical leadership role to get things done quicker 
and adopting a more participative role to ensure involvement 
o f  the members, members ’ engagement, a healthy debate and 
arriving at consensus.
Cultural the chair is expected to act as the big brother with 
wisdom and ability and sense o f direction
Chairperson’s capability and style o f leadership determines 
degree o f  the effectiveness o f the board.
Preparation o f  Agenda and supporting material fo r  the beard 
meeting is are important activities
C E O ’s often share the agenda and the issues o f  strategic 
importance with the chair p rior to the meeting.
Chairs also may discuss some issue before the meeting with 
other members "to get a fe e l’’ fo r  discussion on board. 
Members are aware o f  the issue o f  "conflict o f  interest 
Agenda and the formation, quantity, and time allocations all 
have impact
Time constituted the most pressing constraints fo r  the board 
members
Board members experienced constraints and demands 
differently according to their roles on the board. Chairs and 
CEO experienced the demands from  colleagues and outside 
factors more than others.
Multiple membership o f  the boards can cause time constraints 
Not being prepared which includes lack o f  information, 
mismatch o f  the members, and misallocation o f  time to 
discussion o f  issues seem to adversely affect board 
effectiveness
Choices available to board members are limited
2. Reduction o f  board membership would lead to freeing up more 
time hence a choice fo r  improving effectiveness o f  the board
3. Allocation more time to the board, better management o f effort,
resources, and processes constituted the limited choices 
available to board members ____
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4.
5.
Training was viewed as choice i f  it was available 
Board members proper execution o f  their role is an important 
choice that can affect the board effectiveness
BOARD
CULTURE AND 
D YN AM IC S
Group dynamics
( 1)
I.
Board atmosphere
(2)
Working together
(3)
Chair and conflict
(4)
7.
I .
Group members interaction was influenced by professional 
meeting outside the Board
The nature o f  the role and position o f  the members on the 
board such Chair and CEO influenced the intensity and 
frequency o f  the interaction inside and outside the board 
Personal characteristics and “Chemistry ’ between the 
members played an important part in their interactions 
The membership on PS and belonging to small community 
meant that almost everyone, to lesser and greater degree, 
knew about one another which facilitated interaction inside 
and outside the board
The assumed role o f  the participants as professionals 
influenced the degree and extent o f  their interaction inside and 
outside the board
Generally the board atmosphere was described as “Positive 
and friendly  ”
The CEO generally suffixed good atmosphere 
productivity o f  the board and the resolution oj 
the agenda
The chair person role has been acknowledged 
fo r  creating a good and positive atmosphere
»»
board members worked very well together 
The terms “team work”, “synergy "  were use to signify the 
“cooperation  ”  and “good coordination ”  amongst the 
members.
The associated the harmony, good relationship with working 
well together. There was a distinct feeling o f  undesirability o f  
the conflict and the need to avoid disagreement on the board 
Chairperson played an important part in achieving the state 
o f  “working together” and “achieving results ”, and 
Adherence o f  the members to the classical values which 
emphasized on harmony and cooperation on one hand and 
negative accepts o f  the conflict on the other was seen as 
necessary fo r  getting jobs done especially by chairpersons
Board members are aware o f  the presence and inevitability o f  
conflict during their meetings
It is a ll around expectation, a ll-be-it implicitly, that chairs 
should be charged with the task o f  “conflict resolution ”
Chairpersons adopt different style o f  conflict resolution. It 
varies from  “Classical (chair solves deals with conflict) to 
Human Relations (adopting participative and democratic 
approaches
MEMBERS 
PERCEPTION OF 
CONTRIBUTION 
TO BOARD 
EFFECTIVENESS
Attributes of 
effective Board 
( 1)
1. Board effectiveness is a function o f  multitude o f  personal, 
organisational and managerial factors
2. The expectation o f  the members in defining board effectiveness 
varies according to their roles on the board.
3. Chair is expected to exhibit leadership and management 
qualities
4. CEOs are interested in what board can do fo r  the company
5. Independent members show interests in independence, 
involvement, decision making and relationship between the 
members
6. The committees play an important role in facilitating the
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decision making on the board
Individual (se lf) 
perception of 
effectiveness
(2)
Reward and 
motivation
(3)
4.
1.
2.
Board members described their responsibilities and dues in 
their roles as requirement fo r  effectiveness 
No member described himself o r others as ineffective. In 
contracts, most members described others as effective 
It was generally understood that others should view their 
effectiveness rather than making statement about themselves 
Chair and C EO ’s roles formed a "partnership' and 
‘complementary’ when it came to their effectiveness 
EDs and NEDs saw their role and effectiveness as being able 
to monitor the progress o f  the board and contribute in their 
area o f specialization
The role and effectiveness o f the ED  and NEDs were 
appreciated by other members especially the CEOs
Rewards and motivation are essential fo r  the ensuring 
effectiveness o f the board members
The size o f the monetary reward and incentive should be 
decided by the nature o f  the operations involved. The higher 
the risk the higher the monetary reward.
‘‘Achievement’’, "being associated with high performing 
boards", and "  discharging social responsibilities" were 
amongst non-monetary motivation fo r  the board members 
The monetary reward should be provided to permanent 
members (executives) in form  o f  the "salary", however, NEDs 
should be rewarded by "fee"
Membership o f  the board provides social status which acts as 
a motivator fo r  effective performance
CORE
CAPABILITES
Required core 
capabilities to 
function 
effectively on 
Board
(1)
Available 
opportunities for 
“ Induction”  
Training.
(2)
Available 
opportunities for 
“on -going”  T 
&D
(3)
Acquired Core
1. Board members were aware o f  the required core capabilities 
to function effectively on the board.
The list o f  required competencies included general and 
specific knowledge, skills and competencies required fo r  
improved effectiveness o f  the members on the board. 
Participants often mixed the required capabilities with 
competencies
4. The specific skills, knowledge and competencies encompassed 
managerial and leadership as well as capabilities required fo r  
performing on the board.
5. There also seem to be a suggestion that different roles require 
different set o f  capabilities
1. There is no form al induction training fo r  the board members in 
PSBs
2. Some organisation provide the new members fo r  example 
NEDs with some basic information about the organisation
3. There is an overwhelming agreement that there ought to be an 
induction training programme fo r  the board members 
There is belief that an induction training would help both 
members and the board to work/operate more effectively
1. Little o r no ongoing training and development seemed to be 
available to the board members
2. Participants fe lt that ad hoc training provided is not useful fo r  
increasing their effectiveness on PSBs
3. Most participants seem to have concrete ideas o f  what ought to 
be included in a typical ongoing training programme
4. Amongst the topics recommended ‘Strategic Planning". 
“Corporate Governance", "Business management", and 
"Board members roles and responsibility"  received more 
attention.
1. No o r little training which is directly relevant to their roles
2.
3.
and responsibilities had been acquired p rio r to their 
appointment on the PSBs boards.
Most participants have received some fo r  o f  general 
management training before their appointments 
Most participants reported their experience from  and p rior 
exposure to other boards as the main source o f  relevant 
knowledge, skills and competencies relevant to their present 
roles and responsibilities
There was an overwhelming that training should be provided 
fo r  the members
EXTERNAL 
INFLUENCES 
ON THE 
BOARD
Islamic values
(2)
Ritual and 
tradition
(3)
Global economy
(4)
1. Materials and documentations are prepared in both Et 
and Arabic
Both languages were spoken on die board 
Arabic language is sometime used as additional toe 
assertion, clarification, creating coherence and emphasis 
4. English language is recognized as “business ”  language . 
boards______________________ ___
and way o f  like constitutes the most 
important single external influence on the members behavior 
on the board
Islamic values are adopted in daily life as well as board 
interactions and activities
Islamic values fosters trust, honesty, integrity and hard work
Islamic life values and code o f  ethics determines the
foundation o f  members behaviour in particular and the board
nerformance and effectiveness as the whole.
■
1. Participants are aware o f  the injluences oj the traaition, 
Islamic values and rituals on their behaviour, interaction with 
others and the effectiveness o f  the board.
2. Tradition and rituals have influence on the ways members
interact on the boards o f  PSBs.
3. Islamic values and principles and tribal rituals influence the 
relationship between members and die way boards operate
4. Amongst the traditions and social values which affected the
board effectiveness, “ Respect”, “Respect fo r  elders,
“Honesty "  and “Sharing  ”  seemed to be the most influential
5. Prolonged debates are symptomatic o f  the traditional needs 
fo r  communication, creating understanding and resolving
conflicts
6. The social, traditional and cultural influences impacts all 
aspects o f  the board operations
7. Understanding board effectiveness o r otherwise necessitates 
understanding the external influences in particular social, 
religious and traditional in operation
8. Islamic values are adopted in daily life as well as board 
interactions and activities
Islamic values fosters trust, honesty, integrity and hard work 
Islamic life values and code o f  ethics determines the 
foundation o f  members behaviour in particular and the board 
performance and
On the whole, board members displayed a high level of 
awareness of the global economic condition 
The changing global economy has had impact on the members 
and board behaviour
The global economic decline has made the board members 
more “cautious” in terms of investment decision making 
The awareness of the global economic changes has bee 
perceived as opportunity for becoming more vigilant in 
monitoring, risk assessment and risk management.
5.12 SUMMARY
Presentation o f  data, analysis and findings presents a major challenge for a qualitative 
research. Thus to simplify the process classification o f  the data was attempted. This led to 
identification o f  4 organizations (cases), 16 interviews, and groupings o f  the directors (Board 
members) namely, Chairperson, CEO, Executive Director and None-Executive Directors.
Following the preliminary classification and tabulation o f  the collected data, the data 
extracted from the interviews were subjected to two processes; First Open Coding and then 
to Axial Coding. These processes were attempted to in order analyze the qualitative data to 
bring together the data and ideas. During this process the researcher identified tentative 
names o f  emergent conceptual categories. The aim was to create detailed but broad categories 
to form a preliminary framework for analysis o f  the data. However, instead o f  searching for 
words, the phases and parts o f  the conversations with common themes were targeted. This 
resulted on seven open coding which was shared throughout the interview accounts by all 
interviewees. Thus open coding was used to reduce the data as well as identifying the 
conceptual main categories or themes. Sifting through each main category’ s sub-themes, 
categories o f  the data were identified.
Axial coding formed the next stage o f  the analysis o f  the interview’ s transcripts. It involved 
the re-examination o f  the main and sub categories identified to determine how they are 
linked. These groupings o f  the data were referred to as ‘ issues’ which formed the smaller 
branches o f  the tree o f  data These form the smallest branches o f  the seven main branches o f  
the themes identified via data analysis. Therefore the qualitative data generated was been
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subjected to a thematic analysis which resulted in a complete ‘ tree o f  information’ in which 
the position o f  each main theme, sub theme and ‘ issue’ represent the first main branches, 
second branches and the final smaller branches Understanding the effectiveness o f  the 
Boards as perceived by the participants has shaped the tree o f  the data. The researcher 
believes that the traditional approach which only endeavors the identification o f  the main 
themes may not present the fullness o f  the thematic analysis as it has been carried out here in
this study.
In addition to the above, a summary o f  the data concerning four organizations named, Port 
(A ), Fund (B ), Bank (C ), and Drilling Co. (D ) were provided Here the information provided 
was meant to provide a fuller picture o f  the context whilst the true identity o f  the organization
was disguised.
The process o f  thematic analysis resulted in identification o f  7 major themes. These included;
i. Personal Characteristics;
ii. Membership (Composition) o f  the Board
iii. Board Culture and Dynamics;
iv. Board Members’ Role and Function
v. Members’ Perception o f  Board Effectiveness,
vi. Core Capabilities, and
vii. External Influences on the Board
Further analysis led to the identification sub theme categories and eventually to the 
emergence o f  the issues (N =  157). The key to understanding the effectiveness o f  the members
and the Board is within the issues identified. Certainly the emerged issues indicate that 
effectiveness at Board level is influenced by the nature o f  the organization, individuals’ 
characteristics involved, dynamics o f  the Board, processes involved, individual perceptions, 
core capabilities, and most importantly the external influences such as culture. The degree to 
which these influences impacted the effectiveness o f  the PSBs w ill be discussed in the next
chapter
To recap, .he aim o f .his research is .o  explore the various capabilities required o f  Board
the effectiveness o f PSBs, in context o f the organisational, socio-
Directors to increase
UAE
principal research question was advanced.
.  What factors and influences contribute to the effectiveness o f the board!
Within this chapter, the key findings that emerged from the research are discussed with a
determining their overall significance for this research question. The aim here is toview to
examine each theme identifying the issues that are relevant for the research question.
This chapter is structured according to the seven emergent themes. Each emergent theme is 
considered in turn; factors relevant to the research question are considered and evaluated with 
respect to the relevant literature. Based on this discussion, and the analysis presented in the 
previous chapter, a determination o f  importance is made in which the importances o f the 
factors highlighted are ranked from very low to very high. This chapter closes with a
of the most critical factors for Board effectiveness, and presents a table (Table 6.8)summary
that is a composite o f the relevant factors identified throughout the chapter. As such, Table 
6.8 presents the factors that are critical for the effectiveness o f PSBs in Abu Dhabi.
6.2 THEME 1: PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
The first theme that emerged from the research was the personal characteristics o f  Board 
members. Within this theme, six additional issues were identified. These were the age, gender 
and educational attainment o f Board members, as well as their total years o f experience, years
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of experience at Board level, and total years of experience of PSBs. Overall, in agreement 
with literature, the degree to which the personal characteristics of Board members impacts the 
effectiveness of PSBs in Abu Dhabi was found to be limited and is only of indirect
importance (Ramsay, 1998).
The review of the literature highlighted that it is important to be aware that the personal 
characteristics of Board members influence their behaviour (Forbe and Miliken, 1999; 
Hambrik et al., 2001; Li and Hambrik, 2005; Analoui et al., 2011), and that as a result, an
necessary
effectiveness (John and Senbet, 1988).
Within this study, it was found that participants often conflated age with experience - and that 
this may lead to preferential selection to position on PSBs. However, there was no direct 
relevance of age to PSB effectiveness, and as such age is best understood as being of indirect 
importance, and only relevant given the socio-cultural context in which the study took place 
Indeed, socio-cultural factors were of particular importance in understanding the 
interpersonal relationships and effectiveness of PSBs in Abu Dhabi (see 6.5 and 6 8)
Participants in the study were male and while it was suggested that a diversity of gender may 
be beneficial, the consensus among participants was that the gender of Board members was 
irrelevant, with selection and performance of members being a function of merit. Similarly, 
participants highlighted that educational attainment was of limited importance with respect to 
Board performance. The issue of Board diversity has been studied at length (see for example, 
Eisenberg, 1998; Mak and Yuanto, 2002; Judge and Zeithmal, 2002; McIntyre et al., 2008) 
and the review of this literature reveals that studies show mixed results, suggesting,
ultimately that Board effectiveness is
not solely influenced by demographic factors. Those
findings are corroborated by the present research.
With regards to the experience o f  participants (in industry, at Board level and on the present 
Board) the findings were conclusive: few participants had what they described as 
considerable amounts o f experience, and further did not believe that experience was o f much 
impact on Board effectiveness However, those with industrial experience found that this was 
beneficial to their effectiveness, and those who had lengthy experience on their present
effectiveness
research. It has been found that Board members previous experience (Ingley and 
Van der Walt, 2003; Schilling, 2004) o f Board operations is a determining factor for their
previous
effectiveness.
Ultimately, the personal characteristics o f  Board members were found to have limited impact 
on the effectiveness o f the PSBs under study. The importance o f individual factors is
summarised in Table 6.1.
6.3 MEMBERSHIP (COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD)
The second theme to emerge from the research was the importance of the composition of the 
Board. Within this theme, three key issues are important for understanding the effectives of 
the Board. These are the importance of involving senior management on the Board, the role 
of NEDs, and the participation of Board members on other Boards
First, participants described the importance of senior managers being involved on the Board 
The inclusion of management was found to assist in the smooth operation of the Board, this 
helps to provide specialist operational information, and also ensures that learning takes place 
between the management team and the Board. These discussions also revealed the important 
role that the Chairperson takes in including senior management on the Board; indeed this is 
one of a number of ways in which the Chairperson contributes to the effectiveness of the 
Board, and further discussion of this is provided below and throughout the chapter The 
important role that the Chairperson plays in this regard is unsurprising Previous research has 
found that cooperation between the Board and the management team has been considered 
influential for the effectiveness of the Board (Buchanan and Huczynski, 1997; Adobor, 2004) 
and relations between the management and the Board have been viewed as important for the 
effective operation of the Board (Gray, 1984; Pettigrew, 1992; Cohen and Bailey, 1997). 
Thus, these findings are consistent with previous research.
The second factor highlighted was the important role that NEDs play in contributing to Board 
effectiveness. NEDs were described as providing independence, transparency and challenge 
to the EDs and the Board as a whole - and these functions were perceived to be critical in 
improving the functioning of the PSBs. Such findings are again unsurprising, previous
cwplmer 1996 Kakabadse et al., 2001; Hermalin and 
contribution to Board outcomes (Helmet, 19%,
NEDs
UK
NEDs
------------------------------------
, . t QOt cAo/n nf  the Board (not including the Chairperson) is
Report (2003) recommends that at least 50 A ot tne Boaiu v
NEDs
o f NEDs, some participants did note that the performance o f NEDs
need to ensure that NEDs
research
Ezzamel and Watson (2005) recognise the potential o f NEDs
NEDs
always perform their roles appropriately. Nonetheless, the importance o f NEDs for increasing
the effectiveness o f PSBs in Abu Dhabi is clear, and the Chairperson o f  the Boards was found
to be critical in encouraging and ensuring the involvement o f NEDs on the Board.
The final factor that emerged was the moderate importance o f  Board members membership
of other PSBs. Although the work did not find that the previous experience o f Board
members was an important determinant o f Board effectiveness, it did emerge that experience
of sitting on other Boards was beneficial, with the proviso that Board members did not sit on
too many Boards. Participants expressed that sitting on other Boards increased their
effectiveness by exposing them to new experiences, allowing them to gam an understanding
of the operations o f other Boards, knowledge o f  what is happening in their sector, be exposed
to new business practices and what may be considered best practice, and insights into related
industries. In short, it is contended that the benefits described by participants can be neatly
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encapsulated in the conclusion that the membership of other Boards provides a wide range of 
opportunities for Board members to learn how they may increase their individual and Board 
effectiveness. Indeed, it was found (see Section 6.7) that most Board members acquired their 
core capabilities for performing their roles from experience outside of their present position
on the Board.
Despite this mostly positive evaluation, it was highlighted that holding membership of too 
many Boards may bring difficulties with managing one's time. These findings are again 
consistent with previous research, it has been pointed out that a by-product of sitting on other 
Boards is that it allows Board members to gain and transfer experience (Van der Walt, 2003). 
Further, Board members previous experience of other Boards, and the operation of those 
Boards has been found to be a determining factor for their effectiveness (Sundaramurthy and
Lewis, 2003; Taylor, 2004; McIntyre et al, 2008).
Ultimately, the composition of the Board was found to have a significant impact on the 
effectiveness of the PSBs under study. The importance of these factors is summarised in
Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Membership (composition of the Board)
6
The third theme to emerge
.4 BOARD AND MEMBERS’ ROLES AND FUNCTIONS
from the research was the importance o f  the functions and roles
carried out by the Board and its members. Within this theme eight key issues emerged, and o f  
these, five are important factors for understanding the effectiveness o f  PSBs: the frequency 
o f meetings, decision making, the Chairperson's conduct and leadership, the agenda for Board 
meetings and the occurrence o f  prior discussions with the Chairperson. These are considered
in turn.
First, the frequency o f Board meetings was found to vary between 2-6 times per year, with ad 
hoc meetings taking place as appropriate. Ultimately, the frequency o f  meetings was found to 
have no direct relationship to Board effectiveness. However, as discussed below - the
of Board members being prepared is o f importance - and so the researcher wouldimportance
indirect
advanced warning and agenda's prepared in a timely fashion so that members can be properly 
epared The frequency o f meetings is likely to impact the degree to which such preparation
Pr
is possible.
Second, decision making is an important process and activity o f  any Board (Cadbury, 2002; 
Roberts, 2002; Kakabadse, et al„ 2004; De la Rosa, 2006), and the four PSBs under study 
were no exception. This research highlighted that while the precise decision making process 
differed amongst the Boards, there was a generic procedure: proposals, recommendations and 
items are prepared by management, and then endorsed by the Chairperson for discussion. In 
endorsing the items and moderating the discussion the Chairperson plays a critical role - he 
determines which items are important, and then ensures that there is transparency, openness, 
and a sharing o f views, and that the appropriate amount o f time and effort are spent on
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discussions. To this end, the role of the Chairperson has a significant impact on the way in 
which decisions are made by the Board, and hence, on their overall effectiveness.
The third factor important for the effectiveness of PSBs that emerged also related to the
Chairperson
revealed that the role played by the Chairperson is important for ensuring the success of the
(Turner.
the researcher found that in all four cases the Chairpersons undertook a variety of important 
functions (discussed throughout).
Importantly, the Chairpersons were found to be responsiDie ror managing u.c ^  
interactions of Board members, managing the relationships between Board members, 
encouraging participation in discussion from all members of the Board to stimulate a healthy 
debate, while also ensuring expediency of decision making The importance of these 
functions is consistent with previous research that has found that communication forms a core 
competency (Cadbury, 2002; Roberts, 2002; Kakabadse, et a l , 2004; De la Rosa, 2006) for 
Board members and Board effectiveness as the whole Similarly, it has been found that 
conflict resolution is an important role and capability of an effective Chairperson (Floyd and
Lane, 2000; Gong et al., 2001).
It was also found that the Chairperson played an important cultural role, and should act as a 
‘father’ to other Board members, demonstrating wisdom, ability and a sense of direction This 
finding also helps to explain the role that Chairperson's were found to take with respect to 
decision making. Although the matters which were brought before the PSBs were not chosen 
by the Chairperson, it was found that in many cases, the manner in which the Chairperson,
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introduced, discussed and reacted to those matters
under discussion influenced the likelihood
,ha, importance and weigh, were attached to those matters. Thus, for a number of reasons, 
the Chairperson's role is critical to the effective functioning of the Board: The manner in 
which the Chairperson fulfil, or does no. fulfil their role has a critical impact on the overall
effectiveness of the Board.
The fourth factor to be indentif.ed within this theme was the preparedness of Board members.
highlighted the importance of being provided an agenda in advance of BoardParticipants
meetings to encourage
issues
their input Further, participants highlighted that CEOs often discussed
with the Chairperson and others prior to the meeting. This practice was seen as
beneficial for increasing Board effectiveness as it helped to ensure that members were on the
and helped the Chairperson and others to gain an understanding of what issues
and how Board members perceived the issues to be discussed. That
same page
were of most importance
such preparedness is a desirable factor is consistent with previous research that has found that
performance
Carpenter
Nicholson and Keil, 2004; Huse, 2005).
The fifth and sixth factors relevant to Board effectiveness are the constraints and demands 
placed on Board members, and the choices available to them. The literature on Board 
effectiveness recognizes the importance of considering demands and constraints faced by 
Directors/senior management (Stewarts, 1987). Within this research it was revealed that the 
major constraint individual Board members faced was a lack of time to properly prepare 
themselves. This was often due to demands from other colleagues, outside factors, and in
membership of other Boards Other constraints were those that impeded effectivesome cases
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Board process, such as the mismatch of members at meetings, and the misallocation of time 
to discuss pertinent issues. Consistent with previous research Board member’s particular roles 
influenced the constraints and demands placed upon them (Karasek, 1979; Analoui, 2007) as 
did external influences outside the member’s control (Roberts, 2002; Kakabadse, et al., 
2004). However, not all participants viewed a lack of preparedness as a result of constraints 
and demands but rather saw this as a function of individual choice. It was suggested that a 
lack of time was not the issue, but rather that Board members did not chose to properly
prepare.
Ultimately, the functions and roles carried out by the Board and its members were found to 
have a significant impact on the effectiveness of the PSBs under study. The importance of
these factors is summarised in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3 : Roles and functions of the Board and its members 
" | Not Very Low jMedium
____________  Applicable Low____________ J________
Frequency of X
meetings
Decision
making
X
Chairperson’s 
conduct and 
leadership
Agenda, 
meetings and 
prior
discussion
with
Chairperson 
Constraints 
and demands 
Availability 
of choices
Source: Data Analysis
6.5 BOARD CULTURE AND DYNAMICS
The forth theme to emerge from the research was Board culture and dynamics. Four key 
issues emerged, all of which are important factors for determining Board effectiveness: group
Board atmosphere, working together, and the role of the Chairperson in conflict
dynamics,
resolution.
their roles on
position,
between
Group dynamics was found to be an important factor influencing the effect,veness of Boards.
Participants highlighted a number of factors that influenced their group dynamics, including
the Board, the need to act professionally and in a manner consistent with their
the personality and characteristics of individuals, and the pre-existing social ties 
Board members that led to their interaction in other settings. The important role 
attributed to group dynamics by participants is unsurprising, it is generally understood that 
the cohesiveness of group members (Analoui, 2007) results in increased effectiveness, with 
respect to productivity and output (Hertz and Imber, 1993). The participants in the present 
study highlighted that the interactions between members were mostly good or very good, 
although a small number suggested that relationships could be improved. However, overall 
there was found to be good interactions between the Board members and the group dynamic 
was found to be conducive to effective operation of the Board - and this is consistent with
previous research (Kakabadse, et al., 2004; De la Rosa, 2006).
Similarly, the atmosphere of the Boards was mostly described as being positive, professional 
and healthy. In light of the positive nature of the majority of the Board members interaction 
described above this is to be expected - a number of researchers have argued that the 
interactions and communications between Board members determines the atmosphere of the
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Board (Sherwin, 2003; Kakabadse, et al., 2004). However, some participants did 
acknowledge that the atmosphere could change from one meeting to another and that 
occasionally interpersonal-agendas could sometimes dominate discussion, and influence the 
atmosphere for a period. The majority of participants also highlighted that the Chairperson 
plays an important role in influencing the atmosphere of the Board. Although participants did 
not directly describe a link between Board atmosphere and Board effectiveness, it was 
implicit in their discussions that such a link existed. The positive atmosphere was often 
appended with discussions of teamwork and professionalism.
Given the generally positive interactions and atmosphere of the Boards it is unsurprising that 
participants noted that Board members typically worked well together. Participants used 
terms such as 'team work’, ‘synergy’ and ’harmony' to signify the cooperation and good 
relations that existed As described earlier, some participants highlighted the role of the 
Chairperson in facilitating these positive interactions, and on the whole it was evident that 
good relationships were essential for the effectiveness of the Board, which is a common 
finding of related research (see, Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Hertz and Imber, 1993) 
However, participants highlighted that although relationships were mostly positive and 
professional the occurrence of conflict was inevitable. Further, there was consensus that when 
conflict did occur, it was the role of the Chairperson to resolve it. The Chairpersons in this 
study were found to have approached conflict resolution differently, ranging from the 
adoption of classical to participative and democratic approaches. These findings are 
consistent with previous research that has highlighted that the ability to resolve conflict is an 
important characteristic of the effective Chairperson (Floyd and Lane, 2000; Gong et al„
2001).
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Ultimately, the factors of Board culture and dynamics were found to have a significant 
impact on the effectiveness of the PSBs under study. The importance of these factors is
summarised in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Board culture and dynamics
6.6 MEMBER’S PERCEPTION OF CONTRIBUTION TO BOARD 
EFFECTIVENESS
The fifth theme to emerge from the research was member’s perceptions of contributions to 
Board effectiveness. Within this theme are grouped participants views on the attributes of 
effective Boards, their perceptions of their individual effectiveness and the need for proper 
reward and motivation for Board members.
The discussion of the attributes of an effective Board highlighted a variety of issues that are 
discussed at length in this chapter. Interestingly, when discussing their perception of their 
individual effectiveness, the researcher noted that participants were unwilling to describe 
themselves as effective, and preferred to describe others as effective, and suggested it was 
best to leave others to make judgements about them. However, participants did describe the
high degree of importance that is attached to the contribution made by individual Board 
members for determining the overall effectiveness of the Board. Indeed, the present research 
has made clear that Board members undertake different roles and perform various functions 
that contribute to the effectiveness of the Board. These findings are consistent with previous 
research that has highlighted that Board members contribution is crucial for the overall 
effectiveness of the Board (Aguilera, 2005; Petrovic, 2008; O’Higgins, 2009).
A key factor to emerge from this research is that to encourage Board members contributions, 
it is necessary to provide proper rewards and motivation. It was found that if participants 
were to maintain high morale and dedication, then the proper incentives needed to be 
provided, and for the majority of participants, this meant the receipt of monetary rewards. 
However, participants expressed the view that the nature of the rewards required for each 
individual should vary according to their role, and the work of the Board itself. It was 
suggested that the higher the risk involved, the greater the reward should be - and that while 
performance related pay is advisable for most Board members, it should not be provided for 
NEDs who should receive a fee. This is a fairly common arrangement, it has been reported 
that NEDs are often rewarded with a ‘fee per session’ (Kakabadse et al., 2000). It could be 
argued that an advantage of this practice is that it helps to ensure that NEDs to do not engage 
in short-termism, as they have no financial incentive to endorse decisions that yield short-
term gain but carry short, and long-term risk. These findings are consistent with previous 
research that has found that reward and motivation are crucial for the senior management 
motivation (Park and Ungson, 1997; Quick, 1997; Katzell and Thompson, 1990, Kakabadse 
et al., 2000; Tyson and Boumois, 2005; Analoui, et al., 2011). However, it was also 
highlighted that for some participants, financial rewards are secondary Participants 
highlighted that there are also valuable intrinsic rewards for sitting on high performing
Boards such as a personal sens, of achievement, and the opportunity .0 discharge ones social 
responsibility. Similarly it was reported that one can gain social status by being associated
with high performing Boards.
Ultimately, the factors of Board contribution and rewards and motivation were found to have 
a significant impact on the effectiveness of the PSBs under study. The importance of these
factors is summarised in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Members perception of contribution to Board effectiveness
6.7 CORE CAPABILITIES
The sixth theme to emerge from the research was the requirement for Board members to have 
a number of core capabilities, and in addition, the need for training. Within this theme three 
important factors for determining Board effectiveness emerged: core capabilities, induction
training and on-going training.
As in previous research (see Coulson and Thomas, 1991; Forbe and Milliken, 1999 Boulkden 
et al., 2003) participants highlighted that a variety of capabilities were necessary for Board 
members to perform their roles effectively. When participants were pressed for specifics, they 
tended to provide lengthy lists, sometimes specific and sometimes general, of capabilities,
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competencies and required knowledge bases. These included such things as required 
knowledge of the business, the sector and their role, relevant experience, and a range of 
interpersonal skills. The importance that participants attached to this factor is consistent with 
previous research; indeed, core capabilities are one of the main themes identified in reviews 
of effectiveness in modem PSBs (Kakabadse et al, 2000; Analoui, 2007). When questioned 
about how these core capabilities had been acquired, participants noted having received little 
or no training relevant to their current roles on the PSBs. Although some had received some 
general management training, most participants noted that they had acquired their capabilities
through their previous experiences.
Training and development, and its relationship to Board members effectiveness, and the 
effectiveness of the Board is well established (Kakabadse and Myers, 1996), and this was 
recognised by all participants. Although some NEDs were given background information 
when joining the organisation, it was revealed that no formal induction training is provided 
for Board members. Participants were adamant that induction training for new Board 
members is necessary and would yield considerable increases in Board effectiveness, helping 
to ensure that the PSBs operate more smoothly. Suggestions for what should be included in 
such a program included background about the industry, the business, the roles and functions 
of the Board and a range of interpersonal skills.
Similarly, little or no on-going training and development was provided for Board members, 
and it was highlighted that the ad hoc approach to providing training did not have any impact 
on Board effectiveness. On the whole participants were in favour of on-going training, 
perceiving it to be beneficial for Board effectiveness, although some participants did express 
concern over the availability of Board members to partake in these activities. While there
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were differences with respect to specific training requirements (likely due to the nature o f the 
different organisations), there was some consensus that training in such topics as ‘Strategic 
Planning’, ‘Corporate Governance’, ‘Business management’, and ‘Board members roles and
responsibility’ would be desirable.
Ultimately, Board members showed a significant awareness o f the kind o f  experience, 
knowledge, skills and competencies that are required for them to perform their roles and 
improve their effectiveness, and to increase the effectiveness o f  the Board as a whole. 
Congruent with this, was the strong assertion o f the need for both induction and (to a lesser 
extent) on-going training and development opportunities for all Board members to ensure that 
the necessary knowledge, skills and competencies could be acquired.
Ultimately, core capabilities and training needs were found to have a significant impact on 
the effectiveness o f the PSBs under study. The importance o f these factors is summarised in
Table 6.6.
Table 6.6: Core capabilities
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6.8 EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
The seventh and final theme to emerge from this research is the importance of external 
influences on the operation of the Board. Within this theme, three key issues emerged: the 
global economy, Islamic values, and ritual and tradition.
The Board members o f the four PSBs were found to be highly aware of global economic 
conditions. Participants highlighted that their awareness of global economic conditions has 
led to them being more cautious with respect to their investment decisions and has provided 
an opportunity for the Boards to become more vigilant in monitoring risk assessment and 
management. Thus, the global economy has impacted, to a low degree, the behaviour of 
Boards and thus, their effectiveness. This is consistent with previous research that has found 
that Board members and the Board as the whole are influenced by globalisation (Coulson- 
Thomas, 1991; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005; Johnson et al., 2008) and the influence of the 
external environment.
In contrast to the limited importance of the global economy, the Islamic values of the Board 
and the rituals and traditions within Abu Dhabi were found to have an extremely significant 
impact on the behaviour of Board members, and the overall effectiveness of the Board.
In Abu Dhabi Islamic values provide the comer stone for the social and business interactions 
(Abuznaid, 2006; Sameh, 2011), and participants highlighted that Islamic values, beliefs and 
way of life was the single most important factor influencing their behaviour. Islam was 
described by participants as promoting values of honesty, ethical practice, transparency, 
devotion, integrity and moral conduct. It was highlighted that these values, which influence 
individuals private lives were also pervasive in the Board room, influencing interactions with 
other members and setting standards for codes of conduct. Participants were firm in their
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agreement that the Islamic values shared by Board members helped to create transparent, 
open and trusting relationships and that overall these shared values contributed significantly
to Board effectiveness.
Although two participants suggested that rituals and traditions did not affect Board members 
behaviour and seemed to associate such an influence with a lack o f  professionalism, the 
majority o f participants highlighted the important role that rituals and traditions played in 
influencing their behaviours Given that participants acknowledged the significant impact of 
their religious feeling this is unsurprising - it has been established that rituals and tradition
cannot be separated from dominant cultural values (Chattopadhyay et al., 1999). The
(
discussion o f  rituals and tradition highlighted the importance o f such values o f truthfulness, 
openness, honesty and sincerity. It was found that this cultural influence led participants to 
treat elders with respect, and some described the Board as 'like a family', with the 
Chairperson playing the role o f the father. For the most part, participants expressed the 
beliefs that the influence o f rituals (such as prayer and other religious observances) and 
traditions was important for increasing the cohesiveness o f the group and positively 
influenced interpersonal interactions. However, it was highlighted that the cultural value 
placed on communication meant that sometimes discussions continued for longer than 
necessary. Overall, it was clear that whether positive or negative, the majority o f participants 
believed that rituals and traditions had a considerably significant impact on Board 
effectiveness. These findings are consistent with previous research that has found that 
cultural factors such as religious values and belief systems (Hofstead, 1980; Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 1999; Chattopadhyay et al., 1999; Yousef 2001; Sameh, 2009) impact Board 
operations and outcomes (Abuznaid, 2006; Sameh, 2009; Sameh, 2011).
Ultimately, external factors had a significant impact on the effectiveness of the PSBs under 
study. The importance of these factors is summarised in Table 6.7.
Table 6.7: External influences
economy
Islamic
values
Ritual and 
tradition
Source: Data Analysis
6.9 SUMMARY
Within this chapter the principal research question "What factors impact the effectiveness of
PSBs in Abu Dhabi?" has been addressed. Through the discussion of each theme, and the key
issues that impact Board effectiveness a number of factors have been identified. Table 6.8
(below) presents a composite of the factors that influence effectiveness of PSBs in Abu 
Dhabi.
Table 6.8: Factors Influencing Board Effectiveness on PSBSs in Abu Dhabi
Importance
Factors
Education
Frequency of meetings
Gender
Total Years of Experience
Total years of experience at Board 
level
Total years of experience on present 
Board
The global economy
Very
Low
X
X
X
Low Medium High
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Membership o f the other PSBs
Available opportunities for
going” T &D
Constraints and demands
on -
Availability o f choices
Decision making
Board atmosphere 
Working together
Involvement o f the management 
team on the Board ___________
NED membership o f the Board
Chairperson’s conduct
leadership
Agenda, meetings and prior 
discussion with Chairperson 
Group dynamics
Chairperson and conflict
Board members contribution
Reward and motivation
Required core capabilities to 
function effectively on Board
Available opportunities 
‘Induction’ Training
Islamic values 
Ritual and tradition
Source: Data analysis
In summarising the discussion within this chapter, it is clear that a number o f broad
conclusions can be reached:
First, the factors required for, and impacting effectiveness on PSBs in Abu Dhabi are 
largely consistent with the research conducted on Board effectiveness in other 
contexts: in the western world and in both the private and public sectors. Accordingly, 
there were few reported differences between the roles and behaviours o f the Board 
members on the PSBs and their private sector counterparts
Second, while participants were aware o f a number o f core capabilities required for 
Board effectiveness they highlighted that in all four cases there was little or no
opportunity for induction and on-going training. Throughout, participants highlighted
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that opportunities for induction training (and to a lesser extent - on-going training) 
would be extremely beneficial for incoming and current Board members. Thus, the 
researcher contends that the adoption of induction and on-going training and 
development initiatives would significantly increase the effectiveness of the PSBs in 
Abu Dhabi.
• Third, Board dynamics greatly impact the effectiveness of the Board, and in turn 
Board dynamics and the roles undertaken by members are heavily influence by 
cultural factors. In particular Islamic values and cultural and religious traditions 
impact the values and behaviours of Board members at work, promoting such things 
as honesty, trust, respect and professionalism. Indeed, it is apparent that without an 
understanding of these influences one cannot understand the operation of PSBs in 
Abu Dhabi
• Fourth, the composition of the Board was found to be critical for its effectiveness, 
NEDs were found to provide independence, transparency and challenge to their 
executive counterparts. However, it is noted that this is only the case if NEDs are 
adequately prepared, and willing and able to perform their roles.
• Finally, a recurrent finding is the important and varied role played by the Chairperson 
in determining Board effectiveness, the Chairperson: acts a father figure for the other 
Board members, directs the efforts of the Board, determines the issues which will be 
discussed at meetings, encourages and facilitates participation from Board members, 
regulates behaviours and resolves conflicts amongst Board members. Thus, the 
researcher contends that the Chairperson and the manner in which they conduct 
themselves are vital for Board effectiveness.
The following chapter presents the summary conclusion of this thesis.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS
The financial crisis in 2008, to a large extent, was attributed to the failure o f the corporate 
governance in large corporations such as Enron, Tyco, Parmalat and Marconi and raised 
several questions; was this corporate governance failure9 Could these failures be avoided9 
Could such failures be attributed to the ineffectiveness o f the Boards o f these companies9 Not 
surprisingly there were calls for new policies and to monitor and constrain the so called 
‘unwanted behaviour’ o f  the CEOs and their attempts to dominate the Board’s decision 
making Naturally there were calls for increased examination o f the governance standards and 
codes o f practice and increased Board performance on one hand and increased capabilities o f  
the Directors based on the assumptions that effective Boards cannot exist without effective 
Directors on the other.
Board failures however are not confined to the Western world. Within the developing world 
similar concerns were raised and the fundamental question remains: what makes a Board an 
effective governance mechanism? The interaction o f the Board members and re-examination 
o f their role and their competencies became the focus o f attention. Whilst many efforts were 
invested in finding the ways to improve the contribution o f the Directors and the Board as the 
whole little attention was paid to the examination o f the Public Sector Boards (PSBs), hence 
the rationale for the present study. Observation made by the researcher pointed to the 
importance o f understanding the Directors behaviour in particular and PSBs Board 
effectiveness in Abu Dhabi as the whole. Moreover, the researcher became aware o f  what is 
prescriptively referred to as ‘role taking’ by the Directors on the Board and the reality o f the 
Directors interaction which meant ‘role making’ by the Board members. In short, the Board 
dynamics are very much influenced by the nature o f interactions between the members. The 
researcher recognised that being concerned with the perception o f the Board members alone
is not sufficient. The influence of the interactions of members, Board dynamics and more 
importantly the effect of contextual factors especially the socio-economic, cultural and 
practices of Islam do effect the perception and behaviour of the members, their effectiveness 
and effectiveness of the Board as the whole. The question asked by the researcher is; how 
public sector Boards that are responsible for the economic growth in Abu Dhabi operate? 
This formed another reason for pursuit of the present work.
In line with the tradition of conducting an empirical investigation the first step into the 
unknown was to start with what is already known about the Board operations, the role of 
Directors and their behaviour on the Board. In other words attempts had to be made to seek 
the explanations for the Directors behaviour in the available literature so that the researcher 
could make sense out of the accounts provided by the members of their role, interaction, 
inspirations, and their contribution to the effectiveness of the Board.
As indicated earlier the first step was to review literature related to ‘role’ and its sociological 
origin. Thus, first the literature on the concept and theories of ‘role’ were explored in order to 
understand it origin, its attributes and its relevance for explaining organisational behaviour in 
particular the Board members. Thus, various concepts such ‘role set’, ‘role conflict’, ‘role 
expectation’, ‘role ambiguity’ and more importantly the concepts of ‘role taking’ and ‘role 
making’ were looked at critically from two major and opposing perspectives namely 
structuralism and interpretivism, and each was elaborated on in some detail. It was 
concluded that neither of these perspectives can fully explain the behaviour of the Directors 
as they are. The reality of Board and their operations suggested that maybe the adoption of an 
integrative approach ought to be considered in order to explain the behaviour of the Board 
members since it also included the consideration of the influence of the structure on the
Board members behaviour, their effectiveness and ultimately the Board effectiveness. It was 
clear that understanding Board members behaviour in Abu Dhabi public sector Boards 
requires attention to both the way members interpreted their roles and responsibilities as well 
as consideration o f the organisational and external factors which provided the powerful
influencing factors.
The second part o f the review, focused on critically analysing the different perspectives of  
corporate governance, Board effectiveness and the capabilities required by Directors to 
increase Board effectiveness. Thus, the perspectives on corporate governance such as ‘agency 
theory’, ‘stewardship theory’, ‘stakeholder theory’, and ‘managerial hegemony’ were 
examined in some depth. It was concluded that the precise role o f the Board -  that is, what 
Board members should and will actually do will be, to a large extent, dependent on the way 
in which their role is conceived and presented to them; which will depend in part on the 
socio-historical context o f the firm and the external governance regulations that prescribe 
both what behaviours are possible and desirable. Therefore, it was concluded that adopting a 
prescriptive approach about the role o f the Board and how corporate governance mechanisms 
should operate would maybe become problematic because they are determined largely by the 
philosophical positions rather than the stand which has been adopted by the researcher. 
Ultimately, the influences of the socio-historic context o f the organisation on the behaviour of 
Board members cannot and must not be ignored.
Since Board effectiveness formed the central pivot o f the study a review o f the literature on 
Board effectiveness was attempted. Not surprisingly, it was concluded that Board 
effectiveness is difficult to define. The main question for those scholars who wished to 
examine Board effectiveness was how Board effectiveness can be defined and measured
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Two streams of literature were identified: one which made use of firm financial performance
as a proxy for Board performance while the other, adopted a social-constructionist stand. The 
latter advocated that the notions of the ‘Board’ and of ‘effectiveness’ are social constructs, 
and thus cannot be investigated independently of the beliefs, values and perceptions of those 
who create and continually re-create, and are affected by those constructs. It is this position 
that the researcher has adopted, in part due to philosophical considerations but also because 
the former proposition that took the financial performance as a proxy produced little 
consensus among scholars and researchers hence providing a little more evidence for a 
deeply contested position. The present empirical work on Board effectiveness places great 
emphasis on the influences of context and structure, composition of the Board and Board 
membership which inevitably requires in depth examination of the perception, the role of the 
Chair, CEO duality, the ratio of EDs to NEDs and the interaction amongst them. Thus, not 
surprisingly, the literature indicated the presence of a mix of views on Board and Directors’ 
effectiveness with no real consensus being found.
7.1 AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The examination of the literature showed that not all scholars in the field were content with 
just the examination of composition and structure in order to explain Board effectiveness. 
Thus, some argued that the Directors and their contribution must be taken as the most 
important factor towards effectiveness of the Board. This strand of the literature purported 
that Directors may lack the requisite competencies to undertake their roles as Board 
members, and that many of the problems faced by Directors are due to issues of group- 
dynamics, such as a lack of interpersonal trust, an inability to manage conflict, group think, 
and difficulties in communication. These were suggested to form the key capabilities for 
effective Board of Director performance.
In addition to the accounts provided by other researchers and scholars, as shown above, the 
researcher’s own observation showed that undeniably the Directors contribution forms one 
of the factors which impacts on the success or failure o f the PSBs. However it was evident 
that this only played one part, all be it an important one, towards the overall effectiveness of 
the Directors and the Board as the whole. Other factors such as Board dynamics, the internal 
and external factors, the nature o f the organisation’s activities and issues which were dealt 
with all impacted on the performance o f  the members’ and the Board performance. Thus, 
research questions formulated were thought to provide direction without forming a straight 
jacket for the researcher to operate in. As the findings o f the research later confirmed, the 
guiding question proposed; what factors and influences contribute to the effectiveness o f the 
Board? did provide both the direction and the flexibility necessary for conducting an 
explanatory ground based theory based research. It encompassed the exploration o f the 
various factors and contributions as perceived by Board Directors, including their own 
capability requirements for the Board effectiveness, in context o f the organisational, socio
economic and cultural realities o f Abu Dhabi, UAE.
The achievement o f the following objectives provided the very answers to the sub-research 
questions that researcher had in mind (See chapter three-Methodology);
• To review the literature concerning Board effectiveness and Director capability
• To understand the role and responsibilities o f the members and 
processes/activities o f the Board and their effects on the Board effectiveness
•  To identify the present demands, constraints and availability o f choices that affect 
the performance of Directors on PSBs
• To provide a research based conceptual model to formulate training and 
development policies and procedures which meet the Abu Dhabi Board member’s 
needs for increased effectiveness.
• To explore the personal, organisational, and contextual (socio-economic, 
traditional and cultural) factors which affect the effectiveness of the members and 
the Board as the whole
In order to achieve the above, an explanatory approach was employed to answer to the 
question ‘why’ a phenomenon was employed. Indeed, the nature the present study is 
primarily exploratory and to a certain extent it was at the same time descriptive because it is 
aiming to find out what factors, influences, and components are behind the effectiveness of 
the Board members and Board and PSBs as the whole. However, as explained the issues of 
Board effectiveness have never been explored in the public sector in Abu Dhabi, UAE hence 
the use of explanatory research which is less structured and primarily relies on interviews and 
case studies seem to provide an ideal and workable approach. Of the choice of the 
methodology was determined by consideration of the underlying assumptions concerning 
main research concepts; these included axiology, the role of values in enquiry (biased vs. 
unbiased), ontology (the nature of reality), epistemology (the relationship of the knower to the 
known), which led to construction of a suitable methodology (the best means to arrive at 
knowledge about the World) to explore the perception of the Board members.
The researcher neither advocates to the ‘objectivistim’ which assume that the essence of 
social phenomena exist independent of our perception, nor to subjectivism alone which 
assumes that reality exists only in name or is a product of the mind. Rather, advocating to the 
plausibility of the view that that social reality is the product of a process involving a
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continuous series o f subjective and objective moments. This is particularly important, as it 
was discovered later on during the fieldwork, because research methods cannot be considered 
in isolation from influencing factors such as dominant cultural values and institutions such as 
religion. In the case o f the present research, the culture o f Abu Dhabi and the influence of 
Islamic values, undoubtedly affected the way Board Directors o f PSBs describe the reality as
they perceive it.
The debates on ‘positivism’ and ‘constructionist’ approaches to study of the social and 
organisational phenomenon resulted in understanding that neither could adequately explain
the reality of PSBs in Abu Dhabi.
The researcher felt that there is a need to discover the structures and potential mechanisms 
which underlie the Board phenomenon first, before exploring the behaviour o f the Directors 
(Agency) on the Board meetings and then explaining them by pointing to the social meanings 
which help their construction. It was felt that the conditions on which PSBs are based are of 
paramount importance and need to be understood. Therefore, by adopting ‘Realism as a 
realist alternative, attempts has been made to ensure that both subjective accounts 
(perceptions, understanding and views) o f the participants were captured and simultaneously 
attention was paid to objective organisational and wider social realities which influence and 
contribute the effectiveness o f the PSBs.
The adoption o f the case study approach for this exploratory approach focussed on the 
primary actors who are affected and affect the effectiveness o f the Board. In line with the 
concept o f theoretical saturation, 16 cases from four organisations were targeted for semi 
interviews and were undertaken, though as discussed earlier, data saturation was achieved 
after conducting 12 interviews.
The data collected was subject to systematic and analytical consideration. The accounts 
provided by the participants were reduced, coded, and the emergent themes were cross 
examined with other cases, then the secondary data collected, and the evidence from 
literature also included in the analysis o f the data.
The adoption of the above strategy yielded a collection and generation of the rich qualitative 
data relevant to the subject of the social inquiry. This in turn satisfied the criteria of validity 
and reliability expected from a serious study. On the whole, the researcher was confident that 
the data collected, analysed and the conclusions reached during analysis were the true 
reflection of the realities of the PBS and experiences of the participants within the sample 
cases used. Thus, some measure of generalizability in terms of identification of similarities 
and differences has been achieved.
The above provided the holistic framework which allowed the investigator to understand and 
explain the phenomenon of Board effectiveness as it was and not as it was expected to be. It 
was clear from the start that Board members played an important part in the process however 
as the investigation progressed it became evident that even amongst this group the Chair 
person seemed to play a vital role on ensuring the effectiveness of the other and the Board as 
the whole. This has been explained in detail in the findings of the study in chapter five. 
However, attempt has been made not to provide a simplistic explanation as to what 
contributes to the effectiveness of the PSBs. The findings from the data for example clearly 
showed (See chapter five) that the effectiveness of the Chairperson himself was determined 
by the dynamics of his relationship with the CEO of the organisation and that was influenced 
by the dynamics of interactions between other members including the non-executive 
members.
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7.2 MAIN FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
Following the preliminary classification and tabulation o f the collected data, the data 
extracted from the interviews were subjected to processes o f coding in order analyze the 
qualitative data to bring together the data and ideas. During this process the researcher 
identified initial emergent broad conceptual categories which formed a preliminary 
framework for analysis o f the data. These included; Personal Characteristics; 
Membership (Composition) o f the Board; Board Culture and Dynamics; Board Members' 
Role and Function; Members ’ Perception o f Board Effectiveness; Core Capabilities, and 
External Influences on the Board. Searching for phrases and parts o f the conversations, 
instead of words, common themes were targeted. This resulted in the formation o f seven open 
codings which was shared throughout the interview accounts by all interviewees. Thus open 
coding was used to reduce the data as well as identifying the conceptual main categories or 
themes. Sifting through each main category’s sub-themes, categories o f the data were 
identified. The next stage was concerned with analysis o f the interview’s transcripts. It 
involved the re-examination o f  the main and sub categories identified to determine how they 
are linked. These groupings o f the data were referred to as ‘issues’ which formed the smaller 
branches of the tree o f data. These form the smallest branches o f the seven main branches of 
the themes identified via data analysis. Therefore the qualitative data generated was been 
subjected to a thematic analysis which resulted in a complete ‘tree o f information’ in which 
the position o f each main theme, sub theme and ‘issue’ represent the first main branches, 
second branches and the final smaller branches. Understanding the effectiveness o f the 
Boards as perceived by the participants has shaped the tree o f the data. The researcher 
believes that the traditional approach which only endeavors the identification o f the main
themes may not present the fullness of the thematic analysis as it has been carried out here in 
this study.
Further analysis of the data in each Theme category led to the identification sub theme 
categories and eventually to the emergence of the issues (N= 157). The key to understanding 
the effectiveness of the members and the Board is within the issues identified. Certainly the 
emerged issues indicate that effectiveness at Board level is influenced by the nature of the 
organization, individuals’ characteristics involved, dynamics of the Board, processes 
involved, individual perceptions, core capabilities, and most importantly the external 
influences such as culture. These influences to varying degrees contribute to the 
effectiveness of the Board Directors and the effectiveness of the Board as the whole. As 
shown in the previous chapter factors (See Chapter Six) such as socio cultural, in particular 
Islam, on the behavior of the members, the dynamics of interactions, operations of the PSBs; 
the required core capabilities, roles and function have huge implication for the way PSBs are 
performing.
Certainly the findings of the present study have gone beyond answering the original questions 
asked and therefore all the objectives have been realized. The findings elaborated in form of 
issues have shown that for example, it would be simplistic to assume that the core capabilities 
required by the Board members are the only factor for the improved performance of the 
Directors and the Board as the whole. Rather they should be considered as one of the 
influential ones. It would be a folly to imagine that capable Directors can make substantial 
contribution to the Board performance without considering the contexts (mechanism and 
structure) and its influences on their behavior. In some ways, as shown earlier, even 
improving the core capabilities of the members may not be the solution for their increased 
performance rather it is the social meanings which allows the participants see a particular role 
in a different light. The importance which is culturally given to the chairperson goes beyond
his skills and capabilities in managing the Board. Chairs are seen as ‘Father’ figures, 
‘protectors’, and the one whose opinion traditionally should be respected and followed. The 
public sector as a system recognized the importance o f the Chairperson, CEO, ED and Non- 
ED in accordance to the role advocated to their position on the Board. However, even the 
description o f the role comes with related social status which governs the relationships both 
in on the Board and o ff the Board situations. It is apt to quote from a Director who said “You 
can’t mess with the chair and you shouldn’t”. He went on to say “you shouldn’t because you 
will be challenging our tradition, way life, and the values that we have respected for a long 
time. . Let’s not forget these values and beliefs provide the social sanctions to control his 
behavior on the Board”. The present study forms the first study o f PSBs in Abu Dhabi which 
effectively contextualizes the principles o f the corporate governance. The implications o f its 
findings for theory and practice are ample and they even go beyond the scope o f the study 
itself.
7.3 CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY AND PRACTICE
The present research has extended the scope o f our present understanding o f the effectiveness 
of the PSBs Boards, behavior o f  the Board members in particular and the understanding of 
the corporate governance in general. There are three broad groups o f contributions that the 
present research has made to the development o f the theoretical aspects o f the corporate 
governance. First, the findings o f the research have enabled a better understanding o f the 
PSBs and their operations on their Boards. Interestingly, it was found that the mechanism and 
operations o f the PSBs are not so different from the Boards o f the private sector companies. 
The findings clearly showed that in the developing world like Abu Dhabi, the public sector 
plays an important role towards the development o f the economy; therefore, the Boards play
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a significant role towards ensuring the success of the operations on the Board. However, 
against this backdrop, the study clearly showed that public sector Boards lack the 
competencies and skills needed to optimize their operations. Whilst most members were 
highly qualified, the members lack the experience needed to effectively contribute to the 
Boards’ operations. Whilst previous experience of the members to a large degree seems to 
compensate for the lack of relevant skills and competences, the findings of the study clearly 
indicated to the need for core competencies on the part of the members. In that sense o f the 
word, the present study contributed to the existing body of knowledge concerning the need on 
the part of the members for training and development. Few research projects have looked at 
the capability of the members as decisive factors which contributes to the success/failure of 
the Boards. None has clearly identified the core competencies required for the increased 
effectiveness of the Directors and the Boards in context of public sector organizations. 
Therefore one of the major implications of the findings is that members of the PSBs’ Board 
require core competencies which could be gained prior to joining the Board and during the 
operations of the life of the Board. This has major implications for the policy and procedures 
governing the selection and training of the Board members. It is not beyond the realm of 
reality that this major finding could have implications for other public sector Boards and 
indeed, the private sector within developing countries.
The second major contribution of the present study relates to the role of members on the 
Boards. A great deal has been written on the contribution of the Chair person and the role of 
the CEO on the outcome of the decisions of the Boards. However, what has been identified 
here is a special relationship between the Chairperson and the CEO on the PSBs in Abu 
Dhabi. These interesting findings add to our knowledge of the Chairs behavior in negotiating 
the reality through relationship with the CEOs. As it was shown the Chairs success in running 
the Boards operations and getting the desired result to a large extent has been determined by
the nature o f the relationship with the CEO. The findings show for the first time that the 
influence o f the Chairperson becomes clear in the way the Agenda for the Board meeting has 
been negotiated, al be it, in a very subtle and complex way with the CEO. From then on the 
Boards operations are controlled by the symbiotic relationship between the two agents. An 
amicable relationship between the two parties will ensure smooth running o f the affairs o f the 
Board. Whilst this finding constitutes a major contribution to the theory and practices in 
terms o f understanding the power role and influence o f the chair on the PSBs, the other 
related findings highlight the importance o f this contribution as being even more important 
when it is recognized that cultural values provide the basis for legitimacy o f  the power for the 
chairperson on the Board. This has major implications for the selection and training o f the 
Chairperson for the Boards in the public sector organization. In the context o f  Abu Dhabi’s 
public sector, traditional and religious value systems add importance and legitimacy to the
role o f the Chairperson.
The third and probably the most significant contribution o f the present study to the theory is 
that the research has contextualized the corporate governance principles in Abu Dhabi. This 
first time study highlights the reality o f the PSBs as they are and not in a prescriptive sense of 
the word. It has shown clearly that the operations o f the Boards to a large extent are 
influenced by the context. Not so much the organizational context rather by the influences of 
the wider socio-economic and cultural context. Indeed, the simplest but the most important 
findings relate to the direct and indirect influences o f the Islamic values which govern the life 
and the behavior o f  the members on and off the Board. These forces cannot be ignored. The 
dynamics o f the Boards, behavior and contribution o f  the members, to a large extent, have 
been influenced and even determined by these subtle forces. The implication for the theory is 
a simple but an important one: Board members’ behavior and conduct has to be understood in 
the wider socio-cultural context. The values such as seniority, loyalty, respect and the most
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important of all ‘trust’ play a crucial role in the Board processes and outcome. The 
effectiveness of the Boards and individual members is determined by the interplay of the 
rules and socio-cultural values which are held dearly by the members.
On the whole, the findings of the present study have several implications for the theory and 
practice of the PSBs in developing countries. Also, the researcher intends to publish the 
results of the study to highlight the importance of the Boards and make a contribution to the 
knowledge.
7.4 LIMITATION OF STUDY AND FUTURE RESEARCH
There are several limitations for the present work. The study was limited by the resources 
available to the researcher. Of those resources probably the time has been a major factor. A 
major study of the grounded theory kind may need years of working and learning the culture 
of the PSBs, individual members, observing the behavior of the different Board members on 
and off the Board and more importantly participating in various organizational Boards. 
However, the position of the researcher as a Board member and a citizen of Abu Dhabi and 
his familiarity with the public sector to large extent did compensate for the above limitations. 
The researcher intends to continue with the above research in future to add more to our 
present knowledge of the PSBs and their operations.
The second limitation was the feasibility of conducting interviews in a large number of 
Boards. Having said that, should the researcher have had more time and financial resources 
he would have provided a comparative study of many Boards including both the private and 
public sectors. However, the limitation of time and resources means that this challenge 
should form an item for future studies.
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Certainly, the findings o f research suggest that the role o f the Chairperson and dynamics o f  
the relationship between the Chair and CEO, and the Chairperson and the other Directors
including non-executive Directors requires future research.
The present study has identified a number o f ‘issues’ which each could form the basis for 
future empirical research
There is no doubt that understanding the factors that have contributed to the effectiveness o f  
the members and the Boards o f the public sector in Abu Dhabi have created the basis for 
better understanding o f the Boards and simultaneously has given rise to many intriguing 
issues for future empirical work.
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Table 5.4: Brief profile o f the organizations “A”, “B”, “C”, and “D”
Organization 1: A
* * * * * * *  * * / / y / / / / * / y
v \ \ V Abu Dhabi Ports Company (A) was given control and regulatory enforcement power over all commercial ports assets previously owned by the Abu Dhabi SeaportsAuthority (ADSA).
/ / / / / / // / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / .  
*  0  0  0  0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0 0  0  /  0  *
A Company is a leader in the development of world class ports and industrial zones.
A Company is a master developer and regulator of ports and industrial zones. Its objective is to act as an enabler for development and trade and facilitate the diversification of the national economy. In doing so, it will provide its customers and stakeholders with the highest levels of service in a responsive and transparentmanner.
Company A is given the responsibility to develop Khalifa Port and Industrial Zone (KPIZ) in order to drive economic expansion and diversification for the region. KPIZ is positioned between the Middle East and Asia and strategically located midway between Abu Dhabi and Dubai. KPIZ will be a mega-scale industrial zone and multi-purpose port with special zones dedicated to industrial, logistics, commercial, educational and residential facilities. This world-class project will be linked by a national freight and rail line, highway systems and utility distributionnetworks.
>*Y/**V*Y*Y*VS/j <//* V // .'
2. Short description including history of the Company.
y / . y , v / . V / / / / A •  « v
'///Vs/''////////A'fa
'* * * / * * *  * / * * * / / / S s s *  * * * * * * * *
» » » » * / A W
\ \ \ V
W W i
w
•x^
M M Q Q i
•  /  f  *  *  •  0i  •  * 0 0 0 %  0 0  0 0 M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0  0  0  s w 0  0  f  ^¥ S A / / S / A / & S / / / / S / 'y * /y / ' / / s / y / s 0 y / s sv********/**y**********^**************** v y y > v V / / |*************** a******* ***********
v / . . V |f********************
'V V '  ‘.V s
• » v . \ y
\ v
A \ ’i
Government of
i \ V
A * . 1 W
Dhabi, established
A*..
******V .V / | ***i3. Organization Structure
. v  ' . w
'/ S / s / y S o * * *  / * / • '* * / * .* * /  /*//////*/////*
f  *  0  0 0  >  0 0 .*********** '***//**/ **
{**/** '/ / / > V /, V /
The Board of Directors is the highest governing authority within Abu Dhabi Ports Company (A). The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) reports to and acts as Advisor to the Board. Company A Senior Management comprising Executive Vice President
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and Vice President level designations report to the CEO.
Company A organization structure comprises Business Units, Support/Functional 
Units and Divisions.
Business Units
Ports Unit, comprising:
Regulations, Compliance and HSE Division Planning & Commercial Development DivisionTechnical Services Division Operations Division
Industrial Zones Unit, comprising:
Regulations, Compliance and HSE Division Planning & Commercial Development Division Technical Services Division Operations Division
Support Units
- Projects, comprising:
o Major Projects 
o Special Projects 
o Engineering and Construction 
o Project Controls and Contracts
Finance, comprising:
o Financial Control Division 
o Treasury & Risk Management Division
Corporate Support, comprising:
o Information Technology Division 
o Corporate Procurement Division 
o HR & Administration Division
- CEO Office- Corporate Communication Division Corporate Planning and Performance Division- Corporate Health, Safety and Environment- Legal CounselInternal Audit and Risk Assurance Division
Board Sub-Committee
APPENDIX 1.
Audit Committee Remuneration Committee
Major Management Committees
Executive Committee (EXCOM)- Executive Operating Committee Strategy CommitteeStrategy Project Management Office Tender Board IT Steering Committee- Business Readiness CommitteeChange Control Board
■ X sw X : K M
V » A V ! V t % V ' ’' V A v l
a « > « * * f » * t * i
••vv
A
kV»'
;-*W^SsWRfc. V . W ' A W W . V . V /•  *  •  •  » • »  •  •  •
•* * v ^ X v » v * v / ^ i V * y
' i W . * v *  ^  » v  •  • • 4 C v K v v > / . V .Objectives.
A \ >
;X ;:
VV\ v . v .The objective of company A is to act as an enabler for development and trade and facilitate the diversification of the national economy. The result will be greater prosperity for Abu Dhabi through increased trade and inbound investment, the enrichment of the Emirate’s knowledge and skills base through the interface with global industrial leaders, and the provision of world class employment opportunities for the Emirates through long term and sustainable economic growth. In a nutshell, by developing transformational industrial zones and managing Abu Dhabi’s ports and maritime facilities, company A is a major driving force behind Abu Dhabi’s increasinelv sustainable and broad-based economic future.
NV
V W A
,V A V
Vision
Be the preferred provider of world-class integrated ports and industrial zone services.
Mission
Fulfill Company A’s role in realization of Abu Dhabi Vision 2030. Develop and maintain long-term relationships with leading local international customers.Achieve sustainable development while supporting community needs preserving local values.Be the employer of choice that attracts and retains high caliber staff. Increase shareholders value and satisfy other stakeholders’ expectations.
Corporate Values
Safety and SecurityDo not compromise on safe and secure operations Integrity and FairnessStrive to the highest ethical standard___________
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Embrace fairness and respect TeamworkEncourage and promote teamwork spiritStakeholder FocusEnsure customer satisfactionPreserve and enhance shareholder valueDynamismPromote responsive, effective and results behaviorBe innovative and technology savvy QualityAchieve highest quality standards Sustainable Development Commit to the community Minimize environmental impactsEnsure long-term economic
•  • •  • •  *%a • •  • • • • ! • * ■ * *  *  •  a• V
•  « • • • • • ■ • • •  •  •  •
*•*•*•*« ^ • * \ * * * * * ^ ^ J ^ .W  . V .
* * * * * *  *#*•*•*•*•*•*•*•*•*•*• • • • • • • • • • * * * * ® ® * *  *©*#*•*•*•
* • • * * . *  .  a f t  % • • • • • •  •  • » •  • •  • •  *  % * *  .  a ft ■ •
i  •  •  • « • jm • • • • • • )« • • • • •  •  % •  •  < •  •  •
»  *  • m 0  m m  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  m 0  0  •  m  0  0  M  0  m  M  0  0  0  P  0,  .  .  m .  V *  *  0 0  0  r  0  0  •  /  / •  /  /  *  •  0  0  0  0  0  0•  9 0  *  0  * 0 0 0  0  0  0  0  •  0  0  •  0  0  0  0  0 0 0  •  /ft f  ft ^ ^  W * f  0  0  0 0 ^ ^  w
y / . :
y /S S / /S / /S / / /S S / /S / / /y / / / /S / / j
•  0  0  0  f  0  •  0  •  0 0  # • • • • • /  /  •  /  ^  ^  y1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0^  ^  *  ft f  0  0 *  0 *  0 *0*  0  0 0 0  r
•  •  •  0  0 W 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  •  0  f  0  0 *  0  0 0  0  0  0  0
5. Mandates
/ / -
y / / f t
y w / ^ A V A ' f t
,N  .ADPC rn^date>d by the Emiri Decree No. 6 of 2006 is to own, run and operate aU the non Military and Oil ports in the Emirate o f Abu Dhabi. And own KhalifIndustrial Zone, as per the Decree
Organization 2: B
6. Brief History of Company B
M  M  » W  ■ I I  I  M  I  I  I  I I  M  I  .  M  I T  ■ f  ■ I ' l  !  I I  H I  I  I ' l  I  I  . H i M . i m f w f w w w T T m w w F m r m f f w r w w m f T
Fund (company B) was established in 2007 based on Law No. 14 o f 2005 for the Emirate of Abu Dhabi to support and develop Small and Medium Enterprises.Theamended
name dirham
On 7 March 2011, the Executive Council of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi issued
419
APPENDIX 1.
A \ \ \ \
A
n ' N < ' S \ n \ s \ v .
\ \ \ W
W \sssss
W A V
2v v \ v v
________ ______ basedby AED 1,000,000,000, payable by the Government of Abu Dhabi.
B Fund was established as an independent agency of the Government of Abu Dhabi, to cultivate UAE National entrepreneurship and promote the development of small and medium enterprises (SME) in Abu Dhabi. Its vision is aligned to the Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030 to create a diversified economy and achieve sustainablegrowth.
Ras A1 Khaimah, A1 Ain,Region, in addition to the Head Office in Abu Dhabi
SJC
.W W W v V v V
A N V v N V V . V ,  A * . . V / / .
. \ V A V
A V / . V .  A '  
A \ \ V c W
7. Organization Structure.
A V
A>^
a s
AVV
A V A V, \ \ \ V VNNV A V
v V » W
V A '
SB
v * v
.................. ............# f  ^The Board of Directors is the highest governing authority within B Fund for Enterprise Development. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) reports to the Board. B Fund Senior Management comprising Chief Operations Officer (COO) and Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) report to the CEO.
B Fund organization structure comprises of core operations departments and support functions/departments in addition to corporate functions.
Core Qperations/Functions (Reporting to COO):
1- Entrepreneurship Development Department2- Enterprise Development and Support Department3- Credit Department4- Training Department
Support Denartments/Functions (Reporting to CAO)
1 - Human Resources Department2- Information technology Department3- Finance Department
Corporate Functions (Direct Reporting to CEO) Comprising:
1 - Strategy Department2- Quality Department3- Legal Advisor4- Risk Management5- Incubator Department______________________________
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Advisor to CEO 
Direct Investment Department 
Corporate Communication anc 
Chief Information Security Of
independent Functions (Reporting to Board of Directors
Internal Audit and Risk Assurance Department
B Fund organization structure attached
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•  /  0 *  0 * 9 9  0  4 *  0  *
r +  V / . V / / / / / / A
Vision
To lead entrepreneurship development and facilitate growth of competitive
SMEs
Mission
To fuel an entrepreneurial culture, drive innovation and sustainable growth
SMEs
UAE
SME
A W  . . \ W . * . * . *
v / . v . v . v . w /
\*X*X<#&v
Mandates
V .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  *•* *•*•*•* •  4 *  9  0 9  9 9W . W . W
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Mandated by Law. 14 of 2005 amended by Law 13 of 2009 to look into 
entrepreneurship development and facilitate growth of competitive SMEs in AD.
0 0 0 0 m y . \ v « • A V . N ' . W . '
V * v
A*
.V,*
Brief history of Corporate Governance within the B Fund organization
Corporate Values
Customer Service: B Fund will meet in every reasonable way our 
customers’, partners and stakeholders’ requirements and expectations 
Leadership: B Fund will strive to be visionary and mission-oriented, and to 
be the leading one-stop agency in the provision and delivery of
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entrepreneurship development initiatives and programs
3- Employees development: B Fund will develop, train and support a quality 
and dedicated pool of staff, treating them with respect, and empowering them 
to achieve work and service excellence
4- Integrity: B Fund will apply the highest standards of governance -  legally, 
ethically, morally -  in our work and service, remain transparent and
accountable to our stakeholders and those we serve
5- Operational Excellence: B Fund will constantly review our procedures and 
processes, diligently pursue improvements in every facet of our service, so 
as to be effective and operate at high efficiency levels with the available
resources at our disposal
6- Teamwork: B Fund value teamwork and will strive to establish lasting 
collaborations with stakeholders and partners through fair dealing and 
effective communication for our mutual benefits
7- Corporate Social Responsibility: B Fund will promote the vitality, enterprise 
and well-being of the communities in which we serve so as to contribute to 
the wellbeing and growth of the society.
10. Board structure and membership
Board of Directors:
The Board of Directors comprises seven members appointed by the Executive 
Council, the current composition of the Board of Directors is as follows:
No.
Chairman of the Board of One 
Directors
Vice Chairman One
Board Members Five
Board Executive Committee:
Chairman One
Members Three
Audit Committee:
APPENDIX 1.
Chairman
Member
Independent Member 
None Executive Member
One
One
One
One
/ /
w m
/ . V
7 * Organization specific regulation for the Board establishment, membership and
operator.
1- Board Establishment and Membershi
Law 14 of 2005 amended
Chairman and Board Members’ Appointment:
Chairman of the Executive Council’s Resolution. 46 of 2006, Resolution. 54 
of 2006 and Resolution. 85 of 2009.
3- Mandates for Board of Directors and Board Committees’ Operation:
Board Charter
Audit Committee Charter
Board Executive Committee Charter
4- Major Committees:
Management Committee. 
Management Credit Committee. 
Investment Committee. 
Procurement Committee.
i l
% S V .V * N \
S '* XvXvw CSSs\% v v •  >N V
V i N  >  «  \  »  * \ \ \
' . x . \
ft % ft ft ft ft ft \  \  \  ft ft. \  ft
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100% government ownership 
Public Sector
X S v o X y v ?  
A \  \ \ W \ \ \ 9 w  V «
s v
v \ \ v
TO ? A
v SXy X w a  \ v  > X  \  \ \ \ \ \ v X \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
& v
v ! * .
/ / /
iVvV
1- The Board of Directors meets on a quarterly basis.
2- The Audit Committee meets on a quarterly basis.
3- The Board Executive Committee meets at the request of the Committee 
Chairman.
Organization 3: C
11. Brief History of Company C.
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Listed on the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX), Bank C is an integral 
systemic bank of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) providing a full range of products 
and services to the UAE market. Bank C is the largest bank in Abu Dhabi and the 
second largest bank in the UAE in terms of assets.
Bank C is one of the primary banks to the Abu Dhabi government and public sector 
companies. The Abu Dhabi government owns 70.5% of Bank’s C shares through its 
investment arm, the Abu Dhabi Investment Council (ADIC).
It is the most internationally diversified bank among the UAE banks with offices in
Egypt, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Sudan and Jordan in the MENA region,
Hong Kong in the Far East, London, Paris, and Geneva in Europe and Washington
D.C. in the USA. Its largest external market is Egypt where it operates as a full
service bank with 28 branches and cash offices. In Oman, the bank has eight
branches and cash offices providing a comprehensive range of services throughout 
the Sultanate.
Since its inception in 1968, Bank C diversified earnings base has delivered a strong 
track record. This has been achieved through organic growth. The Group is 
differentiated by its strong franchise, skilled employees and long-serving 
management. Bank C employs 4,216 people in the UAE and 1.097 at its
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international operations worldwide.
As at 31 December 2010, the Bank’s:
• Assets were AED 211.4bn (USD 57.6bn)
• Loans and advances to customers were AED 136.8bn (USD 37.3bn)
• Customer deposits were AED 123. lbn (USD 33.5bn)
• Capital resources, enhanced by AED 5.6 billion conversion of UAE Ministry of 
Finance deposits to Tier 11 capital in February 2010, were AED 32.4 billion (USD
8.8bn)
• The Bank's Basel-11 capital adequacy ratio was 22.6% (Tier-1 at 16.2%)
12. Organization Structure.
The CEO has responsibility for the day to day 
management of NBAD including:
Implementation of decisions of the Board and strategy determined by the Board.
Managing the business of Bank C in accordance with strategy approved by the 
Board.
Managing systems of risk management and control.
Managing delivery of targets set by the Board.
Chairing the Executive Committee and Management Committee.
Bank C organization structure is based on Matrix form.
Vision
To be recognized as the World's Best Arab Bank
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Mission
To provide our customers with exceptional service by creating products and 
delivering services of enduring value to help our customers grow
Corporate Values
Value our stakeholders
%
Accessible to our customers 24 x 7 
Loyal to our heritage and global in our outlook 
Understand our customers' needs
Recognize that people are our single biggest asset and empower them 
Teamwork
Deal with others as we would like them to deal with us
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Customer Pledge
Our Corporate Sustainability and Responsibility Policy Investing in our future. We 
are committed to doing business in a responsible way by dealing with our customers, 
investors and other stakeholders honestly and fairly, by valuing our employees, by 
being accessible and responsive to the communities where we do business and 
through careful environmental stewardship.
14. Brief history of Corporate Governance within the Bank C organization
Bank C is committed to implementing corporate governance practices to a standard 
derived from an amalgam of UAE guidelines and international best practice, 
applied in the context of NBAD. In this respect Bank C welcomed the 
additional guidelines issued during 2010 by a Steering Group on Corporate
APPENDIX 1.
C o m m ittee  on  B ank ing
G o v ern an ce  S tan d ard s  fo r
recognizes
banks
Bank
Bank
framework
initiated during zuiu an cva.ua«v« - .......... ... ~
evaluation will be reflected in further corporate governance improvements and 
enhancement which Bank C will adopt during 2011 and 2012.
Bank C has been continuously improving its corporate governance year on year
improvement in 
globally.
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commitment to continuous corporate governance 
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15. Board structure and membership
H o
Chair
Deputy Chairman 
Board Members
One
One
Seven
Board Committees:
The Board has four Board Committees to which it has delegated responsibilities 
as set out in the terms of reference of each Committee. Committee membership is 
shown above. The Board ensures that directors with appropriate skills are aligned to 
the tasks and responsibilities of each Board Committee Each Committee has the 
appropriate balance of skills, experience, independence and knowledge to enable the 
Committee to properly discharge its duties and responsibilities. The Committees
and their primary activities are:
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Audit Committee
Responsible for overseeing the integrity of the financial statements, preparation of 
the consolidated accounts including changes to accounting policies and practices 
and adherence to disclosure rules, overseeing relationship with external auditor, 
overseeing internal audit, ensuring adequacy of financial controls, internal 
control and risk management frameworks and oversight of Bank C’s values 
and ethics The Audit Committee met 14 times in 2010.
Compensation and Nomination Committee
Oversees compensation, succession planning and appointments of senior 
management as well as overseeing HR policies for Bank C as a whole. The 
committee met 5 times in 2010.
Corporate Governance Committee
Makes recommendations to the Board on appropriate corporate goveman 
and practices. The Corporate Governance Committee met 3 times in 2010.
Risk Management Committee
Sets and monitors the Group's risk strategy and policy guidelines, sets and 
monitors the Group's credit, operational and market risks and approves credits 
above management's delegated authorities. The Risk Management Committee met
13 times in 2010.
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7. Organization specific regulation for the Board establishment, membership and
operator.
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Bank C Governed by the Board of Directors (BOD), the BOD members 
appointed by H.H the Crown Prince of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi for a period of 3 
years renewable, the BOD Developed Board Charter which specify the role and 
responsibilities of each BOD members the CEO and the Sub-Committees, the BOD 
delegate the running of the day to day business to management through the 
Delegation of Authority Matrix, and also ADPC developed number of important 
documents such as Corporate Governance Manual, Code of Business Conduct,
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The Chairman, aided by the CEO, strives to ensure that the Board is well informed 
about Bank C’s business, policies and material issues including all matenal
developments.
Chairman,
Bank
material issues including all material developments.
The Board met regularly throughout 2010, holding 5 meetings. The Board papers
___________  •  «  4
information
Organization 4: D
16. Brief History of Company D
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East, providing its customers with quality drilling, work over??? and well 
maintenance services. Established in 1972, Drilling Company D was the first
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fleet of ten of offshore and onshore drilling rigs, a Multi-Purpose Service Vessel, as 
well as five water well rigs surveying the ground water of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. 
Drilling D take pride in our record of providing safe, healthy working conditions 
while protecting the environment and safeguarding assets.
Since 1973, National Drilling Company D completed the drilling of more than 4,000 
onshore and offshore wells with a total depth of more than 21.5 million feet. This 
exceeds the diameter of the globe of 20.9 Million feet.
In order to cope with the increasing demand for oil throughout the world, Drilling 
Company D has strengthened its capabilities by acquiring new technologies and 
adding more rigs to its fleet all equipped with ultramodern technologies. The 
company plans to increase its number of rigs, and to enhance its existing fleet by 
following a major enhancement program.
In addition to that, the company has been actively supported by the operational 
companies and successfully pre-qualified itself for a number of significant services 
such as directional drilling, drilling system and wire line services. Drilling Company 
D’s role in the petroleum development of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi is widely 
accepted and recognized. It is one of the largest drilling contractors in the region and 
undoubtedly one of the leading in the UAE drilling industry.
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2. Corporate Values
1. Health and Safety Commitment - Focus and commitment towards no harm to 
people, assets or environment.
2. Customer Focus - Meet and exceed customer expectations
3. Leadership - Ability to lead, guide, inspire, direct and influence the performance 
of group members towards the achievement of goals, irrespective of level or 
position.
4. Teamwork - Cooperate and strive together for common goals, using individual 
skills, effective communication, transparency, trust and mutual respect.
5. Ownership - Demonstrate job commitment by taking keen interest, responsibility 
and accountability for all tasks, like one's own.
6. Empowerment - Decentralize decision making and implementing at different 
levels by delegating as per approved authorities.
APPENDIX 1.
7 Professionalism - Adherence to standards, values, and responsibilities in our 
L lm g s  with customers and associates, passionately behe.tng m what we do and
always striving for excellence.
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4. Brief services provided:
Drilling Company D offers efficient drilling and well maintenance services to clients 
at competitive rates, paying special care to protect both, the surrounding 
environment as well as the health and safety of employees.
Research
Logging
Services.
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5. Board structure and membership
Chairman
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One
Deputy Chair One
Board Members Six
Total Seven
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The Company is managed by a Board of Directors comprising seven (7) members 
including the Chairman, his Deputy and the General Manager.
virtue
a Resolution passed by the Supreme Petroleum Council or who represents it. Term 
of office in the Board shall be three (3) years and may be renewed. The Chairman, 
his Deputy and the Board Members remuneration shall be fixed by a Resolution 
passed by the Supreme Petroleum Council or who represents it.
A Board Member may be removed or replaced at any time.
Resolution passed by the Supreme Petroleum Council or who represents it 
Vacancies in the Board of Directors result due to resignation, removal or death o: 
any Member shall be filled by a Resolution passed by the Supreme Petroleun 
Councilor or who represents it.
Regardless o f any vacancy in the Board of Directors, the remaining Members ma> 
continue their activities provided that a quorum is complete to hold a Board meeting
The Supreme Petroleum Council or who represents it shall appoint a General 
Manager of the Company and define his remuneration. The General Manager shall 
be responsible before the Board of Directors for implementation of the Board 
Resolutions and shall conduct the Company's business and defend its rights and 
interests in accordance with its law of incorporation. Articles of Association and 
Board Resolutions. He may also exercise all authorities delegated to him by the 
Board of Directors.
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Jl Ownership structure / stakeholders
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Drilling Company D was established as a national shareholding company subject to 
applicable laws in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.
owned
ADNOC\ As the sole shareholder, ADNOC
General
exceeding
UAE
necessary action shall be taken to amend law No 4 of 1981 in conformity
ownership
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8. Board meetings and durations
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The Board of Directors shall meet twice a year in the Company’ s Head Office or at 
any other venue inside or outside Abu Dhabi Emirate as may specified by the Board 
The Board shall also hold an exceptional meeting upon a request by the Chairman of 
Board of Directors, minimum two Board Members or the General Manager plus one 
Board Member. The Board meetings shall be Chaired by the Chairman of the Board
The quorum shall not be complete unless a Board meeting is attended by four (4) 
Members including the Chairman or his Deputy. The Board Resolutions shall be
equal,
Chairman shall have the casting vote.
The invitation to a Board meeting shall include the invitation to contnbute to the 
agenda items. Usually the member is advised of the meetings at his residence or his 
or her office address about the dates of the meetings.
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In the following cases, Resolutions passed by the Board of Directors shall not be 
valid unless approved by the Supreme Petroleum Council or who represents i t :
1- Changing the Company’s name or moving its place within the United Arab 
Emirates.
2- Shorten or extend the Company's life.
3- Dissolution of the Company or its merger with another company, corporation or 
institutions.
4- Resolutions to participate in companies, corporations or institutions carrying 
out activities similar to those of the Company or which could assist the Company 
in the achievement of its objectives.
5- Increase or decrease the Company's share capital.
The Board deliberations and Resolutions shall be recorded in meeting minutes to be 
maintained in a special register signed by the Chairman and the Secretary of the 
Board. Such minutes shall include names of Members who attended the meeting and 
those who were absent. Should a Member have an objection, he/she may ask to have 
his viewpoint included in the minutes. Minutes of meetings shall be distributed to 
the Board Members.
The Board may act on any allowed business without holding meetings in the 
following manner:
1- In cases of urgency, the Members may participate in deliberations by telephone 
conference or by any similar communication means. Such participation shall be 
deemed as personal attendance at a meeting provided that the actions taken are 
recorded in writing.
2- The Members may also participate in Board deliberations without holding a 
meeting for example by telex or fax to pass a written signed Resolution by majority 
of votes provided the quorum is complete. The Resolutions so passed shall be
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